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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines key works of René Girard (both his earlier literary criticism and 
his later cultural anthropology) and of Charles Taylor (both his philosophical history 
and his philosophical anthropology). Both thinkers see the loss of traditional 
frameworks grounded in religious worldviews as precipitating a crisis of order in the 
modem period. Girard's diagnosis of this loss of order stems from his analysis of 
desire as mimetic, an analysis that leads him to argue that scapegoating and sacrifice 
are essential to the creation of cultural stability and are no longer available today 
either to individuals or communities. I shall claim that this analysis of desire 
thoroughly -  and, even on Girard’s own terms, problematically - debunks 
subjectivity and undermines the possibility of any coherent ethical agency. And I 
shall then go on to argue that Taylor’s philosophy, while taking due cognizance of 
the crisis of order so acutely identified by Girard, allows us to meet it with a robust 
and nuanced account of subjectivity and ethical agency - an account that allows us to 
reject Girard’s apocalyptic forebodings and to imagine that ‘hope and history 
rhyme’.
Introduction
1
Why write a dissertation on the work of René Girard and Charles Taylor? The reason 
for placing these contemporary thinkers in conversation is not immediately evident 
since both occupy quite distinct realms of discourse. Girard is a literary critic and 
cultural anthropologist, while Taylor is much more firmly rooted in academic 
philosophy. Indeed the question arises as to whether such different figures share 
enough of a common language to have a fruitful dialogue. It is not easy to see how a 
preoccupation with scapegoating and sacrifice through the critical lens of literary and 
cultural theory (Girard), and a practical approach to philosophy and articulating the 
sources of the modem identity (Taylor), can be brought together in a coherent and 
purposeful engagement. Surely there is just too much clarification needed before 
either side can address any substantive content?
Yet while Girard nowhere refers to Taylor’s work in any direct way, Taylor 
on more than one occasion refers to Girard’s work with admiration and genuine 
sympathy, although not with complete agreement. Moreover, both thinkers share an 
interest in, and concern for, the continued relevance of religion and transcendence in 
exploring some of the most pressing issues of our time -  issues that might well make 
a sober observer of the contemporary world fear for the future. And, importantly, 
they both take seriously the significance of the Christian revelation in helping us to 
understand our predicament as historical subjects existing in community, and more 
broadly in a web of social and cultural relations. But, before we can properly grasp 
the connections that may make them an exciting, if not urgent, match it is perhaps 
worth saying something about each of their varied careers and then explaining how I
first came to find them so appealing -  each in himself and as a potential dialogue 
partner with the other.1
Girard’s early historical work seems remote from his later concerns, which involve a 
pursuit of what might be called a ‘grand unified theory’2. The beginning of Girard’s 
interest in broader social and cultural questions is often identified with his time 
preparing for and teaching a course on French Literature at The University of 
Indiana. This was the first of several posts that he held after completing his doctoral 
work: others were at Johns Hopkins University (where he Chaired the Department of 
Romance Languages 1965 -  1968), The State University of New York at Buffalo, 
where he was appointed in 1971, and where he stayed until he accepted his final post 
as Andrew B. Hammond Professor of French Languages, Literature, and Civilisation 
at Stanford University in 1981.
In 1966, while still at Johns Hopkins University, Girard helped organise a 
conference which was to have significant impact on the emergence of critical theory 
in the United States. Entitled The Languages o f Criticism and the Sciences o f Man, 
this conference included papers by Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Roland 
Barthes, among other (mainly French) Continental thinkers, whose attacks on 
prevailing theories of consciousness formed the driving force of a new post­
structuralist criticism. In was also during his time at Johns Hopkins that Girard wrote 
his first two books: Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque (1961), and 
Dostoïevski: du double à l ’unité (1963). In these works of criticism he first began to
1 In a private conversation in St Paul’s University, Ottawa, June 2006, Girard acknowledged the 
plausibility of his and Taylor’s similarity in describing certain aspects o f the modem period, and, 
when pressed further on this similarity, encouraged me to explore it.
2 Girard was bom in Avignon in the south of France in 1923. He received his baccalaureate at the 
Lycée of Avignon in 1941 and attended the Ecole des Chartes in Paris from 1943 to 1947, graduating 
with a degree in medieval studies. He travelled to the United States the same year where he enrolled 
as a PhD student of history at Indiana University, graduating in 1950, with a dissertation entitled 
American Opinion of France, 1940-1943. He has remained living and working in the United States 
ever since.
develop his key idea of imitation and to articulate a theory of desire through a 
detailed reading of literary texts.3
In 1972, while at SUNYB, he wrote Violence and the Sacred, which 
represents the first substantial stage of his exploration of the ramifications of his 
theory of mimetic desire in relation to anthropological thought. Developing the 
theory that imitation leads to rivalry and conflict, Girard posited that the origins of 
cultural order and stability reside in repeated acts of violence against a victim, who in 
effect becomes a scapegoat for the community, and thereby a vessel for its own 
destructive energies and hence, in a peculiar way, ‘salvific’. This hypothesis was 
further expounded in his subsequent publications, Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation o f the World (1978), The Scapegoat (1982), and A Theatre o f Envy 
(1991), among other books and articles4. These works elaborate Girard’s sustained 
reflections not only on the role of violence in cultural formation but on the central 
place of the Judeo-Christian scriptures in unveiling, critiquing and repudiating this 
violence. Human beings can overcome violence only by confronting their mimetic 
desires, and renouncing all claims to originality -  ‘the dearest of all their illusions’.
The ‘Colloquium on Violence and Religion’ was set up in 1990 to promote 
Girard’s central ideas concerning the role of violence in culture and society and to 
encourage dialogue and scholarship in the budding field of ‘mimetic theory’. Since
3 The main authors that Girard examines when he first posits a theory of imitative desire, are: 
Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Proust and Dostoyevsky. Although he has lived for over 30 years in the 
U.S.A. Girard continues to write in French. Nonetheless almost all o f his works have been translated 
and are available in English.
4 In addition to the works already mentioned, and not including his many articles, interviews and 
reviews, Girard’s other books are: Critique dans un souterrain (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1976);
To double business bound: Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropology (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978); Job, the Victim o f His People, trans., Y. Freccero (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1987); Quand ces choses commenceront... Entretiens avec Michel Treguer 
(Paris: arléa, 1994); The Girard Reader, éd., James G. Williams. (New York: The Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 1996); I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans., J. G. Williams. (Maryknoll: Orbis 
Books, 2001); Celui p ar qui le scandale arrive (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2001); La voix méconnue 
du réel. Une théorie des mythes archaïques et modernes. Traduit de l ’anglais par B. Formentelli 
(Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2002); Oedipus Unbound: Selected Writings on Rivalry and Desire, ed. Mark 
R. Anspach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
then the conference has met bi-annually. The journal Contagion, subtitled Journal o f 
Violence, Culture and Religion, was also launched in 1990 with the inauguration of 
the new Colloquium helping Girard’s theory to reach a wider audience. Girard is 
considered by many to be one of the most original and influential cultural theorists 
on the contemporary scene.5 Yet, however much my own analysis of his work may 
attempt to ‘make him more philosophical’, he is not strictly speaking a philosopher.
And so it should be stressed that his literary and cultural theory cannot be properly
£
understood simply through an elucidation of central concepts.
When we consider the course of his long career two phases stand out as 
significant. The first comprises his work in literary criticism and the second his work 
in cultural anthropology. The former phase provides an analysis of the intra- and 
inter- subjective dynamics at work in and between the characters in the various 
novels that he treats. Essentially it is a theory of how the novel emerges as a 
powerful existential force in the modem period, the profound insights of which 
subvert all idealist philosophies. The latter phase sets out in a more scientific vein to 
make the case that human culture has evolved from its origins in collective violence, 
and that the order and stability of cultural forms depend on a continuous re­
enactment that attempts to harness the efficacy of an original murder -  an event that 
is always shrouded in misapprehension. The first phase of Girard’s career then is 
characterised by a preoccupation with ‘self and other’, while the second phase is 
characterised by a preoccupation with the role of the collective in generating order;
5 He has been the recipient of a number of honorary doctorates and been awarded the Prix de 
l’Académie Française for Violence and the Sacred, and more recently has had the French Academy’s 
Grand Prix du Philosophie bestowed upon him “in recognition of his position as one of the 
outstanding philosophical anthropologists of his generation.” Chris Renting, Girard: Violence and 
Mimesis, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
6 As Heming asserts in relation to his own work on Girardian theory: ‘The abstract movement o f his 
thought cannot be appreciated in the absence of the extremely dense evidence he enlists to bear out his 
claims; Girard does not present, in other words, a theoretical framework that somehow stands by 
itself.” Fleming, Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p.3.
this second preoccupation leads to the articulation of a generative anthropology, 
which Girard then applies in explaining historical development and in particular the 
abiding concerns of the modem world. What these two phases have in common, as 
we shall see, is a method of structural analysis that Girard appropriates from Claude 
Lévi-Strauss.7
Taylor’s career is just as distinguished as Girard’s. Bom in Montreal in 1931 to a 
French-speaking mother and an English-speaking father, he first studied history (like 
Girard) at McGill University from 1952 to 1955, before going on to read philosophy, 
politics and economics at Oxford University, where he remained until he completed 
his doctorate in 1961. His personal narrative is in some respects the reverse to that of 
Girard, who travelled from Europe to North America; but unlike his European 
counterpart, Taylor travelled from a relatively ‘new world’ to a much older world 
where he was not to make a permanent home. His training in analytic philosophy 
provided him with a plain unembellished style of clear and sequenced argumentation. 
But against the Oxford grain Taylor familiarised himself with the phenomenological 
and hermeneutical traditions of Continental Europe, and especially with the works of 
Hegel, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. He resisted the notion of philosophy as a 
specialised discipline separate from the human sciences, a notion that interfered with 
the pursuit of his broad interests and investigations. In this pursuit he sought to 
present a critique of the so-called human sciences, arguing that much in their
7 Although Girard himself is highly critical of structuralism (see The Scapegoat, 1989) his approach to 
texts has inherited a prejudice against the conscious intentional subject that aligns him with this 
tradition. Both Richard Macksey and Chris Fleming maintain that Girard is not a ‘structuralist’: see 
Macksey’s introduction to The Structuralist Controversy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), p. 
xiii, and the introduction to Fleming’s work entitled: Girard: Violence and Mimesis, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2004), p. 3. Granted, if  the main criteria of ‘structuralism’ disavow ‘extra textual claims’, 
then it must be admitted Girard is not a structuralist. However, as I will argue, if the principle criteria 
involve a disavowal of all philosophies of consciousness then Girard maintains the same basic starting 
point as Lévi-Strauss and therefore his work can be considered, at least in the first instance, as 
‘sturcutualist’.
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dominant methodologies systematically excluded what is most specific about human 
beings. His first book, The Explanation o f Behaviour (1964) is as much a work of 
psychology as philosophy especially as manifested in the then dominant behaviourist 
paradigm whose reductionist view of ‘human nature’ it strongly contests. His second 
book, Hegel (1975), considerably broadened the scope of his enquiry to combine 
philosophical interpretation with historical and sociological reflections on the nature 
of modem society. His later magnum opus, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the 
Modem Identity (1989), continues his Hegel-inspired attempt to understand the 
modem epoch through a profoundly historical mode of philosophical reflection; in it 
he provides an analytic framework for thinking about the self -  a philosophical 
anthropology -  before proceeding to explore ideas of selfhood drawn from modem
Q
literature, art and theology, as well as conventional history of philosophy.
While its eclectic nature makes it difficult to classify, Taylor’s work can be 
characterised in light of its practical goal: “ [t]he realisation of vital human goods in 
accordance with the best available interpretation.”9 His practical concern for human 
flourishing and the struggles that this sometimes entails led him to become actively
8 Not including his many articles, interviews and reviews, Taylor’s other books are: The Pattern of 
Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970); Hegel and M odem Society (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979); Social Theory As Practice (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1983); Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985); Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985); The Ethics o f Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); 
Multiculturalism and 'The Politics o f  Recognition', Amy Gutmann, ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992); Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition, Amy Gutmann, ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays in Canadian 
Federalism and Nationalism, Guy Laforest, ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1993); Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995); A 
Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lecture, with responses by William M. Shea, 
Rosemary Luling Haughton, George Marsden, and Jean Bethke Elshtain, James L. Heft, ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Varieties o f  Religion Today: William James Revisited (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2002); M odem Social Imaginaries, Dilip Gaonkar, Jane Kramer, Benjamin 
Lee and Michael Warner, eds. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); A Secular Age 
(Cambridge: Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). This last work, while covering much of 
the ground that Taylor covers in Sources o f  the Self, and therefore being o f relevance to our discussion 
o f Girard, was only released last year, and hence will not be brought within the compass of my 
dissertation -  apart from one significant footnote in chapter four.
9 Smith, Nicholas H., Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity (UK: Polity Press, 2002), p.
11.
involved in politics (on the left) both in Oxford and when he returned to his native 
Canada in 1961. He has been a singularly dialogical thinker, entering wholeheartedly 
into several philosophical and cultural debates. For example he was a key protagonist 
in the debate between ‘liberals’ and ‘communitarians’ that dominated political theory 
throughout the 1970s and 80s. And his essay “Multiculturalism and the ‘Politics of 
Recognition’” (1992) has become a key text in debates about multiculturahsm, 
citizenship and identity. Like Girard, he has received numerous awards for his 
contribution to scholarship. These including the ‘Marianist Award’ for his work in 
helping to understand the impact of Christianity on modem culture -  a theme to 
which his more recent work has been increasingly addressed. The paper that he 
delivered on accepting this award, “A Catholic Modernity?”, has been read widely 
and with great interest. In 2007 he won the prestigious Templeton Prize for his 
contribution to the area of religion and humanities. For my purposes in this 
dissertation, it is noteworthy that, in his acceptance speech for this award, Girard was 
among the very few contemporary thinkers whom he singled out, and whose work he 
acknowledged as important for his own interest in the often-marginalised field of 
religious studies.
Both Taylor’s ‘philosophical anthropology’ and ‘philosophical history’ have 
constructive and therapeutic aspects that differ from Girard’s analysis in at least one 
important respect. Taylor’s persistent concern is not only to unmask the “universalist 
misrepresentation of contingent modes of self-understanding” 10 -  what Girard 
characterises in terms of ‘myth’ -  but also and crucially to identify and release the 
moral sources of human potential that, as he discerns, lie buried deep within the 
modem aspiration toward freedom. One of Taylor’s main contentions -  developed at
10 Smith, Meaning, Morals and Modernity, p. 8.
length in Sources o f the Self and more accessibly in The Ethics o f Authenticity -  is 
that if we are to overcome the malaises that threaten our high standards of human 
worth and fulfilment today we need to retrieve neglected sources of meaning and 
value, and in doing so to understand the present within a horizon of new possibilities. 
This contention, emphasising the importance of self-realisation through an ideal of 
authentic or original selfhood, is precisely what Girard’s mimetic theory 
fundamentally contests.
Having looked briefly at their intellectual biographies, we can perhaps see 
why, taken separately, Girard and Taylor provide ample material for a rich and 
engaging enquiry -  focused on one or the other’s work per se or on its contribution 
to wider cultural and philosophical debates. But as to how they might both be 
brought together within the purview of a single enquiry -  this is still not in relief. My 
own encounter with both of them may help here, and begin to explain why the 
prospect of a meaningful dialogue between two apparently divergent protagonists 
came to seem both possible and desirable.
What first drew me to Girard’s theory was not the work itself, but the person. While 
doing my graduate studies in Berkeley at the Graduate Theological Union in 1998,1 
had the opportunity to hear him speak in a small, quite intimate setting. What 
immediately impressed me was his thoroughly unconventional style of presentation, 
one that was wholly unapologetic about his non-liberal and apparently non­
egalitarian credentials. His stance appeared all the more out of step in a place like 
Berkeley that took pride in the radical nature of its politics. He came across as 
someone who was not afraid to speak his mind against a tide of ‘political 
correctness’ that saw no problem in saying one thing as long as it was the ‘right’
thing, while perhaps feeling and thinking something altogether different. When, 
towards the end of his talk, he replied to an obviously disgruntled member of the 
audience who challenged his dismissive approach to a liberal position on ‘identity 
and equality’, his words were bracingly uncompromising: “You liberals are all the 
sam e...” The shock wave from this blatant ‘transgression’ was felt around the room, 
if not beyond. Girard, as far as I could gather, was challenging the presumption that a 
sense of ‘fairness’ and an appeal to universal respect did not in fact conceal a deep 
resentment -  what he described as ‘weakened vengeance’. Given the right 
circumstance, such weakened vengeance could become contagious, leading to 
violence and bloodshed. And if anyone thought that being a neo-Nietzschean was a 
more honest calling, as many in the audience clearly did, such an ‘aestethizising’ of 
violence, Girard wanted to insist, gravely underestimated its propensity to envelop all 
in its path, or, failing outward contagion, to plunge the individual into psychosis.
Admittedly I had not read anything by Girard when I heard him speak, so I 
had not formed an opinion as to whether his ‘boat could sail’. But I did vow that 
evening, based on what I witnessed, to become acquainted with his work. What was 
so ‘wrong’ with the dominant modem story as to compel him to such combative 
speech? Something in the manner of this elderly French intellectual who ‘didn’t take 
prisoners’, and was obviously not intimidated either by advocates of ‘pluralism’ and 
‘relativism’, or by traditional religious adherents, had stirred me, perhaps from my 
own rather eclectic slumber.
My initial contact with Taylor’s ideas was a very different experience. Where 
Girard had made a lasting first impression, Taylor whom I never actually heard 
speak, captured my imagination gradually. It was some four years before my trip to 
Berkeley, during my second year of undergraduate study that I was introduced to
Taylor’s philosophy while studying Descartes’ Meditations. Sections of Sources o f 
the Self provided the secondary material that was to help students come to terms with 
the revolutionary consequences of the Cogito. In my final year we studied the Ethics 
o f Authenticity and my research project that year involved an analysis of what Taylor 
describes as the ‘boosters and knockers’ of the contemporary culture and the need for 
greater ‘articulacy’ about the moral sources motivating its most admirable projects. 
His diagnosis of modem culture, and his ability to engage with the full range of 
perspectives concerning modem freedom, was impressive and relevant, and his 
analysis seemed at least to this novice to ring true. Here was a thinker whom my 
tutor had referred to as a ‘philosopher’s philosopher’, who seemed to have his finger 
on the pulse of our age. What was more, the way he explained the notion of 
‘uniqueness’ (the singular and particular in human experience), while at the same 
time situating it in a historical context, allowed a reader to feel connected to others 
and the world in a personally meaningful way. This feeling of connection on my part, 
often combined with a contrary impulse to stand apart, was the beginning of what 
became a sustained interest in philosophy and provided the conditions for what was 
to become a more mature engagement with Taylor’s work. If Girard later arrested my 
naïveté, Taylor earlier cultivated my sense of the possible. A tension was becoming 
evident that required further consideration. Could I take resentment and the cultural 
tendency toward violence seriously, as Girard clearly expected his readers to do, and 
still believe in the moral ideal of authenticity that Taylor seemed so ably to defend? 
This tension took on greater significance the more I continued to delve into these 
thinkers, and for good reason.
11
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Being very much at home in the liberal philosophical tradition, Taylor places a 
premium on the self as the locus of a genuinely moral inspiration that he sees as 
having come about through the various religious, cultural and political revolutions 
that ushered in the modem period. Girard by contrast sees the freedoms gained 
through these revolutions as an attempt to replace one form of ‘divinisation’ 
involving the community, with another that now centres on the individual. Whereas 
the traditional form of divinisation could at least maintain order and peace (more or 
less), the modem form of ‘self-divinisation’ has lost the vital religious ingredient that 
can channel our resentments, restore order when required, and thus keep everything 
from slipping into chaos. For Girard modem individualism is not only naïve, it is 
dangerously naïve.
The apparent conflict between Girard and Taylor concerning the self and the 
modem identity is made all the more intriguing because, as I mentioned above, both 
are Christian thinkers who grant a large role to religion in helping to bring about the 
modem age. For Girard Christianity has made modem individualism untenable. The 
question of having a personally derived identity is not open to the individual in the 
way modem liberal philosophy claims due to the fact that human beings come to 
know themselves only in and through their relationship to a religiously ordered 
world. Hence their so-called ‘identities’ come from the community that forges for 
them a place in that ordered world, without which there can be nothing coherent or 
unified in their self-understandings. Trying to ‘be oneself’, a mode of self- 
determination popular in contemporary culture, simply flies in the face of the 
prescriptive role of language and culture. It is precisely the loss of religion, as the 
binding force that guarantees a sense of belonging, which makes everything today 
seem unclear and in danger of falling apart. Whether identity is social or personal,
without religion as a means of keeping order and peace, Yeats’ apocalyptic vision 
seems prophetic for most Girardians: “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; / 
mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, / The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and 
everywhere / the ceremony of innocence is drowned.. .”n
However, for Taylor contemporary culture is morally meliorist precisely 
because o f its individualism, which is largely owing to the emphasis on personal 
commitment so essential to the Christian teaching that has itself so substantially 
influenced this culture. Like Girard, he believes that individualism as pure 
subjectivism or ‘centring on the self is wrong-headed because it does not take into
account how human beings generate meaning, only as always already participating in
1and partly shaped by a tradition or community. But he nonetheless argues that 
reducing modem individualism to a form of ‘egoism’ is a simplistic explanation of a 
complex phenomenon.14 When set within a historical context this individualism can 
be understood to contain a genuinely moral inspiration.
Both Girard’s and Taylor’s concepts of the modem self appear profoundly at 
odds despite their shared belief in Christianity. Can the problem here be explained 
with reference to their different disciplinary approaches to a similar phenomenon? 
Indeed, Girard’s concept of the ‘identity of the self’ can appear misleading. When we
11 Quoted in Bailie, Gil. Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads (NY: Crossroads Publishing, 
1997), p. 42.
12 By ‘morally meliorist’ here (and in any subsequent use of this expression), I mean to connote the 
possibility of gradual, albeit painfully won, improvement in the human lot. In The Malaise of  
Modernity, Taylor describes something close to what I mean by the phrase: “I suggest that... in this 
matter we look not for the trend, what is up or down, but that we break with our temptation to discern 
irreversible trends, and see that there is a struggle here, whose outcome is continually up for grabs” 
(Ontario: Anansi Press, 1991), p. 79.
13 Smith, Meaning, Morals and Modernity, p. 3.
14 “Individualism has in fact been used in two quite different senses. In one it is a moral ideal, one 
facet o f  which I have been discussing, in another it is an amoral phenomenon, something like what we 
mean by egoism. The rise of individualism in this sense is usually a phenomenon of breakdown, 
where the loss o f tradition leaves mere anomie in its wake...It is, of course catastrophic to confuse 
these two kinds o f individualism, which have utterly different causes and consequence. Which is why 
Tocqueville carefully distinguishes ‘individualism’ from ‘egoism’”. C, Taylor, The Ethics of  
Authenticity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 125f.
unpack his claims we learn that it is not simply that individuals fail to achieve an 
identity today where once they succeeded in doing so. To have an ‘identity5 in a pre­
modem society was to have the question ‘who am I?’ answered for me and therefore 
to be assigned a place, as it were, “by nature”. As Girard uses it in the context of the 
modem age, “identity” is associated with an inability to distinguish one thing from 
another.15 It thus becomes a form of ‘sameness’ that generates confusion and 
conflict. In other words, it has to do with the threat of a crisis that can easily escalate, 
the prospect of which, Girard believes, traditional religious communities were well 
equipped to protect themselves against. For Girard, to try and have an identity in the 
modem sense is to ignore the fact that identity is first and foremost about difference 
that can only be conferred by the cultural order and the generative processes that 
fully belong to the sacred. And his emphasis on the role of imitation in these 
generative processes tends to reinforce his distrust of any existential appeal to 
‘uniqueness’ on the part of the modem subject.
Taylor does not ignore the potential difficulties that can arise in the transition 
from a religious to a secular worldview. Indeed, I want to argue, his profound sense 
of the difficulties here is one of the key factors that brings him close enough to 
Girard to provide the basis of a worthwhile conversation. However misunderstood 
their respective projects appear from the other’s viewpoint, both thinkers are in fact 
attempting to tell a similar story, one in which the modem age still owes a lot to the
15 Kierkegaard also saw the modem period as losing significance: “In The Present Age, he describes 
his own culture as having lost an agreed-upon sense of qualitative distinctions accepted within society 
as a wbole. People no longer make a clear distinction, for example, between fine art and schlock art, 
or between great writers and hacks. As a result, there is no longer a basis for experiencing things as 
genuinely worthwhile or significant in life. As such distinctions are levelled down, Kierkegaard 
claims, the possibility o f finding meaning and fulfilment in our lives is diminished. We would then 
lose any generally accepted bases for making the kinds of commitments that would give our lives a 
point and a sense o f direction.” Guigon, Charles and Pereboom, D., eds. Existentialism: Basic 
Writings (2nd Edition), pp. 1-2.
traditional view of transcendence -  whether or not it can actually live up to this view 
of transcendence once the debt is acknowledged.
For Taylor, the term “identity” only takes on significance in the modem 
period because it can no longer be taken fo r  granted. In the pre-modem world, he 
believes, ‘identities’ were too unproblematic to be considered as such. The very thing 
that makes a personally derived identity both challenging and worthwhile today is 
that it cannot be taken for granted, it must be won, and it can fail. Taylor reminds us 
that the toppling of hierarchies provides precisely the conditions in which it can fail. 
Therefore it is not simply the case that the proponents of modem freedom are 
unaware of the risks here, as Girard’s thesis seems to suggest (though certainly for 
Girard the risks are incomparably greater). With his grasp of the dangers, Taylor sees 
the modem age in a less deterministic way than Girard: having an identity need not 
be a euphemism for ‘sameness’, and hence crisis. On the contrary, it can involve 
genuine difference. Taylor’s confidence in the notion of particularity, as the moral 
force behind the ‘ideal of authenticity’, challenges one of Girard’s central arguments; 
that the modem emphasis on freedom and identity tends irrevocably toward 
sameness and therefore toward crisis and decline. And surprisingly from a Girardian 
point of view, Taylor can articulate this confidence while at the same time taking 
seriously the religious impulse and how it can continue to organise our most deeply 
felt aspirations.
So, Girard and Taylor share an interest in the meaning of religion in a secular 
age, in which religion is more than a set of beliefs and practices, and constitutes 
something of the preconditions of human community. But both draw very different 
conclusions from their analysis of the role of religion and the sacred in the transition 
to the modem world, conclusions that we can now see have to do with the nature of
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‘identity’, and whether individualism is producing ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’. 
Girard’s hypothesis concerning the role of collective violence and scapegoating 
implies that there is no way for the modem subject, in its attempt to realise or fulfil 
itself, to produce anything but crisis. And this leads him into a curious cul de sac 
when attempting to meet the ethical challenges of our age. He offers a powerful 
critique of the moral bankruptcy of liberal culture. The attempts by individuals today 
not only to ‘keep up with the joneses’, but continuously to ‘surpass their own highest 
achievements’ are ultimately, in his view, self-defeating.16 While brilliantly 
diagnosing the desperation and futility of the modem subject in a world emptied of 
transcendence in the traditional sense, and the increasing urgency that prevails when 
religion no longer functions to ‘hold things together’, his bleak view of the modem 
age leaves the individual devoid of religion and powerless when confronted with the 
forces that lead to violence. Hence, not only do we run the risk of failing to live up to 
an exacting standard regarding the realisation of the goal of universal respect 
(something that Taylor admits is a danger that contemporary culture must face), but 
the whole liberal project is fated to run aground because it is predicated on an 
unsustainable concept of the self-sufficient individual. In the process of equalising 
individuals and levelling a hierarchically ordered world that discriminated in terms of 
‘rank and station’, between what goods were available and to whom etc., Girard 
believes, we have fatally weakened a system that channelled our envious and 
rivalrous desires in constructive ways, and thus unwittingly unleashed the violence of 
homo religiosus.
16 Girard provides a nice metaphor for thinking about an individual’s desires and how they culminate 
in self-defeating projects in the absence of externally conferred clearly marked differences: “Rather 
like an insect that falls into the crumbling trap its rival has dug for it, with the grains o f sand that it 
tries to grasp giving way as it tries to move its feet -  desire counts on differences to get up the slope. 
But the differences are obliterated precisely because o f  its efforts...” René Girard, Things Hidden 
Since the Foundation o f the World, trans. S. Bann and M. Metteer. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1987) (London: Athlone Press, 1987), p. 303.
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Herein lies what I take to be the central aporia in Girardian theory. 
According to this theory a modem individual has no capacity to act in an ethical, or 
indeed constructive way, since, outside a religious context that could once guarantee 
order and stability, the ‘ethical agent’ can now ‘act’ only in ways that sooner or later 
break down meaningful categories of difference. Without an ethical subject who can 
compensate for the loss of hierarchy a serious question arises for the proponents of 
this theory. By undermining the conditions of the ethical, whereby an individual can 
take a stand in relation to a community and the cultural forces that prevail there, a 
stand that is potentially creative and transformative, is Girardian theory not 
contributing to the very problem of ‘escalating crisis’ that it is so keen to warn us 
about? And this in turn highlights a deep tension in Girard’s own theory. This theory 
leads him to annul any individual selfhood and thus deny any human agency. Given 
such a thorough undermining of the personal, does Girard not undercut his own 
professed faith in an idea of transcendence that can empower the individual to act 
despite if not because of his or her capacity to lose anchorage in the world? Does not 
the faith he professes empower persons -  individually as well as collectively?
To restate the problem, both Girard and Taylor place considerable emphasis 
on the role of a religious world-view in maintaining order and purpose in a pre­
modem context, and on the corresponding problem that occurs for the individual 
with the decline of such a world-view. But both thinkers, their shared Christian 
commitments notwithstanding, differ considerably with respect to how, or even 
whether, the modem subject can productively engage with his or her desires and 
purposes in a post-religious age. Our values and beliefs, that mediate our relationship 
to the world and provide a source of meaning, appear deeply fraught. Central 
concerns of the dissertation, then, are whether Girard’s thorough undermining of the
subject is sustainable within the terms of his own discourse and whether Taylor’s 
confidence that modem individualism has a genuinely moral inspiration can be 
vindicated when tested against Girard’s analysis of crisis and unity.
Without too much qualification, we can say that the proposed conversation between 
Girard and Taylor is broadly located on the axis between structuralism and 
hermeneutics, or between those theories that see the subject existing only within a 
web of language, viewed as a totality, and those theories that see the subject as 
always already existing within a horizon of experience and historically mediated 
understanding.17 My own analysis is not neutral on the question of whether Girard’s 
or Taylor’s approach to structure is more suitable for understanding the human 
reality with which each grapples. But while I am more critical of Girard’s work, I am 
in no way unappreciative of the immense efforts made by mimetic theory to come to 
terms with the issue of ‘transcendence’ -  efforts, moreover, that can be related 
constructively to the practical concerns of Taylor’s philosophy.
One of Girard’s main contributions to cultural theory is his analysis of desire. 
It is an analysis that fundamentally undermines any autonomy individuals might 
claim to have, since it presents them as imitating the desires of others for the sake of 
their own sense of worth, and hence as having no essential capacity for a self­
17 Girard is interested not only in the operation o f human signifying systems, but also their origins. 
See Things Hidden Since the Foundation o f the World, pp. 6-7, 14. His own theory of myth, which 
attempts to explain language as a development of an original scapegoating or murder, is “worked out 
in dose proximity with the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the most influential structuralist 
anthropologist o f the twentieth centuiy.” Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, 2004, p. 77. 
The latter’s work helps to bridge the disciplines o f structural anthropology and linguistics. See 
“Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology”, in Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Structural 
Anthropology (Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 34-51. Taylor, in contrast to Girard, 
aligns himself with the ‘the post-Heideggerian’ hermeneutics of Gadamer, the central thesis o f which 
claims that human beings are (in Taylor’s phrase) “self-interpreting animals.” Here the layers of 
meanings that the individual encounters, in addition to extending outwards, also extend inwards, 
claiming the interpreting individual in the act of knowing. The ‘self-interpreting act’ in turn 
presupposes a more fundamental thesis, which properly belongs to ‘post-Heideggerian existential 
phenomenology’: “that human existence is expressive of and constituted by meanings shaped by self­
interpretations.” Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 34.
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generated identity. Consequently, the self who wants to be ‘individual’ must deceive 
itself with greater degrees of subtlety and a correspondingly greater potential for 
frustration. The ‘Other’ does not simply call for a meaningful relationship if the self 
is willing, rather it poses a serious problem for the self, whether willing or not. 
Girard’s central thesis concerns the universality of mimetic desire, with individuals 
denied any capacity for effective change or any way of positively transforming their
1 Û 1 <
negative imitations. According to the mimetic hypothesis, beyond the claim to 
‘having an identity’, which modems assume almost as a right, is the spectre of the 
other’s desire that always threatens to remind me that the game is up: that I am not in 
fact myself but rather a pale reflection of another, whose desires I imitate -  an 
imitation hidden behind the mistaken belief that I am unique. The insight of the 
‘great’ novels, Girard claims, exposes this ‘uniqueness’ as illusory. “If the lovers are 
never in accord it is not because they are too ‘different’, as common sense and 
sentimental novels assert, but because they are too alike, because each is a copy of 
the other. But the more they grow alike the more different they imagine themselves. 
The sameness by which they are obsessed appears to them as an absolute
otherness.”19 Trying to be different reminds everyone just how alike he or she is,
20“and the effort to leave the beaten paths forces everyone into the same ditch.” 
Thus, attempting to be an individual in the modem period actually stifles the process
of having an identity, by destroying all independent marks of difference. A theory of
18 In his later work Girard acknowledges the existence o f positive mimesis, as the basis o f a 
fundamentally loving relationship, to counter his early explicitly negative view of mimesis. See 
Rebecca Adams, “Loving Mimesis and Girard’s ‘Scapegoat of the Text’: A Creative Reassessment o f  
Mimetic Desire,” in Violence Renounced: René Girard, Biblical Studies, and Peacemaking, ed. W. 
Swartely (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2000), p. 281. However, accounts of more positive forms of 
imitation, that Girard later wants to claim are also fundamental to the human condition, have been 
only persuasively argued from a strictly theological perspective. For example, see, Steinmair-Pôsel, 
Petra. “Original Sin, Grace, and Positive Mimesis,” Contagion: Journal o f Violence, Mimesis and 
Culture (Volume 14, 1007).
19 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 106.
20 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 100.
mimesis (or more precisely of desire as mimetic), then, helps explain how striving to 
have one’s own identity makes distinctions already marked within a community 
identity insignificant, thereby generating crisis within the individual as well as the 
community.
The first part of the dissertation examines the elements of Girard’s literary 
criticism that inform his analysis of crisis, leading him to an uncompromisingly 
hostile view of selfhood and identity that continues to be articulated in his theory of 
culture. While not contesting the theory of crisis developed in his later work, I argue 
that Girard’s hostility here is based on a deep division between two radically 
different ‘selves’ that he ‘postulates’ -  a division that is then overcome in a finally 
achieved ‘unity’. This division and unity (involving a former self that has been 
renounced and a latter self generated through this renunciation) are formulated in 
terms of ‘death and rebirth’. The individual must die to a false self and be bom to a 
true self, a ‘death and rebirth’ that brings (as well as a new peace with the other) 
unity for the hero of the novel -  and, Girard claims, for the author who through his 
art achieves a depth of insight that unites him with other ‘great’ novelists (and indeed 
for readers who adequately inhabit the literary space produced in the great novels). 
However, it is this very structure of death and rebirth that his later anthropology 
exposes as false, or rather as a transition that can establish unity only through 
violence, that is by the community’s meeting an immanent crisis only by excluding 
and scapegoating one of its members and so in truth -  though a truth that remains 
unacknowledged -  by dividing itself. My argumentative move is to take this later 
theory of cultural crisis seriously and to apply it retrospectively, so to speak, to 
Girard’s early theory: the final ‘unity’ of literary space, I suggest, is achieved only at
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the cost of scapegoating the ‘self who must ‘die’ -  a scapegoating that is itself 
concealed in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel.
Girard, however, does not see the division at the heart of culture as having 
any relation to the unacknowledged division that, as I claim, is inscribed in his early 
work.21 Hence (if my intuition here is correct) the conclusion of his early work 
continues to be employed to explain his later theory of the scapegoat. The crisis in 
literary space that ends in the unity of the literary community, when the author stops 
trying to be ‘individual’, becomes the crisis in cultural space that ends in the unity of 
the anthropological community. However, on one hand, the literary community’s 
renunciation of part of itself, through the author, is the source of a true unity based 
on death and rebirth, while, on the other hand, the anthropological community’s 
renunciation of part of itself is the source of a false unity based on death and rebirth. 
What constitutes the former unity as ‘true’ is the actual guilt of the one set apart (the 
Romantic hero), but what constitutes the later unity as ‘false’ is the actual guilt of the 
community, and the innocence of the one set apart (the scapegoat). Both early and 
later works evince the same pattern of unity from crisis, but two different agents in 
each instance are seen as bearing responsibility. This is the aporia examined in the 
first part of the dissertation, in which I attempt to answer the following question: Can 
both spaces (literary and cultural), which are constitutionally the same in terms of the 
generative nature of crisis, unproblematically maintain two different explanations of 
unity?
21 Speaking of sacrifice in the context of King Solomon’s solution when two women claimed the same 
child as their own, Girard argues that the king ‘decided to divide the child in two.’ Girard claims, 
“[t]he Latin word decidere means etymologically to divide by the sacrificial knife, to cut the throat of 
a victim.” Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation o f the World, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael 
Metteer (London: Athlone Press, 1987), p. 238. If myth and ritual form a ‘cover-up’ of original 
division (or violence), as Girard claims, then a concealed division in his own theory must be a serious 
charge for the proponents of his theory.
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Taylor’s philosophical preoccupations speak to Girard’s hypothesis in a 
number of ways, though not directly. Taylor does not concentrate on the dynamics of 
desire (mediating relations between self, object and other), as Girard’s mimetic 
theory does. He is concerned more with the meanings and values that individuals 
find in their desires and purposes -  meanings and values that may not be readily 
available to them but can nonetheless be seen as significant when explored, clarified, 
and tested through practical reason. For Taylor, the questions are not whether desire 
is mimetic or whether it is more in control of us than we are of ‘it’, but rather 
whether individuals, as subjects, can make sense of their lives (since for him all 
human, understandings and meanings are subject-related). The individual subject, 
however great the delusions to which he or she may be prone, and however deep and 
extensive the cultural webs within which he or she is inserted, is the central and 
undisplaceable locus of human understanding. Contra Girard’s literary self, Taylor 
makes the case that there are some basic ontological conditions whereby the self, 
while always already constituted in large part through relations with others, can 
negotiate its commitments, more or less, in a meaningful way. It is this possibility 
that allows him to claim that having an identity can be something truly ‘different’, 
and not a form of sameness that leaves everyone in ‘the ditch’. Thus, Taylor, like 
Girard, is concerned with crisis and the need for identity and unity, but unlike Girard, 
he develops a morally meliorist account of subjectivity and history. And he does so 
by articulating a concept of selfhood that can grapple constructively with cultural 
tendencies toward fragmentation in the modem period, while at the same time 
maintaining some nourishing continuity with the past.
One question I tease out in the first part of the dissertation concerns whether 
Girard’s literary criticism locks him into a mode of thinking about the subject that
obstructs his later anthropological work and forces him into a position in the human
“JOsciences not dissimilar to the one adopted by Lévi-Strauss. I try to rally Taylor’s 
hermeneutical philosophy (and in particular its account of self and history) in order 
to respond to the problems in Girard’s work that radically undermine selfhood; and 
thereby I open the possibility of what I claim can be a more genial exchange between 
both thinkers concerning religious violence and sacrifice. The following outline of 
each chapter presents an overview of the main developments of the dissertation. It 
briefly charts the way I first expose what I see as the major theoretical problem in 
Girard’s work and the difficulties this problem creates for his theory of religion, and 
then, moving into Taylor’s work, it further charts the way a perhaps chastened Girard 
might see his own theory working out at the level of a philosophical hermeneutics -  
in other words, as a theory of sacrifice within the context of selfhood.
Ill
Part One of the dissertation, entitled “From Self to Sacrifice”, explores Girard’s 
overall work -  his literary criticism and his anthropology. In chapter one (‘Division 
and Unity in Literary Space (The Romantic Fallacy)’) I consider the context of the 
literary world within which Girard was writing during the 1960s. His early 
debunking of subjectivity takes the form of an attack on the Romantic individual (the 
personification of all philosophies of consciousness) for the mistaken belief that his 
desires are his own. Girard’s first major work Deceit, Desire and the Novel, makes 
the case that this individual’s belief in his originality -  especially in the sense that he 
is at the origins of his own desires -  is fundamentally mistaken (constituting what he
22 Of the linguistic revolution in France in the 1960s, and the influence o f Saussure’s insistence on the 
arbitrariness o f the sign on Lacan among others, Seân Burke writes: “Lévi-Strauss could thus declare: 
‘the goal of the human sciences is not to constitute man, but to dissolve him’”. The Death o f  Return o f  
the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998), p. 13.
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calls the ‘Romantic fallacy’). His own deconstruction of this ‘fallacy’ ensures that no 
conscious, intentional subject appears in literary space as he analyses it in a series of 
great novels. His criticism charts the journeys of the heroes of these novels from 
lofty preoccupations with their own self-sufficiency (an illusory originality) to a 
descent into the underground of obsessive emotions as they struggle, with ultimate 
futility, to maintain their own separateness from a model whom they are in fact 
imitating. Finally each the heroes’ struggle ends when he reaches the apotheosis of 
self-deception -  the illusion that he can have the ‘Being’ of ‘the Other’ as his own23. 
At this point he renounces his desire to be original and acknowledges his dependence 
on models. At the end of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, the real hero of the ‘great’ 
novel is revealed as the author who overcomes his false desires in the process of 
writing. The subject who dies in and through his work is bom anew. The unity 
achieved is a unity shared in by all great novelists and the literary community more 
broadly.
When Girard writes his second major work, Violence and the Sacred, the 
structure of ‘death and rebirth’, that was part of the author’s ‘sublime lucidity’ at the 
end of the earlier critical work, is re-examined in the context of cultural space with 
surprisingly different conclusions. The crisis that had earlier been detected in literary 
space is now also detected in myth, and other historical texts, thus highlighting its 
wider anthropological significance. According to Girard, the evidence of ‘death and 
rebirth’, found in the structural similarities detectable in primitive and traditional 
cultures, suggests that the motif of eternal recurrence must be rooted in an original
23 Girard uses the masculine pronoun when discussing his conception o f ‘triangular desire’ even 
though he intends to include female desire within this conception. This creates akwardness for 
commentators on his work committed to the use of non-sexist language. Although I have sometimes 
found no way o f avoiding this akwardness when dealing at close quarters with Girard’s texts, I have 
otherwise sought to avoid such usage in this thesis. I refer the reader to note 82 in Chapter One where 
the issue o f gender in Girardaian theory is given some further treatment.
act of violence by the community against a victim, who, in death, takes on the aura of 
divinity. His hypothesis of the scapegoat sets out to explain this cultural 
phenomenon. The majority of chapter two ( ‘Division and Unity in Cultural Space 
(The Scapegoat Mechanism)’) is concerned with an explication of the main thrust of 
Girard’s argument in Violence and the Sacred in the context of the preceding 
argument of Deceit, Desire and the Novel In this chapter I try to bring out the 
structural similarities between literary space and cultural space. These similarities 
centre on loss o f difference as the basis of the intra- and inter-subjective crisis in 
literary space and of the sacrificial crisis in cultural space.
According to Girard’s anthropological theory this crisis is brought about by 
the symmetrical patterning evident among partners in conflict, a conflict which can 
escalate to the point of threatening the very foundations of a community. Sacrifice is 
understood therefore, as a way of protecting the community from the mimetic 
contagion of violence. But if we accept this, Girard argues, then we must also 
acknowledge that ritual sacrifice itself must imitate an earlier more spontaneous 
process of containment, since, he claims, the original violence must first stop before 
the ritual re-enactment can be efficacious in a restorative and protective way. Hence 
there must be some initial ‘mechanism’ within culture that is triggered so as to stop 
the escalating violence and restore order before the crisis destroys the community. To 
explain this earlier form of containment Girard posits the scapegoat mechanism. The 
overall aim of chapter two is to set out Girard’s anthropology of the scapegoat in the 
context of division and unity in cultural space, and to argue that the early literary 
work informs the anthropological work at all times, except in relation to how the 
resolution of the crisis, and the restored unity, is now understood. I shall claim that 
Girard’s own early literary criticism evinces the same structure that his later work
reserves for myths that conceal acts of scapegoating, leading to the conclusion that 
the ‘unity of literary space’ is achieved at the expense o f the Romantic hero -  the true 
anthropological significance of whose early ‘death’ remains hidden. Is Girard’s anti­
subjectivism thus itself a form of scapegoating that permits him to pass two unrelated 
subjects -  one who dies and the one who is bom again -  off as one and the same 
subject?
In chapter three (“Negating Subjectivity and History: Problems Within 
Girardian Theory”) I argue that Girard’s ‘dualistic’ theory of subjectivity 
catastrophically undermines the possibility of ethical agency on the part of a 
responsible subject. When he introduces his theory of religious violence the need for 
such a responsible subject is all the more pressing, due to the potentially runaway 
nature of mimetic violence. However, instead of a theory of a human subject capable 
of understanding its own relationship to this violence we find a peculiar fidelity to 
his earlier theory of desire and the structure postulated in his earlier literary criticism. 
Taking account of his analyses of literary and cultural space, I argue that Girard 
attempts to maintain two apparently incompatible theories: ‘the Romantic lie’ and the 
‘scapegoat mechanism’. In this chapter I make the case that Girard extends the early 
work into the later work making them appear continuous when, as argued at the end 
of chapter two, there is a structural difference that does not get taken into account: 
the community is now responsible for separating out (or expelling) the individual, 
whereas in the early theory the individual is responsible for this separation. If this 
structural difference is taken into account, as I argue it must, all continuity between 
the early work and the later work is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of Girard’s 
cultural anthropology and his theory of the scapegoat. Furthermore, in this chapter 
we learn that the problems for the Girardian subject are also reflected in his account
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of historical change. For, once again, without tempering his hostility toward the 
modem subject in light of his new insistence on the guilt of the community, Girard’s 
later historical account of the loss of religion as cultural degeneration is made appear 
compatible with the dynamic of the novel and the degeneration of the self in literary 
space.
Thus, it is made appear that Girard’s theory of mimesis depends on the 
absolute instability of an ontological subject. This, as I try to show, places his work -  
ironically -  within the family of modem ideas that flow from Schopenhauerian Will. 
He ends up reifying desire by giving it more status in his discourse than a thinking 
feeling agent. As I want to argue, however, it is his continued antipathy towards the 
subject for the sake of a mistaken compatibility between his early and later works 
that leaves him with little alternative but to exclude a responsible agent from his 
theory of the scapegoat. By making ‘Desire’ entitive (after Schopenhauerian Will) he 
undermines any prospect of a more meliorist (or less dystopian) account of historical 
change when faced with the limits of human experience. And, in the process, he 
suggests a close relationship between mimetic desire and the darker side of the 
modem story touched on below. As part of my attempt to explicate this anti­
subjectivism and the tension it generates in Girard’s overall theory, I make the case 
that his overly psychological reading of the novel plays down the voices of the 
authors whom he discusses to the detriment of their own social analyses. This is a 
conclusion that, in the final analysis, results from his strict allegiance to the 
structuralist method of ruling out any subjective influence on the process of writing. 
This last point reminds us once again of the problem of propounding a theory of 
mimetic desire and sacred violence without an ethical subject who can stand in 
relationship to his or her world. What I attempt to highlight at the end of this chapter
as something that ought to concern Girardian theorists is that, once we lose an 
identifiable subject, we cannot really speak of a genuine quest for the supreme good, 
or of Christian conversion.
Chapter four ( ‘The Modem Period: Transposing the Older Cosmic Order’) opens my 
engagement with Taylor’s work in Part Two of the dissertation (“From Sacrifice to 
Self”), and covers Taylor’s philosophical account, which he details in his major work 
Sources o f the Self While Taylor provides us with a subject that can locate itself in 
moral space and discern some concept of the good, despite if not because of the 
uncertain nature of desire, the question remains as to whether historical 
developments in the west allow us to posit a self that can compensate for the loss of 
the social order that Girard argues once channelled violence in protective ways. This 
part of the dissertation thus responds to what have been identified in Part One as the 
two problem areas in Girard’s overall theory: subjectivity and historical change. And 
it does so through the two distinct but complementary lenses of his work, namely his 
philosophical anthropology and his philosophical history. While there is no way of 
entirely separating out these two aspects of Taylor’s work, by discussing his analysis 
of the transition to the modem period my aim will be to first consider his analysis of 
the historical issues that also arise for Girard in the context of crisis. In chapter four 
(the beginning of Part Two) I argue that, while Girard sees the toppling of hierarchies 
as the source of a sacrificial crisis in the modem period, Taylor understands this 
toppling as occurring within the context of a re-appropriation of order in the Deist 
picture and the emerging individualism that places priority on rational control. 
Hence, order is not undermined, as Girard believes, but transformed.
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In this chapter I set out how Taylor’s philosophical history can address some 
of the main concerns of Girard’s later theory without forfeiting a meliorist 
conception of human development. I consider a number of specific problems already 
outlined with respect to Girard’s theory of subjectivity and the transition to the 
modem age, including his problematic analysis of Augustinian “love” in Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel, and his equally problematic comparison in Resurrection From 
the Underground of Descartes and Corneille as harbingers of egoistic individualism, 
and what he characterises as the whole modem movement toward self-divinisation. 
However, the main problem in Girard’s theory that this chapter tackles is his analysis 
of the modem world as being in state of ‘sacrificial crisis’. When speaking about 
order, both Girard and Taylor analyse the concept of ‘Degree’ in ways that provide a 
stark contrast for my analysis of them. In this context both thinkers understand the 
Renaissance notion of a ‘great chain of being’ very differently, allowing me to 
contrast sharply their core ideas concerning ‘identity and difference’. For Girard the 
notion of ‘Degree’ that is found expressed in ‘the great chain’ is essentially an 
anthropological principle that he uses to explain how order is maintained; the loss of 
degree in the modem period, then, precipitates disorder and leads irrevocably to 
crisis. For Taylor, on the other hand, it is not so much ‘degree’, or the gap between 
grades of difference, that is significant, as chapter four attempts to make clear, but 
rather how the overall order in nature is conceived. In Source o f the Self h t  explains 
how the older cosmic order that had reigned in Europe since Plato, is transformed in 
the early modem period, with the advent of Deism, into a mechanistic order. With 
this transition, the significance of ‘Degree’ is displaced by ‘efficient causality’ and 
the rationalist belief that all things in nature share “interlocking purposes.”24 By
24 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 279.
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comparing Girard and Taylor with respect to the role of ‘Degree’, I will contest 
Girard’s analysis of the modem world as a form of disintegration, by highlighting, 
with Taylor’s help, how order is effectively reconstituted, and internalized, by a new 
mode of subjectivity. By placing ‘degree’ in light of Taylor’s analysis of the 
transition to the modem period, I hope to show how it is reinvigorated by a new 
order that provides the individual with more control.
Even if Taylor’s consideration of the early modem period convinced 
Girardians that order was indeed transformed rather than dissolved, they might still 
argue that these historical developments only plug the dam against a swelling flood 
of violence. Even if we do grant that a new order prevails for a period within a more 
rationalized Christianity, this ‘reordering’, they might claim, need not continue to be 
efficacious into late modernity and post-modemity. Does even a mechanistic order 
not ‘fall apart’, they might ask, once we realize the full import of modem 
disenchantment?25 In chapter five (“Rethinking Division and Unity: Self, Religion 
and the Current of Life) I argue, with Taylor’s help, that the Romantic voice of 
nature continues the process of internalization already well underway by the 
eighteenth century and invigorates it with a new confidence in possibilities of 
integral expression and an affirmative impulse toward unity. In contrast to Girard’s 
reading of Romanticism, Taylor helps us to see how, from Rousseau onwards, the 
distancing by the individual from the potentially corrupting influences of society 
should be seen as a form not of separation but rather of authentic connection.
25 In his essay ‘Nietzsche versus the Crucified’ (in Williams, James G., ed., The Girard Reader, (New 
York: Crossroads Publishing, 2003)) Girard argues that the true significance of Nietzsche’s aphorism 
125 (Gay Science), as a statement of modem atheism and disenchantment, is its account of the 
collective murder o f god, which substantiates his own theory o f the recurrence of original violence 
through myth and religion. However, Girard believes that Nietzsche failed to recognise the radical 
nature o f Jesus’ life and death in exposing the cult of violence once and for all by his innocence.
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Taylor’s work on Hegel provides a way of thinking about significant 
developments in the modem period as a gradual subjectivising of the religious need 
to unify around a victim. By examining the eighteenth century expressivist 
movement and its preoccupations with ‘division and unity’ (what Taylor calls 
‘radical freedom’ and, ‘integral expression’) I draw a parallel with Girard’s theory of 
scapegoating and sacrifice, and the way he understands how cultural unity is 
generated through division or separation -  what he calls ‘unanimity minus one’. I try 
to show how some of Girard’s insights about the sacred (in particular the idea of 
unity through division) have parallels in modem philosophical accounts of 
subjectivity. The philosophical problematising of selfhood during this period 
confronts the basic problem of ‘division’ without forsaking the possibility of non­
violent unity. The self can be seen to attempt to meet the challenge of generating 
difference in a subjective mode, by remaining in touch with our ‘inner nature’. 
However, by the nineteenth century, as Taylor points out, almost all confidence in 
our inner nature as a source of good has been eroded by the prevalence of 
technological control. The power of the creative imagination to benevolently 
transform the world dwindles, while the darker side of the modem story begins to 
loom large. Other, more primordial sources of the self begin to make their presence 
felt, which, Taylor believes, now must also be confronted. His own philosophical 
project attempts to diagnose the modem malaise and, unlike Girard, present an 
account of selfhood that can stand up to its challenges.
Chapter six (“Crisis and Unity in Moral Space: Selfhood, Sacrifice and the 
Good”) explores Taylor’s philosophical anthropology in the context of his already 
examined philosophical history. Specifically, it targets what I have identified as some 
of the problem areas in Girard’s theory of subjectivity, and begins to make the case
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that human agents, in the absence of traditional forms of religion, can still orientate 
themselves in relation to their desires and purposes. While Taylor’s philosophical 
history can respond to a crisis of Degree in cultural space by interpreting order as 
being transposed and internalized in the modem period through the affirmation of 
ordinary life, in this chapter I try to show how, similarly, his philosophical 
anthropology can respond to the crisis in subjectivity in literary space. It does this by 
articulating the transcendental conditions of an experiencing agent. Taylor’s 
hermeneutics give us a way of understanding some of Girard’s central concerns 
without in turn doing violence to the subject by eliminating it from the space of 
positive reflection. The early modem preoccupation with rational control, Taylor 
believes, can be seen to place the subject at the center of the ordering process 
whereas previously such ordering was secured by a metaphysical view of nature and 
cosmos stretching back to Plato. The Romantic reaction to ‘rationalism’, far from 
fragmenting us further, as Girard claims, allows us, for a period, to conceive of our 
inner nature as good, and to bring forward the expression of ‘something new’ as a 
way of compensating for the loss of a purely rational world. What I attempt to argue 
is that Taylor’s philosophical history closely parallels Girard’s analysis of the source 
of modem disenchantment. Both acknowledge the role of Christianity in helping to 
shape our modem age. However, Taylor’s account, unlike Girard’s, does not see any 
radical discontinuity in the modem age with the moral sources that sustained human 
life in a pre-modem world.
Taylor’s depiction of the self as always already orienting itself in moral 
space, I argue, provides a more realistic and convincing account than Girard’s 
depiction of selfhood in literary and cultural space. For this self can find its bearings, 
in however halting or piecemeal a fashion, in relation to the good and, crucially, it
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can make qualitative distinctions by reflecting strongly on its desires. Moral 
frameworks are inescapable, especially when we can no longer take them for 
granted. Our language communities ensure that we are always interlocutors who 
participate in a broader conversation that reflects the vagaries and fragile continuities 
of tradition. Taylor also explores how our life has temporal depth and is narratively 
configured in a way that challenges Girard’s notion of rebirth as something 
completely new. Gaining orientation in moral space and within a temporal horizon is 
not simply a case of ‘deviated transcendence’, as Girard claims; rather, through a 
series of maturations and regressions, we project a future that can somehow redeem 
the past, as part of our lived experience and not just our literary work. In this way, 
Taylor believes, our life story can have narrative unity (so that ‘death’ and ‘rebirth’ 
are never absolute and so never entirely discontinuous), spanning a whole life, in 
which something of the past is always left unfinished and hence part of our future 
projects. Within the narrative picture that Taylor elaborates, the gathering of our life 
is only ever more or less accomplished.
Once the temporal space is opened up in this way we can see how, what 
Taylor calls ‘making qualitative distinctions’ in the context of some higher standard 
of the good that offers itself as a correct interpretation of the world, becomes an 
active way of re-marking difference in relation to our identity. He recognises that our 
highest standards may in fact be incommensurable but he argues that we should not 
accept this possibility as an in-principle limit. From within our western ‘universalisf 
perspective we can only offer the ‘best account available’ at any given time, if we are 
to adequately make sense of our lives, including the actions and feelings of others. 
For Taylor, ‘reasoning in transitions’ is the best if not only way to ensure that we 
take seriously our moral intuitions and what we actually do when we try to make
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sense of our lives on a whole range of issues concerning our identity and the good. 
Making transitions through the practical process of articulating our best account may 
indeed involve sacrifice -  a sacrifice that he believes, like Girard, once played a 
ritual function. But notwithstanding the historical depth to which the subject now has 
access, without the recognition of frameworks, Taylor suggests, we can never know 
what to keep or what to let go -  in short, what to decide. This chapter, the final one 
in the dissertation, points to some important connections between Taylor and Girard, 
regarding the latter’s concerns about ‘transcendence by violence’, and make the case 
that Taylor’s philosophical anthropology, when combined with his philosophical 
history, can provide a way of confronting Girard’s central anthropological concerns 
which I have thematised as ‘division and unity’. Hence selfhood and sacrifice can 
begin to be understood from a more hermeneutical perspective, one that does not 
ignore the generative religious experience shared by all cultures, but rather sees it as 
among a number of forces in the west that have given rise to the modem identity.
In summary, then, the first part of the dissertation attempts to analyse and expose 
what is, I claim, a highly problematic discontinuity in selfhood at the heart of 
Girardian theory. It considers how Girard’s work develops from a critical account of 
the self and its relationship to others in the context of literary space to an account of 
sacrifice as a basic structure of cultural space -  that is, from ‘self to sacrifice.’ It 
includes a critique of Girard’s early work, a critique that draws on his own later 
theory of the scapegoat (which I do not put in question); and it sets out some of the 
problems that arise when his early and later work are seen as continuous. The false 
division within the self, as I try to show, is itself based on a form of scapegoating, the 
unacknowledged nature of which continues to play an active role in Girard’s anti­
subjectivism. I make the case that Girard’s hypostatizing of desire, which arises from 
his hostility toward subjectivity, has ominous similarities with Schopenhauerian Will 
and is difficult if not impossible to relate to Christian agape. The second part of the 
dissertation, dealing with Taylor’s philosophical history and his philosophical 
anthropology, reverses the order of analysis and considers developments ‘from 
sacrifice to se lf. Taylor’s philosophy offers us an analysis of the self, as it develops 
within western religious and philosophical traditions, that attempts to take seriously 
in a self-conscious manner the religious violence that is, from the beginning, partly 
constitutive of human reality. In contrast to Girard, Taylor attempts to explain the 
historical ‘toppling of hierarchies’ and articulate a ‘plausible interpretation of human 
history’, in a way which suggests that an individual need not be understood as 
terminally fragmented and hence prone to violence in the absence of a religiously 
ordered world, but can rather confront the problem of sacrifice, and the modem 
spiritual crisis, creatively. Through expression and articulation, the self can recover 
the background meanings that are frequently left implicit because of the prevailing 
antipathy towards transcendence in cultural and political debates today.
By examining Taylor’s account of the transitions to modem culture in the 
context of Girard’s hypothesis of the scapegoat, it becomes conceivable that the 
latter’s theory of sacred violence, which details the need for a careful prescribing of 
difference in terms of an externally arranged order, is internalised by the emerging 
individualism of the modem period -  a transition that, following from Descartes, 
owes much to Deism and the Protestant affirmation of ordinary life. Arising from 
this, we can begin to see how modem selfhood becomes a development of the 
traditional need for sacrifice, and thereby takes on the defining characteristics of the 
sacred as a way of overcoming the undifferentiation, or ‘divisions’, that could, given
the right circumstances, escalate into collective crisis and scapegaoting. Crucially, in 
the context of what was earlier established in the dissertation as the alignment of 
mimetic desire with blind will, and so the further enfeeblement of any effective 
response to the violence of homo religiosus, I argue that Taylor’s work enables us to 
recover a conception of selfhood, that can not only withstand Girard’s mimetic 
hypothesis but also help to bring Girard’s theory of the scapegoat firmly within the 
discourse of a philosophical hermeneutics. When cast in such a manner our narrative 
quests from sacrifice to self are in no less urgent need of expression and 
understanding. Indeed, they are more than descriptive and explanatory; they can be 
seen as transformative of those very forces that once atavistically determined our 
human horizons.
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Part One
From Self to Sacrifice: Girardian Theory
Chapter 1
Division and Unity in Literary Space 
(The Romantic Fallacy)
The ultimate meaning of desire is death, but death is not the novel’s ultimate 
meaning... Out of supreme disorder is bom supernatural order.1
-  René Girard.
I f  the seed does not die after it has been sown, it will remain alone, but i f  it dies it 
will bear much fru it... [This] verse from St. John serves as an epigraph for The 
Brothers Karamazov and it could serve as an epigraph for all novelistic conclusions.2
-  René Girard.
1. Introduction
Since the publication of Violence and the Sacred in 1972, Girard has earned an 
impressive reputation as a cultural anthropologist. What strikes a reader, when 
attempting to acquaint herself with this late phase of Girard’s work, are claims that 
revolve around his understanding of myth and ritual, and how the religious structure 
of death and rebirth owes its efficacy to a ‘real’ event which is the basis of his 
scapegoat theory. The gods of the old pagan cults of nature and eternal recurrence 
were once real human beings whose immolation restored life and peace to the 
community. What is less widely appreciated perhaps is that this “structure” of death 
and rebirth is also employed in Girard’s early work, specifically Deceit, Desire and 
the Novel, although with quite different conclusions to those drawn in his later 
anthropology. When he published this first major work of criticism the theme of 
death and rebirth is applied not to the community and the origins of the sacred, but
1 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans., Yvonne 
Freccerò (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 290.
2 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, pp. 311-312, (his italics)
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rather to the author as subject of his work. While a theory of how myth functions to 
conceal the true nature of this structure -  the guilt of the community, and the 
innocence of the victim -  is not yet developed, the focus in Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel is nonetheless on the significance of this transformation in bringing about a 
genuine transcendence that becomes the achievement of the ‘great’ novelists. How 
are we to understand this ‘transformation’ that begins for Girard as something 
individual (intra- and inter- subjective) and evolves in time into something collective 
(cultural and communal)?
If we take the early work on its own terms we discover a subject that 
struggles in vain to orchestrate a kind of unity for itself, a self-sufficiency that will be 
impervious to others and can hence withstand the ‘slings and arrows’ that appear 
always set to de-throne it, from without and within. Despite its attempts to stay 
within itself like a ‘spider in its web’ -  intact and complete -  the subject is constantly 
drawn outside by the opinions of others and in her attempts to recover, ends up 
increasingly more divided. However, the author, Girard claims, only to the extent 
that she pushes this dynamic to its limits in and through her work can achieve a true 
unity. Only to the extent that, in and through her work, she dies to the false self that 
deceptively seeks approval from others, can she be bom again -  freed once and for 
all from the negative dynamics that “shrink” her horizon?3 This self gives up the 
illusion of its separateness and embraces its dependence on the other for its true 
identity -  a conversion that is the result of a “sublime lucidity”.4 What I hope to 
explore in this chapter is the nature and status of this ‘new’ subject in Girard’s early
3 René Girard, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky, trans., James G. Williams 
(New York: Crossroad, 1997), p. 31. The spelling o f ‘Dostoevsky’ in this translation of Resurrection 
from the Underground differs from its spelling in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel.
4 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 314.
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work. Does any thread of identity connect it with the subject that first constitutes ‘the 
se lf and culminates in “supreme disorder”?
I will begin by considering Girard’s literary criticism and its relationship to 
French structuralism, whose priority is to debunk the conscious intentional subject. 
By outlining the literary climate in which his early criticism took shape, I make the 
case that this work incorporates structuralist influences, in particular in its reaction 
against traditional philosophies of consciousness. While I offer a detailed analysis of 
Girard’s theory of the novel, the main aim of this chapter is to focus on the central 
thesis of his literary criticism. Therefore, in addition to a nuanced exposition of how 
individuals subject themselves and others to hatred and deception by pursuing 
illusory desires, I will focus on the basic argument at the heart of Deceit, Desire and 
the Novel. This argument claims that the author, in his work, renounces his ‘false 
desire’ and is restored to life, a unity that is ultimately the basis of the literary 
community. The question that each section of chapter one responds to thus concerns 
the basic structure of ‘death and rebirth’ played out at different stages in Girard’s 
criticism; how it is that the self becomes so divided within itself that nothing short of 
a conversion experience can bring an authentic unity. Having examined how some of 
the main themes of his critical work function to explain the disintegration of the self 
within literary space, I explore how (what he describes as) this “ontological illness”5 
culminates in the desire for the very ‘Being’ of the other, and how, for the author, 
this stage is the last rung on the ladder before spiritual death and rebirth. The shared 
experience with other great novelists of this ‘conversion’, according to Girard, forms 
the basis of what he calls ‘the unity of novelistic conclusions’. In the end it appears 
that not only is the subject given new life, but also the literary community -  the
5 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 279.
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canon of great authors, with properly enlightened critics and readers -  is, once again, 
established.
2. Debunking the Modem Subject
In his study of French criticism, The Death and Return o f the Author, Sean 
Burke traces the ‘serpentine history of influences’ that culminated in the attempt to 
debunk the modem subject.6 The main thrust of this debunking, according to Burke, 
is a form of ‘textual dispossession’ from the scene of writing, what he describes as 
“the power of language to organise and orchestrate itself without any subjective 
intervention whatsoever.”7 Outlining the consequences of this movement that was 
not content simply to ‘bracket’ the concept of the subject, but was determined rather 
to ‘annihilate’ it altogether, Burke argues:
For Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, the expulsion of the subject from the space of language 
is . .. seen to extend right across the field of human sciences, and to call into question the idea 
that man can properly possess any degree of knowledge or consciousness. For should it be 
that all thought should proceed necessarily by way and by virtue o f language, then the 
absence o f the subject from language translates into the absence o f the subject or 
consciousness from knowledge. If knowledge itself, or what we take to be knowledge, is 
entirely intradiscursive, and if, as it is claimed, the subject has no anchorage within 
discourse, then man as the subject of knowledge is thoroughly displaced and dislodged.8
With the advent of ‘deconstruction’, the new ‘postmodern mode of criticism’, puts
paid to phenomenological hermeneutics and all expressivist theories: “man can no
longer be conceived as the subject of his works, for to be the subject of a text, or of
knowledge, is to assume a post ideally exterior to language”.9 The ‘textual
dispossession’ of ‘subject’ and ‘author’ connects with the undermining of the
epistemological subject, already well underway in the 1960s, whereby “knowledge
and the subject are seen to be fictive emanations of a language which endlessly
6 Sean Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault 
and Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 10.
7 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 9.
8 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, pp. 14-15.
9 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 15.
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subverts all attempts by the human agent to assert any degree of mastery or 
control.”10 The original claims of phenomenology and hermeneutics to disclose 
‘deep’ or ‘hidden’ meanings behind the play of language are made increasingly 
problematic by the new French criticism.11 But what is lost and, perhaps more 
importantly from a theoretical point of view, what is gained by such a total rejection 
of subj ect and author?
In his much cited essay, The Death o f the Author, Barthes makes the case that 
literature should not be understood as an ‘expression’, but as an impersonal ‘play’, of 
linguistic signs. Writing is privileged over any particular stance of the author who 
relinquishes his status as an experiencing agent with a point of view, and allows his 
imagination free rein through the process of his art so that nothing of any importance 
can be attributed to his intention. The result, according to Richard Kearney, is that 
the “life of the text presupposes the death of the author.”12 Furthermore, our 
understanding of texts must be “de-psychologized”, which “effectively means de­
humanised in the sense of dispensing with the claims of romantic idealism and 
existentialism.”13 The absence of authorial presence, as the determining characteristic 
of poststructuralist theories, is the result of the ‘textual dispossession’ of the subject 
from the scene of writing.
10 Ibid.
11 The loss of the creative subject associated with humanism and existentialism is characteristic of 
what Richard Kearney calls the ‘parodie’ imagination. However, drawing on the mythic language of 
death and rebirth he queries whether there might be an ethical summons at the heart of postmodemity 
to help counteract the ceaseless play of difference wrought by parody. “Even when it can’t go on, the 
postmodern imagination goes on. A child making traces at the edge of the sea. Imagining otherwise. 
Imagination’s wake. Dying? Awaking?” The Wake o f Imagination (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 
397.
12 Kearney, The Wake o f Imagination, p. 274. For discussion on Girard as a ‘typical’ postmodern 
author who distances himself from a philosophy o f subjectivity, see Vanheeswikck, “René Girard in 
Contemporary Philosophy”, in Contagion, vol., 10 (Spring 2003), p. 99.
13 Ibid.
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For Barthes, the author’s voice -  his or her biography, intention, sensibility 
etc. ~ should have no bearing on how we read a text.14 Language itself works against 
any potential carry-over of meaning from author to text:
Structuralist linguistics, Barthes claims, furnishes us with a valuable analytic weapon in the 
destruction of the author. The discovery o f language as a total system of enunciation which 
functions independently of the persons of the interlocutors, shows that the author is never 
more than the ‘instance writing, just as 1 is nothing other than the instance saying “/ ”’.15
As a consequence of this linguistic turn, ‘patriarchal consciousness’ loses it authority
since the status of the author can no longer announce itself through the pen and
miraculously confer significance on the text.16 Moreover, words cease to belong to
the person of the author who is now accused of taking over the role of god from
traditional metaphysics, and of occupying a privileged place as the new ‘transcendent
reality’ to whom all meaning must refer. In this context, Burke argues that the death
of the author can be seen to “fulfil the same function in our day as did the death of
God for late nineteenth century thought.”17 Or as Kearney argues, Barthes’s death of
the author thus “follows from the death of God and announces the death of Man.”18
It is the author as divinized presence that becomes such a problem for many
of the literary theorists of this period (1960s), and this reaction to ‘metaphysics’ in its
now veiled form as ‘humanism’ is part of the intellectual atmosphere in which Girard
becomes a living critic. The identity of the writer and divinity is a definite motif in
Barthes’s groundbreaking meditation on the question of authorship, one that
14 The ‘tyranny’ o f centring on the author is based on the following misconception, according to 
Barthes: “The explanation o f a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if  it 
were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice o f a 
single person, the author ‘confiding in us’.” Quoted in Kearney, The Wake o f  Imagination, p. 275.
15 ibid.
16 Kearney describes these developments as follows: “Language comes to substitute itself for the 
productive subject who previously had been considered its owner and master... and is thereby 
revealed as a self-referential process with nothing before it or after it ... as such it is never original -  
for there is no ‘origin’ outside of itself, i.e. no transcendental reality or transcendental imagination to 
which it could refer.” The Wake o f  Imagination, pp. 275-6.
17 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 22.
18 Kearney, The Wake o f Imagination, p. 276.
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“enlivens” his essay.19 If the author is, in Derrida’s words, the “transcendental 
signified”, all that criticism can do is to accept the role of passive exegete to the 
author’s intentions. The homology between the critic and the medieval cleric is 
formulated in such a way as to leave no doubt as to who the new servant is. Burke 
explains it in this way: “The text is read as natural theologians read nature for marks 
of design, signs of purpose. Where there is design there must be intention... the old 
law is enshrined as the universal law of literary causality.”20 The subservient role of 
the critic that enshrines the author as the glorified ‘object’ of criticism is for Barthes 
the groundless perpetuation of a much older form of deception and enslavement -  
one that makes the ‘ Author-God’ the univocal, absolute author of his work, “one who 
precedes, directs and exceeds the writing that bears his name.”21 To liberate the text 
from its oppressive author, as Barthes and others of this period hoped to do, is to 
reiterate the Nietzschean liberation of the world from God, it is to release “the 
ceaseless play of differences that the death of God opens in its wake.”22
Burke’s argument against the undermining of traditional notions of
subjectivity centres on the extreme lengths to which Barthes’s ‘theo-auteurist 
criticism’ is pushed. The manner in which the latter represents the ‘Author-God’ 
leads Burke to contend that it involves more ‘construction’ than ‘destruction’. “How 
much, we should ask, of the joyous work of destruction consists in badly 
constructing the house?”23 Barthes, he claims, “must create a king worthy of 
killing.”24 This last comment will be instructive for our analysis of Deceit, Desire 
and the Novel, which details the fall and rise of the author through a deceived quest
19 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 23.
20 Ibid.
21 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 24,
22 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, pp. 24-25.
23 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 26.
24 "What is happening in this procedure is that Barthes himself, in seeking to dethrone the author, is 
led to an apotheosis o f authorship that vastly out-paces anything to be found in the critical history he 
takes arms against”. Ibid.
that eventually yields a lucidity, one that the critic believes is the ‘true’ raison d ’être 
of the great novels. As we shall see, this quest (a quest for originality) is what Girard 
calls the “Romantic fallacy” -  a lie that the conscious subject (so beloved of 
humanist theory) must perpetuate at all costs.
A telling sign of Girard’s early structuralist sympathies is the manner in 
which the author/subject ‘dies’ at the hands of the critic in Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel. When Girard thus debunks what he calls the ‘Romantic subject’ he is no 
longer in the orbit of the humanistic and existentialist projects that maintain a 
dimension of depth and rational agency within the conscious subject, but is already 
traversing a literary space that displaces the centrality of a first-person perspective; 
he is, like Lévi-Strauss, content to ‘dissolve man as part of the goal of the new 
human sciences.’25 In his contribution to the conference at Johns Hopkins in 1966, 
attended by many of the new French theorists, he refers to the influence of Lévi- 
Strauss’s work on his own, by then, well-known theory of the novel.26
Burke attempts to make explicit what seems to be implicit in the new French 
theory: that the author is brought back to life to serve the purposes of this theory -  so 
that in Barthes’s criticism, for example, we have what he describes as a new form of 
“autobiography” characterised by a movement from “work to life.”27 Girard, as we 
shall see, does not hide the réintroduction of the author. He announces the death of
25 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 13.
26 “Claude Lévi-Strauss tells us that the real structure o f a cultural phenomenon cannot coincide with 
the spontaneous account given by the subjects themselves. Thus, the application o f structural 
linguistics to phenomena which are extra-linguistic, at least in the narrow sense, necessarily empties 
these of their original value, destroying the grip on being itself they appear to have within their 
original context.” René Girard, “Tiresias and the Critic”, in The Structuralist Controversy: The 
Languages o f Criticism and the Sciences o f  Man, eds., R. Maskey, and E. Donbato (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 19.
27 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 27. About Barthes’s criticism Burke claims: ‘Tw o  
balls must be kept constantly in the air: the author will return but the death o f  the author must stand. 
The ingenious way in which Barthes negotiates this problem is through recasting the relationship 
between author and critic in such a way that authorial return does not impinge upon the idea of the 
birth of the reader. Thus the author will reappear as a desire o f the reader’s, a spectre spirited back 
into existence by the critic himself.” The Death and Return o f  the Author, p. 30.
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the author only in the context of literary space and the religious symbolism that 
brings new life. There is no evidence that he follows structuralism to the limits that 
Barthes explores. Indeed from the proceedings of the conference at Johns Hopkins he
appears closer to the idea of a ‘transcendental intentionality’ at work in the creative
• ^  ftprocess as articulated by George Poulet, than to Barthes’s purely linguistic subject 
-  since at least the subject is clearly ‘returned’ at the end of Deceit, Desire, and the 
Novel, which is not the case with Barthes’s ‘Death of the Author’. However, the 
somewhat different conclusions of Girard and Barthes appear secondary once their 
common starting point is established: from the beginning the subject is not given any 
credibility. Whether the author’s subjectivity is killed off a la Barthes’s criticism, or 
must simply die, a la Girard’s criticism, is really not the significant feature of his 
‘death’. What both thinkers have in common, arguably, is that originality in Girard’s 
criticism and expression in Barthes’s criticism are denied any determining say in the 
creative process. For both, then, the author/subject can be constituted only through 
the act of writing. I shall argue, however, that an unforeseen result for Girard of his 
alignment here with French structuralism is that the one who ‘dies’ in the work bears 
no relation to the one “who is literally bom of the death.”29
28 Describing how his work differs from someone like Sartre, Poulet says o f the author: “There is no 
possibility of re-establishing himself in a true, authentic relationship with his own work as soon as the 
work is finished. That is the position of Sartre.... I would say that the only possible way for an author 
to establish himself in an authentic relationship with his work is precisely when that work is finished, 
and at the same time the intentional concentration with which the author has continuously gone at his 
work, trying to realise it, has stopped, then it is possible for the author to look at his work in a purely 
detached w ay... but at the same time it may be with an extreme lucidity, in such a way that it may be 
only at this exact moment that he can attain the complete knowledge o f  what he has done.” The 
Structuralist Controversy, pp. 85-86. Although Poulet’s criticism exhibits similarities to Girard there 
are differences as to how much consciousness the author may be said to have from the outset of the 
work. For the former some original presence is recognised at the end, for the latter authenticity comes 
through renouncing any claim to originality -  desire fundamentally complicates all original presence. 
See the discussion on Poulet’s conference paper, ‘Criticism and the experience o f Interiority’, in The 
Structuralist Controversy, pp. 73-88.
29 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 312.
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3. Self and Other in Literary Structure
Unlike Barthes, perhaps, Girard explicitly re-introduces a subject at the end of 
his major work of criticism -  the death of the author is the condition for the life of 
the author. This spiritual transformation, he believes, occurs in the author’s own life. 
And, it is the author’s relationship to the other that plays a pivotal part in his 
conversion -  by providing the basic inter-subjective dynamic that gets played out in 
literary space. From analysing the characters in the novels, what makes Girard 
believe that the author’s spiritual life is in question? Indeed, what allows him to posit 
a completely new subject as the fruit of literary space? To try to answer these 
questions we need first to turn to Girard’s central claim concerning the inter- 
subjective relation. It is the dynamic between individuals that is key to understanding 
the author’s spiritual journey, and this dynamic is generated by desire. In Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel, Girard attempts to show that ‘desire’ is never immediately 
directed at an object, but is rather always mediated by the other who thus becomes 
one’s model and eventually (in the modem period) one’s rival. This process of 
mediation releases our baser human emotions -  in a concentrated and controlled way 
in the novel. “The inevitable consequences of desire copied from another desire are 
‘envy, jealousy, and impotent hatred’.”30 These ‘vices’ are hence the ‘stuff of 
literary space. Girard spells out the role of the critic in bringing to light the true 
course of desire or what he calls the ‘mysterious’ triangular structure of all human 
relationships. Thus the novelist through her art explores the most charged 
relationships (emotionally and spiritually). The result is a painful, obliquely gained, 
knowledge of the emptiness of one’s own desires, gained by the author at the end of
30 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 41.
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her ‘great’ work. ‘Working through’31 the structures within which she is first 
imprisoned brings a greater degree of lucidity regarding human reality -  a lucidity 
apprehended and articulated by the critic.
Girard eschews the traditional understanding of desire as “spontaneous” and 
directed to its object, as it were in a straight line.
The straight line is present in the desire o f Don Quixote, but it is not essential. The mediator 
is there, above that line, radiating toward both the subject and the object. The spatial 
metaphor which expresses this triple relationship is obviously the triangle. The object 
changes with each adventure but the triangle remains. The barber’s basin or Master Peter’s 
puppets replace the windmills; but Amadis is always present.... [Hence] the triangle is no 
Gestalt. The real structures are intersubjective. They cannot be localised anywhere.32
The triangular structure -  the substance of the novel -  has been gradually brought to 
light by the “great” novelists. According to Girard, structural thinking “assumes that 
human reality is intelligible: it is a logos and as such, it is an incipient logic, or it 
degrades itself into a logic.”33 With the novelist’s experience in mind he tells us that 
human reality “can thus be systematised, at least up to a point, however 
unsystematic, irrational, and chaotic it may appear even to those, or rather especially 
to those who operate the system.”34 Arising from this, Girard’s thesis is “that the 
great writers apprehend concretely and intuitively through the medium of their art, if 
not formally, the system in which they were first imprisoned together with their 
contemporaries.”35 In and through his own struggles the author ‘systématisés’ his 
often-chaotic experience of human reality, thus making it intelligible. Speaking of 
the critic’s role in recovering this logic, Girard writes, “[ljiterary interpretation must 
be systematic because it is the continuation of literature. It should formalise implicit 
or already half explicit systems.”36 Thus the value of criticism “depends on how
31 I use ‘working through’ in Freud’s sense discussed in his essay “Mourning and Melancholia”, in 
The Freud Reader, (ed.) Peter Gay (London: Vintage, 1995).
32 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 2.
33 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 3.
34 Ibid.
35
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much literary substance it really embraces, comprehends and makes articulate 
From the linguistic model of subjectivity that Girard outlines here, we can say: 
language speaks louder than individuals. For the critic, human reality is ascertainable 
as literary substance; his or her role then is like that of the analyst (though from a 
historical distance) who brings to light through a peculiar therapeutics the true image 
of the subject and his or her world.
The triangular structure allows Girard to detect the true course of desire as it 
appears to flow from the various protagonists in the novels that he treats, and 
structure the relationships between them. He argues that we can only really 
understand what constitutes these relationships when we see that, despite, or perhaps 
because of the individual’s belief to the contrary, desire does not originate in the 
subject and rest on objects by virtue of their intrinsic value. Rather it is aroused and 
finds its object by virtue of a model that holds some prestige or fascination for the 
subject.
The role of the model in directing the individual to objects forces her to 
greater degrees of misapprehension in her struggle for a self-possessed 
consciousness. Girard finds no shortage of cases of mediated desire in the wide array 
of works by ‘great’ novelists -  for example, in Stendhal’s De I’Amour, Proust’s 
Remembrance o f Things Past, Moliere’s Don Juan. Here I shall advert to two widely 
divergent novelists (in time as well as in style), Cervantes and Dostoevsky. In 
Dostoevsky’s The Eternal Husband Pavel Povlovitch Troussotzkie (the ‘husband’), 
through a peculiar fascination, seeks out his deceased wife’s ex-lover, to help him 
become attracted once again to a new wife.
The Eternal Husband...throws a light on the novelistic triangle so brilliant it dazzles us...
The hero is always trying to convince us that his relationship to the object of desire is
independent o f  the rival. Here we see quite clearly the hero is deceiving us. The mediator is
37 Ibid, (my italics).
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immobile and the hero toms around him like a sun... Pavel Pavlovitch can desire only 
through the mediation of Veltchaninov... he drags Veltchaninov along to the house of the 
lady he has chosen, so that he might desire her and thus guarantee her erotic value.38
Girard also discusses Cervantes’ “The Curious Impertinent” which, he claims,
-3Q
portrays a ‘triangular desire exactly like that of Pavel Pavovitch.’ In a similar way 
to the example just given, the protagonist Anselmo pushes his wife into the arms of 
his good friend Lothario (who had introduced the couple) in an attempt to excite an 
ultimately morbid desire.
Anselmo has just married the pretty young Camilla. The marriage was arranged with the help 
of Lothario, a very dear friend of the happy husband. Some time after the wedding Anselmo 
makes a curious request to Lothario. He begs him to pay court to Camilla, claiming that he 
wishes ‘to test’ her faithfulness.40
Taking the triangular structure of desire into account in Cervantes and Dostoevsky, 
the critic concludes: “No literary influence can explain the points of contact between 
“The Curious Impertinent” and The Eternal Husband. The differences are all 
differences of form, while the resemblances are resemblances of essence.”41
All the protagonists in the novels reveal a similar insistence that their desires 
are theirs and not in fact mediated -  an insistence that is essentially deceived. Each 
one of them believes in his uniqueness, his self-sufficiency and ‘totality’ -  as a unity 
attributable to his own special essence -  that the other’s apparent happiness or 
fullness disrupts and disperses. Inner division thus prompts him to generate greater 
degrees of illusion in an effort to excite an unconquerable desire, and to prove once 
and for all that he is original. This belief in the uniqueness and separateness of the 
hero, however, is exactly what the structure of the novel will expose as false in the 
very process of revealing the mediated nature of desire.
According to Girard, the aporia that traditional philosophies and
38 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 47.
39 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 49.
40 Ibid.
41 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 51.
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psychologies encounter in attempting to understand the ‘self/other’ relation stems 
from the same static understanding of desire as having its source in the subject and 
attaching to objects due to their inherent worth. One of Girard’s main contributions 
to French psychology comes from his radical thesis concerning desire as a dynamic 
that “gives rise to the self and by its movement animates it.”42 The self is thus always 
brought into being in the search for a model whose desires it seeks to imitate and 
take as its own.
Girard characterises the intimate belief that our desires are really our own as
the ‘Romantic fallacy’, a self-deception which he claims is “the dearest of all our
illusions.”43 The ‘great’ novelists have explored the aporia of desire and how it can
lead to deception and hatred.
We believe that ‘novelistic’ genius is won by a great struggle against these attitudes we have 
lumped together under the name ‘romantic’ because they all appear to us to maintain the 
illusion o f spontaneous desire and of a subjectivity almost divine in its autonomy. Only 
slowly and with difficulty does the novelist go beyond the romantic he was at first and who 
refuses to die. He finally achieves this in the ‘novelistic’ work and in that work alone.44
Only truly ‘great’ novels apprehend the triangular ‘essence’ that literary space yields.
“As Girard conceives it there are novelists and novels that live up to the potential for
the elucidation of human reality, and there are others that fail to do so.”45 Great
literature is thus a source of genuine knowledge, and those who read the great works,
Girard claims, and follow in the footsteps of the novelist, “relive the spiritual
experience whose form is the novel itself.”46 To do so is to discover what the novelist
discovers, which is, that our desires are not our own, but rather belong to the models
we either consciously or unconsciously admire and imitate (and of course these
models have in turn other models for their desires). As Eugene Webb explains:
42 Eugene Webb, The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology o f  France 
(Washington: University of Washington Press, 1993), p. 7.
43 Webb, The Self Between, p. 9.
44 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, pp. 28-29.
45 Webb, The Self Between, p. 96.
46 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, pp. 221-222.
14
“Girard terms such models ‘mediators’ because they function as go-betweens linking 
us to our objects of desire as well as our aspirations for personal being.”47 Webb goes 
on to suggest that: “In Girard’s analysis there are two basic possibilities in mediation: 
(1) that which leads almost inevitably to conflict, because the self and its model are 
both competitors within the same field o f action, and (2) that which does not, because 
the self and its model cannot be competitors, since their fields of action do not 
overlap. He calls the first one ‘internal mediation’ and the second ‘external 
mediation’.”48 Hence in the novel mediation can take a largely benign external form, 
as in the case of Cervantes’ Don Quixote, or a largely malign internal form, as in the 
case of Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground. However, the latter form of 
internal mediation, or negative mimesis, is the predominant concern of Girard’s first 
two works of criticism because, as we shall see, it is the form that leads to ‘inner 
division’ and the dissolution of consciousness that nothing short of spiritual 
conversion can overcome. In order to fully comprehend the author’s achievement we 
must first fully comprehend the depths to which he must travel in and through his 
work.
4. Fusion and Separation: The Futility of the Romantic Spirit
How does the self become divided to the point that it requires a radical 
transformation that fashions a unity for the author as well as providing the grounds 
for a literary community? According to Girard, the mistake that all the heroes of the 
novels make is that they convince themselves that their own desires are unique, and 
therefore attributable to their own special being.49 What they desire has to be
47 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 92.
48 Webb, The Self Between, p. 93.
49 Traditional philosophical concepts o f desire were considered either ‘rationalist’ or ‘voluntarist’. 
Taking our lead from Socrates’ dialogue with Euthyphro, we might say that the rationalist desires
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desirable because each in his or her singularity desires it. The hero’s desire thus 
flows from him as an expression of his ‘Being’. What these protagonists struggle to 
realise is that the object they each desire is only a means of reaching the other, 
usually their rival, whose prestige they have exalted. Behind the façade of objects, 
Girard tells us, “desire is aimed at the mediator’s being.”50 Despite their attempts to 
convince themselves otherwise through their various encounters and exploits, the 
heroes get closer and closer to the awful truth of their dependence on a mediator for 
their sense of sufficiency; and this ‘knowledge’ divides them inwardly against 
themselves.51
The inner division that the Romantic hero experiences is exacerbated by the 
proximity of a model or mediator who, because he is the model, unwittingly reminds 
the hero -  who can not abide the thought that he is imitating anyone -  of how utterly 
devoid of real substance he is. Since the model holds the key to how I see myself, my 
failure to acknowledge the model as model and my insistence on my own originality 
leads the divisions within my self to generate two opposing images, one of ‘self and 
other’, and one of ‘self as other’, that constantly threaten to merge. When the 
Romantic hero manages to keep these images apart through always excessive 
exploits he experiences a sense (albeit illusory) of ‘Being’, self-sufficiency, and 
integration. When he fails -  as we shall see later in the case of Dostoevsky -  he 
experiences ‘Nothingness’, self-loathing, and disintegration.
something because it is desirable (substance), while the voluntarist might see the value o f the object 
arising from the fact that they desire it (accident). Girard rejects both these concepts for what we 
might call a mediationalist view o f desire, whereby a subject desires the object because others confer 
it with value. See, B. Jowett, trans., The Dialogues o f  Plato, Volume I (London: Sphere Books, 1970)
50 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 53.
51 Inner division is a form of alienation that is primarily psychological: “All heroes of novels hate 
themselves... It is exactly as the narrator says at the beginning o f Swann’s Way: ‘Everything which 
was not myself, the earth and the creatures upon it, seemed to me more precious and more important, 
endowed with a more real existence’. The curse with which the hero is burdened is indistinguishable 
from his subjectivity”. Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 55.
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As long as imitation takes the form of external mediation, the rivalry between 
self and other and the likelihood of inter-subjective crisis are held in check. 
However, the problems that beset Dostoevsky’s characters occur when the model 
gets too close, that is when external mediation turns to internal mediation and 
‘benign’ imitation turns to rivalry. As the distance between the mediator and the 
subject decreases, differences diminish, and...
...the comprehension becomes more acute and the hatred more intense. It is always his own 
desire that the subject condemns in the Other without knowing it. Hatred is individualistic. It 
nourishes fiercely the illusion of an absolute difference between Self and Other from which 
nothing separates it. Indignant comprehension is therefore an imperfect comprehension -  not 
non-existent as some moralists claim, but imperfect, for the subject does not recognise in the 
Other the void gnawing at himself. He makes of him a monstrous divinity.52
To understand the imitative nature of desire is to understand how this division
structures the lives and desires of the characters in the novels that Girard treats. The
key to this structure is the Romantic figure who functions as a kind of archetype for
autonomous being, standing apart and believing in his own separation, independence
and, as Girard ordinarily understands it, his own selfhood. “The romantic vaniteux
does not want to be anyone’s disciple. He convinces himself that he is thoroughly
original.”53
However, the lens of the critic affords a view of literary space that is
altogether different from that of the protagonist. The critical lens shows that
“[ijmitative desire is always a desire to be Another.”54 The problem for the Romantic 
figure, according to Girard, is that he does not see his desires as imitative, but rather 
as singularly his own. Therefore, he remains unaware that, in all his vain pursuits, he 
is attempting to appropriate the ‘Being’ of the other, or the other’s desires, which he 
seeks to maintain as his own.55 However, when the triangular structure of the novel is
52 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 73.
53 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 15.
54 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 83.
55 According to Girard, it is neither the movement toward the self, nor the movement toward the other
17
revealed, the ‘originality and spontaneity’ is exposed as false, as is the much-prised 
‘separation’ between self and other. The ‘subject’ as he appears in the novels (as 
protagonist) is simply a negative datum, whose self-deceptions and mistaken desires 
colour all his intersubjective relationships.56
The hero’s misapprehension concerning the real source of his desires thus has 
to do with the object that is valued, and how he sees himself (his very ‘Being’), 
reflected in this object -  nothing short of the possession of which will fulfil. “The 
romantic vaniteux always wants to convince himself that his desire is written into the 
nature of things, or, what amounts to the same thing, that it is the emanation of a 
serene subjectivity, the creation ex nihilo of a divine ego.”57 The more the vaniteux 
seeks independence the more he inevitably fuses with the desires of his model who, 
no doubt, by proving himself to be in every way superior to his disciple and by 
barring access to the quasi-sacred object, has become an obstacle to the vaniteux’s 
‘divine self-sufficiency’. Girard tells us that the felt need to see our desires as our 
own grows in proportion to our proximity to the model that we are in fact imitating. 
“The closer the mediator gets to the desiring subject, the more the possibilities of the 
two rivals merge and the more insuperable becomes the obstacle they set in each
r  o
other’s way.” This merger or fusion with the other is brought about by an attempt 
to secure its opposite -  separation. And so it is also the terrifying reminder of the
that is primary, the dynamic o f desire itself is the principle structure. This is one of the claims of 
Girardian theory that I will challenge: He places the emphasis on desire without any capacity for the 
subject as agent to take control and determine his or her desire in one direction or another.
56 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, pp. 2-3.
57 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p, 15.
58 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 26. The notion of the ‘mode/obstacle’ is later described in 
Girard's anthropological work as the ‘stumbling block’ or ‘scandalon’ (from the Greek verb ‘to 
stumble’), into which the obsessive individual continually runs in his or her vain attempts to be 
original. René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation o f the World: Research undertaken in 
collaboration with J.-M. Oughourlian and G. Lefort, trans., S. Bann and M. Metteer (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1987).
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subject’s dependence and his utter lack of ‘divine’ self-sufficiency -  indeed of 
‘Being’ itself.
Because of the danger that the ‘Other’ poses to the Romantic hero’s ideal 
spiritual quest, his intra-psychic world -  although darkened with uncertainty -  
becomes the space of constant retreat. This movement inward, as the model 
approaches, is, for Girard, always at the heart of internal mediation and the dynamics 
that lead deeper into ‘the underground’ of human reality, where the negative 
emotions of fear and hatred dominate. Withdrawal is thus a feature of the 
concealment of desire and therefore constitutes what Girard calls the Romantic 
hero’s spiritual askesis.59 The analogy between the literary quest and the spiritual 
quest is developed in Deceit, Desire and the Novel when the critic compares the 
Romantic hero’s search for divine self-sufficiency with St Augustine’s quest for 
God, the eternal essence. Describing the paradoxical dynamics of the hero’s pride, 
Girard writes: “The impulse of the soul toward God is inseparable from a retreat into 
the Self. Inversely the turning in on itself of pride is inseparable from a movement of 
panic toward the Other. To refashion St. Augustine’s formula, pride is more exterior 
to us than the external world. This externality of pride... makes us live a life turned 
away from ourselves.”60 With the analogy between the lover of the eternal essence 
and the lover of the world -  between the Saint and the Romantic -  we have in effect 
not two different loves (as for example we find in Augustine’s theory of the will), but 
rather two entirely different kinds of subject, one with genuine interiority and the 
other without this because always caught up in illusory pursuits that pull her
59 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 153.
60 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 59.
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outward.61 Speaking about the ‘religious world’ of the novel in relation to Stendhal’s 
The Red and the Black, Girard writes:
Just as the mystic turns from the world in order that God may turn toward him and give him 
the gift o f His grace, Julien tums away from Mathilde in order that Mathilde may turn toward 
him and make him the object of her own desire. Askesis for the sake of desire is just as 
legitimate and productive, in the triangular context, as ‘vertical’ askesis is in the framework 
of religious vision. The analogy between deviated transcendency and vertical transcendency 
is even closer than we first suspected.62
For Girard, such an analogy is very much in keeping with the privileged place he
gives to literary space. However, by introducing a dichotomy between ‘literary self
and ‘spiritual self’ he arguably downplays the significance of Augustine’s concept of
the divided will, a concept that manages to explain the fractured nature of the self by
understanding the conflict here as arising from two tendencies of the one will rather
that two subjects. This is an argument to which I will return in Part Two of my
dissertation.
5. Underground Psychology: Dostoevsky’s ‘The Double’
Having considered how the Romantic belief in spontaneous desire leads to 
internal mediation and hence division, Girard explains how this condition becomes 
exacerbated to the point of crisis. Referring to Dostoevsky’s Notes from the 
Underground, Girard argues that the narrator’s most intense suffering proceeds from 
the fact that he does not manage to distinguish himself concretely from the persons 
around him (even though he thinks that he does). It is only slowly that he becomes
61 Terry Eagleton presents us with a poststructuralist assessment o f desire that is remarkably close to 
Girard’s account of the Romantic hero’s spiritual vocation -  reminding us of Girard’s early affinity 
with the new French theory. Eagleton writes: “Desire, in Jacques Lacan’s famous slogan is the desire 
of the Other. To desire another is to desire what that other desires, since this desire is of the other’s 
‘essence’, and only by identifying with it can we therefore become one with the other. This is a 
paradoxical claim, however, since desire, which splits and disperses the subject, is no kind of essence 
at all; so that to desire the other’s desire is to be as extrinsic to them as they are to themselves, caught 
up in the process o f their own decentrement.” The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), p. 277, my italics. As with triangular desire that is mediated primarily by our 
external relationships, the Lacanian ‘desire for the Other’ is more ‘external to us that the external 
world.’ Thus, the interior Augustinian quest for the ‘God o f the human heart’ is denied tout court.
62 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, pp. 155-156.
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aware of this failure. “All underground individuals believe they are all the more 
‘unique’ to the extent that they are, in fact, alike.”63 The rivalry between 
Dostoevsky’s characters is based on a futile attempt to make differences, that are in 
fact illusory, appear real. The more the rivalry escalates the more the characters 
begin to resemble each other. The theme of ‘the double’ recurs throughout Girard’s 
work as a way of describing the symmetry and reciprocity that lead to a loss of 
differentiation and to conflict. Referring to the depersonalisation of Czarist 
bureaucracy explored in Dostoevsky’s The Double, Girard writes, “the individuals 
constantly opposed to one another cannot understand that their actual personalities 
are in the process of dissolving”64 into each other.
The structure of the novel allows us to glimpse how the interior world of the 
characters and the external world they inhabit begin to mirror each other65. In The 
Double we find that the madness in the former world continually meets the madness 
in the latter -  the internal and external worlds, the subjective and objective 
experiences merge. Girard adds to Otto Rank’s study of the theme of ‘the double’ in 
Dostoevsky’s work the observation that, in the novel, the social world and the private 
world are indistinguishable.66 He argues that it is not enough to conclude, as Rank 
does, that the “milieu favours madness”, when this milieu (the intensely bureaucratic 
nature of nineteenth century St. Petersburg) is only the external face of a structure 
whose internal face is the “hallucination” of the double. “The phenomenon itself is 
double in that it bears with it a subjective dimension and an objective dimension that
63 René Girard, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky, trans., James Williams 
(New York: Crossroad, 1997), p. 58.
64 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 59.
65 As with the depiction o f the ‘enemy twins’ common to mythology, or the caricature o f ‘Punch and 
Judy’ in popular culture, opposing sides become mirror images of each other in and through the 
escalating violence. We will explore how Girard applies this loss of differentiation to culture as a 
whole in the next chapter.
66 See Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study (London: Kamac Books, 1989).
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converge in the same result.”67 This convergence is depicted in the novel by the two 
Golyadkins, one the intensely self-conscious protagonist and the other the concrete 
manifestation of the collective persona of all the little petty bureaucrats. Where 
psychiatry fails, it comes down to the novelist to pose the problem of the double, for 
it seems only he can place the social structures in question, which he does, 
profoundly, through his art.
Girard tells us that The Double and Notes from  the Underground are two 
efforts at the same truth. It is pride in each case that leads to disintegration. In the 
case of Golyadkin it takes the form of a powerful hallucination. “This proud man 
believes he is one in his solitary dream, but in his failure he divides in two and 
becomes a contemptible person and a contemptuous observer of the human scene. He 
becomes Other to himself.”68 To the extent that the external model and rival gets 
close to the protagonist, by in turn imitating him perhaps, he reinforces the 
contemptuous internal other that results from the protagonist’s failure to maintain his 
own ‘originality’ -  a failure that (as we shall see) appears inevitable in the modem 
period. The division that pertains to this failure, when it becomes acute in the scene 
of the individuals’ interpersonal existence, gives rise to the hallucination of ‘the 
double’. After giving a startling example of Golyadkin’s ‘love/hate’ relationship with 
his peers, Girard discusses the double movement that leads to the convergence of the 
inner and the outer worlds:
The scornful observer, the Other who is in the Self, unceasingly approaches the Other who is 
outside of the Self, the triumphant rival. W e have seen, moreover, that this triumphant rival, 
this Other outside of the Self whose desire I imitate and who imitates mine, constantly comes 
closer to the Self. To the extent that the interior rupture o f consciousness is reinforced, the 
distinction between Self and Other weakens. The two movements converge to produce the 
“hallucination” o f the double. The hallucinatory phenomenon constitutes the outcome and 
synthesis o f all the intersubjective and objective doublings that define underground 
existence.69
57 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 59.
6$ Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 60.
69 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 61.
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This ‘ontological illness’ is not curable by traditional science. While psychiatry seeks 
to heal patients by leading them back to a sense of “objectivity”, Girard suggests that 
the “objectivity” of Golyadkin is, in some ways, superior to that of the “normal” 
persons surrounding him. What makes the great works “great” is their ability to 
‘work through’ the failed unity and division: it is, in other words, their constant 
attempts to ‘up the ante’ on the previous works that fail to achieve unity (and thereby 
the status of a ‘great’ novel) and to find the perfect unity that stands independently. 
But this search for perfection forces Dostoevsky’s characters further underground to 
where the divisions multiply in direct proportion to the desire for unity.
We can infer from Girard’s analysis that Romantic desire in its ‘weaker form’ 
does not leave the individual ‘divided’ in himself to the same degree that we find in 
the more extreme examples of underground existence. There are, it seems, degrees of 
obsession at work here that only the great novelists manage fully to explore.70 The 
obsessive dynamism at work in the great novels is thus played out on a broader 
socio-historical plane, as we shall see in the next section. For the Romantic who, 
through favourable circumstances and perhaps luck, manages his existence well, the 
social world, although at times dubious, is still a convincing whole. But the 
‘unlucky’ Romantic who clings to the illusion of a self-generating ‘unitary identity’, 
while one dream after another collapses, will persist with his desire to the point of 
madness -  or indeed genius. Romantic desire as Girard describes it is no mere 
‘romanticism’.
Romantics never recognise their own doublings, and thus they only make them worse.
Romantics want to believe they are perfectly one. They choose one o f the two halves of
70 In an essay Girard wrote for the English translation of ‘Resurrection from the Underground’, he 
tells us: “We can formulate the law of the underground in terms o f mimetic desire as a fairly benign 
illness, no doubt, unless it is pushed to what Dostoevsky calls its logical extremes, and then it turns 
into what I called the obstacle addiction... underground people are irresistibly attracted to those who 
spurn them and they irresistibly spurn those who are attracted to them, or even those who do no more 
than treat them kindly.” Girard, Resurrection from  the Underground, p. 152.
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themselves -  in the romantic era properly named, this is generally the ideal and sublime half, 
while in our day it is the rather sordid half. But whichever half the romantic tries to pass it off 
as the totality. Pride seeks to prove that it can gather and unify every thing around itself.71
But this is exactly what pride can not do. For it is not a power of uniting but rather “a 
power of dividing and dispersing”.72 Dostoevsky’s works of genius bring the two 
halves of underground consciousness together. “It is not their impossible synthesis 
that the writer presents, but their painful juxtaposition at the heart of the same 
individual.”73 The author’s creative genius, accessible through his art, reveals this 
ineradicable division, and, for this reason, Girard believes, it is a work that truly 
“gathers.”74
6. The Romantic Lie, and the Historical Struggle for Consciousness 
The scale of the disintegration wrought by the unwitting imitation of the other’s 
desires is not confined to an analysis of the self/other relation. In Girard’s theory, the 
novel as a historical force reflects the quintessential drama of humanity. Part of the 
reason he privileges the ‘literary space’ that renders the triangle ‘substantive’, as a 
basic structure of human relations, is the role he sees the novelist play in history. He 
believes the struggle for consciousness is not purely a philosophical task. Contra the 
objective struggles for consciousness that form part of the logical movement of 
history in the Hegelian scheme, Girard argues that the novel is the home of true 
existential insight:
The Hegelian dialectic is situated in a violent past. It exhausts its last force with the 
appearance of the nineteenth century and of democracy. The novelistic dialectic on the 
contrary appears in the post-Napoleonic universe... (The) novelist mistrusts logical 
deductions. He looks around him and within him. He finds nothing to indicate that the 
famous reconciliation is just around the comer. Stendhalian vanity, Proustian snobbism, and 
the Dostoyevskian underground are the new forms assumed by the struggle of consciousness
71 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 63.
72 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 54.
73 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 64.
74 Sadly perhaps, Dostoevsky’s own personal biography, according to Girard, attests to the painful 
‘divisions’ that characterises underground existence. Girard, Resurrection from  the Underground, pp. 
64-70.
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in a universe of physical non-violence.. ,15 
In their work the great novelists confront the ‘image we all have of our own
76desires’; they explore human conflict at its most intense and its most intimate.
It is the “underground” forms of the struggle of consciousness which are studied by the 
modern novelists. If the novel is the source of the greatest existential and social truth in the 
nineteenth century, it is because only the novel has turned its attention to the regions of 
existence where spiritual existence has taken refuge... Only the novelist, precisely to the 
extent to which he is capable of recognising his own servitude, gropes toward the concrete -  
toward that hostile dialogue between self and other which parodies the Hegelian struggle for 
recognition.77
Underground psychology, as the site of a peculiar division within the self, parodies 
the Hegelian struggle for recognition. Through its entanglements with ‘the Other’ in 
which ‘Being’ is always at stake, the self, for Girard, is not a vehicle of Geist (as in 
the Hegelian dialectic), but rather must come to the humble realisation that its 
historical becoming is also an illusion based on its belief in ‘originality’.
Any foundation or ground that the individual occupies is in fact less solid as a 
result of his struggles, forcing him further and further under as the divisions within 
the self multiply.78 History thus constitutes a descent (a terminal case of what he calls 
“deviated transcendence”).79 In this world every statement designed to justify 
human’s existence as noble and worthy rings so hollow that they must dig even 
deeper into the illusory substance of their being to try, in vain of course, to 
compensate for the profound sense of being out of joint. Nothing of Renaissance and 
Enlightenment humanism is preserved, as the individual’s inner life becomes the
75 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 110.
76 “The objective and subjective fallacies are the same; both originate in the image we have of our 
own desires.” Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 16.
77 •Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 111.
7 ft • • * • • •Much o f how Girard describes this existential ‘working through’ o f the author in the novel can be 
compared quite fruitfully, to Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage whereby the youth who attempts to hold 
onto the ‘perfect s e lf , and embody the figure of the God-Man, will according to Kearney, desperately 
contrive to negate those divisions which constitute his ‘out o f joint existence’. The Wake o f the 
Imagination, p. 206. However, the ‘textual revolution’, that Girard is arguably a part of, cannot be 
considered existential in the same way as Kierkegaard’s work is existential, since we cannot view the 
latter’s ‘silencing’ o f the author as an absolute nullifying o f selfhood without considerable difficulties 
when thinking of him as a religious figure.
79 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 289. ‘Deviated transcendence’ is a term that Girard 
contrasts negatively with pre-modem ‘vertical transcendence’.
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shadowy realm brought about through self-deception. For Girard, the individual soul, 
in the modem period, cannot be reborn out of itself and its own achievements, since 
without external hierarchy to guarantee positive imitation, its attempt to take over the 
role of God increasingly divides it, precisely to the extent that it believes it is 
separate (or individual). For example, in Pico’s Oration on human dignity we find a 
concept of the individual diametrically opposed to Girard’s: “Thou shalt have the 
power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have 
the power, out of thy own soul’s judgement, to be reborn with the higher forms, 
which are divine.” 80 In contrast to Renaissance humanism, in Girard’s literary 
criticism there is no faith in the individual’s power to raise itself up spiritually since 
there is nothing left of itself to trust in. Rather the individual’s power is only realised 
in its capacity to pull itself down. Salvation, it seems, must come entirely from 
outside the self.
Girard views this ‘literary existentialism’ as a dynamic stage of historical
development. It is part of the transition from the pre-modem religious world of
theology where things held their meaning through nature and theologians looked to
81nature for marks of design. He describes the transition to the modem world as a 
period when “men become gods in each others eyes”,82 since they reflect the divine
80 Quoted from “On the Dignity of Man” in E. Cassirer, P.O. Kristeller, and J.H. Randall, Jr., The 
Renaissance Philosophy o f  Man (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 224-225.
81 See Burkes’ criticism o f ‘the death and return of the author’ discussed above.
82 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 53. There is an extensive body o f literature critiquing 
Girard for his sexist use of language, his positing of male desire as normative, and his gender 
neutrality (especially in his early work); all of which, it is maintained, perpetuate male power at the 
expense of women. See, Nancy B. Jay, Throughout Your Generation Forever: Sacrifice, Religion and 
Paternity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Toril Moi, ‘T he Missing Mother: The 
Oedipal Rivalries of René Girard” in Diacritics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1982); Luce Irigaray 
“Women, the Sacred and Money” in Paragraph: The Journal o f  the M odem Critical Theory Group 8  
(1986), While these positions reflect a genuine concern to unmask patriarchy some feminist 
perspectives differ considerably as to how Girardian theory should be understood. Girard’s early 
analysis of desire appears to be male centred, however his theory of the scapegoat develops this 
analysis into a critique o f mythic, often patriarchal, structures that have traditionally marginalised and 
done violence to women. On this point see Patricia Klindeinst, “The Voice o f the Shuttle Is Ours” in 
Literary Theory: An Anthology, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), and
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status that the self desperately seeks to appropriate for itself now that traditional 
religion is on the decline.
Men boast of having discarded their old superstitions but they are gradually sinking into an 
underworld ruled by illusions which become increasingly obvious. But as the gods are pulled 
down from heaven the sacred flows over the earth; it separates the individual from all earthly 
goods; it creates a gulf between him and the world of ici-bas far greater than that which used 
to separate him from the au-dela. The earth’s surface where others live becomes an 
inaccessible paradise.83
The contrast of the postlapsarian world to an earlier prelapsarian world is 
significant. Unlike in the earlier world, human beings are now cut off from 
themselves, isolated as selves that still exist among others. “Deviated transcendence” 
becomes a ‘historical’ phenomenon. Human beings, instead of achieving self- 
realisation or historical becoming, have left their previous state only to fall more and 
more into illusion.
But if the novel is now a source of truth in the absence of metaphysics, Girard 
is not inclined to replace the old gods with a divine humanist subject. On the contrary 
his whole argument is, like Barthes’ theo-auteurist criticism, that the human being 
takes over the role of God in the absence o f ‘God’. But unlike Barthes, Girard 
believes that the consequences of this move are grave, since without a religious 
horizon to govern their relations externally, men will imitate each other, and instead
Susan Nowak (Syracuse University), The Girardian Theory and Feminism: Critique and 
Appropriation, paper presentation at CoV&R Conference in Chapel Hill April 22-24, 1993. Both of 
these thinkers in different ways draw constructively on Girard’s work, the former by analysing the 
scapegoat theory in the context of representations of women in myth and the latter by critiquing 
feminist analyses o f Girard for focusing too much on his implicit gender neutrality at the expense of a 
productive engagement with his account of differentiation. My own study is not unaware of the 
problems posed for Girardian theory in relation to feminism, however the ‘substantive problematic’ 
falls outside the scope of my enquiry. While not wanting to down play the issue of gender, my main 
aim is to critique the absence of an ethical subject -  one who can take a stand somewhere. In so far as 
I draw attention to the inconsistency between Girard’s early and later works with respect to his 
treatment of desire (see chapter three) I hope that my work places the tension in feminist approaches 
to Girard mentioned above in some relief. Girard himself acknowledges the greater responsibility of 
men in the generative processes of collective violence, and even makes the point that when woman are 
made appear responsible for such violence (as in Euripides’ The Bacchae), it is probably owing to a 
mythological displacement on behalf of the author which exculpates men. On this point see Violence 
and the Sacred, p. 142. For a discussion o f the significance of Girard’s work in the context of the 
preponderance of women in myths involving sacrifice see Andrew O ’Shea, ‘T he Lysistrata Project: 
intercultural resistance and the economy o f sacrifice” in Intercultural Spaces: Language, Culture, 
Identity, A. Pearson-Evans and A. Leahy eds. (New York: Peter Lang, 2007).
83 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 62.
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of inner peace -  which was at least a possibility within the older forms of vertical 
imitation, or ‘external mediation’ -  individuals now only find increasing levels of 
unhappiness.
The modem autonomous subject, as well as falling prey to base obsessions, 
has a powerful, albeit illusory, status that can also lure people into rivalry, hatred, 
and conflict. The unavoidable worship of these ‘false gods’ in a modem context is a 
source of profound concern for Girard, since the truth, he believes, is that the human 
beings are ashamed of their imitation and must hide it at all costs. The self whose 
vocation is to divinise itself “refuses to recognise the fearsome problem that the 
presence of the other poses.”84 It is thus this fearsome problem and man’s attempts to 
disguise it that generates grandiose schemes and projects. The modem subject thus 
must conceal its resentment under the pretence of ‘originality’, in the same way that 
traditional Christianity, according to Nietzsche, hid its ‘real motivations’ under a 
veneer of morality. The Romantic-humanist subject thus suffers from a ‘slave 
morality’ that Girard exposes as a form of self-deception.
For Girard, the intensification of the negative dynamic between self and other 
in the modem age occurs behind the screen of a philosophy of consciousness. The 
autonomous rational agent of the Enlightenment withers in the anarchic void of the 
underground. At the core of humanism is an extremely decadent individualism. “The 
illusion present in the forms of individual thought... defines pride correctly by virtue
o c
of its very individualism.” Pride, for Girard, is the determining characteristic of the 
underground - a Romantic pride that attempts to pass its divided nature off as
QZ _
singular. The stories of Dostoevsky remind us that, wherever our ‘best interest’ 
may lie, “the proud always prefer the most abject slavery to the egoism
84 Girard, Resurrection, p. 94.oe _ *
Girard, Resurrection, p. 54.
“Romantics want to believe they are perfectly one”. Girard, Resurrection, p. 62.
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recommended by the false wisdom of a decadent humanism.”87 Every enterprise of 
the modem individual recoils back on itself, generating more and more division. The 
progression of Dostoevsky’s creative work charts the succession of a Promethean 
desire to overcome these divisions by dint of the individual’s own will. Each time we 
find “a new rupture that is brought about at a more elevated level than the prior one 
and whose aesthetic and spiritual fruits will be accordingly more remarkable.”88 By 
uncovering the core structure of these dynamics with the help of the spatial 
metaphor, Girard shows how Dostoevsky’s creative work is “always bound to a 
feverish interrogation that bears on the creator himself and on his relations with 
others.”89
Any ‘ethic’ associated with modem individualism must sooner or later fall 
under the sway of a pride that continually attempts to announce its own 
independence even, if not especially, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary -  suggesting that the subject depends more than ever on the other. In this 
view, the modem individual will shore up it’s own separation from others and 
assume the mantle of virtue while doing so. The ethical subject is radically 
undermined here, since ethics is understood ultimately as a futile ruse to justify the 
Romantic hero’s facile sense of ‘self-sufficiency’.
For Girard, historical ‘becoming’, without a shred of genuine consciousness, 
is a negative unfolding, or unravelling. The subject thus appears as utterly beyond the 
realm of the good. The critic relies heavily here on the ineluctability of Dostoevsky’s 
existential insights to make his case concerning historical change. The effects of 
what Dostoevsky expresses so well in Notes from the Underground, Girard argues,
87 Girard, Resurrection, p. 55.
88 Girard, Resurrection, p. 85.
89 Ibid.
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have made themselves felt well before the nineteenth century. Describing where 
these “concealed but recognisable” effects first emerge he says:
Perhaps it is most suitable to seek the first traces of our malaise in the very origin of the era 
of the individualist, in that morality o f generosity that Descartes, the first philosopher of 
individualism, and Corneille, its first dramatist, developed at the same tim e... It is significant 
that rationalist individualism and the irrational morality of generosity appear conjointly. If 
one considers this ‘generosity’ in light o f Demons, one will see there perhaps the beginning 
of an ‘underground’ dynamic whose moments correspond to the metamorphoses of morality 
and sensibility, as they work themselves out in the contemporary period.90
When confronted with the awesome problem of ‘the Other’ in the modem period (as
men become gods in each other’s eyes) the ‘morality of generosity’ is exposed as a
form of attempted self-divinisation. The more the subject attempts to prove to itself
that it is benevolent, the more it relies on ‘the Other’ to dignify its ‘acts of kindness’.
Thus the morality of generosity, for Girard, is the ultimate ruse of the Romantic hero
who wants to be original -  even in what he deigns to bestow on others. However,
when his pride fails to be acknowledged as good, and hence to convince him of his
‘generosity’, he gropes for a ‘higher’ degree of confidence in, what will be yet
another failed act of self-deception that leads further into the underground.
According to Girard, all of history since Descartes and Corneille is an attempt to
maintain an ever-shrinking distance between self and other and their competing
attempts at “self-divinisation.” An absolute distinction is hence the ultimate illusion.
We shall now turn briefly to Girard’s account of Dostoevsky’s vision of man’s failed
yet prophetic attempt at historical becoming.
7. Failure to Gather: ‘The Dostoyevskian Apocalypse’
If we accept that Romantic desire is responsible for the confusions that lead 
to the pathologies of underground existence then Girard also asks us, albeit 
indirectly, to acknowledge that this belief in ‘spontaneity’ and ‘originality’ is the
90 Girard., Resurrection, p. 94.
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source of the revelation of novelistic structure. Without novelists who fall under the 
sway of this Romantic impulse we would have no adequate spatial metaphor to guide 
us on our journey through literary space. It is, after all, Dostoevsky who experiences 
Romantic desire in its fullest and refuses to yield. Girard stresses: “He is not a bad 
romantic because he lacks the essence of romanticism but, on the contrary, because 
he possesses it in superabundance, because he is always ready to rush into madness 
or genius.”91 Indeed this is only to restate what the protagonist tells us at the end of 
Notes from the Underground “As for me, I have never done anything but push to
Q9extremes in my life what you yourself would dare push only half way.” Because of 
this morbid determination, to destroy oneself in order to have oneself (albeit an 
illusory self) Girard claims he has detected in the progression of Dostoevsky’s work 
and thought a certain structure that pertains to all literature and consequently to all 
human relations. It is the ‘metaphysical desire’ at work in novelistic experience that, 
when subjected to the analysis of the critic, paradoxically yields literary substance.
The novelists themselves only obliquely intuit the triangular structure that 
constitutes this ‘literary substance’; it requires the literary critic to make it clear. This 
structure reveals how desire never travels in a straight line but instead turns back on 
itself and on the one whose attempts to be original and self-sufficient are constantly 
frustrated by the very imitative nature of desire itself. This paradoxical dynamic 
leaves the individual seeking his own total and independent being, drawing away in 
an attempt to hide his desire, while becoming more and more like the other. The one 
who succumbs to this metaphysical desire “wants to draw everything to himself, 
gather everything into his own Self but he never succeeds. He always suffers from a 
‘flight’ towards the other through which the substance of his own being flows
91 Girard, Resurrection, p. 98.
92 Girard, Resurrection, p. 68.
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away”.93 The intensity of the hero’s attempts to hide his desire is only matched by 
the intensity of his attempts to find a model worthy of his imitation. Each failed 
attempt only disperses and divides him further. “Pride goes always towards 
dispersion and final division, which is to say towards death. To accept this death is to 
be reborn into unity.”94 The works that truly ‘gather’, Girard claims, are the ones that 
reveal the myth of Romantic desire and its fruitless form of ‘gathering’ -  to these 
works is given the name “Romanesque” or new.95
The intersubjective crisis elaborated in Deceit, Desire and the Novel, in the 
context of the Romantic fallacy and the extremes of underground existence, also 
contains elements of collective crisis that Girard, even at this early stage, begins to 
articulate in relation to Dostoevsky’s work. The fate of the Romantic hero, like 
Golyadkin’s ‘doubling’, unfolds in a broader social milieu. The ontological sickness 
or futile search for ‘Being,’ in extremis, leads to death.96 This death is described by 
Girard as a form of “suicide” -  one that also strangely extends to the community. 
“As the mediator approaches, the phenomena connected with metaphysical desire 
tend to be of a collective nature. This is more apparent than ever in the supreme 
stages of desire. Thus in Dostoevsky along with the disintegration of the individual 
we find a quasi-suicide of the collective.”97 In a move that anticipates his 
anthropological study of collective violence, Girard argues:
Most of the great collective scenes in Dostoevsky end in visions of chaos. In Crime and 
Punishment it is the extraordinary funeral feast in honour o f Marmeladov. In The Idiot it is 
the great scenes in LebedefTs villa, the public concert interrupted by the entrance of Nastasia 
Philipovna and the slap in the face to Prince Myshkin. Dostoevsky is always haunted by the 
same spectacle, but even in the height o f his genius he seems incapable o f  translating its 
horror. It is not his imagination but the literary genre that is not capable o f the task.98
93 Girard, Resurrection, p. 64.
94 Girard, Resurrection, p. 140. See also Girard’s comments on Matthew 12:30/Luke 11:23, ‘"Whoever 
does not gather with me scatters”, Girard, Resurrection.
95 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, pp. 16-17.
96 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 282.
97 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 280.
98 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, pp. 280-281.
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For Girard the implications are clear: the community is undeniably claimed by the 
madness of negative mimesis. This is a theme that will be developed further in 
Girard’s anthropology. If the literary genre is incapable of fully translating ‘the 
horror,’ the critic will find another means. But for now, the critic gives the clearest 
example, up to this point, of the hero’s “vision of terror,” which, once again, lays 
claim on the community."
It is the scene from Crime and Punishment when torment is visited on 
Raskolnikov at the lowest point of his descent into hell, “just before the release of the 
conclusion” and the restored unity of his conversion.
He seemed to see the whole world laid waste by a terrible and unparalleled plague, which 
had swooped down on Europe from the heart of Asia. Everyone except a very few elect 
perished. Microscopic trichina of a hitherto unknown variety penetrated the human organism. 
But these corpuscles were spirits endowed with intelligence and will power. Individuals 
infected with them immediately became unbalanced and mad. Yet by a strange paradox never 
before had men thought they were so wise, so sure of knowing the truth. They had never had 
such confidence in the infallibility of their judgement, of their scientific theories and o f their 
moral principles... Everyone was a prey to anguish and beyond understanding each other. 
Yet each one believed that he alone knew the truth and was grieved at the thought of the 
others. Each person at the sight of the other beat his breast, and wrung his hands and w ept... 
they could not agree on the measures to be taken for good and evil and they did not know 
whom to convict and whom to acquit. They killed each other in a kind of absurd fury.100
This one quote from Crime and Punishment, depicting a ‘terrible contagion’, poses
the whole problem that Girard’s later work will seeks to address -  the problem of
uncontained violence.101 It is a problem that is intimately linked for modems like
Dostoevsky with the inability to know ‘whom to convict’, what Girard will later
describe as a sacrificial crisis par excellence.
The vision of terror recounted in Deceit, Desire and the Novel has the
characteristics of what Girard details in his later work The Scapegoat, as a collective
99 If, as Girard claims, Dostoevsky’s genius is unable to transgress the “limits of credibility”, we 
might conclude that the critic does not hesitate to transgress these limits. Girard, Deceit, Desire and 
the Novel, p. 281.
100Quoted in, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 281.
101 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 290.
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crisis.102 But when, as with other myths, we might expect a hero or a god to appear 
and to fight a monster and perhaps die, thus restoring order, what this account turns 
up is a ‘strange paradox’ that finds men ‘very wise’, but unable to agree. The 
community is left with no victim and no possibility of unanimity -  in other words, 
left to die in an “absurd” crisis without end. According to Girard, the “sickness is 
contagious and yet it isolates individuals; it turns them against the other.”103 The 
responsibility for this crisis lies with the modem individual, about whom he writes: 
“Each believes he alone knows the truth and each is miserable when he looks at his 
neighbours. Each condemns or acquits according to his own law.”104 The intra­
psychic divisions generated when metaphysical desire reaches its apotheosis are 
symptoms of individual crises that are themselves but instances of a much greater 
dispersion.
8. Authentic and Inauthentic Unity: Novelistic Conclusions
The theme of death and rebirth that we discussed at the beginning of this
chapter in relation to the structuralist influences on literary criticism during the 1960s 
is also evident at the end of Deceit, Desire and the Novel In this section I want to 
explicate Girard’s understanding of the meaning of novelistic experience, as evinced 
in the symbolic death and resurrection of the principal characters. At the end of the
‘work of genius,’ Girard contends, spiritual resurrection has been affirmed at the
expense of a Romantic individualism that inevitably leads to spiritual death. In and 
through the physical death of the hero in the novel life, is being generated -  what he
102 For example, the motif o f the plague is a sign that differences have broken down. In the next 
chapter we will explore the ‘signs of persecution’ is greater detail, since they form what Girard 
describes as a five element typology for identifying myths that conceal scapegoating and are thus 
central to his hypothesis concerning collective violence. See Chris Fleming, René Girard: Violence 
and Mimesis, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) p. 80.
103 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 282.
104 rbid.
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sees as the common culminating motif of all ‘great’ novels and calls “the unity of 
novelistic conclusions”. Summing up this unity, which Girard believes brought 
Dostoevsky his own restored humanity, we are given the following lines to ponder: 
“In the second part of The Brothers Karamazov little Ilusha dies for the sake of all 
the heroes of Dostoevsky’s novels and the communion which springs from that death 
is Balzac’s and Proust’s sublime lucidity shared by many. The structure of crime and 
redeeming punishment transcends the solitary consciousness.”105 The last lines in 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel, are the last lines from The Brothers Karamazov that 
portray a collective scene of jubilation, the Christian themes and symbols of which, 
Girard claims, are shared by other novelists: “memory, death, love and 
resurrection.”106 The authors, through the available index of powerfully mediating 
symbols, draw together the imaginary plots that all share the same basic meaning: 
our desires are not our own.
The contagion that Raskolnikov’s vision details as a collective crisis and 
Girard reads as a ‘suicide of the community’ reflects the ontological sickness of the 
Romantic individual that worsens in proportion to the mediator’s proximity, and 
ultimately leads to the complete disintegration of the subject. “The very desire to
♦ * • . . . .  107unify oneself disperses, and here we have arrived at the definitive dispersion”. In 
the end, what we find with many of Dostoevsky’s characters is that the 
contradictions caused by internal mediation destroy the individual. The hero’s 
tireless ‘sadomasochistic’ pursuit of what negates him leads into the most parched 
deserts in a paradoxical attempt to find the purest waters of self-affirmation. “The
10Rwill to make oneself God is a will to self-destruction which is gradually realised.”
105 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 314.
Ibid.
107 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 279.
108 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, pp. 286-287.
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In the end, all the heroes in all the great novels share the same essential insight into 
their previously mistaken desire, and the corresponding realisation of the mediator’s 
actual power over them.
The deviated desire of the Romantic hero may indeed lead to death but 
according to Girard the novel itself leads to life. At the end of Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel Girard claims that there are two sets of conclusions that pertain to novelistic 
experience: 1) two kinds of death, and 2) two kinds of conversion. Of the first set, 
Girard gives the following example: “There are two antithetical deaths in the 
conclusion of The Possessed: one death that is an extinction of the spirit. Stavrogin’s 
death is only death; Stephan’s death is life. This double ending is not unusual in 
Dostoevsky.”109 Physical death and spiritual death are juxtaposed in a powerfully 
symbolic way by the author so as to place the regenerative characteristics of 
novelistic experience in relief. However, the theme of ‘death as life’ becomes the 
basis of the second set of conclusions that go beyond the novel and encompass the 
author’s own experience having traversed the literary space of his ‘great work’. The 
two deaths -  one of which is in fact life -  thus correspond to the two conversions, 
one of which, Girard argues, represents the hero’s transformation in death, while the 
other points to the author’s own conversion in the act of writing the novel.110
The first kind of conversion is the one concerning the characters in the novels 
that Girard treats. The endings of these novels, whether The Brother’s Karamazov, 
Don Quixote, or The Red and the Black, all depict a conversion in death: a spiritual 
conversion, or a death that leads to life. This “unity of conclusions” is denied by 
contemporary criticism, Girard claims, because it wishes to preserve (in a Romantic
109 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 291.
110 Girard tells us that the following verse from St John’s Gospel could serve as an epigraph for 
novelistic conclusions: “If the seed does not die after it has been sown, it will remain alone, but if it 
dies it will bear much fruit.” Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 311.
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vein) the “uniqueness” of the work of art.111 But for Girard this denial overlooks the 
principle that can explain this unity -  a principle that relates in each case to a single 
phenomenon. “The unity of novelistic conclusions consists in the renunciation of 
metaphysical desire. The dying hero repudiates his mediator”. And this repudiation 
implies renunciation of divinity and renunciation of pride.
In renouncing divinity the hero renounces slavery. Every level of his existence is inverted, all 
the effects o f metaphysical desire are replaced by contrary effects. Deception gives way to 
truth, anguish to remembrance, agitation to repose, hatred to love, humiliation to humility, 
mediated desire to autonomy, deviated transcendency to vertical transcendency.112
Girard’s comments here have a bearing on the two kinds of conversion, or the second
set of conclusions, since it is not only the characters who give up their Romantic
illusions and are reborn, but the novelist too undergoes a conversion. The principle
behind the unity of novelistic conclusions suggests to Girard that there must be a real
unity at work in the lives of the novelists. Something is being wrought through the
novel that belongs to the novelist proper, constituting a second conversion.
Who then are the ‘real heroes’ of the novels Girard treats? Who are the
beneficiaries of the insight that has been working itself out in the novels through the
thwarted desires of the principal characters? “The hero succumbs as he achieves truth
and he entrusts his creator with the heritage of his clairvoyance. The title of hero of a
novel must be reserved for the character who triumphs over metaphysical desire in a
tragic conclusion and thus becomes capable o f writing the novel.”113 The author
having overcoming the illusions of spontaneous desire is revealed as the real subject
of literary space.114
111 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 293.
112 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 294.
113 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 296 (my italics).
1,4 This is the insight that Girard carries forward, as his opening remarks at the conference at Johns 
Hopkins in 1960 attest: “1 am personally convinced that great works of art, literature, and thought 
stem ... from a genius’s ability to undertake and carry out a radically destructive reinterpretation of his 
former intellectual and spiritual structures. Unlike lesser works, perhaps these masterpieces will pass 
the test o f  the most radical structural interpretation because they partake o f the same essence, to a
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In the end, the heroic characters recognise the power and influence of the 
mediator on their desires, and thus their dependence on him. The more the 
protagonists of the novels treated by Girard try to separate themselves from their 
model, that is, the more they attempt to convince themselves that their desires are 
their own, the more their pride forces them to merge with their model -  where the 
only option left is spiritual death or spiritual rebirth (represented by physical death). 
This merger between hero and mediator has its counterpart in the unity of the 
novelist, whose own personal narrative merges with the narrative that culminates in 
the hero’s conversion. “The hero and his creator are separated throughout the novel 
but come together in the conclusion.”115 One of the examples that Girard gives of this 
development is the claim by Flaubert: “Mme Bovary, c’est moi.” What is revealed 
here, according to Girard is, the ‘miraculous’ nature of the novel whereby the self 
and other “become one”.116 This communion with the other is paradoxically what 
allows the hero to emerge as a new subject. By renouncing their false belief in 
originality they are humbled by the actual role that the other plays in their life. Girard 
describes this paradoxical outcome as follows:
Victory over self-centeredness allows us to probe deeply into the Self and at the same time 
yields a better knowledge o f Others. At a certain depth there is no difference between our 
own secret and the secret o f Others. Everything is revealed to the novelist when he penetrates 
this Self, a truer Self than that which each of us displays. This Self imitates constantly on its 
knees before the mediator.117
By attempting to shore up his own separateness, the Romantic hero was only 
hastening his lack of difference from ‘the Other’. “Great novels always spring from 
an obsession that has been transcended. The hero sees himself in the rival he loathes;
higher degree no doubt, than our most searching analysis.” Girard, ‘Tiresias and the Critic”, in The 
Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences o f  Man (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 20.
115 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 296.
116 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 300.
117 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 298.
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118he renounces the ‘differences’ suggested by hatred.”
In the conclusion of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel we leam that the author as 
subject undergoes a spiritual conversion, symbolised in the conclusion of his great 
work as a death that the critic believes is in fact life.119 As already mentioned Girard 
describes the significance of this transformation in the context of little Dusha’s death 
in Dostoevsky’s The Brother’s Karamazov, who dies for the sake of all Dostoevsky’s 
heroes “and the communion that springs from that death is Balzac’s and Proust’s 
sublime lucidity shared by many.”120 The “sublime lucidity” achieved here -  as the 
light guiding this conversion -  is, Girard believes, shared in by the ‘great’ novelists 
and “many” others, including the readers who follow in their footsteps. It is a lucidity 
that stems from the author’s painfully won insight into the triangle determining 
intersubjective relations -  an implicit structure governing literary space: one that 
(when acknowledged) generates an authentic literary community, and one that is 
fully articulated, as such, by the critic.
The triangular structure concealed by the Romantic fallacy is the ‘true’ 
principle governing novelistic experience. But can this structure as the logical 
‘result’ of criticism be traced back to the author as subject prior to the scene of 
writing? Can the author’s ‘intention’ be said to have any bearing on the meaning of 
the novelistic experience, or is it only the critic -  equipped with a more sophisticated 
understanding of language -  who can uncover this meaning, independently of all
118 Ibid.
119 At the time of writing his first major work o f criticism, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, there was 
another surreptitious outcome of ‘the conclusion’ that the critic draws. It has to do with his own 
conversion at the end of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel. This ‘outcome’ was only revealed much later 
in an interview with James W illiams. Girard recounts: “When I wrote the last chapter o f my first 
book, I had a vague idea of what I would do, but as the chapter took form I realized I was undergoing 
my own version o f the experience I was describing. I was particularly attracted to the Christian 
elements... So I began to read the Gospels and the rest o f the Bible. And I turned into a Christian”. 
James Williams, (ed.), The Girard Reader (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2004), p. 285. Girard’s 
own ‘death and rebirth’, and his early critical work thus parallel his analysis o f the author and the 
novel.
120 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, pp. 313-314.
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intentionality? These questions summon once again the spectre of the conscious
intentional subject, forcing us to ask whether the subject that Girard so thoroughly
debunks as a Romantic lie, has anything in common with the restored subjectivity
1 1discovered by great novelists “at a certain depth”. In other words, is the spiritually 
restored author any relation of the phenomenological and hermeneutical subject so 
thoroughly debunked by all those theories that influence Girard from early on?122
Shortly after the publication of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, Girard 
published a shorter essay in which he clarifies the experience of religious conversion 
as novelistic unity with specific reference to Dostoevsky’s own life. This work of 
criticism/biography entitled Resurrection from the Underground was first published 
in French with the subtitle: ‘du double à l’unité’ or from the double to unity. This 
French subtitle gives us every reason to believe that Girard’s earlier insight into 
triangular desire has consolidated and the notion of literary space as the locus of the 
death of the Romantic subject and the rebirth of the author is further advanced. In it 
Girard clarifies the experience of conversion as the achievement of unity, with 
specific reference to Dostoevsky’s own life. In the first chapter he sums up what he 
had earlier called the unity of novelistic conclusions, with specific reference to 
Dostoevsky’s own resurrection from the underground: “For Dostoevsky, to create 
oneself is to slay the old human state, prisoner as it is of aesthetic, psychological and 
spiritual forms”.123 It is this assessment of the author’s experience -  when taken to 
the limits to which Girard takes it -  that places his theory, I believe, within the 
family of theories that are content to debunk more traditional models of subjectivity. 
The old humanist subject as ‘metaphysical presence’, and the old ‘human state’ as a
121 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 298.
122 What he many years later describes in an interview with James Williams, as the “fashionable 
mode” within which he is first writing.
123 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 31 (my italics).
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Romantic illusion, must die, but the author himself can return in and through literary 
space, as a deconstructed and now properly reconstructed subjectivity. However, we 
may ask, is there anything of the original subject left to substantiate the claim that it 
is indeed the same person? If not, might we just as easily suppose that the 
reconstruction is most likely an act of construction by the critic on behalf of the 
literary community?
9. Conclusion: The Spiritual and the Literary
Girard’s early work clears a path through the underground of human 
experience, where we paradoxically witness the hero’s sense of self-sufficiency 
depending more and more on a model/rival, at the cost of increasing dissonance 
within the self, and between self and other. This invidious dynamic becomes 
apparent in the novels Girard treats and is made manifest as literary substance by the 
critic. The structure is this substance of the novel, speaking to us of a peculiarly 
morbid human tendency to try and maintain a belief in our own originality, our own 
inherently ‘valuable’ desires, while our encounters with others continually threaten to 
confront us with the ‘reality’ behind all our exploits. The illusion of originality only 
conceals the fact that we must borrow our desires and secretly attempt to pass them 
off as our own, thus deceiving others, but ourselves most of all. This Romantic he, 
according to Girard, is at work in all great novels, and is gradually being exposed by 
the novelists whose literary endeavours provide the space for an existential working 
out of this negative historical phenomenon. The hero’s askesis -  as the 
characteristically negative movement of this existential working out -  is constituted 
by a withdrawal that is also the basis of a flight toward the other. The manifestation 
of ‘the double’ in Dostoevsky’s work is an example of an extreme form of Romantic
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obsession with originality (what Girard calls “metaphysical desire”). It provides an 
example of how unreflective imitation can lead to a kind of ‘hallucination’ that itself 
has a bearing on the social world where we confront the problem that ‘the Other’ 
poses. Personal disintegration and social disintegration become parts of the same 
experience.
Girard describes the historical unfolding of metaphysical desire, in the 
modem period, as a time when ‘men become gods in each others eyes’. The loss of 
religious frameworks, or vertical transcendence (and the possibilities of external 
mediation that prevented individuals falling into rivalry) means that men now seek 
each other out in order to satisfy their deepest yearnings. Analogously to Barthes's 
‘theo-auteurist criticism’, Girard claims that the modem subject takes over the role 
of God from traditional metaphysics, but with this difference: the traditional picture 
appears more favourable to Girard, since a much more sinister form of imitation now 
holds sway between people -  a condition referred to as deviated transcendence. What 
Girard describes as the ‘Dostoyevskian apocalypse’ is the culmination of this 
negative imitation that spreads throughout the whole organism and results in a 
‘suicide’ of the social. When individuals strive for autonomy in the modem period 
they no longer know whom to acquit and whom to condemn. At the end of Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel we learn that the spiritual death and resurrection that all great 
novelistic conclusions enact, also occurs in the great novelists themselves.
However, the consequence of Girard’s ‘debunking’ of subjectivity means 
that the presence of a first-person perspective, as we saw above, cannot be tolerated, 
because such a perspective is wedded to the lie of ‘originality’ and thus suffers from 
a debilitating ontological sickness that can be only cured by the catharsis of the text 
brought about by the therapeutics of criticism. Even the long tradition of Western
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spirituality does not escape the fundamental debunking of subjectivity at work here. 
How, for example, can we understand Christian conversion without a concept of 
interiority through which the soul on its searching journey meets God? When 
textuality is given priority over ontology in this way we lose any meaningful concept 
of a singular interiority or a reflective subject capable of steering a course through 
negative mimesis. While the critic in this scenario becomes like Tiresias pointing out 
Oedipus’ tragic flaw, his own tragic wisdom is kept off limits -  apparently irrelevant 
to the enquiry.124 One imagines Augustine’s self-understanding as being wholly 
irrelevant to his Confessions. Any attempt to understand how he experiences what he 
describes only deflects one away from the plenitude of the text toward an altogether 
illusory ‘Author’.125 Within a structuralist discourse the very distinction between
1 T i ;
inner and outer loses its significance. What content can be given to ‘internal 
mediation’ without a developed concept of interiority? Is this not a significant point 
of tension in Girard’s theory where it seems the primary orientation of ‘internal 
mediation’ is always towards an external rival? One of the chief characteristics of the 
hero’s askesis is withdrawal for the sake of desire -  a withdrawal predicated on the 
belief in the existence of a worthy rival whose desires will form the very basis of the
124 See Girard’s commentary on the role of criticism for cultural theory, in René Girard, ‘Tiresias and 
the Critic” in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages o f Criticism and the Sciences o f Man 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972). Also, on the role o f Tiresias as parallel to Oedipus 
-  as one who knows his fault because he shares his fault -  see Mark R. Anspach, “Editor’s 
Introduction: Imitating Oedipus”, in Oedipus Unbound: Selected Writings on Rivalry and Desire (CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), p. xii.
125 Speaking about what Barthes calls the ‘founders of language’, those authors who exceed the 
parameters of conventional author-text relations, Burke says: “Barthes allows the logothethes 
privileges that extend far beyond those granted the author in traditional man-and-the work criticism. 
What Barthes will not allow to his founders, however, is any representational significance in their 
discourse, any content: Sade without evil, Fourier without socialism, Loyola without God, these are 
the postulates upon which the study commences.” Burke, The Death and Return, p. 41.
126 Speaking o f the development of structuralist, and post-structuralist thought in contemporary culture 
Kearney quotes Barthes who says of the author: “did he wish to express himself, he ought to at least 
know that the inner thing that he wishes to translate is itself only a ready formed dictionary, its words 
only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely.” Kearney, The Wake o f Imagination, p. 
276. A little further on in this work Kearney claims: ‘The imagination which is deconstructed into a 
parody of itself abandons all recourse to the metaphysical opposition between inner and outer.” 
Kearney, The Wake o f Imagination, p. 290.
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subject’s false identity, by providing it with a self image. When all movement is 
characterised thus, can there be any ethical basis to withdrawal, or indeed can there 
be any form of interiority that we might claim as ‘good’?
Death and rebirth is a common theme in the critical works of Barthes and 
Girard. The latter’s early criticism charts the journey from division and 
disintegration, to unity and integration, and in the process begins to provide a model 
of subjectivity as a ‘divestment of agency’, whereby the work now influences the 
author rather than the author consciously attempting to influence the work -  what 
Burke describes, as we discussed above (see note 27), as a new form of 
autobiography characterised by a movement from ‘work to life’. The author, as 
subject, will “reappear as a desire of the reader’s, a spectre spirited back into 
existence by the critic himself’.127 The spiritual symbolism that Girard draws on to 
explain his theory of the novel is no less evident in Barthes’s criticism. As Burke 
observes: “Like a Dionysus, or a Christ, the author must be dead before he can 
return. In a sense too, he must continue to be dead though he has returned. The text 
remains the ‘destroyer of all subjects’ yet, through the twists of a silent dialectic, it 
also might contain a ‘subject to love’.”128 And a little later, in his analysis of
Barthes’s réintroduction of the author in the context of a new criticism and a new
readership, Burke makes the point: “As with other mythical sacrifices, resurrection
129and rebirth are not long in coming.”
The author as ‘progeny of his work’ is a consequence of the debunking of 
subjectivity by structuralist and poststructuralist forms of criticism, but it is also a 
way of introducing an alternative discourse on subjectivity fully in keeping with the 
aims of this new criticism, which is to fundamentally undermine all ‘original
127 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, pp. 27-30.
m  Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 30.
129 Burke, The Death and Return o f the Author, p. 47.
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presence’.130 Girard’s early work achieves a manner of thinking of these 
developments within structuralist thought as part of a peculiarly Western reflection 
on the self/other relation. The death and rebirth of the author, he claims, is not 
“ ...essentially different from that of Saint Augustine or Dante. This is why the 
structure of The Brothers Karamazov is close to the form of The Confessions and The 
Divine Comedy. It is the structure of the incarnation, the fundamental structure of 
Western art and Western experience. It is present every time artists succeed in giving 
their work the form of the spiritual metamorphosis that brings the work to birth.”131 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel, and Resurrection from the Underground are both 
powerful meditations on the novel that lay out the groundwork for Girard’s 
subsequent reflections on the role of crisis in the origins of human culture. However, 
the symbolic structure of ‘death and rebirth’ in these early works of criticism, will, or 
so I shall argue, become an impediment to Girard’s later theory of culture, when he 
attempts to explain how it actually conceals the real violence which erupts at the 
height of the paroxysms of negative imitation, resulting in a collective murder, or 
scapegoating.
130 As Kearney observes: “The postmodern death of the author, Barthes claims, follows from the death 
of God and announces that of Man. He does not bemoan this situation. On the contrary, he sees it as 
heralding a new land of an-archy, and absence of origin (arche) where every act of writing traces a 
field which has no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all 
origins.” The Wake o f  Imagination, p. 276.
131 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 140.
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Chapter 2
Division and Unity in Cultural Space 
(The Scapegoat Mechanism)
Since the idea of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from the idea of the 
profane in the thought of men, and since we picture a sort of logical chasm between 
the two, the mind irresistibly refuses to allow the two corresponding things to be 
confounded, or even to be merely put in contact with one another; for such a 
promiscuity, or even too direct a contiguity, would contradict too violently the 
dissociation of these ideas in the mind. The sacred thing is par excellence that which 
the profane should not touch, and cannot without impunity.1
-  Emile Durkheim
If the history of modem society is marked by the dissolution of differences, that 
clearly has something to do with the sacrificial crisis to which we have repeatedly 
referred. Indeed the phrase “modem world” seems almost like a synonym for 
“sacrificial crisis”.2
-  René Girard
1. Introduction
Girard’s later work, beginning with Violence and the Sacred published in 
1972, marks a shift in context and preoccupation. From his earlier concern with the 
intra- and inter- subjective dynamic depicted in literary space he moves to a concern 
with the more collective dynamics of culture, especially in its mythic and religious 
manifestations. What motivates this transition? Undoubtedly, a key factor that 
brought this shift about is his self-confessed Durkheimianism that seems to be
• 3confirmed the more he extends his discourse into anthropology. How does his work 
on religion and the sacred character of violence come into focus? Signs of his now
1 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1915), 
pp. 37-57.
René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1984), p. 188.
3 For Girard, as for Durkheim, the sacred “is not something ‘added to’ society after it gets going, but 
that which arises with and is integral to society and social order” Chris Fleming, René Girard: 
Violence and Mimesis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 67.
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more anthropological concerns are already evident in his early work when the 
structure of death and rebirth (with all it mythic and religious resonance) is identified 
in literary space and attributed to the author at the end of Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel. We can perhaps, with hindsight, think of Girard as anticipating a move 
towards cultural anthropology. Yet, it was not until after the international conference 
hosted by him and his colleagues at Johns Hopkins University in 1966, and attended 
by some of the central figures of the new French theory, that his interest in the area 
of anthropology began to take definite shape.4 This interest comes to the fore in his 
second major work, Violence and the Sacred, which puts forward a theory of culture 
based on an analysis of myth and ritual, and their relationship to Greek tragedy and 
other historical phenomena -  an analysis that brings the once literary critic into 
conversation with Lévi-Strauss, Herbert, Mauss, and Freud, among other eminent 
nineteenth and twentieth century cultural theorists. Comprehensive study of cultural 
systems has remained the focus of Girard’s subsequent work, marking him out as an 
important thinker in the area of anthropology.
However, his early work, although confined to analysing the structure of the 
novel, contains many of the elements or themes that will re-emerge in his theory of 
culture. The first theme is that of a ‘crisis’ -  caused by ‘internal mediation’ and the 
phenomenon of ‘the double’ -  a psychological deterioration involving hallucinations, 
that has a direct bearing on the social world of the sufferer. This strange condition, 
elaborated in one of Dostoevsky’s novels, describes the process whereby the 
Romantic hero can no longer distinguish between the image he has of his own 
desires, which he always supposes to be ‘original’, and his alter ego, which arises
4 Girard first tentatively broaches a grand theory of culture rooted in scapegoating in his 1965 essay 
“Oedipus Analysed”. In this essay, which is still firmly within the discipline of literary criticism, he 
postulates the theory that Oedipus is a scapegoat. René Girard, Oedipus Unbound: Selected Writings 
on Rivalry and Desire, ed. Mark R. Anspach (USA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 44 -  47. .
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from his secret imitation of a rival. When these two worlds merge, as they do for 
Golyadkin, the individual can no longer maintain the ‘lie’ that has gradually become 
the basis of his conscious life. Doubling thus precipitates a crisis that in Girard’s later 
work comes to be played out at the level of the community and the wider culture, and 
becomes akin to Durkheim’s notion of the dangerous proximity of the sacred and the 
profane quoted above.5 The contagiousness that besets Dostoevsky’s characters, 
manifesting itself as division and generating disintegration, is much the same illness 
that besets the primitive mind when the sacred and the profane are not kept separate.6 
Girard’s initial insight thus becomes the spring for a broader analysis that takes its 
‘sociological’ starting point from Durkheim’s account of the ‘extraordinary 
contagiousness of the sacred object’.7
The second theme that re-emerges in cultural space is the notion of ‘death and 
rebirth’. As we have seen, the influence of French theory is evident on Girard’s work 
here where the ‘life of the text presupposes the death of the author’.8 The triangular 
structure at work in novelistic experience is an essential aspect of this death and 
rebirth because, when brought to light, it reveals the true course of desire that 
eventually frees the hero and author from a false, destructive belief in their own 
originality. When viewed in light of ‘novelistic conclusions’ and the author’s own 
symbolic death and resurrection, imitative desire reveals a commonly understood 
‘mythological’ structure. In attempting to account for the prevalence of this structure
5 The notion o f a ‘collective crisis’ is also discussed, as we saw, in relation to Raskolnikov’s 
apocalyptic vision, although the contagious nature of the violence is an idea that is still in embryonic 
form when Girard is writing as a literary critic. It does, however, re-emerge in a more developed way 
with profound importance for Girard’s theory o f sacred violence -  with the result that we find a near 
perfect correspondence between the early intra- and inter-subjective crises, and the later ‘collective 
crisis’, as will become clear in this chapter.
6 For an analysis o f Durkheim’s views on the ‘extraordinary contagiousness o f the sacred’, see 
Cesáreo Bandera’s essay entitled “Separating the Human from the Divine”, in Contagion: Journal of 
Violence and Religion, Vol. 1 (Spring, 2004), p. 85.
7 Ibid.
8 Keamey, The Wake o f Imagination, p. 274.
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in culture, Girard, as we shall see, brings forward a theory that appears to explain, 
from a paleo-anthropological perspective, the point(s) of origin for all narrative 
structures of death and rebirth -  a violent eruption against one member of the group 
by our primitive ancestors.9
A third element that we find re-emerging in cultural space is the theme of 
unity, which as we saw is closely related to the ‘death and rebirth’ of the author/hero 
and to the life of the literary community: all works of genius share in a regeneration 
that makes the authors the real heroes of the novels in question. In this chapter I will 
continue to explore the constitutive theme of ‘division and unity’ with the purpose of 
highlighting how it is also present in his later work. By providing an exposition of 
Girard’s theory of collective violence, developed at length in Violence and the 
Sacred, I hope to show how these same elements -  crisis, death/rebirth, and unity -  
are understood in the context of his analysis of the larger cultural space: to show, in 
other words, how literary space and cultural space share a similar structure. 
However, I will argue, that when we look back into Girard’s early work in the light 
of his later insight into scapegoating and its concealment in so-called ‘texts of 
persecution’, we can detect that very scapegoating and concealment in Girard’s own 
literary criticism. Hence, with no small degree of irony, Girard -  the great ‘de- 
mythologiser’ -  is exposed as an agent of sacred violence.
2. De-differentiation: The Link Between Self and Sacrifice
As Girard brings his insight into the structure of the novel forward the field of
enquiry no longer corresponds only to the modem period. He begins instead to
consider a whole host of much earlier literature -  biblical texts, mythological texts,
9 As will become clearer in this chapter, Girard maintains that this violent eruption becomes the 
anthropological condition for human evolution, an event that is repeated over ages and gradually gives 
rise to a ‘signifier’ and eventually a linguistic system rooted in the community and reinforced through 
ritual.
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foundational stories, texts of persecution, early Greek drama, and certain aspects of 
primitive religions.10 He claims to find in these texts patterns of practice, ritual and 
representation that are common across all cultures. These correspondences suggest 
that the community, and the order that prevails in it, was founded and repeatedly 
restored through violence, the truth of which has been kept hidden but is now 
detectable in the texts just mentioned.11 This stunning ‘revelation’ leads Girard to the 
inescapable conclusion that there must be a ‘mechanism’ at work within culture 
whereby a crisis is prevented from engulfing a community when one member is 
singled out to take the blame for and the brunt of the hostilities that constitute this 
crisis.12
The link between Girard’s early work of literary criticism and the later work 
of anthropology is his central postulate concerning the erosion of differences 
between self and mediator, or what comes to be referred to as mimetic antagonists:13 
in the transition from literary theory to cultural anthropology the protagonists 
become ‘antagonists’. We have already observed how rivalry between individuals 
can intensify, dissolving the characteristics that previously distinguished them and 
making them ‘doubles’ of each other (as evident in the case of the ‘two Golyadkins’). 
In Violence and the Sacred Girard repeats this insight: “When all differences have
10 As with Fleming’s work on Girard what cannot be replicated in this thesis is the extensive amount 
of ethnological, and literary particulars that Girard brings to bear on his reflections. His theoretical 
framework does not stand independently of these particulars. However, I am attempting to take his 
theory of sacred violence seriously from a philosophical perspective with the obvious limitations that 
follow from a mostly conceptual analysis of diverse cultural phenomena.
1! René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation o f the World: Research undertaken in 
collaboration with J.-M. Oughourlian and G. Lefort, trans. S. Bann and M. Metteer. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1987).
12 René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Y. Freccero. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986).
13 Chris Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 42.
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been eliminated and the similarity between the figures has been achieved, we say that 
the antagonists are doubles.”14
In bringing this insight forward, however, Girard moves one step beyond his 
initial postulate. He now claims that not only does conflict produce doubling and the 
erosion of differences, but, conversely, doubling and erosion produce conflict. “At 
the beginning of Violence and the Sacred, Girard approvingly cites the psychologist 
Anthony Storr, who notes that nothing ‘resembles an angry cat or man so much as 
another angry cat or man’. This endorsement of Storr is based on the psychologist’s 
corroboration of one of the central preoccupations of Girard’s work: the pervasive 
symmetrical patterning in forms of rivalry and agonistics.”15 Whereas the thrust of 
the early work highlights the attempts of the Romantic individual to restore unity 
within himself, thus giving credence to his ‘unique and spontaneous desire’, what 
immediately marks out the later work is the ‘symmetrical patterning’ inherent in the 
reciprocal exchanges between partners in conflict -  a dynamic that is once again 
detrimental to unity. In this anthropological space, ‘one word borrows another’ and 
insults fly, as a ball flies from one player to another in tennis. “Conflict stretches out 
interminably because between the two adversaries there is no difference 
whatsoever.”16
This last claim appears counter-intuitive from the perspective of much socio­
cultural theory, which tends to explain conflict in terms of unmanageable differences 
between people rather than the absence of those differences.17 According to Girard, 
the truth of the situation is in fact the reverse: peace depends on clearly marked
14 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 159.
15 Fl eming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 42.
16 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 45.
17 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 43.
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differences.18 People do not enter into conflict because they are confronted with the 
difference of another that is somehow threatening as difference, rather they enter into 
conflict because the other somehow upsets an existing difference or order and thus 
makes everything appear the same. However, conflict, when reciprocal, while 
appearing to restore difference actually erodes it. As Fleming observes, Girard offers 
a wide array of dramatic examples as evidence of this thesis:
...those episodes in tragic drama, for instance, in which adversaries match each other ‘blow  
for blow’: the deadly duel between the brothers Eteocles and Polyneices in Euripides’ 
Phoenician Women, who imitate each others’ verbal -  and eventually physical -  attacks, until 
they die simultaneously; the fatal encounter between Heracles and Lycus in Euripides’ 
Heracles', the resemblances of Oedipus and Laius in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King', and the 
increasingly undifferentiated rival camps of Brutus and Cassius on the one hand and Mark 
Anthony on the other, in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.19
At the cultural level, the phenomenon that gives rise to such progressive de­
differentiation is what anthropologists call the ‘blood feud’: the often catastrophic 
escalation of violent reciprocity.
A blood feud marks the failure of a culture to direct violence along endorsed 
pathways, as for example in capital punishment and sacrifice.21 When prohibitions 
fail to regulate behaviour, conflict can spill over into a community in unsanctioned 
ways, and the differences that ordinarily hold the community together break down. 
“[E]very move is reciprocated with ‘interest’ in a desperate attempt to arrest violence 
through a frenzied administration of the same. The erosion of the identities of the 
warring parties and the absence of a judicial system or juridical power that 
transcends antagonists ensure that such conflicts remain autogenous, their singular
99gesture reiterated indefinitely.” Vengeance, Girard tells us, turns all antagonists
18 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 49-78.
19 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 43.
20 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 44.
21 Ibid.
22 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, pp. 44-45.
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into doubles,23 even as each blow attempts to establish an absolute degree of 
difference that will arrest violence, restore order, and end the conflict. Their 
reciprocal violence makes them the same even though from within the system all 
they can see is difference -  a difference that must be shored up at any cost. Because 
of this there is a risk that the act of vengeance will “initiate a chain reaction whose 
consequence will quickly prove fatal to any society modest in size”.24
While a chain reaction can draw every member of the community into the 
conflict, vengeance, according to Girard, cannot belong to every member of society. 
Nor is it enough if we wish to prevent it to convince people that it is detestable “for it 
is precisely because they detest it that men make a duty of vengeance.” The cycles 
of violence in a primitive society that Girard believes the institutions of the sacred 
were responsible for curtailing have been largely replaced in modem society with a 
juridical system. This system “does not suppress vengeance; rather it effectively 
limits it to a single act of reprisal enacted by a sovereign authority specializing in this 
particular function. The decisions of the judiciary are invariably presented as the 
final word on vengeance.”26 Since primitive societies have no publicly sanctioned 
system of dealing with vengeance, that is, since they have no ‘certain cure’ once the 
social equilibrium has been upset, Girard believes, it is safe to assume that 
preventative measures will play a vital role. And so, he articulates a concept of 
sacrifice: “as an instrument of prevention in the struggle against violence.”27 The 
main difference between prevention at the level of the community and prevention at 
the level of the self is that the ‘instrument of sacrifice’ is only available to the 
community. The self lacks the cathartic resources to protect itself once a crisis arises.
23 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 12-20.
24 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 15.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 17.
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And from this we can presume that the self can protect itself, to the degree that it can 
do so at all, only by a law that has been effectively internalised; and here again, 
Girard might argue, we are back to an ‘instrument of sacrifice’.
3. Some Characteristics of Violent Reciprocity
One of Girard’s consistent claims since the publication of Violence and the 
Sacred has to do with the role of conflict and violent reciprocity in the erosion of
differences and the onset of a sacrificial crisis that threatens to engulf the entire
community with unthinkable consequences. Greek tragedies share certain literary 
traits and motifs that allow us to discern this invidious dynamic if we only let go of 
our precious belief today in the ‘originality’ of the work of art.29 Girard is reminding 
us in Violence and the Sacred of what he sees as a “Romantic Manichean” tendency 
that views heroes and villains as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ without recognising how each plays 
off the other to generate an overall momentum, one which provides the background
30dynamic of culture as a whole (as the Greek tragedians knew all too well ).
Order and peace depend on cultural distinctions which in turn depend on the 
difference between impure violence, such as patricide and incest found in Oedipus, 
and purifying violence, which belongs to ritual and especially sacrifice. To collapse 
or efface the difference between pure and impure violence, Girard argues, is to risk 
the spread of reciprocal violence throughout the community.
The sacrificial distinction, the distinction between the pure and the impure, cannot be 
obliterated without obliterating all other distinctions as well. One and the same process of 
violent reciprocity engulfs the whole. The sacrificial crisis can be defined, therefore, as a 
crisis of distinctions -  that is, a crisis affecting the cultural order. This cultural order is 
nothing more than a regulated system of distinctions in which the differences among
28 Of particular relevance to my argument are the following works by Girard: Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation o f the World (London: The Athlone Press, 1978), The Scapegoat (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989), A Theatre of Envy (Surrey: Gracewing and Indigo, 1991).
29 Girard’s criticism here is similar to the criticism above that pertains to ‘the unity o f novelistic 
conclusions’, whereby the emphasis on ‘originality’ obscures the shared meanings of the authors.
30 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 47.
54
individuals are used to establish their “identity” and their mutual relationships.31 
When we fail to see how clearly marked differences create order and peace we fail to 
see how the cultural order determines every possibility with respect to identity. The 
loss of identity is essentially a cultural crisis. The chain reaction described earlier 
becomes more insidious when we consider what is now at stake in this escalation of 
violence. “When the religious framework of a society starts to totter, it is not 
exclusively or immediately the physical security of a society that is threatened; rather 
the whole cultural foundation of the society is put in jeopardy.”32 Anything that 
threatens the institution of sacrifice ultimately threatens the very basis of the 
community and therefore the preservation of human life.
From the point of view of modem freedom, which comes about with the 
discrediting of traditional religious frameworks, equality becomes an important 
principle determining the political sphere and all aspects of institutional life. 
However, this principle, according to Girard, tends to regard all differences as 
obstacles in the path of human happiness.33 All rank, all hierarchy in the modem 
period is held in question and thus the very basis of cultural order and stability is 
perpetually undermined. Girard diagnoses this ‘flattening’ in anthropological terms 
as a “sacrificial crisis” that pertains to the modem world.34 When differences become 
“unhinged” as they do in less sacrificially secure societies like our own, they become 
uncertain and potentially threatening. He believes that when people feel less secure 
about ‘what they have and who they are’, the unhinged differences generate rivalry 
as their potential to confer significance appears open to more and more people. This 
happens, for example, when in our culture the redundant titles of the nobility, access
31 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 49.
32 rbid.
33 rbid.
34 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 188.
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to which once adhered to strict criteria, are open to purchase by anyone who can 
afford them. Such ‘flattening’ in the modem period, Girard argues, generates 
mimetic rivalry and conflict because once differences no longer serve as a dam 
against violence they serve to swell the flood.
Girard draws on Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida to provide us with an 
interesting metaphor to help dispel our ‘fashionable intellectual attitudes’ that tend to 
see difference as a problem to be overcome. Ulysses’s speech about the besieged 
Troy is a reflection on the role of ‘Degree’ in human endeavour. This Degree is the 
underlying principle of all order, natural and cultural, which allows individuals to 
find a place for themselves, “.. .it lends a meaning to things, arranging them in proper 
sequence within a hierarchy; it defines the objects and moral standards that men 
alter, manipulate and transform”.36 Girard emphasises the musical dimension of this 
metaphor and just how discordance is synonymous with collective violence.
.., O When Degree is shaked,
Which is the ladder to all high designs,
The enterprise is sick! How could communities,
Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities,
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
The primogenitive and due o f  birth,
Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels,
But by degree, stand in authentic place?
Take but one degree away, untune that string,
And hark what discord follows! Everything meets 
In mere oppugnancy.37
Loss of differences gives rise to chaos and violence, forcing men into a perpetual 
confrontation that strips them of their distinctive characteristics, “in short their 
identities.”38 The consequences of this loss are similar to the mixing of the sacred 
and the profane, a mixing which contradict too violently the dissociation of these 
ideas in the mind (Durkheim). Shakespeare captures the essence of ‘collective crisis’
35 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 50.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 51.
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in a late Renaissance context.39 Degree maintains balance and harmony, while lack 
of degree brings conflict. “In this situation no one and nothing is spared; coherent 
thinking collapses and rational activities are abandoned. All associative forms are 
dissolved or become antagonistic; all values, spiritual or material, perish.”40 And in a 
curious comment Girard asserts: “To say that this speech merely reflects a 
Renaissance commonplace, the great chain of being, is unsatisfactory. Who has ever 
seen a great chain of being collapse?”41 We may note that Girard is demythologising 
here the ontological order canonised by western metaphysics; all cosmic order, as the 
basic pattern of eternal Being (following the Greek concept), when cast in these 
anthropological terms, is viewed as a temporal projection of the sacred. Platonic 
metaphysics is thus rejected. Given the significance that Girard places on ‘Degree’ in 
Shakespeare’s work, and his belief that its loss illustrates how social order becomes 
unhinged, it is important to explore further this ‘anti-metaphysical’ reading if we are 
to grasp precisely what he means by disorder and, correspondingly, order.
4. Shakespeare’s ‘Mimetic Theory’; The World as Stage
Girard’s extended treatment of Shakespeare’s work as the paradigm of his 
mimetic hypothesis concerning sacred violence can be found in his later critical 
work, A Theatre o f Envy (1991). In this book he applies his now more developed 
theory of collective violence to a whole range of Shakespeare’s dramatic works, 
comedies as well as tragedies, and argues that this late Renaissance individual puts 
the world and its constituent forces upon the stage with greater verve and insight than
39 The rest of the speech just quoted, which contains common motifs of collective crisis, such as ‘a 
flood’, is emblematic o f the undifferentiation that holds sway in a sacrificial crisis, as we shall see 
below when we outline Girard’s five-element typology for identifying myths that conceal acts of  
scapegoating.
40 Ibid.
41
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many nineteenth century anthropologists.42 According to Girard, it is not the great 
chain that Shakespeare is interested in. Ulysses’s speech as we saw above is no banal 
variation on this ‘Renaissance commonplace’, which must be “fundamentally eternal 
and unchanging, failing which it no longer fits the definition of Being in the 
metaphysical and medieval sense”.43 There may be, Girard admits, local disruptions 
within an order understood as a great chain, due to human sinfulness, but the order 
does not melt down in the way described in Ulysses’s speech.44 For this reason he 
believes the picture of cosmic order at work in the great chain of being does not 
govern Shakespeare’s genius, which is, on the contrary, much more attuned to the 
mutability of the world. Degree exists as a function of culture and not an ontological 
given. As the basis of differentiation it is the primary concern of the artist in Troilus 
and Cressida. Girard describes its significance as follows:
“Degree”, from the Latin gradus, means a step in a staircase or on a ladder, a nonhorizontal 
spacing between two entities, and more generally rank, distinction, discrimination, hierarchy, 
difference. It is also the “endless jar” between justice and injustice, the same empty space 
once again that prevents any confusion between right and wrong. Justice is no exercise in 
exquisite impartiality, no perfect balance, but a fixed modality of imbalance, like everything 
cultural.45
When the crisis of Degree has reached fever pitch, the mimetic crisis has likewise 
reached its most intense point. As in the intersubjective crisis, “formally 
differentiated entities have turned into undifferentiated doubles that keep colliding 
for no discernible purpose, like loose cargo on the deck of a storm-tossed ship. Their 
violence has destroyed whatever object they desire in common, depriving their
42 ‘The difference between ancient Greek tragedy and Shakespearean tragedy, Girard believes, cannot 
be accounted for simply in terms of greater ‘aestheticism’ or Shakespeare’s ability for far more 
complex ‘psychological profiling’. The necessary condition for the creation o f Shakespeare’s dramatic 
works resides, rather, in a cultural unveiling set in motion by the ancient Hebrews more than three 
thousand years before Shakespeare’s birth”. Chris Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 
101.
43 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, p. 162.
44 Ibid.
45 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, pp. 161-162.
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struggle of its significance.”46 Like Dostoevsky’s characters, individuals imitate their 
rivals’ desires with no sense of the proper limits within a hierarchical system -  in 
other words, their rivals have become ‘gods’. “The destruction of degree is an influx 
of mimetic rivalry so massive that it resembles the plagues that never fail to show up 
in this kind of apocalyptic tableau.”47 Conflict and violence thus become contagious 
and the differential principle that ordinarily suppresses mimetic rivalry succumbs to a 
“virulent attack of the disease it is supposed to prevent” 48
According to Girard, the notion of ‘Degree’ is present in all of Shakespeare’s 
plays.49 However, it is more than a source of stable meaning and clearly marked 
differences, separating individuals in rank and station, it is also “paradoxically” a 
principle of unity among people. It is thus a source of separation and unity, or, 
perhaps, more accurately, unity in separation, because “when this separation is gone, 
when people come too near each other, hark what discord follows.”50 The loss of 
Degree precipitates a sacrificial crisis.
Girard explains why, in the absence of Degree, rivalry and crisis escalate 
while in its presence they are, if not absent, at least containable -  in other words they 
do not lead to destruction. Because human desires are governed by imitation, a 
negative example of which we saw at work in Romantic individualism, all ‘order’ 
attempts to channel desire in constructive ways. Military rank is a paradigm example 
of the kind of order to which Shakespeare links imitative desire. “In a disciplined and 
efficient outfit, each soldier looks up to the rank immediately above his own in the 
hope of promotion. Each soldier takes his commanding officer as a model and
46 Girard, A Theatre o f Envy, p. 162.
47 Girard, A Theatre of Envy, p. 163.
48 Ibid.
49 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, p. 174.
50 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, p. 164.
59
guide.”51 But when imitation ignores military rules and traditions it can just as easily 
bring destruction as the kind of excellence accredited in the army. Describing the 
anthropological function of this strict rank and station Girard writes: “Order consists 
of a chain of obedient imitation so pervasive that it facilitates the contagion of 
disorder when disorder appears.”52 The difference between ‘good’ imitation, and 
‘bad’ imitation in the final analysis stems not from two types of imitation but from 
Degree itself: “Imitation is ‘good’ imitation when it conforms to the rules of Degree 
and respects the distinctiveness of each rank.”53 Once again, cultural order requires 
clearly marked differences that can only be maintained by an underlying principle of 
Degree; the failure of Degree gives rise to bad imitation, whereby “Each thing meets/ 
in mere oppugnancy”.
This principle is central to Girard’s overall theory of collective crisis. It 
provides a more secure anthropological basis for the distinction between internal and 
external mediation adumbrated in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel.5* As long as the 
models and their imitators live in separate worlds, as in the case of Adamus and Don 
Quixote, they cannot become rivals. Their ‘external’ mediation prevents them 
selecting the same object. However, as these worlds overlap more and more in the 
modem period, they can and therefore do select the same objects, thus generating 
mimetic rivalry and a greater likelihood of crisis.55
In a system that is governed by external mediation and that therefore respects 
the principle of Degree the “people on the lower steps look up to the people above
51 Ibid.
52 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, p. 165.
53 Ibid.
54 To recap on Girard’s early analysis o f the novel: “We shall speak o f external mediation when the 
distance is sufficient to eliminate any contact between the two spheres of possibilities o f which the 
mediator and the subject occupy the respective centres. We shall speak of internal mediation when this 
distance is sufficiently reduced to allow these two spheres to penetrate each other more or less 
profoundly”. Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 9.
35 Ibid.
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them and are likely to choose them as models, but in a purely ideal sense. They must 
select their concrete object of desire inside their own worlds, and rivalry is 
impossible. The imitators would prefer to select the objects of their models, but 
Degree prevents them from doing so.”56 If in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel the 
‘internal mediation’ is the dominant focus, we might say that the notion of Degree in 
Violence and the Sacred and A Theatre o f Envy provides a basis for filling out the 
picture of imitation more in terms of ‘external mediation’ -  in line with a more 
general anthropology.
A healthy Degree means a lot of external mediation throughout the system structured by it, 
and therefore few internal conflicts. As soon as Degree weakens, the mediation tends to 
become internal, and the mimetic rivalry thus generated accelerates the incipient cultural 
disintegration that produced it in the first place. The breakdown o f traditional institutions 
destroys their ability to channel desire into the non-competitive directions that prevent 
mimetic rivalries.57
It thereby opens the way to the kind of conflict that all great playwrights -  and, we 
might add, in a slightly different context, novelists -  love to portray. “The 
Shakespearean notion of ‘Degree’ includes within itself the spatial metaphor that 
underlies the distinction between external and internal mediation.” The principle of 
Degree at work in Shakespeare’s plays, Girard argues, is an anthropological principle 
essential to an ordered system of difference, and crucial to containing the rivalry that 
first appears in Girard’s work in relation to novelistic experience. The now extended 
literary space is ultimately a reflection of cultural space and the dynamics that 
necessitate ‘prohibition’ -  when the sacred and the profane are mixed. According to 
Girard, the principle of Degree is not to be confused with the metaphysical view of 
nature associated with traditional accounts of the great chain of being -  “a medieval 
idea that Shakespeare might have borrowed for purely decorative purposes.”59 We
56 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, p. 165.
57 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, p. 166.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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might reasonably ask, though, whether the underlying principle that gathers together 
“all the particular degrees and differences” does not itself verge on the metaphysical 
when Girard describes it as “a single differential principle... with a capital D, upon 
the integrity of which the stability of cultural systems and their existence depend.”60
5. Violence and Scapegoating: From Crisis to Resolution
So far in this chapter I have been looking at the dynamics of violent 
reciprocity - the loss of clearly marked differences, and the on-set of a ‘sacrificial 
crisis’ that spreads throughout the community and beyond. I made the point that 
Greek tragedy, according to Girard, contains an insight into sacred violence made 
recognisable in the similarities between ‘hero’ and ‘villain.’ Moreover, I made the 
point that the notion of ‘Degree’ can be read as a way of assigning differences that 
are essential to order and harmony. Without hierarchy and clearly marked differences 
the “ ‘modem world’ is almost like a synonym for “sacrificial crisis.’”61 I already 
mentioned how, on a cultural level, a phenomenon that gives rise to de­
differentiation is what anthropologists call the ‘blood feud’. One example of this 
phenomenon given by Girard allows him to compare the Greek world of tragic drama 
with an account of a more ‘primitive’ response to the threat of violence. While the 
former conceals the true events the latter has no such inclination. The example is 
taken from Jules Henry’s Jungle People, which deals with the Kaingang Indians in 
Brazil, who had been moved to a reservation shortly before the author came to live 
among them and to observe their ways in the middle part of the twentieth century.
60 Girard, A Theatre o f  Envy, p. 162.
61 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 188.
62 About Henry’s work with this displaced tribe whose rituals were in decline, Girard says: “He was 
thus able to observe at first hand, or through the testimony o f witnesses, the process I call the 
sacrificial crisis.” Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 52. The whole study documents the breakdown 
of the society through internal feuding. Henry claims that although the group were well suited to adapt
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Thus, Girard’s analysis of the role of Degree in Shakespeare finds its 
correlate in his study of primitive societies: differences must ‘stand in authentic 
place’ .63 Similarly, we learn that Greek tragedy is a child of the sacrificial crisis.64 It 
draws its inspiration from a direct intuitive grasp of the role played by violence in 
cultural order and disorder, in mythology and the sacrificial crisis. Hence, “England 
in the throes of religious upheaval provided Shakespeare with such an inspiration for 
his Troilus and Cressida.”65 Once the crisis reaches a certain point the process 
appears to reverse itself; order is re-inscribed and the whole process begins again. 
Tragedy recounts these events with a certain amount of lucidity -  although the 
insight it conveys is always ‘imperfect’.66 Yet the knowledge of cultural order and 
disorder is present in certain inspired texts, including tragic drama, if only the 
anthropologist is prepared to look for it. However, when we discover this knowledge, 
another question confronts us. Once the sacrificial crisis begins there seems to be no 
way of bringing it to a halt, and yet, Girard argues, we know from various textual 
accounts that either hide their inspiration or gradually reveal it that the violence does 
stop, What stops it, and brings the collective crisis to a halt? “If there are really such 
events as sacrificial crises, some sort of braking mechanism, an automatic control 
that goes into effect before everything is destroyed, must be built into them. In the
and cope with the rigours of the natural environment, “they were unable to withstand the internal 
forces that were disrupting their environment and, having no culturally standardised devise to deal 
with them, were committing social suicide.” Girard, Violence and the Sacred p. 54. The ‘tit-for-tat’ 
killings were meant in a bizarre way to stop the violence but only succeeded in adding fuel to a fire. 
The fear generated by the “kill-or-be-killed” attitude cannot be explained by modem psychology. 
Commenting on how the Indians’ fears are not merely ‘projections’, Girard points out: “In a universe 
deprived of any universal code of justice and exposed to violence, everybody has reason to fear the 
worst”. And in a sentence reminiscent of Golyadkin’s ‘peculiar objectivity’, Girard says: “The 
difference between a projection of one’s own paranoia and an objective evaluation of circumstances 
has been worn away”. Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p.54.
63 Girard also deals with how twins are treated in Greek drama and primitive societies -  how they can 
strike terror into the community by their undifferentiation. “Behind the image o f the twins lurks the 
baleful aspect of the sacred, perceived as a disparate but unified force” Girard, Violence and the 
Sacred, p. 58.
64 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 66.
65 Ibid.
66 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 64-65.
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final stages of a sacrificial crisis the very viability of human society is put in 
question.”67 What (or who) saves the community from total annihilation?
In order to explain the breakdown of differences that leads to crisis and the 
restoration of order that re-inscribes differences creating peace once again, Girard 
turns to the figure of Oedipus. Prior to the onslaught of collective violence at Thebes 
Oedipus, he tells us, is a ‘polluted presence, a receptacle for universal shame’. But 
another Oedipus emerges at the end of the play who becomes a “definitive” hero in 
the final tragedy of the Oedipus cycle, Oedipus at Colonus.69 At the end of the first 
play we are given a clue to the hero’s efficacy, with the line “All is well.” Order and 
stability are restored as was intended when the violence was initially directed 
towards Oedipus. Therefore, it seems only logical to attribute the happy result to the 
victim himself.70 This double meaning of the victim as evil and good is the key to the 
mystery of crisis and order or violence and the sacred. “At the supreme moment of 
the crisis, the very moment when reciprocal violence is abruptly transformed into 
unanimous violence, the two faces of violence seem juxtaposed; the extremes meet. 
The surrogate victim serves as a catalyst in this metamorphosis. And in performing 
this function he seems to combine in his person the most pernicious and the most 
beneficial aspect of violence.”71 The surrogate victim becomes the unrecognised 
incarnation of the community’s own violence. If Oedipus is the saviour of the 
community it is only because he is a patricidal and incestuous son.
T 7  *This same pattern of the poison becoming the cure “is to be found in
67 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 67.
68 The plague motif in Oedipus the King conceals the presence of a sacrificial crisis. It functions like 
the motif of the flood in Ulysses speech in Troilus and Cressida, except it is hidden. Girard, Violence 
and the Sacred, p. 75/87.
69 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 85.
70 Ibid.
71 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 86
72 On the similarities between Oedipus and the pharmakos who share a dual connotation, see Girard, 
Violence and the Sacred, p. 95.
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innumerable tales from folklore and mythology; in fairy stories, legends, and even in 
works of literature. A source of violence and disorder during his sojourn among men, 
the hero appears as a redeemer as soon as he has been eliminated, invariably by 
violent means.”73 All these stories point to the mechanism that Girard believes 
restores the stability of a community in crisis. The pervasiveness of this pattern leads 
him to speculate further: “If the generating spark of religion and the transcendental 
force that characterises it are in fact the product of violent unanimity -  of social unity 
forged or reforged by the ‘expulsion’ of the surrogate victim -  then...we will find 
ourselves dealing not only with myths but with rituals and the whole question of 
religion”74. It transpires that the aim of all religion is to keep violence outside the 
community through ritual re-enactment of collective violence and scapegoating.75 
‘The complete explanation of the Oedipus myth -  that is the determining of the 
precise function of the surrogate victim -  permits us to understand the aim of the 
sacrifleers. They are striving to produce a replica, as faithful as possible in every 
detail, of a previous crisis that was resolved by means of a spontaneously unanimous 
victimisation.”76 The exemplary myth of Oedipus allows Girard to penetrate the 
‘meaning of myth’ and thus understand it in its properly religious context. When 
viewed anthropologically, in light of the scapegoat mechanism, religion itself is just 
another word for the surrogate victim, who reconciles the oppositions generated by 
the mimetic impulse.77 It is this reconciliation that gives culture its basic structure.
The taxonomy of the scapegoat is highly elaborate. Girard devotes an entire
book to exploring the various aspects of scapegoating and what makes a scapegoat 
suitable as a sacred object. Everything from the marks of the scapegoat, its arbitrary
73 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 87.
74 rbid.
75 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 92,140
76 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 94.
77 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 307.
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nature, stereotypes of persecution and the generation of unanimity are all discussed 
in the context of real historical phenomena -  witch trials, persecution texts etc. 
Anyone can play the part of the victim, given the unpredictable and indiscriminate 
oscillations of mob behaviour. However, it is not very difficult to detect well- 
established patterns of persecution in cultures like our own. Summarising aspects of 
Girard’s work on The Scapegoat, Fleming writes: “both common sense and the 
findings of the empirical social sciences tend to corroborate -  that scapegoats or 
surrogate victims tend to be marginalised figures or outcasts, persons often existing 
on the fringes of society who, for that very reason, are vulnerable to the kinds of
7ftviolence of which surrogate victimage is the most radical expression.” Outrageous 
charges are often levelled at scapegoats:
...incest as well as rape, bestiality, and parricide, is a crime which involves transgressions 
that level and confuse the identity of subjects and their relative loci in the social order. 
Scapegoats, that is, tend to be accused of exactly the kinds o f acts which would contribute to 
the annihilation of distinctions within the community, crimes which are thought thereby to 
bring about the crisis of which they are accused: ‘They attack the very foundation of cultural 
order, the family and hierarchical differences without which there would be no social 
order.”79
When we confront these stereotypes in various historical contexts we realise that the 
persecutors actually believed in the guilt of their victims and that real violence 
resulted -  someone is actually scapegoated. This highlights another important point 
about the scapegoat mechanism: it functions in a non-volitional, automatic way. Nor
is the fact that it operates unbeknownst to its participants ‘accidental’; its very
80operation requires miscomprehension.
Much of the misunderstanding and mistaken belief surrounding sacred 
violence is stimulated by the false accounts of scapegoating, contained in mythology
78 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 51.
79 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 52.
80 The ‘miscomprehension’ here is not entirely unlike the Romantic individual’s failure to see that his 
desires are in fact mediated. However, Girard would most likely argue that the necessary 
miscomprehension at the cultural level is beneficent in terms o f social order while the Romantic 
individual seems to produce nothing but negative mimesis.
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and other forms of representation. Girard tells us that myth, which itself is the 
inspirational source of much tragic drama, recounts the event of collective violence 
from the perspective of the restored community -  the innocent victim is invariably 
disguised in the process as a villain, a hero, a stranger, a monster, and ultimately a
Q 1 m ,
god. Language, Girard says, cannot properly grasp hold of the sacrificial crisis. On 
one hand it invites anecdotal history, and on the other a visitation of grotesques and 
monsters»82 All the previously terrifying and subsequently peaceful aspects of a 
crisis get mixed together in the process of being ‘mythologized.’ Tragedy then 
‘pieces together the scattered fragments of reciprocity and balances the elements 
thrown out of kilter’ in the earlier process.83 Drawing out a difference between 
Girard’s interpretation of myth, and the traditional approach to mythology, and 
narrative more generally since Aristotle, Gil Bailie argues that myth actually 
conspires to keep silent the voice of the victim.84 Monstrosities that recur throughout 
mythology are one of a number of features whose combined effect is to silence the 
victim and to ensure that the violent resolution of the crisis continues to be narrated 
from the point of view of the community. And so, “we can only conclude that myths 
make constant reference to the sacrificial crisis, but do so only in order to disguise 
the issue. Myths are the retrospective transfiguration of sacrificial crisis, the 
reinterpretation of these crises in light of the cultural order that has arisen from
81 For an account of ‘otherness’ that is quite critical o f Girard’s theory of the scapegoat, see Richard 
Kearney, Strangers, G od’s and Monsters, (London: Routledge, 2003).
82 “Mythology succumbs to the latter; tragedy is constantly threatened by the former". Girard,
Violence and the Sacred, p. 64.
83 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 64-65.
84 Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 
1997), pp. 30-41. In particular: “The Greek word for myth, muthos, is mu, which means ‘to close’ or 
to ‘keep secret.’” Bailie, Violence Unveiled, p. 33. We might contrast this view of muthos with the 
dominant philosophical understanding of the term mythos as itself a form of mimesis taken as “the 
transformative plotting of scattered events into a new paradigm”. See R, Kearney, On Stories (London 
Routledge, 2002), p. 12.
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them.”85 Hence myth attempts to keep secret the fact of original violence.86
6. Mimesis and the Monstrous Double
At the beginning of this chapter I mentioned how the figure of the double that 
functions in Girard’s early work to explain the loss of difference at the intra- and 
inter- subjective level parallels the loss of difference pertaining to reciprocal violence 
in his later work -  when antagonists become doubles. This basic dynamic is central 
to Girard’s theory of conflictual mimesis. In Violence and the Sacred however, 
‘triangular desire’, which had been deployed in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel as a 
spatial metaphor is no longer used to describe the dynamics that give rise to 
doubling. If the loss of differences can spread and threaten an entire community 
something more than a ‘spatial metaphor’ is needed to explain the storm that brews 
with such ferocity and takes the form of a collective crisis. The principle of Degree 
now functions to designate the space between differences in a hierarchy, and 
“mimetic desire” becomes the term used to explain the hyper oscillations that lead 
from reciprocal violence to collective violence -  from disorder to order. By using the 
term ‘mimetic desire’ Girard does not confine his analysis to the self/other relation 
since the action no longer centres on the hero, as in the novel, but on the mediator
07 t .
who is also a rival. Anyone can imitate anyone else, and everyone imitates.
85 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 64.
86 On the need to forget original violence Terry Eagleton writes: “David Hume, perhaps the greatest of 
British philosophers, cautions that if  we investigate the origins o f  nations, we shall find there rebellion 
and usurpation... Blaise Pascal is quite as candid as Hume on the need to obliterate one’s genesis.
‘The truth about the (original) usurpation’, he writes conspiratorially, ‘must not be made apparent: it 
came about originally without reason and has become reasonable. We must see that it is regarded as 
authentic and eternal, and its origins must be hidden if  we do not want it soon to end’.” Terry, 
Eagleton, Holy Terror (NY: Oxford University Press 2005), p. 64 (quotation in text from B. Pascal, 
Pensées).
87 In Violence and the Sacred Girard tells us: “Our first task is to define the rival’s position within the 
system to which he belongs, in relation to both subject and object.. .In desiring an object the rival 
alerts the subject to the desirability of the object. The rival, then, serves as a model for the subject, not 
only in regard to such secondary matters as style and opinions but also, and more essentially, in regard
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Collective crisis, as the logic of what can go wrong when we ignore our tendency to 
imitate, has replaced the intra and intersubjective crisis -  cultural space thus 
supersedes literary space as individual concerns become eclipsed by the enormity of 
sacred violence.
The structure of desire discussed in Violence and the Sacred is essentially the 
same as in Deceit, Desire and the Novel, except perhaps for the curious fact that what 
was described as ‘Romantic desire’, supposedly owing to the individual’s 
‘uniqueness’, is now said to “correspond to a primary impulse of most living 
creatures, exacerbated in man to the point where only cultural constraints can 
channel it in constructive directions.”88 The basic idea behind the escalation of 
violence towards crisis is the notion of the “double bind”, borrowed from Gregory 
Bateson’s theory of schizophrenia. If desire is allowed follow its own bent it will 
lead to two contradictory imperatives for the subject, who naturally imitates 
unselfconsciously until interrupted by a mediator. This double imperative: “imitate 
me, I am your model/ don’t imitate, I am your rival” leads to greater and greater 
attempts to obtain an illusory object and more intense displays of violence in the 
process.
The uncharaielled mimetic impulse hurls itself blindly against the obstacle of a conflicting 
desire. It invites its own rebuffs, and these rebuffs will in turn strengthen the mimetic 
inclination. We have, then, a self-perpetuating process, constantly increasing in simplicity 
and fervour. Whenever the disciple borrows from his model whatever he believes to be the 
‘true’ object, he tries to possess that truth by desiring precisely what his model desires. 
Whenever he sees himself closest to the supreme goal, he comes into violent conflict with a 
rival. By a mental shortcut that is both eminently logical and self-defeating, he convinces 
himself that the violence itself is the most distinctive attribute of this supreme goal!89
Violence then is self-perpetuating, since it is the motive force and the ineluctable 
object of our desires. Rivalry spreads, as each rival turns to even greater violence in a
to desires”, p. 145. The fact that everyone imitates and not all imitation is the same means, “only the 
role o f  disciple is truly essential”. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 147.
88 Ibid.
89 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 148.
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fatal attempt to seek out an obstacle that promises to be truly insurmountable. 
Mimetic desire would destroy the community if it were not for the surrogate victim, 
who stops the process, and the various rituals that renew the therapeutic effects of the 
original ‘expulsion’, thus preventing the crisis from beginning afresh.90
Girard tells us that ‘the monstrous double’ emerges from within the 
mechanism responsible for sacrificial substitution in a crisis-ridden community, 
where differences never really disappear, although from outside the system the 
symmetry appears definitive 91 Describing the confusion that besets antagonists from 
within, Girard says:
...the differences that seem to separate the antagonists shift ever faster and more abruptly as 
the crisis grows in intensity. Beyond a certain point the nonreciprocal moments succeed each 
other with such speed that their actual passage becomes blurred. They seem to overlap, 
forming a composite image in which all the previous ‘highs’ and ‘low s’, the extremes that 
had previously stood out in bold relief, now seem to intersect and mingle. Where formerly he 
had seen his antagonist and himself as incarnations of unique and separate moments in the 
temporal scheme of things, the subject now perceives two simultaneous projections of the 
entire time span -  an effect that is almost cinematographic.92
When the collective experience of the monstrous double looms large the differences
are not eliminated, as seems apparent from outside the system, but muddied and
confused, leading to hallucinations.
Girard provides an explication of Euripides’ The Bacchae as a compelling
example of collective violence, scapegoating and the hallucinatory effects of the
monstrous double. Referring to the atmosphere of terror that accompanies the
hallucination of the ‘thousand headed dragon’ when Dionysus springs his trap on
Pentheus, Girard writes: “When violent hysteria reaches a peak the monstrous double
looms up everywhere at once. The decisive act of violence is directed against this
90 Ibid.
91 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 158-159.
92 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 160.
93 ‘T o  my knowledge only Dostoevsky, both in his early novel The Double and in the masterpieces o f  
his maturity has set forth in concrete terms the elements of reciprocity at work in the proliferation of 
monsters.” Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 161.
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awesome vision of evil and at the same time sponsored by it.”94 In The Bacchae, the 
monstrous double is everywhere. From the beginning of the play “animal, human, 
and divine are caught up in a frenetic interchange; beasts are mistaken for men or 
gods, gods and men are mistaken for beasts.”95 As soon as the dizzying effects of the 
heightening mimetic antagonisms are felt, the doubling becomes decisively linked to 
the image of the terrifying monster. Pentheus gives us a good example of this 
primordial ‘cyclothymia’ just prior to the unanimous resolution to the tragic play 
when he says to Dionysus: “I seem to see two suns, two Thebes, with two times 
seven gates. And you, you are a bull walking before me, with two homs sprouting 
from your head.”96 When doubling becomes monstrous, the crisis has reached a 
critical point and the mechanism of the scapegoat is well and truly operative. What 
Girard adds to the intersubjective doubling explored in his early work is a more 
general concept that allows him to group together all the hallucinatory phenomena 
provoked at the height of the crisis by unrecognised reciprocity.97 When we fail to 
see that our own violence erodes differences, even while it appears to us to establish 
them, crisis escalates.
7. Bringing Together All Rites: The Janus Face of the Sacred
At the end of Chapter One we saw how the ‘unity of novelistic conclusions’ 
brings the authors, the heroes of the novels, and the literary community together in a 
shared unity through the structure of death and rebirth, at the end of Deceit, Desire 
and the Novel. In a similar way, the last chapter of Violence and the Sacred is
94 Ibid.
95 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 162.
96 Ibid.
97 The new more expansive concept of monstrous double helps him to further explain two sets of 
‘puzzling’ religious phenomena: possession and the ritual use of masks. Girard, Violence and the 
Sacred, p. 164.
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entitled “The Unity of All Rites”. In it Girard attempts to show how mimetic desire 
and the surrogate victimage mechanism apply to all ritual experiences, including the 
forms of ritual that are often regarded as aberrations. Having examined the works of
no
Freud and Lévi-Strauss in earlier chapters, Girard proceeds to connect a host of 
apparently anomalous practices, such as cannibalistic ritual, initiation rites, tragic 
catharsis, and modem medicine. Even philosophical scapegoating in classical Greek 
culture is examined with a focus on Socrates as a victim of his people, and the poets 
expelled from Plato’s Republic for tending to side with the victims of their tragic 
dramas over the citizens. As his study unfolds so too does the evidence of a founding 
event based on the formula ‘unanimity minus one.’ More and more examples are 
added of the prevalence of scapegoating in early cultures. Gradually, Girard begins 
to articulate the full scope of his hypothesis -  a conclusion that seems quite 
staggering.
As we bring together the various elements of our discussion, only one conclusion seems 
possible. There is a unity that underlies not only all mythologies and rituals but the whole of 
human culture, and this unity of unities depends on a single mechanism, culturally 
functioning because perpetually misunderstood -  the mechanism that ensures the 
community’s spontaneous and unanimous outburst o f opposition to the surrogate victim."
Even the modem judicial system, which, at the outset of his study, provided a
method of protection by taking on the responsibility of revenge, must now be
explained in the context of generative violence in the form, for example, of capital
punishment. Otherwise, he says, we are back to a social contract theory that would
contradict his line of argument because it would be based on rational agreement
rather than misapprehension.100
Any elements of ritual that appear not to fit Girard’s account -  and hence to
98 Girard argues that Freud drew back from the mimetic hypothesis to protect his ‘precious ‘Oedipus 
complex’.’ He also argues that it is, ironically, Freud’s now discredited work in Totem and Taboo on 
the collective murder that contains some of his most brilliant insights into the origins of culture.
"  Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 299-300.
100 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 298.
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remain as anomalies -  can be accounted for, he believes, by the inherently 
ambiguous nature of the sacred, and, in particular, the inherent need for the victim to 
appear both truly central to the community and, at the same time, utterly foreign. 
Girard shows this ambiguity operating in the institution of monarchy, as one 
institutional form of political power. The failure of modem ethnologists to 
understand this ambiguity, he argues, is itself a function of the sacred.
It does not seem to have occurred to modem theorists... to draw together such different 
institutions as the African monarchies, the cannibalistic rites of the Tupinamba, and the 
sacrificial ceremonies of the Aztecs. However, each of these institutions casts light on the 
other. In the Aztec rites a certain time elapses between the election of a victim and his 
execution. During this time every effort is made to gratify his desires. The people prostrate 
themselves before him, fight for the privilege o f touching his garments. He is treated like a 
king, almost like a god. Yet this reverential treatment ends in a brutal murder. The 
Tupinamba prisoner shares certain similarities with the African king. In each case the 
victim’s situation combines grandeur and misery, veneration and ignominy.101
Discrepancies between these rites can be explained, Girard maintains, by seeing them
as three different ways in which three societies look at the same process: the loss and
+ « 1 n?subsequent recovery of social unity.
To add credence to this theory of ‘paradoxical lucidity’ Girard sets it in a
western context, where suddenly the ‘king and the fool’ become like primordial
doubles of each other, holding between them the oscillating forces of mimetic desire.
When we consider the monarchy of the Ancient Regime in France or any other traditional 
monarchic system, we cannot help wondering whether it would not be more profitable to 
consider these institutions in the light of sacred kingship than the light of modem ideas about 
monarchy. The concept o f Divine Right is not a fiction made up on the spur o f the moment to 
keep the king’s subjects in line. The life and death of the monarchic concept in France -  its 
sacred rites, its fools, its cure o f scrofula through the royal touch, the grand finale of the 
guillotine - all this is clearly structured by the influence o f sacred violence.103
The sacred character of the king is defined by his identity with the victim. The dual
forces personified by the king, Girard believes, are internalised within each of us. At
one level or another each of us recognises the face of the victim behind the king and
the fool in the tragic drama of human existence -  the world is truly a stage,
101 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 301.
102 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 302.
103 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 304.
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continually being set for a global cathartic performance. Whatever was missing from 
the ‘unity of novelistic conclusions’ by way of an explanation of why the great 
novelists arrived at the same conclusion, i.e. ‘the unity of unity,’ has been ‘found’ 
and articulated in Violence and the Sacred. “All religious rituals spring from the 
surrogate victim, and all the great institutions of mankind, both secular and religious 
spring from ritual. Such is the case as we have seen, with political power, legal 
institutions, medicine, the theatre, philosophy and anthropology itself. It could hardly 
be otherwise, for the working basis of human thought, the process of ‘symbolisation’, 
is rooted in the surrogate victim.”104 The symbolic structure of death and 
resurrection, as the basic structure of the novel and western art more generally, when 
viewed in a properly anthropological light can now be understood as the Janus face 
of the sacred concealing the victimisation and collective murder of a scapegoat. Both 
the unity of novelistic conclusions and the unity of all rites point in one direction: the 
scapegoat mechanism. This, it transpires, is not only a unifying principle that can 
explain the origin and function of all rites, it is also a generative phenomenon 
responsible for all symbolic thinking -  all cultural forms all historical and political 
institutions, the origins of language, and the process of hominization itself. Sacrifice 
as a deceiving ‘norm’ that hides its origins in scapegoating, provides a way for 
societies to pass from one condition to another through a process of death and 
dissolution, what the philosopher Georges Bataille calls “creation by means of 
loss.”105
104 Giraid, Violence and the Sacred, p. 306.
105 Quoted in Terry Eagleton, Holy Terror (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 129. Speaking 
about the politically institutionalised version of sacrifice that we find in the form o f the state, Eagleton 
argues: ‘‘[The] scapegoat maintains a metaphorical rather than a metonymic relation to the people as a 
whole. It is a substitute for them, rather than a signifying part of their collective life. Far from 
glimpsing a reflection of its own features in this traumatic horror, the community thrusts it out, thus 
disavowing its significance and perpetuating its own self-blindness. By displacing its own deformities 
onto a vilified other, it can rid itself magically of its defects. Sacrifice of this sort is a kind of social 
therapy or public hygiene, from which you emerge cleaner and stronger”. Terry Eagleton, Holy Terror
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8. Beyond Structuralism: Representation and Real Violence
From a philosophical point of view Girard’s theory of collective violence as 
an explanation of the origins of culture appears wildly speculative. However, in order 
to grasp how he reaches these conclusions it is important to try to understand his 
relationship to a leading structuralist like Claude Lévi-Strauss whose work allows 
Girard to think of culture and cultural history as a system of signs designating 
fundamental differences based on hidden structures detectable in myth. To see him in 
this way is not to look first to a pre-historic event, as the ‘substance’ of his claim, and 
presume that he would have us believe that our imagination along with some archaic 
and often fragmentary ‘texts’ can be a reliable means of reconstructing an incredibly 
remote scenario. Rather, to acknowledge Girard’s structuralist influences is to look 
first at language as a totality -  as an all-encompassing system of signs that leads him 
to posit an explanation for this system that lies outside itself, as system. If we 
approach his theory of origins in this way it becomes easier thereafter to begin to 
understand how the ‘system’ and its ‘explanation’ might provide the basis of a 
credible pa/eo-anthropological theory of culture.106
In Violence and the Sacred Girard begins to look beyond structuralism for an 
explanation of cultural order and disorder. However, he remains sympathetic to its 
basic methods, and its general antipathy towards philosophies of consciousness. 
“Structural analysis cannot deal with everything,” he claims, “but within its limits it 
is highly satisfactory.”107 Fleming makes the case that “Girard’s work remains true to 
structuralism in several respects, not least in so far as both affirm the idea that there
p. 131.
106 See, William Mishler, “The Question of the Origin of Language in René Girard, Eric Gans, and 
Kenneth Burke”, in Anthropoetics 5, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1999).
107 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 241.
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are generative structures which lie beneath the surface of texts that supplant authorial 
intention and ‘direct’ the action of the narrative in the absence of the subject’s
1 ORconscious collaboration.” In addition, Lévi-Strauss remains an important 
anthropologist for Girard since “he is perhaps the first to appreciate the centrality of 
differentiation and undifferentiation in analysing the symbolic structures of 
mythology.”109 Yet Girard departs from Lévi-Strauss and structuralism in general, 
because, in his view, both fail to give meaning to the most essential cultural structure 
-  beyond the “logico-semantic world of myth itself’ — the polarization of all against
Girard’s mature engagement with the work of Lévi-Strauss, beginning in 
Violence and the Sacred with an analysis of “marriage laws”, continues to develop in 
Things Hidden Since the Foundations o f the World where the homologies and 
variances between their respective theories become more apparent. In the latter of 
these works Girard examines two myths also examined by Lévi-Strauss in his 
Totemism -  the myth from the Ojibwa Indians of North America and the myth from 
the Tikopia people of the Pacific.111 His analysis of these particular myths allows
108 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 85.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid, p. 85.
111 Fleming provides a synopsis of both myths: “The first depicts the origin of the five Objibwa clans 
from six anthropomorphic supernatural beings who came from the ocean to mix with humans.
Initially, one of the six beings covered his eyes and refused to look at the humans. His curiosity, 
however, eventually got the better of him, and -  lifting a comer o f the veil covering his eyes -  his 
gaze fell upon an Objibwan man, who was killed instantly. Although he was possessed of no 
malicious intent, the other supernatural beings persuaded the godly being with the deadly gaze to 
return to the water. The five remaining beings continued to dwell among the humans and become a 
great blessing to them. From these remaining five came the five great totems o f clans”.
‘The second myth, of the Tikopia, tells of how at one time the gods were little different from 
the mortal beings and even served as representatives for the various clans. It happened one day that a 
foreign god named Tikarau came to visit; the local gods prepared a feast for the visitor and organised 
some competitive ‘trials of speed and strength’ to see whether they or their guests would triumph. 
During one o f the races the visitor slipped and claimed to be injured; in a flash, however, he stopped 
limping and bolted towards the food prepared for the feast, gathered it all up and dashed away in the 
direction of the hills. The local gods set out after him and Tikarau slipped and fell again, enabling 
some o f his pursuers to retrieve some of the stolen food: a coconut, a taro, a yam, and a breadfruit. 
Although the thief was successful in escaping with most of the food that he had gathered up, the four 
vegetables retrieved were saved for humans -  these fruits became the basis of the totem system”.
76
Girard “not only to interpret and discuss the myths, but to engage with Lévi-Strauss -  
and indeed structuralist analysis itself -  in more general terms.”112 Girard interprets 
these myths in the manner set out in his work The Scapegoat, utilizing as a key to his 
reading what he refers to as the signs of persecution: a five fold set of criteria (what 
Fleming calls a “typology”) that he finds evidence for in the texts he analyses.113 The 
themes or motifs that give textual evidence of sacrificial crisis are as follows:
1) A theme of disorder or undifferentiation: Girard believes that the beginnings 
of myths depict the crisis of degree that corresponds with the way in which 
intense mimetic rivalry progressively erodes all differences. As Fleming 
points out, most creation myths begin with a depiction of a state of the 
‘world’ as an undifferentiated mass or an original chaos, that Girard suggests 
can “also be found in mythical accounts of cosmic catastrophes, fires, floods, 
droughts, pestilence, and fights between people (especially twins).”114
2) An individual who has committed some transgression, and is therefore guilty 
of a crime. Whether the offence is represented as being ‘grave’ or ‘trivial’ the 
actual seriousness of the crime is indicated by its grave and serious 
consequences.115
3) The presence of certain stigmata or ‘victimary signs’: Girard highlights how 
the central figures of mythology are invariably exceptional characters “World 
mythology swarms with the lame, the blind, and the crippled or abounds with 
people stricken by the plague. As well as heroes in disgrace there are those
Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis p. 82.
112 Ibid.
113 We can find this ‘typology’ discussed in more detail in Girard’s work The Scapegoat. Fleming 
schematises it in a useful way in his own work on Girard, and I have further schematised it here for 
my purposes.
11 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 80.
115 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 81.
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who are exceptionally beautiful and free of all blemish.”116
4) A description of the killing or expulsion of the culprit. As Fleming explains, 
“Myths detail events whereby a guilty party is killed or driven away, either 
by the whole community acting as one, or by one person who acts for the 
whole community. For Girard this indicates the scapegoating act stricto 
sensu. ”117
5) A return of order: The killing or expulsion has the effect of generating peace 
and a return to order. The negative mimesis and violence of the community 
are expelled along with the victim, binding the community in a restored sense 
of calm. Hence, “the victims represented in myths are invariably sacralized or 
venerated -  given the features and even the moral profile of a saviour figure -  
owing to the way in which they have transformed the communities under 
threat.”118
The Objibwa myth and the Tikopia myth treated by Lévi-Strauss evince the 
structural requirements of a scapegoat narrative, based on the above typology. 
Indeed, as Fleming points out, for both Girard and Lévi-Strauss the two myths 
mentioned here “chart the movement from an undifferentiated state to a 
differentiated state via the expulsion or occlusion of a ‘foreign element’ through 
which (differential) meaning is established.”119 However, despite the similarities 
between Girard and Lévi-Strauss in their readings of the same myths, for the latter 
the ‘expulsion and occlusion’ are simply the “necessary conditions” for the creation 
of meaning. In other words, the fragile system of signs discovers what it needs in 
order to organise itself into symbolic thought. The structuralist who understands
116 Girard, The Scapegoat, pp. 31-32-49.
1!7 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 81.
118 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 82.
119 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 85.
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language in this way, therefore only “interprets the expulsions as exemplifying a 
logic of exclusion or elimination, which, in its exclusion, frees the mind from a 
certain perceptual or conceptual congestion”120. But the structuralist does not see the 
exclusion as having any bearing on a ‘real event’, outside the system of signs, and so
there is no adequate explanation provided of the “actual commonalities” found in the
121various texts.
By limiting the meaning of these commonalities to their ‘abstract structures’, 
Lévi-Strauss ignores “how the differentiation he details is established”.122 Describing 
this central issue in the debate between mimetic theory and structuralism, Fleming 
writes: “The difference is that for Girard, this elimination is not merely an abstract 
operation that somehow makes conceptualisation possible, but a historically based 
event, or series of events, that provides the impetus for the generation of the 
narrative.”123 Moving beyond Lévi-Strauss in relation to the origins of structural 
thought itself, Girard contends that “the elimination of the gods in both myths [the 
Ojibwa and Tikopia] suggests communal acts of violence directed at victims.”124
If structuralism is constitutionally unable to get behind the structures it 
describes, it is because it always needs “to assume that the binary oppositions it 
uncovers are never generated for them [structures] but are always already there; the 
mediation of the conflictual polarities always takes place through the system 
itself.” 125 This, however, does not account for the most significant aspects of the 
system -  that is, that such ‘conflictual polarities’, as the basis of structural 
differentiation, should exist in the first place, or even how the ‘mediation’ that
120 rbid.
121 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mime sis, p. 86.
122 Ibi<L.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 87.
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10f\‘decongests’ the mind is accomplished. So, while structuralism of Levi-Strauss’s 
kind is right to claim that mythology represents the birth of human thought, it is 
wrong to determine this birth as having come about through an “immaculate 
conception”; it is an “intellectual blind alley” to conclude, as structuralists do, that 
“from the beginning there was difference.”127 Summing up the contribution of 
Girardian theory to structuralist thought, Fleming remarks:
Part o f the appeal of Girard’s thinking is that it is capable o f being faithful to the 
considerable insights of structuralism by plotting structural homologies over a broad range of 
cultural institutions, practices, and texts, while at the same time not resting content with these 
homologies, refusing to see in these complete ‘explanations’. For instance, the ambiguity 
with which ritual holds its sacrificial victims and myth holds its heroes is amenable to a more 
satisfying explanation if one can actually explain -  and not merely articulate -  these 
correspondences by appeal to a singular generative mechanism that engenders both ritual and 
myth.
Girard’s explanation of the basic structures governing language and culture, therefore 
reaches beyond structuralism to the “astructuralism” (Fleming’s phrase) 
presupposed by his scapegoat hypothesis. From a presumption of disorder comes a 
concept of order that cannot be explained with reference to its internal structures. It is 
only by positing a ‘real event’ outside the system of signs, Girard believes, that one 
can account for difference as the result of ‘expulsion’ and ‘mythic re-appropriation’ 
-  a theory, in other words, of sacred violence.
In chapter one I argued that Girard was already being influenced by 
structuralism when he wrote Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, and that the spiritual 
death and rebirth of the author was part of a more general debunking of the 
humanistic subject by a wave of new French theory. In this chapter we saw how the 
crisis that led to disintegration at the level of the individual in Girard’s early work 
became the basis of a dominant motif of his later work -  collective crisis. Reciprocal 
violence generates de-differentiation at the level of culture, giving rise to a mimetic
128 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 88.
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frenzy. The principle of Degree, as examined in Shakespeare’s plays, provides the 
paradigm of healthy imitation and stable cultural order. However, external mediation 
can easily give rise to internal mediation when ‘Degree’ becomes threatened, leading 
to violence and chaos. When violence is at its most intense, Girard believes, the 
community is prevented from destroying itself by the scapegoat mechanism. Those 
caught up in the violence become polarised against a surrogate victim -  an example 
of which he claims, can be found in the Oedipus cycle, whereby the poison and the 
cure become synonymous, and the ambiguous power of the sacred is conferred with 
grave consequences upon the King of Thebes. Evidence of a ‘surrogate victim,’ 
Girard claims, can be found in all cultures, if we are only prepared to recognise the 
link between dedifferentiation and violence.
9. Conclusion: Reading back in
The movement that we find in Girard’s early work, from division to unity -  
from death to rebirth -  is repeated in his later work. ‘The Self and Other in Literary 
Structure’ thus appears to be a proto-theory of culture. Deviated transcendence, 
rooted in pride and ‘metaphysical desire’, promises unity but leads to division. 
However, by renouncing the differences suggested by hatred -  a renunciation that is 
the fruit of a ‘sublime lucidity’ -  the ‘hero’ achieves a restored unity through a 
symbolic death and rebirth shared in by the literary community. In the later work we 
saw how, in death, the scapegoat becomes associated with the newly found peace and 
subsequently remembered and revered through myth and ritual - sacrifice being the 
perfect form of therapeutic re-enactment. When Girard comes to look at culture as a 
whole the movement once again starts with crisis or the breakdown of differences 
and ends with unity or restored order. However, the death and rebirth that governs
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the scapegoat mechanism is no mere ‘mythology’ or ‘symbolic structure’, it is rather 
the constituent feature of a ‘real event’ -  one that Girard believes can explain the 
origins of the sacred and of culture more generally. If we read the early work -  and 
especially its culmination in this ‘unity of novelistic conclusions’ -  in light of the 
central theme of Violence and the Sacred (the scapegoat mechanism), it appears that 
something of a ‘sacrificial crisis’ is at work in literary space, i.e. differences break 
down (doubling, mimetic crisis) and are then restored through a quasi-mythic death 
and rebirth. And if ‘real violence’ against an innocent victim is the proper 
explanation of this structure, who or what, we might ask, functions as the ‘scapegoat’ 
-  the generative element that guarantees unity, at the end of Deceit, Desire and the 
Novell
To try to answer this question I want to consider the implications of Girard’s 
later theory for his early theory. Specifically, I want to look at the structuralism of 
literary space in light of the astructuralism of cultural space. This will involve taking 
the five-element typology mentioned above, which claims to uncover myths of 
persecution that point to acts of real violence against real victims, and applying it to 
Girard’s own analysis of novelistic space in Deceit, Desire and the Novel; it will 
involve, in other words, treating his literary criticism as a mythological text and thus 
conducting a kind of Girardian reading on Girard. Once again, the themes that occur 
in myths, and provide textual evidence of sacrificial crisis and scapegoating, are: 1) a 
theme of undifferentiation and disorder, 2) the presence of an individual who has 
committed a ‘transgression’ (and thus is responsible for the crisis), 3) the presence of 
certain signs on the culpable individual, 4) a description of this killing or expulsion, 
and 5) the return of order. When these themes remain hidden, the text functions in a 
mythological capacity to conceal collective violence by displacing the responsibility
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for the crisis onto an innocent victim -  unity has thus been achieved on the basis of a 
lie, that implicitly perpetuates the original act of violence.
When we consider these themes in relation to Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 
we find an unusual correspondence between Girard’s own theory of the novel and 
what he goes on to describe in an anthropological context as the constitutive features 
of a scapegoat myth, i.e. crisis, expulsion and restored order. For example, the first 
theme of crisis can be readily identified in the fraught intersubjective relation 
between self and other, particularly in the way imitative desire leads to internal 
mediation and obsessive rivalry. We find the fullest expression of this crisis in what 
Girard calls ‘The Dostoyevskian Apocalypse’ where Raskolnikov’s vision of a 
plague of deadly flies descending on Europe provides the background explanation of 
how the culmination of internal mediation in metaphysical desire leaves the 
individual not knowing whom to condemn or whom to acquit, in other words, in a 
state of undifferentiation. This ‘cultural contagion’ thus becomes a fuller account of 
the disease -  referred to at the beginning of the book as an “ontological sickness” -  
that ends in the suicide of the social.129 When read in light of the first theme that 
gives textual evidence of scapegoating, we can conclude with Girard the 
anthropologist that such ‘pestilence’ and ‘plague’ invariably represent displaced 
depictions of the process of undifferentiation, “the annihilation of specificities 
symptomatic of a sacrificial crisis.”130
The second theme proposed by Girard as hidden evidence of a scapegoat 
myth is a blameworthy individual, someone who is seen as having caused the 
disintegration. This theme is once again obvious in Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 
where the Romantic hero is depicted as the archetype of all characters whose failed
129 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 279.
130 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. SO.
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exploits are owing to the mistaken belief in their own originality. The Romantic hero 
is thus deemed responsible by Girard for the crisis in the self-other relation, and 
literary space more broadly. He is the one who would be god, but who in fact 
requires a resurrection from the underground. Like Oedipus, he is both good and evil; 
he is the poisonous presence in literary space and ultimately the basis of a restored 
unity.
The third theme, the presence of certain marks or signs on the victim, is 
perhaps more obscure in Girard’s early work, though I would argue it is nonetheless 
evident. In describing these ‘stigmata’ Fleming suggests that the central figures of 
world mythology are invariably highly unusual characters, “aliens, monstrous 
creatures or gods; these all bear obvious signs of physical or moral 
exceptionality.”131 The fact that these exceptional human beings are usually depicted 
as “heterogeneous mixtures of god, human and animal” is also indicative of the very 
crisis brought about by mimetic rivalry -  the loss of difference. Thus, in Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel, when Girard tells us that ‘men become gods’ is he not at once 
exposing the problem for cultural systems of this kind of ‘heterogeneous mixing’, 
and also reinforcing the attendant problem of scapegoating by making modem 
individualism guilty of ‘self-divinisation’ -  of being responsible for the mixing? In 
other words, does he not offer an account of a type which in his own later analysis, 
must be considered mythic? When he formulates his scapegoat theory, men do 
‘become gods’, not because of individual crisis, but because of collective crisis. But 
unlike the images from world mythology, Girard does not represent his Romantic 
‘god’ uncritically, he does not believe the hero is an exceptional figure, at least not 
until the genius is revealed at the end of the first work of criticism as the fruit of
131 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 81.
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novelistic experience. What he describes in teims of ‘ontological sickness’ is a 
condition and a dynamic in which the hero believes himself to be both debased and 
divine. The signs of divinity are thus part of the hero’s own interpretation of desire, 
and it is this attribute that makes him guilty. Girard’s early understanding of the 
victim in Deceit, Desire and the Novel revolves around the Romantic hero as ‘victim 
of triangular desire,’132 ‘victim of internal mediation,’133 ‘victim of metaphysical 
desire,’134 and ‘eternal victim,’135 What strikes a reader as odd, having learned that 
the later work reveals the hero of structural violence as ‘innocent’, is the manner in 
which the Romantic hero is referred to as a “victim”, but one who is actually guilty 
for the crimes of literary space. By making the hero of the novel the ‘victim of 
desire’ Girard also, ironically, makes him guilty of the one crime that will justify his 
expulsion from literary space. Unlike more archaic myth perhaps in which the victim 
was driven out and then in his absence seen as a god, in the myth that pervades 
literary space the hero wants to be god, and is hence expelled. Yet like archaic myth,
i o r
in and through his absence he is revered as a ‘genius’ and a ‘true hero’.
In a manner reminiscent of the way Oedipus is marked with the stigmata of a 
‘club foot’, we find in Girard’s early description of Descartes, the father of modem 
individualism, a depiction of his ‘divided nature’, in other words his pride, as 
somehow symbolic of the way in which the philosopher walked with “unbalanced 
gait” due to the “great weakness on his right side on which he was unable to support 
himself.”137 Should this description of a physical manifestation of a spiritual disease
132 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 3.
133 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 177.
134 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 283.
135 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 299.
136 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 296.
137 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 92.
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not rightly be declared a kind of mythologizing by the literary community that 
justifies the subject’s expulsion?
The fourth theme, a description of the killing or expulsion of the culprit, 
signifies for Girard the act of scapegoating. It is what Mircea Eliade calls the
1 - i o
‘creative murder’ that establishes the community or polity, and I want to suggest it 
is represented at the end of Deceit, Desire and the Novel by the spiritual death of the 
Romantic individual, a death that Girard believes is itself depicted in the great novels 
by the physical death of the principal character. However, when the critic, like a Dr. 
Kevorkian,139 assists with this textual suicide, we have to wonder whether his own 
invisible intentions do not conceal a more sinister desire to tidy up the literary scene 
at any cost. Either way, the physical death as the basis of a spiritual death can be seen 
as a kind of ‘killing’ of the old Romantic self, in which the literary critic and the 
literary community participate. The culpable party must be expelled.140
If the previous four themes and their appearance in Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel, fail to persuade us that mythological displacement is at work in Girard’s own 
criticism (based on his later criteria for identifying such mythological displacement), 
then perhaps conviction will be finally secured when we consider the fifth and last 
theme in relation to what Girard describes as ‘the unity of novelistic conclusions’. 
This theme, ‘the regeneration or return of order’, relies on the above-mentioned 
‘killing’ to engender peace and unity. The death and rebirth of the author that we find
138 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 81.
139 Former American pathologist who claims to have assisted 130 patients with their ‘right to die’, and 
who served eight years of a prison sentence between 1999 and 2007 for second-degree murder. See 
Ellen Piligian and Monica Davey, “Dr. Kevorkian, assisted-suicide advocate, is released from prison”. 
International Herald Tribune, Americas (June 1, 2007).
140 We might say that the form of scapegoating at work here resembles what Eagleton describes as a 
metonymic rather than a metaphorical relation (see note 105 on page 73 above) to the people as a 
whole. “It is a piece of them rather than a displacement. In this tom, twisted thing, the people come to 
acknowledge something of their own twisted disfigurement, contemplating themselves in the Real 
rather than the imaginary. They recognise in this dereliction of being their own horrific double, and in 
doing so open themselves to a deathliness at the core o f their own identity.” Holy Terror, p. 131. If 
this describes the ‘Romantic lie’, we need not, in Eagleton’s analysis, see it as false.
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at the end of the literary theory functions in the terms of what Girard later calls 
‘double transference,’ associated with the ambiguity of the victim who is both 
monstrous and godlike. The ‘secondary displacement’ (from being a polluted 
presence that must be expelled, to being raised up to divine status) ensures that 
victims become heroes/gods, “owing to the way in which they have transformed the 
crisis and ‘saved’ the communities under threat.”141 The novelist thus undergoes 
regeneration because, for Girard, the unity of novelistic conclusions points to the 
truth of literary space. The hero who is capable of writing the great work, that is, 
every author and every novelistic genius, and every great critic for that matter142 -  
must put to death his or her Romantic self. Thus the literary community is bom.
Girard’s five-element typology for identifying myths that conceal 
scapegoating, when applied to his own early theory, actually reveal this work as 
mythological. By his own later diagnosis of collective violence and its evidence in 
myth, we can unmask his literary criticism as a form of scapegoating that charts the 
crisis, resolution and unity of the literary community around the Romantic hero, and 
what might be called philosophy of consciousness (in all its various guises). For all 
Girard’s analysis of the Oedipus story, does he not himself embody here something 
of its tragic spirit? By identifying with Tiresias is the critic not reinstating the 
paradox of the blind seer who tries to warn Oedipus, but ends up hastening the 
violent resolution that he himself participates in? The next chapter will examine how 
this blind spot in Girardian theory forces him to merge the ‘Romantic Fallacy’ and
141 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 82.
142 In an interview with James Williams at the end o f The Girard Reader, Girard relates how when he 
started working on Deceit, Desire and the Novel in the late 1950s it was very much in the mode o f the 
atheistic intellectuals of the time. René Girard, The Girard Reader, (ed.) James G. Williams. (New  
York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996), p. 283. In the same interview Girard recounts how 
he identified with the novelist’s conversion when he wrote the conclusion o f Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel Girard recounts: “When 1 wrote the last chapter of my first book, I had a vague idea o f what I 
would do, but as the chapter took form I realized I was undergoing my own version o f the experience I 
was describing. I was particularly attracted to the Christian elements... So I began to read the Gospels 
and the rest o f the Bible. And I turned into a Christian”, p .285.
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the ‘Scapegoat Mechanism’ so as to fatally undermine subjectivity and all meliorist 
accounts of historical change.
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Chapter 3
Negating Subjectivity and History 
(Problems within Girardian Theory)
By evoking the notion of metaphysical desire, I am not in any way giving in to 
metaphysics. To understand this notion, we have only to look at the kinship between 
the mimetic structure... and the part played by notions of honour or prestige in 
certain types of rivalry that are regulated by society: duels, sporting competitions etc. 
These notions are in fact created by the rivalry; they have no tangible reality 
whatsoever. Yet the very fact that there is a rivalry involving them makes them 
appear more real than any object... In our world [a world not stabilized by victimage 
mechanisms], we end up with an ‘infinite’ measure of desire -  what I have called 
ontological or metaphysical desire.1
- René Girard
... for the course of History is predictable in the degree to which all men [sic] love 
themselves, and spontaneous in the degree to which each man loves God and through 
Him his neighbour.2
- W.H. Auden
1. Introduction
The first quotation above, taken from Things Hidden Since the Foundation o f 
the World, describes the conditions that give rise to the modem sacrificial crisis. In it 
Girard makes the point that what, in the past, appeared to be ‘real’ marks of 
distinction were only conferred with meaning by desire itself. Within a traditional 
worldview, ordered hierarchically by the principle of Degree, desire, and hence 
rivalry (and hence violence), is contained. But in our world, a world that does not 
even have the appearance of the real, these forces are being unleashed. However, 
what may strike a reader who has been persuaded by my argument so far -  that there
1 René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation o f the World, pp. 296-297.
2 Quoted In Anthony Hecth, The Hidden Law: The Poetry o f  W. H. Auden (New York: Harvard 
University Press, 1994).
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is an important difference between Girard’s early and later works -  is that Girard 
continues to use terms from his early explanation of crisis (as ’’metaphysical desire’) 
to explain the modem sacrificial crisis. When the protections that once formed part 
of the sacred, are no longer available, an ‘infinity’ of desire goes unchannelled. This 
assimilation of an already suspicious view of history into an anthropological account 
of cultural disintegration results in a thoroughly dystopian position that gives no 
quarter to ‘humanism’. The apocalyptic tone of his most recent work, Achever 
Clausewitz, confirms this.3 Indeed, Auden’s poetic insight into a ‘spontaneous 
History’ brought about by each individual’s capacity to love God and neighbour, 
cited in the second quotation above, must be considered, in Girard’s account, yet 
another illusion of the Romantic fallacy.
In chapter two, I discussed how literary space and cultural space share the 
same basic elements with regard to crisis and resolution (division and unity). Yet, I 
argued, Girard’s early work does not share with the later work the same explanation 
of this resolution -  namely the scapegoat mechanism -  since this latter explanation 
properly belongs to this later work. When we read the early work in the light of the 
theory of the scapegoat and the five-element typology that Girard claims provides the 
interpretative key for identifying myths that conceal acts of scapegoating, we find 
evidence of such ‘scapegoating’ in Deceit, Desire and the Novel -  or so I have 
argued. The renunciation of the Romantic individual at the hands of the critic 
functions in the same way as the victim’s immolation at the hands of the community, 
that is, as the catalyst of a restored unity. But the unity achieved at the end of Deceit,
3 The picture on the cover of this most recent work is a mushroom cloud from a nuclear bomb. René 
Girard, Achever Clausewitz (Paris: Carnets Nord, 2007). Also, in a recent interview with Robert 
Doran, Girard asserts, “I personally think that [9/11] represents a new dimension, a new world 
dimension. What communism was trying to do, to have a truly global war, has happened, and it is real 
now.” René Girard, “Apocalyptic Thinking After 9/11”, in SubStance, No. 115, Vol. 37, no. 1 (2008),
p. 21.
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Desire, and the Novel is not the same as the unity achieved at the end of Violence 
and the Sacred. The ‘unity of novelistic conclusions’4 provides the basis of an 
identity between the author and the critic, while the ‘Unity of All Rites’ exposes all 
apparently unifying activity as a form of division -  ‘unanimity minus one’. Hence, in 
Girard’s work we find two different and conflicting accounts of unity: the unity of 
the literary community at the end of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, which is ‘true’, 
and the unity at the end of Violence and the Sacred, which is ‘false’.
The first strand of my critique of Girard, then, exposes his own scapegoating 
of the subject under the terms of the Romantic fallacy. This certainly places his early 
work in question as a credible account of subjectivity and the self/other relation, 
since we can now readily see that the rebirth of the hero has more to do with 
legitimating the literary community than the actual integrity of a restored selfhood. 
But there are two other related strands of critique that I wish to develop in this 
chapter -  so that in all I am bringing forward three lines of argument against 
Girardian theory. The second strand has to do with the fact that Girard continues to 
employ his early work to help explain and buttress his theory of the scapegoat and in 
particular his application of this theory to the modem period. The third strand 
(constituting my most sustained critique) focuses on the consequences of this 
continued employment of his early work for explanatory purposes in his later work (I 
shall identify three significant -  and significantly problematic -  consequences). 
While there is a good deal of interdependence between them, for the sake of my 
overall argument these three strands can remain broadly independent.
I have already elaborated the first strand in chapter two. In the next section of 
this chapter I proceed to the second strand showing how Girard relies on some
4 “The unity of novelistic conclusions consists in the renunciation of metaphysical desire.” Girard, 
Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 293, 294.
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central insights from his early work to explain the modem crisis in cultural space 
(and hence considers the later work as unproblematically continuous with this early 
work). While I do not wish to attack his theory of the scapegoat in his later 
anthropology, I do want to question its apparent continuity with his early work and 
the suggestion that this anthropology requires the absence of a meliorist view of 
human development. In the remaining sections of this chapter I proceed to the third 
strand of my overall argument, highlighting the problems for Girard’s theory -  by 
way of inconsistency and tension -  that derive from his continued concealment of the 
early act of scapegoating in his account of a ‘debunked’ subject.
The first consequence, as I will show, of Girard’s relying on his (now 
problematic) early theory to explain his later theory is that it commits him to two 
incompatible accounts of violence: one (in the early theory) stressing the need for 
violence to be kept hidden, and the other (in the later theory) claiming that the true 
allure of violence lies in its being made manifest. By examining the influence of 
Alexandre Kojeve on Girard’s formulation of desire as mimetic, I make the case that 
Girard’s later understanding of how crisis escalates is not compatible with his early 
theory, and that his reliance on his early account of mimetic desire to explain 
collective violence is by no means straightforward. The second consequence of 
Girard’s dependence on his early theory is that a moral subject is given no space to 
emerge in his or her own right. I will consider how the Girardian view of 
‘interdividual psychology’ further alienates the perspective of a thinking feeling 
subject, by divesting it of any positive sense of interiority. The third consequence of 
Girard’s continued use of the problematic theory concerns where (in the absence of a 
moral subject) he is pushed when trying to account for ‘agency.’ Having outlined 
how desire ends up with more status and agency than a moral subject, I will argue
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that such reifying of desire is more characteristic of Schopenhauerian ‘Will’ than 
Christian agape, and is thus at odds with Girard’s own stated belief in the Christian 
kerygma.5 The final section in this chapter makes an ancillary, but nonetheless 
important, point concerning Girard’s understanding in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel 
of the limits of the author’s insight into his own world. I argue that Girard’s 
hypostatizing of desire translates as a kind of irrationalism that cannot account for — 
and consequently must deny — for example, Dostoevsky’s own critique of the 
determining and reductive forces of nineteenth century Russia; this critique is 
dismissed -  unwarrantedly, I shall claim -  in favour of a purely psychological 
reading of the author’s development. If Dostoevsky’s own analysis of culture matters 
prior to any ‘novelistic conclusions’ -  which of course would indicate a pre- 
apocaiyptic lucidity on his part -  perhaps Girardian theory need not dispense with an 
ethical subject altogether when confronted with the peculiar dynamics of desire.
2. Explaining Cultural Space by reference to Literary Space
As I have attempted to show through my analyses of the literary and the 
cultural spaces, Girard’s early criticism can be understood as a form of scapegoating, 
whereby the Romantic hero is symbolically put to death, and the genius who is 
consecrated through this ‘slaying’ is partaken of by the literary community: unity is 
established. There is nothing particularly problematic about this for Girard’s later 
theory so long this theory does not in any significant way depend on it in explaining 
subjectivity and historical change. To use the earlier work -  and what has now been
5 On the problematic nature o f Girard’s mimetic theory for certain strands of Christianity see Gavin 
Flood, ‘Mimesis, Narrativity and Subjectivity in the Work o f Girard and Ricoeur”, in Cultural Values, 
vol. 4, no. 2 (April, 2000), especially the following passage, concerning the absence o f subjectivity in 
Girard work: “[T]he subjective response, and the subjective appropriation of the Christian narrative, is 
central to a sense of Christian narrative identity. While Girard might not object to this conception of 
subjective response, he arguably underestimates its importance in history, for subjectivity is 
overwhelmed by the more powerful force of mimetic desire”, p. 213.
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shown (if my argument in the previous chapter holds good) to be its spurious account 
-  to validate his anthropological claims would be incompatible with the spirit of 
Girard’s later work exposing the scapegoat mechanism.6 The aim of this section is to 
show where Girard is still trading off his early theory when he attempts to explain the 
relevance of his later mimetic theory for the modem period.
But before I examine this use of the early theory, I want to discuss briefly 
Girard’s more explicit pronouncements, in the context of his theory of collective 
violence, on individualism and the modem period. The modem individual, while not 
directly to blame for the crisis in cultural space, is nonetheless not granted any 
capacity to come terms with mimetic desire in a manner that could resist violence or 
be deemed creative and transformative. This is so, Girard believes, broadly for two 
reasons: first, individualism is rooted in sacrifice, and, second, the individual lacks a 
cathartic mechanism. In Violence and the Sacred, he claims that sacrifice is a social 
institution, of which modem psychology can be understood as a much later 
development, ‘contrary to its original spirit’.
In ritual sacrifice the victim, when actually put to death, diverts violence from its forbidden 
objectives within the community... If the transfer is purely personal, as it is in 
psychoanalysis, then sacrifice cannot be a true social institution involving the entire
community. But sacrifice as we know it is essentially a communal institution.y
“Individualisation” marks a later, decadent stage in its evolution.
In Things Hidden Since the Foundation o f the World, Girard extends his hypothesis 
of the scapegoat, and sacrifice as a ritual re-enactment of an original violence, into 
the fields of biblical studies and psychology, as part of his sustained engagement 
with French psychoanalysis; individuality is further undermined as having any 
reliable agency that does not depend on the social institution of sacrifice. Without
6 On the need to reveal distortions that conceal scapegoating, Girard writes, ‘These distortions must 
be identified and corrected, in order to reveal the arbitrary nature o f the violence that persecution texts 
present as justified.” René Girard, ‘The Scapegoat as Historical Referent”, in The Girard Reader,
(ed.) lames G. Williams (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 2003), p. 105.
7 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans., Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984), p. 101.
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‘clearly marked differences’ that are socially prescribed, individuals do not act; 
‘Desire’ now acts for them.
Desire is the mimetic crisis itself; it is the acute mimetic rivalry with the other that occurs in 
all circumstances we call ‘private’, ranging from eroticism to professionalism or intellectual 
ambition. The crisis can be stabilized at different levels according to the individuals 
concerned, but it always lacks the resources o f  catharsis and expulsion.8
Without a capacity to act positively and non-violently, the modem subject who 
believes in her own individuality or rational agency must be seen as effectively 
contributing to what Girard claims is the sacrificial crisis of the modem world.
Girard’s hypothesis of the scapegoat as the cornerstone of the human 
community brings forward a theory of transcendence by violence re-enacted through 
ritual as a means of harnessing the protective, restorative, and, ultimately, 
preservative forces of an original act of violence. This hypothesis marks a transition 
in his overall work from an analysis of death and rebirth that results in a completely 
new subject in his early criticism, to an analysis of death and rebirth that results in a 
new quasi-community in his later anthropology. In contrast to his early criticism, 
transcendence in his later work is not an individual but rather a collective 
phenomenon. The self’s prospects of overcoming, of letting go, of experiencing 
peace, or indeed identity and unity, it transpires, are functions of the sacred -  which 
is always and everywhere rooted in the community -  and arises out of the protective 
and restorative need to preserve life amidst crisis (uncertainty, loss of difference and 
death). Modem psychology intuits this function but cannot nearly replicate it to the 
same extent, since the mechanism that is generated by unanimous violence is not 
available to the individual. The individual, as individual, lacks the cathartic resources
8 René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation o f  the World. 288.
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that belong to the community and therefore in our world the ‘processes of desire’ do 
not ever give rise to a ‘collective crescendo’.9
I have been arguing up until now that there is nothing particularly 
problematic about Girard’s early scapegoating for his later theory as long as he does 
not use the early work to explain aspects of this theory. Nor is there any obvious 
problem with his later theory of individualism as a ‘decadent stage of sacrifice’ if 
this theory is plausible within the terms of his account of the sacred. We might say 
that Girard is perfectly entitled to a ‘happy coincidence’ between his earlier antipathy 
toward the Romantic hero and his later profound suspicion of individualism -  
provided that this later suspicion is not based on the earlier antipathy, which (if my 
argument holds water) is deeply problematic.
We saw in chapter one that the explanation of modem individualism revolves 
around triangular desire. This explanation allows nothing in the action of the self or 
the movement of history except a form of ‘self-divinisation’ that comes about with 
the loss of transcendence in the modem period: outside of a religious framework, 
“men become gods in each others’ eyes”. Not only does the other appear more 
powerful with the toppling of traditional hierarchies, each individual must produce 
‘Being’ from within him or herself. Each must actively seek to take over the role of 
God from medieval theology, while secretly looking to the other for guidance. 
Historical change is negatively determined by the intra- and inter- subjective 
dynamics of desire and the modem belief in each individual’s originality. Self- 
divinization, or metaphysical desire, is based on the lie of horizontal transcendence, 
and as such it is an extreme manifestation of the individual’s Romantic illusions.
9 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 287.
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In the scenario just outlined, in which ‘men become gods’, any ethic of 
‘generosity’, as we saw in chapter one, is co-opted into a relentless self-deception, 
which Girard detects in what he considers the more or less equivalent perspectives of 
Descartes and Corneille -  who both appear as ominous harbingers of modem 
individualism. This deceived and deceiving subject, short of a radical conversion, is 
helpless to resist negative mimesis through independent moral choice. While 
imitative desire has of course negative consequences for the subject in Girard’s early 
work, it also has negative consequences for the subject in his later work, since it is 
now the catalyst of a sacrificial crisis that can be stopped only by some external 
cultural mechanism. By privileging imitative desire over human agency in both cases 
as an explanation of crises (literary, cultural), the individual, by default, is held 
responsible for the crises by Girard; either by pursuing her Romantic illusions (early 
work), or indirectly, by following her desires and hence contributing to mimetic 
escalation (later work). Thus, the individual crisis in the modem period treated in 
Girard’s literary criticism is made appear symptomatic of the crisis in cultural space, 
that is, as a condition arising from the lack of a cathartic mechanism when the sacred 
and the profane are mixed. These two theories of individualism that we find in 
Girard’s work (one in his literary criticism and the other in his anthropology) appear 
to be aspects of one continuous and consistent theory. Might Girard plead ignorance 
of the correspondence here and once again invoke a ‘happy coincidence’?
This possibility seems unlikely when we carefully consider Girard’s later 
work, because when we do we are forced to acknowledge that his cultural 
anthropology is in fact trading off his early theory. Not only does he not renounce his 
early problematic theory of the Romantic fallacy, as the source of crisis in a modem 
context, he actually employs this theory of crisis to help validate his later theory of
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crisis.10 As we saw in chapter two, when he develops his anthropology he holds onto 
a theory of imitation developed in the literary work (one that brings the ‘false’ desire 
for originality to light), and he places it in the context of Degree to provide an 
example of the collective crisis that now pertains to cultural space. The internal 
mediation, or ‘inner division’, experienced by the underground man (as the paradigm 
case of Romanic illusion), is thus supplemented in the later work by a fuller 
‘anthropological’ account of the external mediation facilitated by a healthy measure 
of Degree and a harmonious order free of unchannelled rivalry and desire. Thus, 
internal mediation and external mediation are seen to explain loss of order and order 
respectively (the former coming to dominate in the modem period). It is not simply a 
‘happy coincidence’ that the individual appears responsible for the crisis in both 
literary and cultural space. Girard actively promotes the idea that both ‘spaces’ are 
interdependent and quite naturally continuous; what follows from this 
interdependence and continuity in assessing modem individualism -  that it is 
responsible for crisis -  is not mere chance. It suggests that the ‘lack of a cathartic 
mechanism’ can now explain how ‘men become gods in each others eyes’, and this 
in turn appears to explain why the modem world is synonymous with a sacrificial 
crisis. The literary space and the cultural space are run together as if both analyses of 
death and rebirth, crisis and unity, are unproblematically parts of one unified theory 
of culture.11
By relying on the early criticism as still valid, Girard draws conclusions from 
it that help him explain crisis and unity in cultural space. When the early and later
10 In a much later interview with James G. Williams he actually confirms the theoretical status of his 
early analysis with one small amendment: he now claims the author is “scapegoating” the “wicked” 
hero of the novel (without any reference to his own scapegoating of the Romantic hero). See, René 
Girard, “The Anthropology of the Cross”, in The Girard Reader, (ed.) James G. Williams (NY: 
Crossroads Publishing, 2003), p. 284.
11 Other evidence of Girard’s reliance on the early theory can be found scattered throughout his later 
work, often as references to the explanatory power of literary space. See, Girard, Violence and the 
Sacred, p. 146; Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 161; Girard, Things Hidden, p. 288,
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works appear to be part of one overarching theory, the Romantic individual is seen as 
somehow intrinsic to the cultural order and disorder that characterises the sacred. 
And since the principle of Degree can no longer apply in the absence of traditional 
hierarchy in the modem world, negative mimesis, as a symptom of the false belief 
that one’s desires are original, becomes the predominant experience of so-called 
‘freedom’. When “men become gods in each others’ eyes”, it appears they are 
attempting, in the absence of a cathartic mechanism, to generate a unity that seems 
no longer possible, for Girard, once religious horizons, and their ritual functions, 
fade. The Romantic fallacy (that purports to debunk all philosophies of 
consciousness) is thus seen to explain the failed logic of history and human 
development in the absence of religious frameworks, as if cultural space is a natural 
continuation of literary space.12
But what is remarkably ironic about Girard’s retrospective anthropologising 
of his early literary work is that it involves him in committing the very ‘crime’ 
(scapegoating) that he himself has both given us the most penetrating account of and 
made a career out of exposing in the work of other authors!13 The early theory of 
crisis -  when made to appear congruent with his later work -  generates a number of
12 For one thing it discounts the minimum condition of subjective agency, that is, being able to take a 
stand in relation to the world: as Girard himself says when he is asked where he is speaking from, “I 
do not know and I do not care”. Girard, Things Hidden, p. 435.
13 ‘Crime’ does not seem too strong a word here when we bear in mind Girard’s own explicit 
recognition that scapegoating can occur in theorising, amounting to what he calls symbolic violence. 
This violence also occurs with respect to how some modem thinkers understand what follows from 
Nietzsche’s ‘Death o f  God’ as an insight that actually implicates people in an original crime. The 
madman o f Nietzsche’s oft-quoted tract, Girard claims, hits on the essential truth of the matter when 
he says, “we have killed him.” (Girard, “Nietzsche versus the Crucified”, in The Girard Reader, p. 
256). Those who ignore this anthropological insight in favour of an atheistic reading o f this passage 
(in other words as the ‘death of metaphysics’), Girard believes, only reiterate a “harmless cliché for 
what Nietzsche is really saying”. (The Girard Reader, p. 257). Indeed, those who ignore the 
significance of the theme of the murder are themselves guilty o f perpetuating ‘real’ violence since, 
“the text of the death o f God functions as one more murder of God as long as the theme o f the murder 
remains unacknowledged.” (The Girard Reader, p. 258). Quotation by Nietzsche taken from The Gay 
Science, aphorism 125.
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problematic consequences which I will be examining in the remainder of this 
chapter.
3. History as Negating Negativity: The Legacy of Alexander Kojève
The influence of Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel on a generation 
of French thinkers, including Girard, has been widely noted.14 Describing the broad 
contours of Girard’s and Kojève’s relationship, George Erving remarks: “For both, 
desire is constitutive of human subjectivity, operates concretely at the level of 
anthropology and psychology, is concerned with existential recognition, is socially 
mediated, and is ineluctably bound up with violence.”15 Erving argues that, while 
Kojève’s reading of Hegel is based on an explicit assessment of the ‘master and 
slave’ dialectic, he follows Marx’s humanistic turn, and incorporates Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity, in which “true subjectivity emerges only by its willingness to 
overcome the living biological self.”16 The human agent transcends itself (its own 
biological givenness) by transforming the natural order. “Consequently, for Kojève, 
the self is a finite being, though, paradoxically, it is not an objective entity or thing 
that, as Kojève remarks ‘is always identical to itself. The self is rather an action 
such that “the very being of this I will be becoming, and the universal form of this 
being will not be space but time.”17 Erving tells us that Kojève’s dual ontology, 
which attributes true being to the non-natural self who must overcome its natural
14 Girard has gone some ways to disavow Kojève’s influence on his central insight. Eugene Webb 
claims that Girard related to him in a conversation that he had been reading Kojève at the time he was 
writing Deceit, Desire and the Novel, but that he “did not believe Kojève or Hegel to have made a 
contribution toward what he himself considers his major original insight, the theory... of the 
resolution o f violence through its polarization onto a single victim; both Kojève and Hegel, he says, 
remained bound to the idea o f a perpetual dialectic o f violence”. Webb, The Self Between, p. 116.
15 George Erving, “René Girard and the Legacy o f Alexandre Kojève”, in Contagion: Journal o f  
Mimesis and Culture, ed. Andrew McKenna, Vol. 10, (Spring 2003), p. 113.
16 Ibid.
17 George Erving, “René Girard and the Legacy o f Alexandre Kojève”, p. 114.
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self, privileges difference over identity, and thus breaks with Hegel’s Absolute Geist. 
However Kojeve holds onto Hegel’s dynamic concept of desire. “For Kojeve, desire 
creates the condition by which consciousness becomes ¿¿//-consciousness (and thus 
human rather than animal consciousness), for desire is what makes the subject aware 
of himself as such by drawing attention to the fact that he is not that which he 
contemplates.”18 The individual’s being thus presupposes desire.19
The subject constituted by desire is a ‘negating negativity’, i.e. an emptiness 
in search of a fullness. “It is a negativity that seeks positive content by negating and 
appropriating for itself the desire, that is, the being of another.”20 Only in such a way 
does a subject gain recognition, and thereby say ‘I am’. “It is only as a creature who 
desires to have the sovereignty of its non-natural self recognised that man becomes 
aware of his pre-eminence over an animal consciousness that is given, fixed and 
incapable of self-reflection.”21 Desire reveals the emptiness that the object of desire 
fails to satisfy, and as such it becomes conscious of itself as “other than the static 
given real thing that stays eternally identical to itself.”22 Therefore, what it must seek 
to appropriate if it is to be satisfied is the desire of the other, which inevitably gives 
rise to conflict and violence since in order to fully appropriate the other’s desire the 
subject must destroy the other.23 For Kojeve, the other is a function of my being;
18 ibid.
19 Such a conclusion was anathema to the ancients. In a world ordered to the Good, being did not 
depend on appetite. “Aristotle argued that humans, as rational beings, could decide to follow the 
commands of reason or to ignore these commands and follow their desires.” Lauren Swayne Barthold, 
“Towards an Ethics o f  Love: Arendt on will and Augustine”, in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 
26, no. 6 (London: Sage, 2000), p.3. Barthold also argues: “Although, one could not find any explicit 
notion o f the will in Aristotle, he developed a notion that concerned the deliberation over which is the 
best means to reach a certain end. Thus his notion o f lprohairesis\ which refers to the mediation 
between thinking and desire, could be described in tenus of the faculty of choice” (Ibid. p.3). When 
as Kojève claims, ‘man’s very being implies and presupposes Desire’, this ‘faculty of choice’ has 
become what Girard describes as ‘internal mediation’, or negative mimesis. Thus, any rational, and 
thereby positive, content is held in doubt.
20 Erving, “René Girard and the Legacy of Alexandre Kojève”, p. 115.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 On the anthropological conditions of conflict that gives rise to the master and slave dialectic,
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therefore human society is ‘necessarily contentious’. Erving quotes Kojève on this 
point: “The I of Desire is an emptiness that receives a real positive content only by 
[a] negating action that satisfies Desire in destroying, transforming, and 
“assimilating” the desired non-I. And the positive content of the I, constituted by 
negation, is a function of the positive content of the negated non-I,”24 Thus desire as 
a negating negativity creates the conditions whereby the other maintains the integrity 
of the I. The ‘ineluctable violence’ of desire forms the basis of Kojève’s master and 
slave dialectic, and it is worth noting the parallel between this intersubjective 
violence and the collective crisis depicted by Girard. In both cases, the other and the 
surrogate victim function to generate unity and identity where there was none. 
Erving’s analysis suggests that in both instances violence is central to the process -  
the negating ‘I’ becomes a dim reflection of the negating community. However, as I 
have already shown, while the early and later forms of unity through negation are 
structurally the same, different conclusions are drawn by Girard from each. Thus, the 
early unity is seen as ‘true’, while the later unity is seen as ‘false’ (as unanimity 
minus one).
Kojève’s main postulate of desire as ‘negating negativity’ foreshadows 
Girard’s theory of mimetic rivalry. In particular Kojève’s comments on the mediated 
nature of desire are significant in anticipating Girard’s concept of ‘triangular desire’. 
Erving quotes the key passage in Kojève’s text that might be seen as the starting
Kojève claims: “[it] does the man o f the Fight no good to kill his adversary. He must overcome him 
‘dialectally.’ That is, he must leave him life and consciousness, and destroy only his autonomy. He 
must overcome the adversary only in so far as the adversary is opposed to him and acts against him. In 
other words, he must enslave him.” Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading o f  Hegel: Lectures 
on the Phenomenology o f Spirit, (ed.) Allan B loom  trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1980), p. 15.
24 Erving, “René Girard and the Legacy of Alexandre Kojève”, p. 115.
25 What we find when we read back in to Girard’s appropriation of Kojève’s dynamic concept of 
desire in his (Girard’s) early work, is that the centre o f negating activity shifts from the author as 
ontological subject to the text, which now contains any possibility o f unity through a catharsis o f 
Romantic originality -  and hence, original presence.
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point of Girard’s mimetic theory. “Desire directed toward a natural object is human 
only to the extent that it is ‘mediated’ by the Desire of another directed toward a 
natural object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire 
it...human history is the history of desired Desires.”26 Arising from this analysis, 
Erving outlines five characteristics that Girard’s mimetic model has in common with 
Kojeve’s, including the observation that desire is constitutive of human subjectivity. 
However, he goes on to point out...
The most fundamental point of comparison is that for both, Desire and being form an identity 
relation. It is axiomatic for Girard not only that desire is mimetic, but that ‘Imitative desire is 
always a desire to be another.’ Thus while Girard’s model of triangular desire describes the 
apparent role o f the model as the mediator o f an ostensible object-related desire, this turns 
out to belie a submerged desire to possess the being o f the mediator/model itself. As with 
Kojfeve. desire for Girard is not finally directed at objects per se, at what Kojeve refers to as 
the ‘given’ and ‘thingish’, but rather at ‘the spectacle of another real or illusory desire’ for 
desire is aimed at the mediator’s being.27
The autonomous subject who desires self-sufficiency is delusional in so far as he
believes that he can succeed, but his desire as such is truthful since by desiring he
rightly senses that he lacks being, and while Girard’s subject despairs at this fact
Kojeve’s simply ‘shrugs’ and resumes his negating activity. For both thinkers I
come into being as a human subject only through the other who becomes the
substance of my ‘being’: this analysis (as we shall see a little later) paves the way for
Girard’s articulation of ‘the interdividual’ as a subject existing between self and
other.
The similarities between Kojeve and Girard are surely striking. However, 
there are differences between them that highlight the tension discussed above with 
regard to the incompatibility between their distinct views of conflict. Girard’s
26 Erving, ‘The Legacy of Kojfeve”, p. 116.
27 Ibid.
28 Erving, ‘The Legacy of Kojeve”, p. 117.
29 Kojfeve’s influence was wide reaching, especially among French phenomologists. According to 
Herbert Spiegelberg, French phenomenology takes it for granted that Husserl’s phenomenology 
belongs together with Hegel’s Phenomenology o f  Spirit and even originated from it. In Kojdve’s 
lecutres on Hegel in Paris in the 1930s, attended by many young French theorists, he simply asserted
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analysis of Hegel in his literary criticism appears to mark a break with Kojeve 
concerning what the assertion of violence signifies. To hide his violence is the 
superior achievement of the one who inhabits the underground. Thus deceit becomes 
the operative term for Girard (and of course it is highlighted in the very title of his 
first major work) in a way that surpasses the more straightforward intentions of 
Kojeve’s dialectical partners.30 Erving quotes the passage that underscores Girard’s 
‘break’ in this regard: “The Hegelian dialectic rests on physical courage. Whoever 
has no fear will be master, whoever is afraid will be slave. The novelistic [that is, 
Girardian] dialectic rests on hypocrisy. Violence, far from serving the interests of
31whoever exerts it, reveals the intensity of his desire; thus it is a sign o f slavery.” 
Deceit, as the crucial postulate for Girard, and the chief characteristic of the 
Romantic fallacy, is in the service of desire, which must not show itself as such for 
fear ‘being’ will dissipate. Violence is the foil for the hero’s askesis -  it reveals his 
deepest secret -  whereas his withdrawal (his concealment of desire and violence) 
allows the masquerade of his ‘being’ to pass unnoticed. Furthermore, this 
masquerade allows him to attract potential rivals.
The ‘zero-sum’ logic ensures that the subject operates with a sense of 
inadequacy, shame and self-hatred, while simultaneously regarding the other with 
envy. In its bid for mastery, the Girardian subject, according to Erving, “attempts to
that “Hegel’s phenomenology was ‘phenomenological description in the Husserlian sense of the 
word’. Such an interpretation became possible because to Kojeve the Hegelian method, in contrast to 
the reality which it tried to explore, was ‘by no means dialectical; it is purely contemplative and 
descriptive in the phenomelogocal in the Husserlian sense of the term’.” Spiegelberg, H,, The 
Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1994), pp. 440-441. In both Kojeve’s and Girard’s interpretation of Hegel’s phenomenology, the 
genuinely dialectal aspects of spirit, so important to the hermeneutical tradition o f Gadamer, Ricoeur, 
and Taylor, are played down.
30 Deceit is the negative characterisation o f inwardness that haunts the Girardian subject. It constitutes 
the process of internal mediation whereby the subject is all the time confronting a negative image o f  
himself as a reminder of his lack of originality. Kojeve’s subject is too busy moving on to the next 
‘project’ to feel any great internal dissonance.
31 Quoted in, Erving, “The Legacy o f Kojeve”, p. 120 (my italics).
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dissimulate its feelings, but its strategies inevitably fail. Its fundamental delusion 
regarding desire and subjectivity results in a self-defeating, unreflective mimesis. 
Thus Girard’s postulate of the romantic fallacy ensures that deceit becomes the 
subject’s modus operandus [sic], for the self is both deceiving and deceived.” For 
Kojeve the self has nothing to hide. Since it does not strive for Romantic autonomy it 
is not motivated by a sense of shame nor does it approach the other with envy. “It has 
no need for deceit” because its struggles for ontological recognition are overt, 
depending as they do on courage and violence rather than the dissimulation of one’s 
‘true’ intentions. Kojeve’s ‘struggle’ is thus a “psychologically straightforward
engagement -  one imagines, for example, two knights jousting -  where the goal of
satisfying desire, of achieving mastery and thus human consciousness, is understood 
from the outset to be wholly dependent upon the Other.”33
Girard’s and Kojeve’s subjects appear to differ considerably on the basis of 
what they publicly exhibit since the latter asserts its violence while the former 
conceals it. Yet Erving does not quite say this. Indeed, he initially states that for both 
Girard and Kojeve “desire is constitutive of human subjectivity... is concerned with 
existential recognition, is socially mediated, and is ineluctably bound up with 
violence.” He sees Girard’s break with Kojeve coming with respect to the former’s 
crucial postulate concerning the deceptions of Romantic self-sufficiency, which, as 
discussed, Kojeve’s subject does not share. If, as Erving claims, the two subjects 
share violence, it cannot be the same kind of violence; in other words, it cannot be 
outward violence -  a violence that is put on display. While Erving’s point is that the 
Romantic subject differs from the Hegelian and Kojevian subject in terms of deceit, 
he does not make an explicit link between the deception and what is in fact hidden in
32 Erving, ‘The Legacy of Kojhve”, p. 120.
33 Erving, “The Legacy of Kojeve”, p. 121.
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the way that Girard does in the passage quoted above ( ‘violence is a sign of 
slavery’). If, in Girard’s early work, ‘violence is a sign of slavery’ then the subject is 
loath to put it on display.34 When Girard posits a Romantic fallacy (as self- 
deception), he automatically discounts himself from sharing with Kojeve a theory of 
‘violent struggle’ as the motive force of history. Thus Erving is right to point out an 
important difference between Girard and Kojeve with respect to the former’s key 
postulate of deceit, but he is surely wrong to say they both share a theory of violent 
struggle as the motive force of history -  unless, that is, Erving does not distinguish 
between Girard’s early and later work. It is, once again, Girard’s later work that 
maintains a theory of outward violence, which (unlike the Kojevian dialectic), is not 
a self-overcoming, but rather a gradual escalation of apocalyptic violence. Therefore, 
Girard’s negative view of human effort in history marks another point of divergence 
with Kojeve.
Erving tells us that Girard ultimately rejects Kojeve’s progressive view of 
history because this view is, effectively, an anthropologising of the Christian idea of
35transcendence that involves an “immanent but absolute self-understanding.” 
Bringing the Christian idea of transcendence within a temporal horizon implies, for 
Girard, “the pernicious illusions of ‘horizontal transcendence’ and ‘metaphysical
» •  •  36desire’ that trigger mimetic crises and their resolution through legitimized murder.” 
Erving is certainly correct in his analysis here, but he unquestionably places Girard’s 
early theory of crises in the context of Girard’s later theory of crisis; hence, we are 
informed, metaphysical desire leads to scapegoating. However, the idea of 
‘horizontal’ or ‘deviated’ transcendence is developed in Girard’s early work. It
34 One o f the examples that Girard gives of this concealment relates to Julian de Sorel in Stendhal’s 
The Red and the Black, who puts down the weapon “whose decorative role is symbolic” when he 
notices Mathilde’s eyes “shine with joy.” Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 112.
35 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 123.
36 Ibid.
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explains the individual’s attempt to acquire the other’s ‘being’, and in this sense it is 
only truly appropriate to explaining the dynamics of triangular desire and the intra- 
and inter-subjective crisis. When Girard writes Violence and the Sacred he then 
develops a theory of mimetic desire that is adequate to explain the collective crisis 
that culminates in scapegoating -  one that relies on an outward display of violence 
that can account for the contagion that ends in violent opposition. But as we saw this 
theory cannot emanate from the early work without some difficulties. For, first, the 
early work, when viewed in light of the later work, must be seen as a form of 
unacknowledged violence; and, second, Romantic self-deception cannot generate the 
conditions of the sacred, i.e. crisis on a collective scale.
Like other philosophers using Girardian theory, Erving does not sufficiently 
distinguish between the early and later work.37 He simply reflects the understandable 
tendency within this theory to believe that the early explanation of crisis also works 
for the later explanation of crisis.38 Only when the sacred is understood to be 
responsible for cultural order does the explicit nature of violence becomes self- 
evident. Violence, Girard claims, in his later work, is “that beautiful totality” that 
men seek to possess.39 It is “the signifier of ultimate desire, of divine self- 
sufficiency. .. whose beauty depends on its being inaccessible and impenetrable.”40 
Deceit, as the basis of an illusory subjectivity, cannot remain a central postulate of 
Girard’s theory once an account of scapegoating is introduced. Why then does he
37“Girard’s theory o f  history builds directly upon the premise of the subject’s romantic fallacy, where 
unreflective mimesis as a source of violence formed an ever-present threat to primitive communities.” 
Erving, “René Girard and the Legacy of Alexander Kojève”, p. 121.
38 For example see Stephen L. Gardner, ‘The Ontological Obsessions o f Radical Thought”, in 
Contagion: Journal o f  Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, Vol. 10. Spring (2003), p. 21.
39 Girard continues: ‘T he victim of this violence both adores and detests it. He strives to master it by 
means o f a mimetic counter violence and measures his own stature in proportion to his failure. If by 
chance, however, he actually succeeds in asserting his violence over that model, the latter’s prestige 
vanishes. He must then turn to an even greater violence and seek out an obstacle that promises to be 
truly insurmountable.” Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 148.
40 Ibid.
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bring a theory of self-deception forward to explain a theory of violent escalation? 
Perhaps to do otherwise would be to acknowledge that his early treatment of
subjectivity was unduly severe, constituting as it does an act of symbolic violence.
4. Interdividual Psychology: A Loss of Positive Interiority?
The influence of Kojève’s conception of desire, as negating negativity, and of 
the other as a function of the self, has a considerable impact on Girard’s thought as it 
develops. With Kojève’s emphasis on ‘violent struggle’, and Girard’s early emphasis 
on ‘self-deception’, an ethical subject can neither advance nor retreat with any degree 
of certainty. Hence when we consider Girard’s later anthropology, which has 
absorbed Kojève’s understanding of desire, what we actually find is a subject who is 
constantly moving between self and other. In the absence of an intentional rational 
agent there appears to be no way for this subject to locate itself, to take up a position, 
and commit itself; in Girardian theory ethical agency can only be the servant of 
negating negativity and/or self-deception. Jean-Michel Oughourlian (one of the 
significant interlocutors in Things Hidden Since the Foundation o f the World) 
conceptualises the subject of mimetic theory as the ‘interdividual se lf. Commenting 
on how desire brings this self into existence, he says:
Because desire is the only psychological motion, it alone... is capable o f producing the self 
and breathing life into it. The first hypothesis I would like to formulate in this regard is this: 
desire gives rise to the self and by its movement animates it. The second hypothesis... is that 
desire is mimetic. This postulate, which was advanced by René Girard as early as 1961, 
seems to be capable of serving as the foundation of a new, pure psychology - that is, one 
unencumbered by any sort o f biologism. We have chosen to call this interdividual 
psychology f
The implications of this view for our understanding of human motivation and 
traditional concepts of the self are radical. For one thing it suggests that we do not 
value objects because of their intrinsic worth, but rather we value and thus reach for
41 Quoted in, Webb, The Self Between, p. 7.
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them because of some vaguely felt sense of insufficiency that requires a remedy. 
This view thoroughly debunks any possibility of rational evaluation on the part of the 
subject since our desires are now acutely dependent on other people -  a fact that our 
‘deceived’ consciousness wholly ignores in its bid for ‘rational’ agency. 
Oughlourian’s two hypotheses, building as they do on mimetic theory, require that 
we revise earlier psychologies. “They demand that one renounce the mythical claim 
to a self that would be a permanent structure in a monadic subject.”42
In opposition to this mythic self that we must renounce, Oughlourian says 
that the interdividual self is an “unstable, constantly changing and ultimately 
evanescent structure”.43 Mimetic desire (the imputed ruler of the human world) 
means that no object can be trusted and no subject can be reasonably discerning -  
reason loses its bearings. According to Girard, the modem shift to the subject, with 
the unleashing of desire that accompanies it, coincides with the erosion of traditional 
hierarchies that functioned in a protective capacity against the potential for 
uncontrollable mob violence. Our efforts to free desire in constructive and creative 
ways today are ultimately stifling.
Some people equate the proliferation o f desire with a loosening of the bonds of culture, 
which they deplore; they link it to the levelling of ‘natural’ hierarchies on a broad front, and 
the wreckage of all values worthy o f respect. In the modem world, these enemies of desire 
are ranged against the friends of desire; the two camps pass judgement on each other in the 
name o f order against disorder, reaction against progress, the past against the future, and so 
on. In doing so they oversimplify a very complex state o f affairs. In contrast to what the 
‘enemies’ o f desire are always telling us, our world shows itself to be quite capable of 
absorbing high doses of ‘undifferentiating.’44
What would have destroyed other societies, Girard tells us, is transformed into an
engine of development that can assimilate (well neigh all) cultures and populations
that had remained outside this ‘engine’s’ sphere. By this means premodem culture
become modernised. However, the expansion of human potential that the friends of
42 Quoted in, Webb, The Self Between, p. 9.
43 Ibid.
44 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 284.
109
desire expect never truly materializes: “Either the liberated desire is channelled into 
competitive directions that, though enormously creative, are ultimately 
disappointing, or it simply ends up in sterile conflict and anarchic confusion, with a 
corresponding increase in the sense of anguish.”45 As religious taboos and cultural 
prohibitions are toppled, the individual believes that its desire will blossom, “its 
wonderful innocence will finally be able to bear fruit.”46 The problem with this form 
of flattening and equalising is that the external obstacles that traditionally prevented 
desire from spreading no longer function in a protective capacity.
As the key markers of difference erode, the effects of mimesis will ensure 
that another obstacle is found to take the place of the prohibition that no longer 
works.47 But something in the nature of this process has fundamentally changed.
Men lose the kind of obstacle that is inert and passive, but at the same time beneficent and 
equal for all - the obstacle that for this reason could never really become humiliating or 
incapacitating. In place of this obstacle established by religious prohibition, they have to 
reckon increasingly with the kind of obstacle that is active mobile and fierce - the model 
metamorphosed into a rival, interested in personally crossing them and well equipped to do 
so.48
The loss of hierarchies brought about by modem freedom has increased the 
likelihood of negative mimesis because it has replaced external obstacles with 
obstacles that mediate internally in a much more uncertain and potentially chaotic 
manner. The more people give in to their desires the more difficult it is for them to 
negotiate their relationships to others. Hence, the more people invest in ideas of 
freedom and liberation “the more they will in fact be working to reinforce the 
competitive world that is stifling them.”49 Everything since the Enlightenment it 
seems constitutes a loss of differentiation that is assimilated for the time being so 
long as the tentacles of desire have something to grasp. The self as part of the
45 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 285.
46 Ibid.
47 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 286.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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historical play of mimesis and the growing undifferentiation is, from the Girardian 
viewpoint, inextricably caught in the nets of the sacred without any truly effective 
way of protecting itself from crisis. The ‘interdividual self thus attempts to take 
account of this ‘undifferentiation’ by treating its interior life as mythic but, with such 
a thorough debunking of consciousness and intentionality, we are left wondering if 
there is any subjectivity left reliably to mediate otherness, or constructively reflect on 
its own negative mimesis.
Girard’s work articulates a ‘concern for victims’, and underscores the 
importance of the other, and of getting beyond the confines of ego psychology, or a 
narrow view of consciousness. However, as Webb highlights, “in the absence of a 
fully developed philosophical anthropology”, the centrality of the other “seems to 
depend more on the personal good instincts of the thinker than on a well-developed 
theoretical foundation.”50 A persistent difficulty in understanding Girard’s 
philosophical position lies in his unwillingness to attribute any positive dimension to 
the notion of inwardness. Reading Girard in conversation, in Things Hidden Since 
the Foundation o f the World, one gets the impression that his partners in dialogue do 
not help him in this regard.51 Having tried to distinguish “that obscure thing named 
desire” as something that “must only occur in a world in which barriers are pulled 
down and differences eradicated”, in other words the modem world, Oughourlian 
turns to the question concerning where all the mimetic desire now goes, without the 
previously effective religious channels.
Desire can, in fact, be defined, in similar terms (to ritual activities) as a process o f mimesis
involving undifferentiating; it is akin to the process o f deepening conflict that issues in the
mechanism of re-unification through the victim. Yet in our world the processes of desire do
50 Webb, The Self Between, p. 225.
51 At the beginning o f the chapter on ‘Mimetic Desire’, which opens the section entitled ‘Interdividual 
Psychology’, in Things Hidden, Girard and his interlocutors discuss the process o f ‘hominization’ and 
how desire ‘evolves’ in a peculiarly human manner.
I l l
not ever give rise to the collective crescendo that marks the ritual activities; at no stage are 
they concluded by an act of spontaneous expulsion.52
Girard accepts this analysis, desire has become localised. But he elaborates: “As a
state, it corresponds not so much to mimetic crises as they occur in primitive
societies, but to something at once similar and different, which is linked to the lasting
enfeeblement of founding violence in our own world.” He attributes responsibility
for this ‘enfeeblement’ to the Judea-Christian texts. The church’s sacrificial reading
of the gospels allows this founding violence to remain, albeit in a weakened state,
and therefore the “mimetic crisis... has been enormously slowed down and
lengthened, in the individual historical context.”54
Running parallel to Girard’s analysis of culture and his hypothesis of
founding violence is his interpretation of the Judaeo-Christian scriptures. He
understands these texts as unique in definitely exposing the innocence of the victim,
from whose immolation through mob violence, and putative ‘guilt’, culture emerges.
After the Christian event, the world can no longer be founded by violence against
victims. And for this reason, Girard believes, wherever the Christian culture takes
root it becomes increasingly difficult for violence against victims to ensue. All other
accounts, to a greater or lesser extent, continue to cover-up the innocence of the
victim and the guilt of the perpetrators. A consequence of the Christian event is the
“gradual effacement of the victimage mechanism”,55 and the loss of the once
cathartic effects of the sacred; what contemporary culture experiences in an acute
way.
52 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 287.
53 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 288.
54 Oughourlian summarises Girard as follows: “[In our world] in which the mechanisms of culture are 
exposed to the slow but inexorable subversion of a Judaeo-Christian element tempered by the 
sacrificial interpretation, the mimetic crisis must be lived out in this modified modem version, by each 
individual in his [sic] relationships with others.” Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 288-289.
55 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 289.
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In Girard’s account of the transition to the modem world we find every 
indication that the site of the ‘collective crisis’ has shifted from the external cultural 
world of the community to the internalised cultural world of the individual. 
However, he clearly sees this as something ultimately negative for the individual and 
all of his or her relationships.
Desire is what happens to human relations when there is no longer any resolution through the 
victim, and consequently no form of polarisation that is genuinely unanimous and can trigger 
such a resolution, But human relationships are mimetic none the less. We shall be able to 
discover beneath the ‘underground’ (in the Dostoevskyan sense) and always deceptive form 
of individual symptoms, the dynamic style of the sacrificial crisis. In this instance, however, 
there can be no ritualistic or victimarv resolution, and, if and when it becomes acute, the 
crisis ensues - what we call psychosis.5
The dynamics of the modem sacrificial crisis are still worked out through ‘internal
mediation’ -  which, as we saw in Chapter one, is fundamental to understanding the
intra- and inter- subjective crisis. Once the scapegoat mechanism is revealed, all that
this inner world can muster (any overt conception of subjectivity being precluded by
the structuralist framing of this whole analysis) is thwarted desire. This world of the
Romantic subject (the personification of all philosophies of consciousness) is
hollowed out by ‘Desire’ that is without openness to reasonable intervention. This
inner world is a world of frustration, self-loathing, resentment, hallucinations, and
57eventual psychosis. Nietzsche and the figure of the madman loom large.
How are we to be clear about Girard’s view of subjectivity? If we take the 
Romantic fallacy as the precondition of consciousness the corruption of the inner 
psychic life of the experiencing subject is a fa it accompli -  an example of which we 
find in Girard’s analysis of the underground man. The difficulty with this position 
when it continues to be a part of Girard’s over all theory is that it reduces all
56 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 288.
57 According to Girard, it was the cumulative effects o f resentment as ‘weakened vengeance’ in a 
mind that understood the significance of sacred violence and its loss o f efficacy in a Christianized 
world that finally drove Nietzsche mad. Girard, “Nietzsche versus the Crucified”, in The Girard 
Reader, p. 252.
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psychologies of the subject and all philosophies of consciousness to the control of a 
single entity called Desire. An example of this reduction can be found in the 
following formulation by Girard: “...far from being unconscious in Freud’s sense 
and only appearing in its true form in our dreams, desire not only observes but never 
stops thinking about the meaning of its observations. Desire is always reflection on 
desire.”58 Here as Paisley Livingston points out, it would appear as if “desire., .were 
what pulled the strings of the human marionette... a kind of homunculus equipped 
with... cognitive faculties”.59 Is the inevitability of such a reifying of desire not 
unnecessarily written into the structure of the subject within Girardian theory from 
the beginning?60
In the end, giving desire more status than a thinking feeling subject 
undermines Girard’s discourse because he believes, as a Christian thinker, that there 
is a “real human subject”, who emerges out of “the rule of the kingdom of God.”61 
Webb brings out the incongruity of maintaining, as Girard attempts to do, a 
structuralist notion of the subject (one that refuses all interiority) as part of a 
Christian commitment, by highlighting a key gospel term: the kingdom of god. “It is 
perhaps worth mentioning that in all the places in the New Testament that speak of
58 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 328 (my italics).
59 P. Livingston, Models o f desire: René Girard and the Psychology o f  Mimesis (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 25. According to Frank Richardson and Kathy Frost, Livingston 
suggests that in order to clarify a number of matters about the nature and operations of mimetic desire, 
we have to use many o f the ideas and terms of an ‘intentionalist psychology’ (usually discouraged by 
Girard’s structuralism), and that we can do so without lapsing into subjectivism or individualism. 
“Girard and Psychology: Furthering the Dialogue”, p. 7. Paper presented at an international meeting 
of the Colloquium on Violence and Religion (CoV&R), in June 2006.
60 Another example of Girard’s tendency to reify desire arises in a chapter entitled ‘Desire without 
Object’. After a discussion about how mimetic desire generates ‘doubles’, which, as we saw, leads to 
hallucinations and crisis at the intersubjective level, Oughourlian asks: “You are saying that ‘desire’ 
does this and that... Would you not agree that you are tending to give desire a false identity?’ Once 
again Girard refuses to give any legitimacy to a first-person perspective: “If desire is the same for all 
of us, and if it is the key to the system o f relationships, there is no reason not to make it the real 
‘subject’ o f  the structure - a subject that comes back to mimesis in the end. I avoid saying ‘desiring 
subject’ so as not to give the impression of relapsing into a psychology of the subject.” Girard, Things 
Hidden, p. 303.
61 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 199.
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the “kingdom of God,” the term in Greek is basileia tou theou, which means literally, 
the ‘rule’ or ‘reign’ of God -  not a place, that is, or even a community, but a 
condition of being governed inwardly by the will of God.” Outside this kingdom 
“the only subject is the mimetic structure” -  the individual who desires is simply a 
crisis without a resolution. When the ‘inner’ is thus construed only as Romantic or 
disorderly desire that later becomes synonymous with the lack of a sacrificial 
mechanism it appears that the Kingdom of God is nowhere near at hand.
The loss of positive interiority in Girard’s work as it develops is in part 
understandable when we consider how he explains the Romantic hero’s ‘spiritual 
askesis’ in his literary criticism. As we saw in chapter one, the analogy between the 
literary quest and the spiritual quest is developed in Deceit, Desire and the Novel 
when the critic compares the Romantic hero’s search for divine self-sufficiency with 
Augustine’s reflective search for God, the eternal essence. With this analogy -  
between the lover of the eternal essence, and the lover of the world, between the 
Saint and the Romantic -  we have not two different loves (what we find in 
Augustine’s theory of the will), but rather two entirely different kinds of subject, one 
internal and the other external. The question I posed in that same chapter (can there 
be any form of interiority that we might claim as ‘good’?) appears even more 
relevant when we consider the extent of the spiritual crisis that Girard is now arguing 
confronts humankind. We are left wondering whether Girard’s early atheism-inspired 
debunking of modem subjectivity, which undergoes no significant revision, does not 
altogether run aground in a discourse that attempts to include ‘extra-textual’ claims 
of ‘real’ violence and also a Christian concept of the good as love {agape) The lack 
of an available subject due to Girard’s early scapegoating in literary space thus gives
62 Webb, The Self Between, p. 176, Chp. 6, note 4 (my italics).
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‘desire’ and even ‘violence’ more status in his theory than the very conditions of 
Christian conversion.
5. ‘The Death of Desire’: Mimesis and the World as Will
A precedent for the tendency to hypostatize desire, and, in doing so, to 
hopelessly undermine the subject is to be found in the work of the German 
philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, who is arguably the first major thinker to 
emphasise “the abstract category of desire itself.’’63 Like Girardian ‘Desire’, which 
is, in the end, more ‘entitive’ than a thinking feeling agent, Schopenhauerian ‘Will’ 
ensures that the subject becomes the blind servant of an even more blind force, the 
self-replication of which, Eagleton tells us, is its own sole purpose. In the context of 
early nineteenth century ‘bourgeois society’ we discover that the determinative role 
and frequency of ‘appetite’ permits a dramatic theoretical shift.64 “With 
Schopenhauer, desire has become the protagonist of the human theatre, and human 
subjects themselves its mere obedient servants or underlings.”65 The emerging 
individualism of the social order is furthered by the now apparent “infinity of 
desire”, where the only end of accumulation is yet further accumulation.66 In a neo- 
Marxist vein, Eagleton provides an analysis of these developments that parallels 
Girard’s literary account of the movement from vertical to horizontal transcendence.
63 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1990), p. 158. Girard does 
make the point that desire is never fully abstract since it is fundamentally relational (Deceit, Desire, 
and the Novel, p. 178). However, as he moves away from a first-person perspective, and all positive 
forms o f subjectivity, gaining one’s bearings within such an intra- and inter- relational world becomes 
increasingly difficult. And when in Things Hidden desire becomes ‘hypostatized’ we have to wonder 
whether ‘relationality’ itself has not become abstract for Girard’s discourse.
54 The regularity o f desire in bourgeois society permits a dramatic theoretical shift. What follows is: 
“[t]he construction o f desire as a thing in itself, a momentous metaphysical event or self identical 
force, as against some earlier social order in which desire is still too narrowly particularist, too 
intimately bound up with local or traditional obligation, to be reified in quite this way”, Eagleton, The 
Ideology o f  the Aesthetic p. 159.
65 Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, p. 159.
66 Ibid.
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In a traumatic collapse of teleology, desire comes to seem independent of any particular ends, 
or at least as grotesquely disproportionate to them; and once it thus ceases to be (in the 
phenomenological sense) intentional, it begins monstrously to obtrude itself as Ding-an-sich, 
an opaque unfathomable, self-propelling power utterly without purpose or reason, like some 
grisly caricature o f the deity.67
The modem period, as a kind of fatal rupture (Girard), is the same period that
witnesses the articulation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the ‘World as Will’,
where the subject is now the site of an irremediable fissure, helpless in its attempts to
recover any positive resources within itself that might bring about greater clarity or
indeed satisfaction.
The will is not simply ‘an absence in search of a fullness’ as when the subject 
is construed as a ‘negating negativity’ (a la Kojeve). The self is now at the mercy of 
an agency that inscribes its diabolical presence on the body. Because of this integral 
link with the human organism, when desire becomes hypostatized in the modem 
period, it is possible to see it, as the Romantics did, as supremely positive. However, 
Schopenhauer provides the ‘sting in the tail’ to all idealist philosophies of this kind, 
since
...the preconditions of such Romantic affirmation are also the preconditions of the 
Schopenhauerian denunciation of desire tout court, accepting the categories of Romantic 
humanism but impudently inverting the valuations. Like Schopenhauer, you can retain the 
whole totalizing apparatus of bourgeois humanism at its most affirmative -  the singular 
central principle informing the whole o f reality, the integrated cosmic whole, the stable 
relations of phenomena and essence -  while mischievously emptying these forms o f their 
idealised content.69
If Freud’s transformation of what Girard calls the ‘eternal kingdom of ideas’ into
nr\
‘false essences’ is a modem form of mythological thinking, for Schopenhauer this
67 Ibid.
68 According to Schopenhauer, ‘The world as idea, the objective world, has... as it were, two poles; 
the simple knowing subject without the forms o f its knowledge, and a crude matter with form and 
quality. Both are completely unknowable; the subject because it is that which knows, matter because 
without form and quality it cannot be perceived.” Arthur Schopenhauer, “The World as Will and 
Idea”, quoted in A. Hofstadter and R. Kuhns, eds., Philosophies o f  Art and Beauty: Selected Readings 
in Aesthetics from  Plato to Heidegger (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 
449.
69 Arthur Schopenhauer, “The World as Will and Idea”, quoted in A. Hofstadter and R. Kuhns, eds., 
Philosophies o f  Art and Beauty, pp. 159-160.
70 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 251.
117
‘transformation’ is simply the naturally recurring tendency of the will. When, as 
Eagleton claims, you drain off the ideological substance from the system (“freedom, 
justice, reason, progress”) you can then simply “fill the system, still intact, with the 
actual degraded materials of everyday existence.”71 Desire can now latch on to 
anything it sees fit to desire in a kind of negative competition since there is no 
discernible hierarchy of ‘goods’. Whether desire is its own end or there is some 
notion of the sacred at work here is secondary. The main point that Girard and 
Schopenhauer agree on with respect to desire is that, independently of any intentional 
subject, it directs itself.
In the absence of any discernible objective truth, one ‘lie’ replaces another 
slightly more ‘honest he’ as the subject takes on the myth-making function that was 
once the prerogative of the community. Schopenhauer’s notion of the will...
...structurally speaking serves just the same function as the Hegelian Idea or the Romantic 
life-force, but is now nothing more than the uncouth rapacity of the average bourgeois, 
elevated to cosmic status and transformed to the prime metaphysical mover of the entire 
universe. It is as though one retained the whole paraphernalia of the Platonic Ideas but called 
them Profit, Philistinism, Self-Interest and so on.72
In this terrifying vision, the whole world, “from the forces of gravity to the
rumblings of the gut” (Eagleton), are invested with a futile craving. Human beings in
the market place are divine forces, writ “repellently” large; their ‘self-divinisation’,
to use a Girardian term, projects their “sordid appetites as the very stuff of the
cosmos.”73 The grander his gestures the sooner they fall flat. The naturalising effect
of this debunking removes any hope of an historical alternative. Like the modem
‘friends of desire’ whose ‘liberation’, Girard claims, is ultimately stifling,
Schopenhauer’s vision suggests that every attempt to affirm life is a further step
towards undermining the very thing that makes such an affirmation meaningful. “The
71 Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, p. 160.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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forms of the Hegelian system are turned against that system with a vengeance; 
totalization is still possible, but now of a purely negative kind.”74 It is this negative 
kind of totalisation is easily recognisable in the dynamics of underground existence.
The Romantic hero’s desire for ‘originality’ can be understood as a dim 
reflection of the now unassailable inner will. To be in touch with this inner will, to 
make my ‘spontaneous desire’ an expression of my unique individuality, is at root a 
dangerous naivety. In reality there can be no personal purchase on such an 
impersonal inner force. “What makes me what I am, the will of which I am simply a 
materialization, is utterly indifferent to my individual identity, which it uses merely 
for its own pointless self-reproduction.”75 This self-reproducing will, like desire, 
becomes the puppet master of a deceived and deceiving ego, all the time 
‘strategizing’ at the expense of a thinking, feeling agent. Schopenhauer’s distrust of 
what is most fundamentally human can be seen as anticipating Girard’s own distrust 
of the individual’s belief in his or her ‘unique identity’, or selfhood.
At the very root of the human subject lies that which is implacably alien to it, so that in a 
devastating irony this will which is the very pith o f my being, which I can feel from the 
inside of my body with incomparably greater immediacy than I can know anything else, is 
absolutely unlike me at all, without consciousness or motive, as blankly unfeeling and 
anonymous as the force which stirs the waves. No more powerful image of alienation could 
be imagined than this malicious parody o f idealist humanism.77
There is no longer any authentic ‘transcendence’ or ‘unity’ within the self that is not
already circumscribed by the implacable will, announcing itself in the modem period
as the absolute enemy of our conscious life. This enemy thus functions like an
intolerable weight of meaninglessness that “we bear inside ourselves as the very
n o
principle of our being, as though permanently pregnant with monsters.” And, not
74 Ibid.
75 Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, p. 161.
76 Guard, Things Hidden, p. 301.
77 Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, p, 161.
78 Ibid.
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incidentally, ‘the monstrous’79 is the very form of the crisis for the individual given
over to blind mimetic desire. In Schopenhauer’s scheme, subjectivity as the basis of a
renewed transcendence through internalisation and individuation becomes hopelessly
and irreparably flawed. The creative self, as the spoiled child of a Romantic idealism,
must renounce its claims to transformative potential. It must accept once and for all
that our flawed subjectivity makes us forever strangers to ourselves. "It is this which
touches on the guilty secret or impossible paradox of bourgeois society, that it is
exactly in their freedom that men and women are most inexorably enchained, that we
live immured in our bodies like lifers in a cell.”80 And if we develop Eagleton’s
metaphor here with a certain nod to Girard’s reading of the sacred character of all
legal systems (as essentially sacrificial), we might indeed go so far as to wonder
81whether such ‘free’ individuals are not in fact on death row.
Both Girard and Schopenhauer draw similar conclusions from their respective 
negative assessments of desire, and both thinkers would appear to adopt explicitly 
‘religious’ solutions to the apparently hopeless human condition. While Christian 
conversion provides the basis of reflective mimesis for Girard, thus pointing us (in 
the absence of any inner haven of the self) towards “good models”, for Schopenhauer 
the category of the ‘aesthetic’ provides a temporary escape from the prison-house of 
subjectivity. Unlike the Romantic individual, Schopenhauer’s aesthetic individual 
harbours no illusions concerning his self-sufficiency. Nor is it a question of trying to 
deceive anyone by trying to hide his desires. In Schopenhauer’s world “the 
detachment we attain for a precious moment in contemplating the artefact is an
79 Girard, Violence and the Sacred.
80 Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, p. 161.
81 This is how Eagleton describes the ‘death of desire’ in the modem period: ‘T he Schopenhauerian 
aesthetic is the death drive in action, though this death is secretly a kind o f life, Eros disguised as 
Thanatos: the subject cannot be entirely negated as long as it still delights, even if what it takes 
pleasure in is the process of its own dissolution.” Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic p. 164.
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implicit alternative to appetitive egoism.”82 The whole point of Schopenhauer’s 
‘solution’ is to see the self and the world as they are in all their futility: “only by 
somehow piercing the veil of Maya and recognising the fictional status of the 
individual ego can one behave to others with true indifference -  which is to say, to 
make no significant difference between them and oneself.”83 My own individual self, 
like all other individual selves, is a false construal of what is only an effect of an 
indifferent malevolent will.
The solution to the crisis wrought by Schopenhauerian “Will” is similar to 
Girard’s own solution to the crisis at the end of Deceit, Desire and the Novel, for
o4 k
which Flaubert provides the motto -  “Mme Bovary c’est moi!” The Romantic hero 
who successfully overcomes his metaphysical desire achieves a kind of 
transcendental detachment, whereby he realises that “at a certain depth there is no 
difference” between self and other.85 Both the Romantic hero and the 
Schopenhauerian subject must forfeit their former status and let go of their fictional 
selves that otherwise keep them ‘immured’ in their false egos, believing that they are 
in fact ‘different’. Thus, like the symbolic regeneration of the author at the end of 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel, the aesthetic individual achieves a similar rebirth, as 
Eagleton points out: “Just as all true knowledge springs from the death of the subject, 
so too does all moral value; to act morally is not to act from a positive standpoint, but
to act from no standpoint at all. The only good subject is a dead one, or at least one
86which can project itself by empathic indifference into the place of every other.”
82 Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, p. 164.
83 Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, p. 165.
84 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 299.
85 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 269. Cf Erving’s last note on the loss o f difference at the 
end o f Girard’s first major work, which Girard posits as the basis of a new unity for the Romantic 
hero, and the way it is oddly characterised as the source o f crisis in Girard’s later work.
85 Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, p. 164.
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However, it remains impossible to know whether my ‘empathy’ for you is not just 
another ruse of the will.87
When desire becomes hypostatized in Girard’s later work we are left 
wondering how to understand the solution offered (to the problem posed by ‘desire’), 
which is to ‘imitate good models’ since once again knowledge and action appear 
ironically at odds. Girard himself recognises the difficulty here. Speaking of mimesis 
in the modem world, he says: “there is no way of distinguishing on an objective 
basis, no way of making a systematic overall distinction, between forms of behaviour 
that are ‘good’ to imitate and those that are not.”88 If Girard’s hypostatizing of desire 
is the offspring of Schopenhauer’s bleak vision then any claim to a ‘positive’ form of 
mimesis to counteract the ‘negative’ mimesis that leads to crisis, can only sound 
hollow.89 His attempt to reinscribe a positive act that can be genuinely grasped by the 
subject is thus open to a similar critique as Schopenhauer’s ‘sublime 
disinterestedness’, the source of which Eagleton puzzles over: “It can obviously not 
be a product of the will, since it involves the will’s momentary suspension; but it is 
hard to see how it can be the work of the alienated intellect either, and in 
Schopenhauer’s drastically reduced universe there are really no other agents 
available.”90 If reason cannot influence the ravenous will, and the fictional nature of 
identity only exposes one’s actions as futile, then any ethical solution of the kind that
87 Eagleton puts the dilemma this way: “All practice for Schopenhauer inhabits the domain of illusion; 
to prosecute my pity for you is in that moment to dispel it, to find myself writhing instead in the toils 
o f self-interest. Only by transcending the diseased category o f subjecthood altogether could one 
individual feel for another; but this very proposition cancels itself out”. Eagleton, The Ideology o f the 
Aesthetic p. 165.
88 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 290.
89 Eagleton puts the problem of practice as follows: ‘T o  fight injustice is to desire, and so to be 
complied with that deeper injustice which is human life...Every bit o f the world, from doorknobs to 
doctoral dissertations to modes of production and the law o f the excluded middle, is the fruit o f  some 
stray appetite locked into the great empire of intentions and effects... The world is one vast 
extemalisation of a useless passion, and that alone is real” Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, 
p. 162. Girard would perhaps argue that desire is indeed useful if  it is generative, but without the 
possibility o f unanimity in the modem world we have to conclude that desire in Girardian theory is 
made redundant.
90 Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, pp. 165-166.
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Girard and Schopenhauer propose is impossible. And if their theory is able to dissect 
the insidious workings of the will, or the violence that pertains to mimesis, then 
“reason to that extent must be capable of curving back on itself, scrutinizing the 
drives of which it proclaims itself the obedient servant.”91 Either both have somehow 
given desire the slip in their theorizing, or “that theorizing is just another of its futile 
expressions and so quite valueless.”
The contradiction that Schopenhauer’s work shares with Girard’s work is a 
kind of “transcendentalism without a subject” (Eagleton). This is the case, because to 
be subject to the ‘agency’ of desire is to accept that “the place of absolute knowledge 
is preserved” though lacking all “determinate identity.”93 The knowing subject has 
been dislocated and its former space made utterly inscrutable: “There can be no 
subject to fill it, for to be a subject is to desire, and to desire is to be deluded. An 
idealist philosophy that once dreamt of finding salvation through the subject is now 
forced to contemplate the unspeakable prospect that no salvation is possible without 
the wholesale immolation o f the subject itself, the most privileged category of the 
entire system.”94 The insight into scapegoating that Girard brings forward in 
Violence and the Sacred pertains more than ever to his own analysis of modem 
freedom. By bringing out some of the comparisons with Schopenhauerian ‘Will’, we 
discover that Girard’s debunking of the subject and his hypostatizing of desire can be 
understood in line with a tradition that rejects one of the central tenets of Western 
spirituality. This tenet pertains to personal experience and the new significance it 
comes to have within Christian spirituality from the sixteenth century onwards, a
91 Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, p. 167.
92 Ibid.
93 Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, p. 168.
94 Ibid, (my italics).
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development we will have a chance to examine in more detail in the second part of 
the dissertation.
6. Dostoevsky’s Conscious Attack on Rationalism
Bringing out the affinities as I have just done, between Girard’s projects and 
the philosophical developments that have sought to hypostatize desire at the expense 
of ‘reason’ and ‘subjectivity’, makes it easy understand why Girard can be seen as an 
ally of modem forms of irrationalism. His analysis of Dostoevsky in particular adds 
substance to this view when it claims that the central insight of novelistic experience 
must pertain to the psychology of the author himself even when the ‘irrationalism’ of 
his characters can be understood as reflecting the ‘irrationalism’ of the social world. 
As we saw in chapter one, the Romantic fallacy, as the basis of inner division, is 
something that the individual must get beyond. It provides the primary source of 
conflict, which will get played out in literary space by the great novelists. Hence, the 
individual must overcome himself (‘slay the old human state’). Regardless of where 
the social forces are pushing him, the Romantic hero pushes himself, thereby 
achieving, in the great works, a restored unity and vertical transcendence. The 
starting point for the critic is thus the largely irrational exploits of the principal 
characters. In the end, desire knows more than an illusory subject, characterised by 
“envy, jealousy, and impotent hatred.”95
But does Girard’s critique of Dostoevsky not perhaps place too much 
emphasis on the psychological unravelling of the author through his characters at the 
expense of the author’s own understanding of his creative work in the context of the 
period in which he is writing? In other words, by overplaying the structuralist
95 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p 41.
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debunking of subjectivity, does he not gravely downplay the author’s own deliberate 
depiction of the reductive social forces of his time? Dostoevsky’s himself had a quite 
developed critique of these forces and if this critique is to be accorded any 
significance then analysis must bear on more than the hidden structure of the author’s 
desires. It must also at least consider what the author is attempting to depict prior to 
the ending of his ‘great work’. Here, arguably, we find a very acute subjectivity 
attempting to reflect the irrational spirit of the age, at least as much as, if not more 
than, he is trying to work out his own hateful relationships. Has Girard made too 
much of the ‘Romantic fallacy’ in Dostoevsky’s work?
From 1700 onward, particularly in France and England, there was a 
comprehensive effort to replace the classical philosophical understanding -  much 
indebted to Aristotle -  of human nature, society, and history. Because of the success 
of a new scientific stance to the world associated with Isaac Newton, the methods of 
the natural sciences came to be regarded as the only valid methods of arriving at 
truth. In the eighteenth century, many thinkers aspired to be ‘Newtons of the Mind’, 
who would apply that scientific approach to developing a new foundation for the 
entire range of human existence.96 Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground 
represents a vigorous attack on the influence of this ‘scientific temper’ on the 
intellectual and cultural attitudes of nineteenth century Russia. Notes from the 
Underground is written by a man desperately trying to overcome a profound sense of 
loneUness, isolation, and alienation, brought on by his contemporary intellectual 
culture. As Lev Shestov, an early twentieth century Russian philosopher remarked, 
the Notes are ‘an existential critique of pure reason.’97 Dostoevsky himself comments
95 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. Volume II: “The Science o f Freedom” (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), p. 174.
97
See, E.V. Cherkasova, “Kant on Free Will and Arbitrariness: A View from Dostoevsky's 
Underground” in Philosophy and Literature 28.2 (2004) 367-378.
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on the plight of the principal character in the preface of this work as follows: “In the 
chapter entitled ‘Underground,’ this person introduces himself and his views, and as 
it were, tries to explain the causes that brought about, inevitably brought about, his 
appearance in our midst”.98 In a style that Mikhail Bakhtin refers to as ‘polyphonic’, 
Dostoevsky writes the definitive counter-Enlightenment story.99
Dostoevsky’s main attack is on what he sees as the ‘wall’ of closed 
rationalism that turns the human’s consciousness of himself or herself into a kind of 
disease. The ‘wall’ that the thinking feeling subject confronts here is the utterly 
unquestionable status of scientific dogma. There simply is no thinking through the 
human’s baser instincts: as the main character of the Notes points out, when an 
individual being is left only with the feeling of revenge, he “dashes straight for his 
object like an infuriated bull with its horns down, and nothing but a wall will stop 
him.” 100 The almost mystical ‘iron laws’ of nature are summed up in the formula 
“2x2=4”.101 The hero of Dostoevsky’s masterpiece pushes this equation as a formula
1 rt'y
for human nature to its logical conclusions. The more self-absorbed modem
98 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground/The Double, trans., Jessie Coulson (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1983).
99 In the new ‘polyphonic’ novel the characters are “free people who are capable o f standing beside 
their creator, of disagreeing with him and even rebelling against him. The plurality o f independent and 
unmerged voices and consciousnesses and the genuine polyphony of full-valued voices are in fact 
characteristics of Dostoevsky’s novels. It is not a multitude of characters and fates with a unified 
objective world, illuminated by the author’s unified consciousness that unfolds in his works, but 
precisely the plurality of equal consciousnesses and their worlds, which are combined here in the unity 
of a given event, while at the same time maintaining their unmergedness. “Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems 
of Dostoevsky’s Poetics”, trans. R. W. Rostel (Ann Arbour: Ardis, 1973), p,4.
100 Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, p.20.
101 Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground p. 40.
102 “As soon as they prove to you, for instance that you are descended from a monkey, then it is no use 
scowling, accept it as a fact. When they prove to you that in reality one drop of your own fat must be 
dearer to you than a hundred thousand of your fellow-creatures, and that this conclusion is the final 
solution of all so-called virtues and duties and all such prejudices and fancies, then you have to accept 
it, there is nothing to be done about it, for twice two is a law of mathematics. Just try refuting it .. .” 
Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, p. 23. Part of the cultural background to Dostoevsky’s 
critique of the ‘2x2=4’ formula was the publication some years earlier of Nikolia Chemyshevsky’s 
essay, The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy (1860), which expressed similar sentiments to 
those embodied later in the characters of Chemshevsky’s novel What is To Be Done, a work that was 
to have a major influence on Dostoevsky. “In general, it is necessary only to examine more closely an 
action or a feeling that seems to be altruistic to see that all o f them are based on the thought of
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human’s are, the more conscious they become, and the more aware they are of the 
utter futility of conscious existence. Consciousness thus becomes similar to a disease, 
making everything that was once ‘noble’ and ‘true’, appear debased and artificial. 
The more enlightened and educated we become according to nineteenth century 
standards the more we discover that we are physically or physiologically determined. 
Dostoevsky brings out the fact that we experience this ‘being determined’ as a 
degradation of our being. The underground man, who, having committed a 
loathsome action that at first appears shameful, ends up taking an unusual pleasure in 
this degradation: bitterness, thus turns into “a sort of shameful accursed
1 O'!sweetness.”
To understand what we might call this ‘guilty pleasure’ in self-abasement is 
to grasp the irrationalism that Dostoevsky appears to suggest is at least more 
authentically human than the ‘closed rationalism’ of 2x2=4. Referring to where the 
degradation leads when one becomes aware that one is pushed to the ‘wall’ by the 
laws of ‘acute consciousness’, the narrator says that you realise then that there is no 
escape for you, “that you never could become a different man,” 104 and therefore if 
you are a scoundrel then you are not to blame for being a scoundrel. Hence a peculiar 
problem faces the ‘irrationalist’, since nineteenth century scientism does not quite 
manage to remove our consciousness of responsibility.105 So we end up conscious of 
being inexorably determined and yet to blame. “The worst of it, look at it which way 
one will, it still turns out that I was always the most to blame in everything. And
personal interest, personal gratification, personal benefit; they are based on the feeling that is called 
egoism” Edie, J. Scanlan, and M.B, Zeldin, (eds.), Russian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Press, 1965), p. 49.
103 Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, p. 19.
104 Ibid.
1051 am grateful to Brendan Purcell of the Philosophy Department in University College Dublin 
whose lectures and conversation helped me to understand Dostoevsky’s own critique of nineteenth 
century Russia.
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what is most humiliating of all, innocently to blame.”106 The underground man spells 
out the bizarre contradictions of this reductionist determinism: the human person, 
despite all he is told, still feels anger at this contempt for his humanity, yet, because 
he accepts what science is telling him, knows that he should not feel that anger. He is 
aware that the new scientism fundamentally erodes the categories of moral existence, 
for example good, evil, guilt and forgiveness.107 When applied to human reality, 
scientific rationalism denies the individual the prospect of a genuine act, leaving him 
to feel in a kind of inertia, a depersonalised experience of what is most fundamental 
to his sense of self. Is Girard’s ‘alienated Christianity’ not reflected here in 
Dostoevsky’s fierce though brilliant assessment of the social forces of nineteenth 
century Russia?
Perhaps. But unsurprisingly, in opposition to the general critical assessment 
of Dostoevsky’s ‘Notes’ as constituting in part, but primarily, a devastating attack on 
the prevalence of utilitarianism in nineteenth century Russia, Girard makes the case 
that the author is in no way identical with the protagonist who asks rather sourly: 
‘what’s the point in wishing by numbers.’108 What Girard wants to emphasise instead 
of Dostoevsky’s attack on modem scientism and rationalism, is that the author can 
only be identified with the hero at the end of the work of genius, when he has
106 Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, p. 19.
107 ‘1 should certainty have never been able to do anything with my generosity of soul -  neither to 
forgive, for my assailant would perhaps have slapped me from the laws of nature, and one cannot 
forgive the laws o f nature; nor to forget, for even if it were from the laws of nature, it was still an 
affront. Finally, even if I wanted to be anything but magnanimous, had desired on the contrary to 
revenge myself on my assailant, I could not have revenged myself on anyone for anything because I 
should certainly never have made up my mind to do anything, even if  I had been able to.” Dostoevsky, 
Notes from the Underground, p. 20.
108  t iReflecting an anti-rational view, the protagonist from The Notes says: “As a matter of fact... if the 
formula for all our desires and whims is some day discovered -  I mean what they depend on, what 
laws they result from, how they are disseminated, what sort o f good they aspire to in a particular 
instance, and so on -  a real mathematical formula, that is, then it is possible that man will at once 
cease to want anything, indeed I suppose it is possible that he will cease to exist. Well what’s the point 
o f wishing by numbers?” Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, p. 34.
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overcome his ‘metaphysical desire’ in the “‘miracle of writing the novel.”109 “It is 
true,” he tells us, “that Dostoevsky shares his hero’s disgust for the mediocre utopias 
of the end of the nineteenth century. But we should not mistake this partial 
agreement with total agreement... the underground Dostoevsky is not Dostoevsky, 
the genius, but rather the romantic Dostoevsky of earlier works.”110 Girard, as we 
saw in chapter one, privileges a structuralist approach to literary space. Dostoevsky 
the genius, the one who overcomes his metaphysical desire and his illusory self, does 
so in the process of writing. However, if Dostoevsky’s attack on utilitarianism is only 
‘partial’, not the serious work of the novel, the implication is that the real problem 
lies in the psychology of the individual. The structuralist reading, then, minimizes the 
effects of the reductive socio-cultural forces at play in nineteenth century Russia -  
and, more to the point, discounts Dostoevsky’s own strong rejection of them in and 
through his novel.
Similarly, Girard maintains, the contagion that besets Europe in 
Raskolnikov’s vision is owing to a form of metaphysical desire, or pride, whereby 
‘men condemn or acquit according to their own law’ (something we also explored in 
chapter one). Girard’s focus on the individual’s ‘Romantic fallacy’ is so strong that it 
does not admit of anything that might mitigate the fact that our desires are borrowed, 
that is, Girard’s budding mimetic theory. In terms of the project of the early work 
this seems understandable: it does after all concern ‘the self and other in literary 
space’. The dynamics of desire in structuring our relationships have an important 
significance here. However, a critique of rationalism is an attack not only on social 
engineering, but also on the undermining of human beings and their relationships, 
brought about by this engineering. It is arguably this aspect of the critique of
109 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 300.
110 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, pp. 259-260.
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utilitarianism that comes through when Dostoevsky presents his devastating attack 
on the ‘wall of closed rationalism.’ If scientism stifles and cramps human freedom it 
is because it also undermines human relationships, making any alternative to a bland 
instrumentalism or a negative imitative desire difficult in the extreme. If men do 
“condemn or acquit according to their own law” then perhaps the ‘law’ here has as 
much to do with a narrow form of rationalism that soaks the good out of life leaving 
us alienated from each other and from our selves, unmotivated and uncaring.
Dostoevsky’s radical critique of utilitarianism forces us to contemplate 
nineteenth century scientism as a project that undermines what is fundamental to 
being human. His attack does not preclude a critique of negative mimesis, but it does 
make some of the conclusions drawn from Girard’s analysis more difficult to sustain. 
For example, if rationalism is the driving force behind the worst excesses of the 
dehumanising tendencies of the modem project then the transition from vertical to 
horizontal transcendence is not as easily explicable solely in terms of pride. The 
explanation now has to include an account of epistemologically driven societal 
changes, as much as the psychological dynamics of individuals. Viewed in an 
existential light, the problem of rationalism and scientism can be recognised as the 
‘law’ that makes it impossible to know who is responsible in every instance, because 
our inner life, our passions, our consciousness, etc., are not reducible to rational 
methods of analysis and application. If we are all ‘innocently guilty’ because of an 
exaggerated confidence in 2x2=4, as the protagonist in Notes spitefully insists, then 
no one is really to blame. Is this not the dilemma that Dostoevsky is hinting at when 
he has Raskolnikov proclaim that ‘nobody knew whom to condemn or whom to 
acquit’? It is a stumbling block perhaps to our will to scapegoat, but an all too human 
problem nonetheless, that certainly is not at odds with Girard’s later theory of the
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sacred. We may justly ask, from the outset of his early theory, does Girard really 
need to do away with an ontological subject altogether in order to account for the 
‘resurrection’ of an already quite lucid author?
7. Conclusion: Beyond Literary Space
In this chapter I have developed three main lines of argument against 
Girardian theory. I began by first reiterating the theoretical anomaly that, as I had 
argued in chapter two, exists in his early work. This anomaly was identified from the 
structural similarities between the early and later works, which present two different 
accounts of unity: the first a ‘true’ unity and the second a ‘false’ one. When the 
anomaly was further explored by reading back into Girard’s early work in light of his 
later work, I suggested that he himself was guilty of scapegoating the Romantic hero 
for the sake of the literary community -  so that the early ‘unity’ is exposed also as 
false. This I outlined as the first main strand of my argument against Girardian 
theory.
The second strand of my argument concerns evidence that Girard’s later work 
employs the early theory to help validate the latter account of crisis, showing that not 
only does Girard not renounce the problematic early work but actually draws on key 
aspects of it to bolster and support his account of crisis in the modem world. As his 
theory evolves he attempts to maintain what is (according to the first strand of my 
argument) a mythological account of literary space alongside a demythologising 
account of anthropological space -  a form of scapegoating and a rejection of 
scapegoating -  with three significant consequences for his theory.
The third and final strand of my argument details these consequences flowing 
from Girard’s attempt to maintain two incompatible theories under the one
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explanatory umbrella of crisis in the modem period. If Dostoevsky’s ‘Underground 
Man’ pushes to extremes what others will only push half way, then we might say 
Girard himself is pushed to extremes when he is forced to maintain a view that pits 
‘Desire’ against the individual to such a degree that the only conceivable 
interpretation of the modem world is that it becomes ‘synonymous with a sacrificial 
crisis’. By negating subjectivity and history and making the later work appear 
continuous with the early work, Girard’s overall theory generates a number of 
profound tensions: first, incompatible accounts of crisis that purport to cohere in one 
unified theory of subjectivity and history; second, the loss of interiority and a first- 
person perspective, and hence the possibility of true, or positive spiritual askesis, to 
counter the negative mimesis of internal mediation; and, third, the hypostatizing of 
desire, and hence the aligning of ‘Mimetic Desire’ with ‘Blind Will.’ In sections 
three through five above I attempted to elaborate these consequences.
The problems are most readily identifiable here when we draw out the 
implications of Kojeve’s theory of desire for Girard’s work. While he is clearly 
indebted to Kojeve, Girard maintains a view of historical development as a negative 
unfolding in which the self in all its struggles is condemned to futility -  a view which 
is clearly at odds with Kojeve’s progressive concept of history. As we saw the self is 
governed by deceit and therefore must hide its desires and violence from the other 
out of fear that its lack of originality will be noticed. The early theory thus 
contradicts the later view in which violence is the ultimate goal and the basis of a 
divine self-sufficiency -  less a neurotic need to hide itself and more an outward 
activity that is always in danger of becoming contagious. The tension between the 
early and later work is now exposed, since we can readily see that the Romantic 
fallacy cannot be responsible for the collective crisis as Girard suggests in his later
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work when he places internal mediation and external mediation in the context of 
Degree as the underlying principle of all order, whose failure triggers a sacrificial 
crisis. Internal mediation, which generated the crisis in literary space, is thus viewed 
by Girard as an essential component of the crisis in cultural space, as if the 
explanation of cultural space is but the extension of the explanation of literary space.
Section four set out to highlight how Girard’s concept of the ‘interdividual 
self is left without anchorage on a sea of mimetic desire. I outlined there how this 
self, whose ontological insufficiency corresponds to a lack of catharsis, forces Girard 
into a construal of desire as having more agency than an individual self with an 
inwardly generated personal identity (a central tenet of Christian faith). In the 
following section I drew a comparison between Girardian ‘Desire’ and 
Schopenhauerian ‘Will’ in order to demonstrate how such a reifying of desire ends 
up doing violence to the subject; this demonstration strengthens the case already 
made against Girard’s own scapegoating tendencies,111 but perhaps more 
significantly it points to a danger that runs counter to the Christian spirituality to 
which he himself is committed.
Finally, in addition to elaborating the tensions and inconsistencies arising as 
consequences from what I address in the first two strands of my argument, I 
attempted in the immediately preceding section above to draw out the irrationalism 
implicit in the reifying of desire. In doing so, I made the case that while such an 
attack on the subject and reason may appear to be the substance of Dostoevsky’s 
work as analysed by Girard, Dostoevsky himself presents a well worked out critique 
of the social forces that ‘produce’ the irrationalism at work in The Notes from the 
Underground, and the nineteenth century more generally. In other words, he is not
111 Girard’s ‘scapegoating tendencies’ have been addressed elsewhere. See R. Kearney, The Poetics o f  
Modernity: Toward a Hermeneutic Imagination (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), especially part 
three, ‘Current Debates’.
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simply a slave to mimetic forces until he gradually works through these dynamics in 
his novels but is rather capable of analysing with profound insight the broader social 
picture that gives rise to various forms of obsession. This fact reminds us that we 
need not dispense with a subject altogether when confronted with the peculiar 
dynamics of desire.
Now that we have oudined the problems in Girard’s theory we can perhaps consider 
how Taylor might come to his aid by addressing them. If Taylor is genuinely to be of 
help here he can do so only by taking seriously Girard’s key concern -  a concern 
whose significance and urgency, I believe, is in no way diminished by the aporiai 
into which Girard himself has been led in trying to deal with it. This concern is: the 
loss of difference and the consequent crisis that arises for communities and 
individuals in their attempts to generate unity and identity. Why is this a deep and 
troubling concern? Quite simply because in these very attempts the creation of 
victims and scapegoats by some form of violence seems to be unavoidable. Girard’s 
career has been characterised by a determined effort to expose the source of division 
and violence in cultural systems. Beginning with his early criticism, he has charted 
and attempted to explain the processes of undifferentiation and crisis. Regrettably, as 
I have tried to show, his explanation has involved a radical undermining of any 
viable conception of subjectivity or historical change. Despite his final restoration of 
a transcendent subject at the end of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel (a restoration that, 
for reasons I that have been at pains to elaborate above, does not work), his 
insistence on the ‘Romantic lie’ as the modus operandi of the modem self has made 
it impossible for a subject to occupy a genuinely ethical space. My main hypothesis 
in the dissertation is that we cannot hope to offer an account of how the challenge to
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contemporary culture, so powerfully identified by Girard, is to be met without a 
nuanced conception of an ethical subject who is capable of successfully traversing a 
space from division to unity -  and of doing so in a post-religious age. Is such an 
account available? I hope to answer this question affirmatively when I turn now in 
the second part of the dissertation to explore key aspects of Taylor’s thought.
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Part Two
From Sacrifice to Self: Taylor’s Philosophical
Account
Chapter 4
The Early Modern Period 
(Transposing the Old Cosmic Order)
As in Greek tragedy and primitive religion, it is not the differences but the loss of 
them that gives rise to the violence and chaos that inspires Ulysses’ plaint. This loss 
forces men into a perpetual confrontation, one that strips them of all their distinctive 
characteristics -  in short of their “identities.” Language itself is put in jeopardy. 
“Each thing meets in mere oppugnancy”: the objects are reduced to indefinite 
objects, “things” that wantonly collide with each other like loose cargo on the decks 
of a storm tossed ship... To say this speech merely reflects a Renaissance 
commonplace, the great chain of being, is unsatisfactory. Who has ever seen a great 
chain collapse?1
- René Girard
There was of course a traditional “organicism” in the old views of order: the different 
things in the universe depend on each other and support each other. But where that 
mutual dependence once flowed from the fact that each holds its ordered place in the 
whole, which would otherwise revert to chaos... now the support takes direct 
efficient-causal form... This new order of interlocking natures arises to take the 
place of an order predicated on ontic logos. As the metaphysical basis of the earlier 
view erodes, in particular with the growing success of mechanistic science, the new 
vision can step into the vacuum2
- Charles Taylor
1. Introduction
A cursory glance at the quotations above alerts the reader to a contrast 
between what appear to be two very different accounts of order and transition in the 
human world. Girard’s theory, captured succinctly here in the first quotation, 
purports to explain order from an anthropological perspective that appears 
profoundly suspicious of ontology and the capacity of a historical subject to survive 
the decomposition, which, for him, characterizes the modem period. For Taylor, 
however, this period need not be seen as a case of terminal decline; as he observes,
1 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 51.
2 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, pp. 275, 276.
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‘something new arises.’ His immense enquiry in Sources o f the Self reveals that 
modem selfhood in all its anthropological, epistemological, aesthetic and political 
implications, also has its roots in ideas of the human good, that form part of a 
perennial quest of human cultures. These ideas of the good, as an aspect of life and 
yet somehow beyond life, help shape our group and individual identities and, Taylor 
believes, as the human story evolves they gradually become clearer and more 
articulate. He argues that the modem emphasis on universal and equal respect is the 
result of a long effort to define and reach the good, so that gradually the conception 
of selfhood becomes the locus of dispute, contestation and recognition in the working 
out of our value commitments. Hence, gaining orientation to the good through telling 
and retelling our stories becomes paramount to having an identity -  something we 
will return to in greater detail in the final chapter. At the heart of ‘the good’ as it 
comes to be construed in the modem period is what Taylor calls the ‘affirmation of 
ordinary life,’ a value that has decisively if not completely replaced an earlier 
conception of reason as still connected to a hierarchy based on ‘death and rebirth’ -  
in other words, to a sacrificial worldview -  as a phenomenon somehow grounded in 
nature. His analysis of the aims of ‘ordinary life’ as superceding the older neo- 
Platonic view of hierarchy presents a rebuff to Girard’s account of the great chain as 
playing only a marginal and “decorative” role in the maintenance of order. The new 
view ‘fills the vacuum’ (that Girard otherwise rightly sees as) resulting from the loss 
of traditional hierarchy.
While dealing with a shorter anthropological timeline than Girard, Taylor has 
a more positive view of the modem period, borne out in his analysis of developments 
in the West. His aim in Sources is, on one hand to provide a historically grounded 
account of what our Western notions of respect consist in today, and, on the other
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hand, to provide an ontological analysis of the basic conditions of human agency. 
The former account then is his “philosophical history”, while the latter analysis is his 
“philosophical anthropology”.3 While these two are never truly separate, for the sake 
of responding adequately to Girard’s own ‘bi-focal’ analysis (literary/cultural), I will, 
for now, consider them as distinct: in chapters four and five I will, for the most part, 
explore the relevance of Taylor’s philosophical history for Girard’s work, taking up 
then the relevant aspects of his philosophical anthropology in chapter six.
Unlike Girard, Taylor believes that there is a real moral basis to modem 
culture that can be reclaimed from the background of its key concerns, although 
articulating its significance is increasingly difficult. Breaking out of the structures of 
violence is a historical project that requires a depth dimension to human experience 
that is difficult to fathom in Girard’s work due to, as I have argued, the persistent 
‘effects’ of structuralism. The latter’s reaction to existential and historical depth is, as 
Keamey observes in the context of certain strands of postmodernism, a form of 
“surrender to the prevailing positivism which declares that things are the way they 
are and cannot be otherwise.”4 By contrast, Taylor’s account of the developments in 
modem culture, as we shall begin to see in this chapter, attempts to confront the 
human tendency toward ‘sacrifice’ in a self-conscious way, while providing a 
morally meliorist view of the self and its historical developments. Unlike Girard, 
who sees the collapse of a theocentric concept of hierarchy and the unleashing of 
desire as a definitive loss for the individual, Taylor believes by placing the individual 
at the centre of the ordering process the early modem period provided the conditions 
of a new kind of authentic selfhood. His philosophical history highlights how an
3 Nicholas H. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning Morals and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2002), p. 8.
4 Keamey, The Wake o f Imagination, p. 393.
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internalisation of the good first becomes radical around the sixteenth century, and 
begins to mirror the differentiating role of the traditional cosmic order.
In light of Taylor’s work, I attempt to establish, in this second part of the 
dissertation, whether a workable model of human agency can be formulated that does 
not necessarily entail the rejection of Girard’s theory of the sacred. I will begin in 
this chapter by considering Taylor’s more historical account, and the way it responds 
to a number of specific issues that I have already outlined with respect to Girard’s 
account of the transition to the modem period. I will try to show how Taylor’s work 
can address some of these issues that, left as they are, tend to undermine the 
possibility of any positive account of human agency or historical development. The 
main issues, already outlined in Part One, are: 1) the loss of positive interiority as an 
aberration of Augustine’s concept of the will, 2) the historical veracity of conflating 
the views of Corneille and Descartes, and 3) the inability of modem culture to 
replace the traditional sacred order when the community can no longer effectively 
resort to violence. These ‘undermining motifs’ in Girardian theory can be strongly 
contested, as I shall attempt to show, by reference to Taylor’s account.
The first such motif concerns the Romantic hero’s spiritual askesis which, as 
we saw, is a kind of futile withdrawal by the individual for the sake of a more 
‘worthy’ obstacle to excite his desire, something that Girard juxtaposes with the 
Saint’s spiritual journey inwards in search of God. I suggested that the analogy, 
between the lover of the eternal essence, and the lover of the world -  between the 
‘Saint and the Romantic’ -  presents, not two different kinds of love (as is the case 
with Augustinian caritas and cupiditas), but rather two entirely different subjects. 
Rather than one subject and two tendencies of the will (which, as we shall see more 
clearly in this chapter, is Augustine’s position), Girard separates ‘literary space’ from
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‘spiritual space’, with the result that his concept of the self involves two entirely 
different subjects and two entirely different wills. The Romantic thus becomes 
preoccupied with ‘originality’, as a futile expression of his own desire, while the 
Saint, becomes preoccupied with ‘originality’, as the place of his home in the eternal 
essence. By explicating Taylor’s work on ‘Augustinian inwardness’ I will argue that 
his interpretation of Augustine allows for a less dichotomous view, while also 
recognizing how the subject can become divided through a certain objectifying stance 
to the world.
The second but related problem with Girardian theory that we will revisit in 
this chapter has to do with his understanding of modem individualism as pure egoism 
or ‘pridefulness’. By explaining Descartes’ appropriation of the Augustinian subject, 
Taylor draws out the continuity between the premodem and the modem experience, 
and in the process he shows how the moral sources that once belonged to a cosmic 
order defined by the Greek concept of Being, begin to be redefined and further 
internalized as rational, in the seventeenth century. What for Girard is a negative 
unfolding (discussed in chapter one), rooted in the individual’s self-deception 
concerning his own ‘originality’, has for Taylor a moral import, and is part of an 
incamational mode of life. We see the difference here discussed with respect to both 
Girard’s and Taylor’s comparisons between Descartes and Corneille. As we noted in 
chapter one, for Girard, pride announces itself in the modem world as the inability to 
admit that we imitate others. Its effects are recognizable in “the morality of 
‘generosity’ that Descartes, the first philosopher of individualism, and Corneille, its 
first dramatist, develop at the same time.”5 Thus the ethic of ‘individualism’ for 
Girard is just a ruse of the ego in its bid for divine self-sufficiency. In its attempts to
5 Girard, Resurrection, p. 94.
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avoid the reality of its own imitative desires, it seeks out “proof’ to convince itself of 
its own superiority. Later in the chapter we will show how Taylor’s reading of the 
difference between Descartes and Corneille challenges Girard’s view that both early 
modem thinkers share a similar ethic, and highlights what is new and radical about 
the beginning of the modem period.
The third and perhaps most significant problem to which we will address 
Taylor’s philosophical history in this chapter is Girard’s later anthropological 
analysis of the modem world as “synonymous with a sacrificial crisis”. For Girard, 
as we saw in chapter two, the movement from vertical to horizontal transcendence -  
what he describes in his early work as a period when ‘men become gods’ -  is 
characterized as a transition from external to internal mediation, whereby the 
negative imitation that pertains to the Romantic fallacy now holds sway. The 
anthropological principle of Degree is privileged by Girard over the philosophical 
doctrine of the ‘great chain of being,’ in order to explain how external mediation 
holds internal mediation in check -  who after all ‘has ever seen a great chain 
collapse.’ A traditional hierarchical order thus functions to contain violence by 
channeling mimetic desire in non-rivalrous ways, while the absence of hierarchy, and 
hence Degree, releases desire in competitive and ultimately destructive ways. 
Without Degree, Girard argues, there is crisis, and, since Degree is an inherently 
anthropological and social principle, the individual in the modem world does not 
have any capacity to keep the destructive forces in check.
In Part One I argued that in order to understand how this anthropological 
principle fails to restore order in the modem world, Girard relies heavily on ‘internal 
mediation’, or the negative dynamics that arise from the Romantic fallacy. The 
problem with making the later theory appear continuous with the early theory is that
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it further masks Girard’s early mythological account, concealing his own act of 
scapegoating the subject. What follows from this when we look again at the 
anthropological principle of Degree is that the Romantic hero is now held 
responsible not only for the crisis in literary space but also for the crisis in the 
modem world: once ‘Degrees are shaked’, hierarchies are flattened and thus it 
appears ‘men become gods in each others eyes’. From the Girardian perspective the 
older order simply cannot function to contain violence once the individual’s pride 
gains a foothold. As long as the early mythological account that appears to explain 
crisis so well, is still intact and apparently continuous with the later theory there is no 
way for Girard to conceive of an alternative to the total loss and deterioration of 
order in the modem period. But is all order really so fundamentally undermined 
when the individual attempts to gain some autonomy? When Girard himself is seen 
to be scapegoating the modem individual, for the sake of the literary community (and 
to be merging two separate theories as if they were somehow a unified theory), are 
we not now in a position to speak to Girard’s strongest claims concerning violence 
and religion, and to do so from the perspective of a historical and ontological 
subject? Later in this chapter we will consider Taylor’s analysis of how the 
traditional order associated with Degree is transposed onto a Providential order that 
places the individual at least partly in control of the design in nature that had been, 
prior to the modem period, a socially determined hierarchically arranged cosmic 
order. At the heart of this transposition is Taylor’s central idea concerning the 
affirmation of ordinary life, a largely Protestant revolution in thought that presents 
the strongest challenge yet to Girard’s thorough debunking of subjectivity and 
historical development in the name of Christian anthropology.
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2. Taylor’s St. Augustine: “In Interiore Homine”
In her work entitled Love and Saint Augustine, Hannah Arendt describes how, 
for Augustine, whose every experience is conditioned by death, our striving after 
future goods is something we must always fear. Arising from this, ‘only a present 
without a future is immutable and utterly unthreatened.’6 It is here in the ‘futureless 
present’ that we find the absolute good, which Augustine calls eternity. Human life 
does not endure; each day we lose it a little more. While only the present appears real 
there seems no way of measuring it - no space in which to take a stand. ‘Life is
*7 t  o
always either - no more or not yet.’ However, humans do measure time. Arendt 
puts Augustine’s question as follows: “Perhaps man possess a ‘space’ where time 
can be conserved long enough to be measured, and would not this ‘space’, which 
man carries with him transcend both life and time?”9 The space that permits us to 
measure time turns out to exist in our memory where things are being stored up.
Memory contains the trace of all our past experiences - even our anticipated 
experiences, and all things imagined whether realized or not. It is here that the true 
space of the subject opens.
Memory, the storehouse of time is the presence o f the “no more” (iam non) as expectation is 
the presence of the “not yet” (nondum). Therefore, I do not measure what is no more but 
something in my memory remains fixed in it. It is only by calling past and future into the 
present o f remembrance and expectation that time exists at all.10
6 Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, eds. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 13.
7 Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, p. 14.
8 The idea o f the sacred articulated here is not purely that of an anthropological function, a la Girard, 
but rather lies in what is, timeless existence. Speaking of religious perspectives as a search for the 
rediscovery of man, Ruth Nada Anshen writes, “By emphasizing timeless existence against reason as 
a reality, we are liberated, in our communion with the eternal, from the otherwise unbreakable rule of 
‘before and after.’ Then we are able to admit that all forms, all symbols in religions, by their negation 
o f error and their affirmation of the actuality of truth, make it possible to experience that knowing 
which is above knowledge, and that dynamic passage o f  the universe to unending unity.” M. Hades 
and M. Smith, Heroes and Gods: Spiritual Biographies in Antiquity, ed. R.N. Anshen (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. x-xi.
9 Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, p. 15.
10 Ibid.
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Hence it is only in the ‘now’ of the present made possible by memory that the past 
and the future meet; it is here in the ‘now’ that time is measured backwards and 
forwards. However what prevents humans from living in this now, that is, in eternity, 
is life itself, which never “stands still.”11 This is so, Arendt tells us, because it takes 
an object to determine and arouse desire. Life itself (human existence, temporality, 
createdness) is defined for Augustine by what it craves because craving, by drawing 
us away from the now, does not permit time to stand still.
Memory, thus, opens the space of temporality within which the search for 
God takes place, and as such it holds a central place in Augustine’s philosophy. The 
structure of craving that Arendt discusses in relation to Augustine’s conception of 
love, a structure that depends on the possession of the object craved, is determined 
by the space of memory where past and present meet. Human beings in turn help 
constitute the earthly world by what they crave or love for “it is the love of the world
that turns heaven and earth into the world as a changeable thing. In its flight from
♦ • 12 death, the craving for permanence clings to the very things sure to be lost in death.”
And so, we learn that the wrong kind of love craves the wrong kind of object, which
continually disappoints, and correspondingly the right kind of love craves the right
kind of object - thereby directing us on the path to eternity, and to the ultimate Good.
To these different kinds of love Augustine gives the terms ‘cupiditas’ and ‘caritas'
respectively.
Taylor’s analysis of Augustine is indispensable to his understanding of 
modem freedom and how the ‘good life’ has come to be expressed in and through 
our various horizons of significance -  horizons, which as we shall see in chapter six, 
have meaning within a temporal context and require personal commitment. What
11 Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, p. 16.
12 Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, p. 17.
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Augustine unequivocally establishes for later thinkers like Descartes is the 
irreducible notion of ‘reflexive self-presence. ’ In the section in Sources o f the Self 
entitled “In Interiore Homine” Taylor presents a detailed account of the striking 
elements of continuity between Plato and Augustine, while at the same time 
highlighting what he sees as an important difference. While both thinkers hold to the 
same oppositions -  that is, between spirit/matter, higher/lower, eternal/temporal, 
immutable/changeable -  Augustine, Taylor claims, ‘centrally and essentially’ 
describes these oppositions in terms of ‘inner/outer.’13 Here is how Taylor, following 
this early Church Father, describes the difference between the two realms: “the outer 
is the bodily, what we have in common with the beasts, including even our senses, 
and our memory storage of our images of outer things. The inner is the soul.”14 For 
the person concerned with his or her spiritual wellbeing a crucial shift in direction is 
articulated here. The road from the ‘lower to the higher’ now passes through our 
attending to ourselves as inner.15
Taylor, however, wants to stress another important facet of this inward 
person, indeed of this whole mode of inwardness, which has to do with a different 
kind of self-presence than, he claims, we find in Plato - one that is intimately 
connected with God. The image of the sun as the ‘highest good’ or the ultimate 
principle of Being plays a central role for both Plato and Augustine. For Plato we 
discover the highest good by “looking at the domain of objects, which it organises in 
the field of Ideas.”16 The power of seeing the good that resides in the eye of the soul
13 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 129.
14 Ibid.
15 Taylor’s own main textual source for his reading o f Augustine is E. Gilson, The Christian 
Philosophy o f  Saint Augustine. John Millbank critiques Taylor’s analysis of Augustinian inwardness, 
by arguing that to see it as a ‘deepening’ of an already existing Socratic turn to interiority (which he 
thinks Taylor does) is an ‘oversimplification’. However, to pursue this further and respond cogently 
on behalf o f  Taylor, which I believe could be done, is beyond the scope o f my analysis here. See, J. 
Millbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 207.
16 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 129.
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does not have to be put into this metaphorical ‘eye’ - rather the eye just has to be 
turned. As with Augustine, the right direction is crucial -  except with one important 
difference. For Augustine, while God is also more likely to be known through His 
created order, our principal route to God, Taylor argues, is not through the object 
domain but in our selves.17 The Good is now very much rooted within, defined 
primarily as a way of seeing. In other words, the light of God is not just out there 
illuminating the order of being, as we find with Plato’s vision, it is now the very light 
in the soul, referred to in John’s Gospel as the “light that lighted every man that 
cometh into the world.”18 In an important sense, the light of the good is now at either 
end of our experience -  in the ‘what’ experienced and the ‘who’ experiencing.
By shifting the focus from the field of objects known to the activity itself of 
knowing, where God is now found, each of us can begin our own particular search 
for knowledge. By doing so each of us takes up a reflexive stance. In an attempt to 
draw out the significance of this turning to the self, Taylor contrasts it with the way 
the ancient moralists would have viewed reflexivity. He tells us that they often gave 
advice about ‘caring for one’s soul’, which was reflexive in so far as they wanted to 
stress the foolishness of getting wrapped up in things that essentially do not matter. 
As with our modem day over-zealous businessperson to whom we might say, “take 
care of yourself’, the point was that “showing a profit” or “getting ahead”, or 
whatever might be driving you, is not worth a heart attack.19 The injunction here, 
Taylor suggests, calls us to a reflexive stance but not a radically reflexive one; the
17 The reason for this is: “...because God is not just the transcendent object or just the principle of 
order of the nearer objects, which we strain to see. God is also and for us primarily the basic support 
and underlying principle of our knowing activity. God is not just what we long to see but what powers 
the eye which sees”. Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 129.
18 Ibid.
19 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 130.
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latter first comes into play with Augustine and the adoption of a first-person 
standpoint
Taylor explains this radically reflexive first-person standpoint in the 
following way. The world that is known by me is there for me - is experienced by 
me. Our emphasis on objectivity leaves out just this dimension of the first person -  
what it is like to be a certain kind (just this kind) of experiencing agent. By being 
radically reflexive we can turn and make our own experience an object of attention, 
we can become aware of our awareness. Describing this reflexivity, Taylor writes: 
“Radical reflexivity brings to the fore a kind of presence to oneself which is 
inseparable from one’s being the agent of experience, something to which access by 
its very nature is asymmetrical: there is a crucial difference between the way I
experience my activity, thought, and feeling, and the way you or anyone else does.
20This is what makes me a being that can speak of itself in the first person.” 
Augustine’s turn to the self was radically reflexive in this way and what followed, we 
might say, ‘instinctively’, was a language of inwardness; the inner light that shines in 
our presence to ourselves instantiates our first person standpoint. Unlike the outer 
fight it illuminates the space where I am present to myself.21 In this space where I am 
aware of my own activity of sensing and thinking, I am made aware of this activity’s 
dependence on something beyond it, which provides the standard for all reasonable 
activity - something that I should look up to and revere; “By going inward I am 
drawn upward.”22
The idea that God is to be found within is crucial to Augustine’s account of 
our search for self-knowledge; this is so because even when the soul is present to 
itself it can fail to know itself, it can be mistaken about its own nature. Our search is
20 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 129.
21 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 131.
22 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 134.
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doomed to failure unless we already have some understanding of ourselves -  a 
knowledge that lies implicit in our memory. Augustine, Taylor tells us, breaks from 
the Platonic theory of prenatal experience and develops a concept of memory that 
comes to include matters that have nothing to do with past experience. Just as God 
is the source of light behind the eye of the soul that draws me inward, God is also the 
source of memory that leads me to true self-knowledge. Once again, in going 
inwards where I strive to make myself more fully present to myself, I am drawn 
upwards to the awareness that God stands above me. “At the very root of memory 
the soul finds God... And so the soul can be said to ‘remember God’.”24 By going 
within I find the truth, but I find it in God. This, for Taylor is the ultimate ‘reflexive 
move’ that Augustine articulates, whereby we now grasp the intelligible not just 
because our soul’s eye is directed to it, but primarily because we are directed by the 
Master within.25 Indeed, what greater theory of ‘positive mimesis’, that turns against 
rivalrous desire, can there be than one that takes its lead from this inner ‘singular’ 
domain?
Augustine places the focus on our activity of striving to know and he makes 
us aware of this in a “first-person perspective.” God is found in the intimacy of my 
self-presence, where knower and known are one. As well as being behind the eye of 
the soul God is the One whose Ideas the eye strives to see. God is “closer to me than 
I am to myself’, but it could never be the case in this view that my pride is ‘more 
exterior [to me] than the external world’ as Girard argues is the fate of the Romantic
23 Describing this development that was decisive for Descartes’ later theory o f innate ideas, Taylor 
shows how inwardness is given further scope and significance: “Deep within us is an implicit 
understanding, which we have to think hard to bring to explicit and conscious formulation. This is our 
‘memoria'. And it is here that our implicit grasp of what we are resides, which guides us as we move 
from our original self-ignorance and grievous self-misdescription to true self-knowledge.” Taylor, 
Sources o f  the Self, p 135.
24 Ibid.
25 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 136.
26 Ibid.
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hero. Because even when I am drawn outward through cupiditas it is still me who is 
searching for permanence, for God; for my origins in the eternal essence. The 
movement inward through caritas, is the basis of Augustine’s attempt to discern his 
relationship with God in the soul and its activity. In this striving for the good, 
humans show themselves most clearly and uniquely as the image of God through 
their inner self-presence and love. Thus we can see how essentially linked this 
doctrine of inwardness is to Augustine’s whole conception of the human being’s 
relationship to God.27 Our inwardness, however potentially corrupting it may be, is 
also our route to God. Arising from Augustine’s thought, Arendt and Taylor stress
different but complimentary aspects of ‘memory’: for the former it opens the space
28of temporality, while for the latter it is the soul’s implicit knowledge of itself.
I already mentioned that, depending on what the object of our love is, our 
soul can potentially face two ways: ‘towards the higher and immaterial, or towards 
the lower and sensible’ -  or towards the “inner or outer” (Arendt). Our attention is 
directed in two ways in accordance with the two directions of desire, caritas or 
cupiditas. Once again, Taylor points out the similarity and the difference between 
Augustine and Plato on this crucial issue of two directions, or two loves. The key 
difference, he tells us, resides in Augustine’s developed notion of the will. From 
Stoic thinkers like Chrysippus, there developed a notion of the will based on moral 
choice (prohairesis), or our power to give or withhold assent, which through
27 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 137.
28 Taylor explains how the soul comes to know itself from its implicit knowledge o f God, and how 
this move becomes the basis o f Augustine’s attempts to discern the image o f the trinity in the soul and 
its activity. “The mind comes to know itself and, in that, love itself [first trinity]. The same basic idea 
underlies the second trinity, of memory, intelligence, and w ill... In this, the basic movement o f the 
trinity in the soul is made even clearer. ‘Memory’ is the soul’s implicit knowledge of itself... But to 
make this explicit and full knowledge I have to formulate it. In the particular case o f  the soul, the true 
latent knowledge I have o f myself will be overlaid by all sorts o f false images. To dissipate these 
distorted appearances, and to get to the truth, I have to draw out the implicit knowledge within (which 
also comes from above).. .But to understand my true self is to love it, and so with intelligence comes 
will, and with self-knowledge, self-love.” Taylor, Sources o f  the S elf  p. 136.
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Christian interpretation came to place an emphasis on personal commitment, and, as 
Taylor claims, had a deep influence on early modem thinking. But a second change 
emerged out of a Christian outlook that was given paradigmatic formulation by
ry Q
Augustine. “Where for Plato, our desire for the good is a function of how much we 
see it, for Augustine the will is not simply dependent on knowledge.” This view 
argues that human beings are capable of two radically different moral dispositions. 
Unlike the Socratic/Platonic doctrine of right action, where seeing the good is 
tantamount to doing the good, “Augustine’s doctrine of the two loves allows for the 
possibility that our disposition may be radically perverse, driving us to turn our backs 
on even the good we see.”31
And so, the Christian view insists that knowledge alone is not enough - the 
will must first be healed through grace before we can function fully on the Socratic 
model.32 We do not get around the problem of the divided will by claiming that only 
Romantics choose the worse half and mistake it for the “totality”.33 Romanticism, as 
Girard characterizes it, is determined by a fundamental disposition of the will, but 
Augustine would no doubt argue that this does not sum up the constituent force of 
subjectivity, since it is still the subject who struggles with this weakness, knowing all 
the time of his own failing (as Augustine surely did). To annex all of subjectivity, 
and characterize it as ‘Romantic’, based on an evaluation of one constitutive 
tendency of the will, is to misrepresent an important strand of Western spirituality.34
29 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 128.
30 Taylor, Sources o f the Self p. 137.
31 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 138.
32 Ibid.
33 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 62, 63.
34 Augustinian spirituality is not easily amenable to mimetic theory. By highlighting how mediated 
desire is always object related, and does not (pace Girard) need a third object, or (pace Kojeve) 
become its own object, Arendt points to what we might see as a significant source of tension between 
Augustine’s model o f  desire and Girard’s model o f desire. “Even caritas mediates between man and 
God in exactly the same way as cupiditas mediates between man and the world. All it does is mediate. 
It is no revelation of an original interconnectedness of either man and God or man and world.” Arendt,
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The Christian development of the will weaves together two ‘master ideas’ 
which struggle to coexist: “The will as our power to confer or withhold all things
• • • >35considered assent, or choice; and the will as the basic disposition of our being.” 
This development complicates the Socratic model where we always act for the good 
we see and introduces a potential conflict between ‘vision and desire.’ The 
significance of this conflict for us is that “in the zone in which we live, of half 
understanding and contrary desires, the will is as much the independent variable, 
determining what we can know, as it is the dependent one, shaped by what we see.” 
The circularity here, Taylor claims, can lead us to dominate and possess the things 
that surround us. The danger is that we make ourselves into what is most detestable 
in ourselves. As in the case of the ‘underground man’, and other Dostoyevskian 
‘heroes’, we then become slaves to our own obsessions, and dominated by a
* 37fascination with the sensible - including the spectrum of negative relationships.
What we find described in Girard’s theory of internal mediation -  as the 
quintessential underground disease -  arguably has its source in what Taylor calls 
Augustine’s radical reflexivity, with one important qualification. Radical reflexivity 
is central to our moral understanding, but if it were only a source of evil, as internal 
mediation appears to be, the solution, as Taylor argues, might simply be to turn away 
from the self, and become absorbed in impersonal ideas or indeed an external model. 
But for Augustine “it is not radical reflexivity which is evil, on the contrary we show 
most clearly the image of God in our fullest self-presence. Evil is when this 
reflexivity is enclosed within itself. Healing comes when it is broken open, not in
Love and Saint Augustine, p. 30.
35 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 138.
36 Ibid.
37 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 139.
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i38order to be abandoned, but in order to acknowledge its dependence on God.” Here, 
overcoming evil is not simply dependent on seeing the good, but involves something 
also in the dimension of the soul’s sense of itself, which as we noted, belongs to 
‘memory’. Where for Plato the eye has the capacity to see, for Augustine it has lost 
this capacity and must be restored through grace.39 For Girard, ‘novelistic 
experience’ might be said to draw out the conflict between vision and desire in the 
context of the self-other relation.40 We saw, for example, that the pride of the 
Romantic hero is based on a belief in originality, a form of inverted Augustinianism. 
However, we also pointed out that this analogy to Augustinian desire ends up 
creating a dichotomy between the ‘Saint and the Romantic’, which we can now see 
more clearly is false, since Augustine’s notion of the will is neither caritas nor 
cupiditas, but both. That is, two tendencies of the same will, at play in a human 
drama whose stage is the inner person. God who is found in the intimacy of my self­
presence can be thought of “as the most fundamental ordering principle in me.”41 
This new ordering principle becomes a defining feature of the transition to the 
modem period.
3. Disengaged Reason and the Affirmation of Ordinary Life
Augustine’s ‘schismatic will’ provides the template for seminal concepts that 
Taylor believes come to characterize much of the modem outlook - will as our moral 
choice, and will as the basic disposition of our being. The former acts with greater 
rational consistency towards empirical data, the latter feels somehow cut off from the
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 In Deceit, Desire, and the Novel Girard claims: ‘T he subjective and objective fallacies are one and 
the same; both originate in the image which we all have of our own desires.” Girard, Deceit, Desire, 
and the Novel, p. 16.
41 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 136.
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world, isolated yet still longing for unity with the whole. Both have their source in 
the experience of lack associated with Augustinian “radical reflexivity” and “self­
presence”. In terms of ‘moral choice’, the lack can be remedied by a certain rational 
control, whereas in terms of ‘our basic disposition’ the lack seems almost like a 
terminal weakness. In the next chapter we will consider in greater detail the 
developments of the will as ‘our basic disposition’ and in particular how the 
Romantic tradition attempted to remedy the weakness, but for now we shall focus on 
the developments of the will that sought greater rational control.
We saw how lack o f permanence ‘manifests’ itself as an absence for 
Augustine - a fear of death associated with the loss of the ‘wrong’ object of desire. 
But ‘fear’, as the very experience of loss, also takes on rational significance for 
Augustine in terms of ‘negation’, which he translates into one of the basic modes of 
argument for the existence of God in the Western Christian tradition.42 A variant of 
this ‘ontological argument’ inhabits Descartes’ proof in the Third Meditation. The 
proof that I exist turns out to be derivative from the proof that God exists. However, 
negation is expressed in The Meditations in terms of doubt and in relation to the idea 
of Descartes’ own finite nature, since if he did not also have implanted ‘within him’ 
an idea of infinity and perfection, how would he even know he was doubting? 
Whether or not the argument that God exists actually convinces is not the issue here. 
According to Taylor, what is at stake is the significance of this “lack” that Augustine 
experiences. Drawing explicitly on Cartesian language, Taylor phrases developed 
reflexivity in this way: “... to understand myself as doubting and wanting is to see 
myself as lacking in some respect, and hence as finite and imperfect. So my most
42 Taylor rehearses the typically Augustinian form o f proof: ‘T he démarche which is common to ... all 
(proofs) is something like this: my experience of my own thinking puts me in contact with a 
perfection, which at one and the same time shows itself to be an essential condition of that thinking 
and also to be far beyond my own finite scope and powers to attain. There must then be a higher being 
on which all this depends, i.e. God. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 140.
153
basic and unavoidable modes o f self-understanding presuppose the idea of 
infinity.”43 What stands out here within a modem rational framework is the ‘mode of 
self-understanding’ that is ‘lacking’ and ‘imperfect’, a mode that is constitutive of 
the very notion of radically reflexivity. The Romantic hero, it seems, was not the first 
to experience insufficiency in the face of Being; but this insufficiency, although it 
may lead to a conversion to ‘vertical transcendence’ within literary space, still does 
not provide materials for a rational proof -  in Augustinian/Cartesian mode -  for 
God’s existence.
Girard’s antipathy toward the modem period discounts any continuity 
between Augustine and Descartes, whom he describes as “the first philosopher of 
individualism”.44 Unlike Taylor, Girard sees Descartes as the instigator of modem 
‘self-divinization’, but he ignores the philosophical import of the move to radical 
reflexivity, and more specifically its source in Augustinian inwardness. As we 
discussed in chapter one, his use of St. Mark’s text, “Whoever does not gather with 
me scatters”,45 places the emphasis on novelistic experience as the place of 
“gathering” by the author who successfully renounces metaphysical desire. Here the 
critic once again eschews a first-person perspective.46 The deep structures of the text 
replace the depths of the soul, and the critic replaces God as the minister of effective 
therapy. This break with Augustine is further reinforced when Girard characterizes
43 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 141 (my italics).
44 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 94.
45 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 64.
46 In making the case for Augustine’s ‘proto-cogito’, Taylor draws our attention to another remarkably 
modern fact about Augustine’s thinking - he not only used the word ‘cogito’ but also singled it out for 
comment. ‘T o  focus on my own thinking activity is to bring to attention not only the order o f things 
in the cosmos that I seek to find but also the order I seek to make as I struggle to plumb the depths of 
memory and discern my true being. In the Confessions, Augustine reflects how our thoughts “must be 
rallied and drawn together again, that they may be known; that is to say, they must as it were be 
collected and gathered together from their dispersions; whence the word ‘cogitation’ is derived”. And 
Augustine goes on the point out the etymological link between ‘cogitare' and ‘cogere’ - ‘to bring 
together’ or ‘to collect’.” Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 141. Disengaged subjectivity was, of course,
not what Augustine had in mind, but the influence of the whole language and experience of
inwardness is undeniable.
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the Cartesian ethic, which begins with self-reflexivity, as a form of “proof’ that the 
individual requires in order to convince himself of his ontological sufficiency, in 
other words as a means of ‘self-divinization’. It is this ‘proof of the individual’s 
superior being, masked under the veil of ‘generosity’, that Girard believes Descartes 
shares with his contemporary Corneille.47 However, for Taylor, it is precisely this 
ethic of generosity that is quite radical with respect to the modem emphasis on 
rational subjectivity, what he refers to as the Cartesian stance of “self-generating, 
methodological ordering of evident insight”. For Taylor, distinguishing between 
Descartes and Corneille is crucial if we are to properly understand the shift from the 
older hierarchically ordered world of the ‘honor ethic’ to the modem world of the 
‘disengaged subject’. Generosity undergoes a transposition with Descartes whereby 
it becomes an emotion that accompanies my newly discovered sense of my human 
dignity as a rational self.48 It is not simply a thickly disguised justification for the 
individual’s superiority; rather it becomes part of what I owe to myself, if I am to 
fulfill my capacity as a rational agent. What we have, Taylor tells us, “is a virtually 
total transposition of the notion of generosity from the defense of honor in warrior 
societies (portrayed by Corneille) to the Cartesian ideal of rational control.”49 Taylor 
believes that this modem theme of the dignity of the rational agent, which has such a 
considerable place in modem ethical and political thought, arises from an 
internalisation of moral sources at the beginning of the modem period.50
47 As we discussed in chapter one, Girard claims (quoted from Chapter One), “Perhaps it is most 
suitable to seek the first traces of our malaise in the very origin o f the era of the individualist, in that 
morality of generosity that Descartes, the first philosopher of individualism, and Corneille, its first 
dramatist, developed at the same tim e... It is significant that rationalist individualism and the 
irrational morality o f  generosity appear conjointly”. Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p.
94.
48 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 154.
49 Ibid.
50 Taylor’s most recent work A Secular Age (which as I indicated in the introduction I do not intend to 
include within the compass of this dissertation) also draws our attention to this important distinction 
between Descartes and Corneille, with even more relevance for our conversation on the way in which
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In my bid for control I may no longer meet the personal God of Augustine, 
but I am nonetheless driven inwards by ‘doubt’ to where I now achieve a clarity and 
fullness of self-presence that was lacking before.51 What appears to be significant to 
Girard’s conversation with philosophy is not so much the way God is replaced as the 
way the locus of control (what Taylor also calls “the centre of gravity”) has shifted.52 
What we are left with after Descartes is a mechanistic view of the world, which 
comes to characterize so much of Deism, and is part of the new Reforming 
Movement. Hence, the distinction between Descartes and Corneille is a sign for 
Taylor of a ‘transvaluation’ that emphasizes the dignity of the rational agent. 
‘Control’ rather than ‘proof is the motivating force. Individualism here is generating 
more than the multiple divisions that come to flourish in underground existence. 
Properly understood, it will soon inspire a new attitude toward nature and the social 
world, initially under the banner of a reaction against the traditional metaphysical 
order.
The affirmation of ordinary life holds a central place in Taylor’s analysis of 
modem freedom. It marks a decline in a metaphysical view, and its attendant values, 
and the rise of a new religious view, the aims of which were largely compatible with
‘rank’ (for Girard, ‘external mediation’) is internalized in the modem period. Speaking once again 
about what Descartes added to the ethic of ‘generosity’, Taylor suggests that, the word “meant 
something different in the seventeenth century. It designates the lively sense one has o f one’s rank, 
and of the honour which attaches to it, which motivates one to live up to the demands of one’s station. 
Corneille’s heroes are always declaring their ‘générosité’ as the reason for the striking, courageous 
and often gruesome acts they are about to commit. But Descartes takes the notion out o f the public 
space, and the field o f socially defined ranks, into the internal realm of self-knowledge... The rank I 
must live up to is the non-socially defined one o f  rational agent... In other words, the central place, 
the virtue which can uphold and sustain the others, which Socrates gave to wisdom, for instance, and 
others have given to temperance, for Descartes falls to generosity. The key motivation here is the 
demands laid on me by my own status as a rational being, and the satisfaction is that of having lived 
up to the dignity o f this station.” Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge and London: Belknap 
Press/Harvard, 2007), p. 134.
51 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 157.
52 “The thesis is not that I gain knowledge when I turn towards God in faith. Rather the certainty of 
clear and distinct perception is unconditional and self-generated. What has happened is rather that 
God’s existence has become a stage in my progress towards science through the methodological 
ordering of evident insight. God’s existence is a theorem in my system of perfect science”. Taylor, 
Sources o f  the Self, p. 157.
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the concurrent revolution in the sciences. Prior to this ‘transvaluation of values,’ 
theoretical contemplation and the participation of the citizen in the life of the polity 
generally were thought to out-rank ordinary life.53 The transition that Taylor details 
upsets the older hierarchies by displacing the locus of the good life from ‘some 
special range of higher activities’ to ‘life itself. The consequence of this change, he 
tells us, is that ‘full human life’, which for Augustine is still synonymous with 
eternal Being and the well ordered soul, “is now defined in terms of labor and 
production, on the one hand, and marriage and family on the other.”54 The sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries see the locus of value begin to shift from an other-worldly 
sphere of ‘immutable substances’, which excluded ordinary human concerns, to ‘this 
world’ as somehow holding the key to happiness and human flourishing. As a result 
of the affirmation of ordinary life “higher activities come under vigorous 
criticism.”55
The Scientific Revolution, most notably in the work of Francis Bacon, 
discredits the Aristotelian ideal of theoria as involving contemplation of the order of 
the cosmos. Taylor argues that Bacon constantly points out that the older sciences 
have sought some satisfying overall order in things rather than being concerned to 
see how things function. As a result, they have not borne fruit or “adduced a single 
experiment which tends to relieve and benefit the condition of man.”56 The goal of 
the new science was just the opposite.57 With the change in values came the reversal 
of the older hierarchy. What was previously seen in a negative light as being lower is
53 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 212.
54 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 213.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Taylor describes it as follows: “Science is not a higher activity that ordinary life should subserve;
on the contrary, science should benefit ordinary life. Not to make this the goal is not only a moral
failing, a lack of charity, but also and inextricably an epistemological failing. Bacon has no doubt that 
the root o f this momentous error is pride... ’We impose the seal of our image on the creatures and 
works of God, we do not diligently seek to discover the seal of God on things’.” Ibid.
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raised and valued as the new standard. Conversely, what was previously seen as 
higher is frowned upon as vanity and presumption. Practical benevolence and the 
reduction of suffering begin to take centre stage, thus implicit in the affirmation of 
ordinary life, then, is an inherent bent towards social equality -  the centre of the good 
life is something that everyone, and not just the privileged few, can share and have a
, . 58part in.
Taylor argues that the scope of this social reversal can best be measured by 
looking at the critique launched against another hierarchical view, one we looked at 
briefly in distinguishing between Descartes and Corneille -  the honor ethic with its 
roots in the citizen life. This ethic reflected the then rigidly stratified social structures 
and particularly the distinction between aristocrats and commoners.59 While the 
social dimension of this challenge was not immediately evident, the goals of the 
‘ethic of honor and glory’ were denounced outright as the worst forms of vanity. 
The promotion of ordinary life eventually gives this critique its historical 
significance as an engine of social change. In the latter part of the seventeenth 
century, we leam...
The critique is taken up and becomes a commonplace of a new ideal of life, in which sober 
and disciplined production was given the central place, and the search for honour condemned 
as fractious and undisciplined self-indulgence, gratuitously endangering the really valuable 
things in life. A new model of civility emerges in the eighteenth century, in which the life of  
commerce and acquisition gains an unprecedentedly positive place.60
Whereas commerce had previously been thought to lead to a demeaning
preoccupation with material, worldly things -  and in some societies engaging in trade
had been seen as a violation of aristocratic values -  commercial life now came to be
seen in a positive light as a civilizing force.61 Now too, the aristocratic search for
military glory came to be seen as wildly destructive and even piratical. By contrast,
58 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 214.
59 Ib id .
60 Ibid.
61 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 213.
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commerce came to be understood as constructive and polite, binding people together 
in peace and forming the basis of proper values.
Within traditional hierarchies there were, of course, differing conceptions of 
value: in the case of contemplation, a world order structured by the Good, and, in the 
case of the ethic of honour and glory, fame and immortality, as the spur to great 
deeds. Furthermore, hierarchy, as Girard reminds us, kept order in check by ensuring 
that imitation remained ‘external’. However, to understand the moral source driving 
the ethic of ordinary life that reacts against the older honor code, Taylor claims that 
we have to look to Judeo-Christian spirituality and in particular the transformations 
wrought by the Reformation. Common to all Reformers was a rejection of the kind of 
mediation involved in forms of worship that eclipsed personal commitment. Tied to 
this rejection of mediation was a rejection of the medieval understanding of the 
sacred that flowed from the most fundamental principle of the Reformers - that fallen 
humanity could do nothing to effect their own salvation. And so we find one of the 
most powerful ideas influencing the new Protestant movements: “that of an 
unaccountable salvation by an almighty and merciful God, against all rational human 
hope and utterly disregarding our just deserts”63. To have faith is to acknowledge 
how utterly helpless we are.
Of course the whole Catholic understanding of the sacred, as well as the 
mediating role of the church, ran counter to this view of faith and therefore had to be 
rejected. This rejection included not only the Mass, as a human attempt to effect 
communion with God, but also a vast panorama of traditional Catholic rituals and 
pieties designed to mediate God’s grace and enrich the common life. Indeed the 
Catholic understanding of the church as the locus and vehicle of the sacred ceased to
62 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 214.
63 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 215.
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make any sense within a Reformed view; now each person “stands alone in relation 
to God: his or her fate - salvation or damnation - is separately decided.”64
In rejecting the sacred and the idea of mediation, Protestants also rejected the 
monastic life and the view (mistaken according to Taylor) that these vocations 
supposed a hierarchy of nearness to the sacred, with the religious life being seen as 
“higher” than the secular life, and in particular productive life and the family.65 For 
the Reformers, such a hierarchical understanding of monastic life undermined the 
personal commitment of the Christian, permitting lay persons only half involvement 
in their own salvation, because it left them dependent on those more fully committed 
to the Christian life for mediating grace and, as less dedicated than those with special 
vocations, prepared to settle for a weak commitment of faith.66 Thus, the same 
movement through which the Reformers rejected the Mass and the various forms of 
Catholic mediation also brought a rejection of special vocation to the monastic life 
and an affirmation of the spiritual vocation of lay life. “By denying any special form 
of life as a privileged locus of the sacred, they were denying the very distinction 
between sacred and profane and hence affirming their interpenetration.” This 
affirmation of ordinary life had the effect of hallowing what had been hitherto 
considered profane. And we can readily see how, with the collapse of hierarchies and 
greater “interpenetration”, the rites of ‘making sacred’ (in the Girardian sense), are 
brought under increasing pressure -  but as part of a development that understands 
itself as inspired by an incamational mode of life. If, as Durkheim claims (see above, 
beginning of chapter two, note 1), crisis results for primitive peoples from too great a
64 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 216.
65 Taylor, Sources o f  the S e l f p. 217.
66 Taylor describes the ‘half-involvement’ and the Protestant response in this way: “I (the Catholic) 
am a passenger in the ecclesial ship on its journey to God. But for Protestants there can be no 
passengers. This is because there can be no ship in the Catholic sense, no common movement carrying 
humans to salvation. Each believer rows his or her own boat”. Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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contiguity of the sacred and the profane, for the modem mind this ‘contiguity’ 
becomes a moral imperative.
4. Right Use, Right Order: Innerworldly Asceticism
The challenge to monasticism was partly seen as a challenge to a Christian 
church that had been overtly influenced by a Greek ideal - in particular the Platonic 
notion of the Good. This Greek/Christian synthesis (which, Taylor argues, was worth 
supporting) helped Augustine to go beyond his Manichean phase by providing a 
justification for seeing all of being as good.68 However, while many people 
influenced by Platonic oppositions renounced worldly things as a means to salvation, 
the early Protestants saw this form of asceticism as presumption. In affirming the 
good in the here and now, the Reformers spumed any ‘oppositions’ that placed our 
ultimate standards elsewhere - namely in a cosmos ordered for the Good. As a result 
of such ‘other-worldly’ theories, Greek philosophy gave rise to a view of self- 
abnegation that brought the wholeness and integrity of the human good into question. 
Doctrines such as Stoicism, that preached the foolishness of loving things in this 
world, were hard to reconcile with the Jewish-Christian doctrine of creation found in
♦ A Qthe first chapter of Genesis that claims all of creation is good. According to Taylor, 
the two views of self-denial or asceticism provide a contrast between Greek and 
Christian notions of the good: the former gives up what is without value while the 
latter gives up what has value -  and for that very reason. He describes this important 
difference as follows:
For the Stoic, what is renounced is, if  rightly renounced, ipso facto  not part of the good. For 
the Christian, what is renounced is thereby affirmed as good - both in the sense that the 
renunciation would lose its meaning if  the thing were indifferent and in the sense that the
68 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 220.
69 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 218.
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renunciation is the furtherance of God’s will, which precisely affirms the goodness o f the 
kinds of things renounced: health, freedom, life”.70
By giving up a good in order to follow God, the Christian becomes an instrument of
God’s hallowing of life. There is no need to renounce part for the sake of the whole,
or to mutilate the very thing we are attempting to affirm -  hence the rejection of
pagan sacrifice by Christianity is a related idea. “In the restored order that God is
conferring, good doesn’t need to be sacrificed for good. The eschatological promise
in both Judaism and Christianity is that God will restore the integrity of the good”.71
The Christian sense of loss at renunciation is profound because it is a real loss, and
in this it follows Christ’s own death, which was not a rejection of the world on his
behalf, but a consequence of evil in the world.
The Christian/Greek synthesis constantly justifies a certain notion of
hierarchy that placed the integrity of the good in question, allowing some to appear
more deserving of salvation, and consequently it was a natural target for the
challenges of Protestantism. Where the Greek view of renunciation dominated,
ascetic vocations could appear ‘higher’ and of course this gave succour to the
Reformers arguments that the ordinary good was being perverted -  a correction that
became urgent in their view. As the movement spread, the hallowing of mundane life
could not be reconciled with notions of hierarchy: at first of vocation and later even
of social caste. But how was ordinary life to encompass the new spiritual purposes of
‘exalting the humble and humbling the exalted?’72 And how was it to do so in light
of God’s ends and for his glory? This is where Augustine’s theory of ‘two loves’
provided something of a solution, not because he necessarily favoured the things of
this world and everyday life, but because his notion of inwardness provided a way of
70 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 219.
71 Ibid.
72 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 221.
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seeing things in a new light.73 The new order that started to emerge with ordinary life 
involved understanding where the things of this world belonged. “God placed 
mankind over creation and made the things of this world for humans. But humans are 
there in turn to serve and glorify God, and so their use of things should serve this 
final goal.”74 Just as the right object orders our craving and our relationship to God, 
the right use of things helps God put shape on that order in our everyday lives. 
Likewise the wrong object leads to the wrong use, which manifests itself in sinful 
attachment. “The consequences of sin is that humans come to be concerned with 
these things not for God’s sake but for themselves. They come to desire them as ends 
and no longer simply as instruments for God’s purposes. And this upsets the whole 
order of things.”75
To be Reformed meant to take one’s proper place in God’s creation and to do 
this one had to avoid, on the one hand, the error of asceticism, and, on the other 
hand, the error of becoming absorbed in things, or taking them for our end. “It was 
not the use of things that brought evil, Puritan preachers constantly repeated, but our 
deviant purposes in using them.”77 Taylor describes the Puritan intention in quasi 
Augustinian terms: “we should love the things of this world but our love should as it 
were pass through them to their Creator.”78 With the Reformation we now love 
worldly things, but with the love of God in our hearts. This right relationship to
73 Arendt claims, that “[t]he road to ‘happiness’ is pointed out by desire and leads to ‘enjoyment’ by 
way of ‘usage.’ The right object of enjoyment determines the objects o f  right usage: ‘Things to be 
enjoyed make us happy. Things to be used help us who tend toward happiness’.” Love and Saint 
Augustine, p. 33; internal quotation taken from Augustine, Christian Doctrine I.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 When the right order is restored through grace human beings turn from things back to God, but not 
through asceticism or rejection of the world. We stem our sinful craving and attachment to the wrong 
thing by enjoying the things of God’s creation while remaining detached from them. That is, by 
enjoying them in a certain spirit, which might be described in more direct Augustinian language as 
using them while not craving for them or seeking to possess them
77 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 222.
78 Ibid.
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things restores God’s creation. The ethic of ordinary life introduces a new vigour into
the notion of inwardness, whereby God’s grace opens human being out to
participation and belonging through an instrumental relationship to things.
The interpenetration of the ‘sacred and profane’ that is so necessary to a
Reformed order where older hierarchies are displaced, comes with a certain distance
from things that one would otherwise seek to possess. This distance is not a
renunciation in the traditional sense, but rather seeks to affirm what earlier ascetics
tended to renounce. The key is to affirm it in the right spirit, which involves putting
it ‘under our feet’ rather than seeing it as having no place in the order of the good. It
is the inner person that makes this transposition, giving rise to what Weber calls the
Puritan’s “innerworldly asceticism”.79 We separate ourselves from the world in order
to better understand God’s creation. “The answer to the absorption in things which is
the result of sin is not renunciation but a certain kind of use, one which is detached
from things and focused on God.”80 Drawing on the work of Perry Miller, Taylor
recognizes the paradox in an aspiration to hallow ordinary life not by connecting it to
the sacramental life of the church in the manner of the Catholic tradition but rather
by living it in a way that is both ‘caring and not caring’. “It is a caring and not caring,
whose paradoxical nature comes out in the Puritan notion that we should use the
world with ‘weaned affections’. Use things, ‘but be not wedded to them, but so
81weaned from them, that you may use them, as if you use them not’.”
This understanding of the role and place of ‘the ordinary’ extended to 
thinking about one’s own position in life - as part of God’s plan. The term vocation 
was no longer just associated with the priesthood or monastic life; for Puritans 
everyone had a particular calling, the specific form of labor to which God summoned
79 Ibid.
80 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 223.
81 Ibid. Taylor is quoting here from, Perry Miller, The New England Mind.
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him or her, and every calling, whether judge, blacksmith, or midwife, was considered 
valuable in God’s eyes.82 And as with our use of things, our primary aim in working 
at whatever we are called to do must be to serve God. However, we do this by 
serving others through our calling: “a central feature of any valid calling was that it 
be of benefit to humans.”83 Marriage too was affirmed as a vocation through the 
hallowing of ordinary life, and its new spiritual significance was also tempered by 
the same rules that applied to use: “it must never become an end in itself, but serve 
the glory of God.”84 Without losing the essential spirit of Augustine’s Hellenized
Of
philosophy, we can say that the rule for the Puritan was ‘to have but not to hold’.
Using things as God intended requires knowing the mind of God which now 
must be ‘(re)discovered’ in our fallen state. Scientific probing becomes part of a 
religious effort to use things according to God’s purposes because it helps us to 
discover just what those purposes are. Thus an instrumental stance towards the world 
takes on spiritual significance. It not only “allows us to experiment and obtain valid 
scientific results... which gives us rational control over ourselves and our world. In 
this religious tradition it is the way we serve God in creation.”86 We do this, once 
again, through our calling (which is both for God’s order, and ourselves) and through
82 The phrase that best captures this change, occurring as the title of the first section o f the chapter by 
Taylor in Sources on ’ordinary life’, is the Puritan expression ‘God loveth adverbs’. What matters is 
not what one does (the verb) but how one does it (the adverb); ‘it all turns on the spirit in which one 
lives whatever one lives, even the most mundane existence.’ Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 224. Once 
again, we can critically advert to Girard’s theory by saying that it is not our place, or ‘rank’, in a
hierarchy that is significant in the early modem period, but the way we live our life, aided of course
by our inner connection to God.
83 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 225.
84 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 226.
85 Taylor discusses the Puritan strand of Reformed Protestantism at length because it provides an 
extreme example of the affirmation of ordinary life: a movement, he believes, that has profoundly 
shaped the modem identity. From the beginning what helped to define ordinary life as a movement for 
change was that its purposes were largely conducive to those of the scientific revolution a connection 
that proved more that a coincidence. Both movements appealed to ‘living experience’ be that personal 
conversion or direct observation. They stood together in their opposition to the traditional Aristotelian 
view of nature and order, and in their belief that knowledge should be useful - for the general good 
and benefit o f mankind. On a deeper level, Taylor argues, the connection comes through in the 
religious outlook that suffuses Bacon’s work. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 231.
86 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 232.
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an instrumental stance that protects us from treating things as ends valuable in 
themselves whereby we become absorbed in things that could wrench us away from 
God. We can readily see that by the time Descartes conducts his meditations the 
ground is already fertile for his ‘disengaged reason’. The whole modem worldview 
begins to take shape around a set of ideas that view detachment as the correct mode 
of existence - a mode that is only made possible by a certain inwardness that can put 
things in their proper place by adopting an instrumental stance to the world.
Taylor credits John Locke with developing ordinary life into a more 
productive form, and further rationalizing Christianity. “Where in the Reform variant 
it was a matter of living worshipfully for God now it is becoming a question of living 
rationally. ”87 Procedural reason, whereby we remain ‘disengaged’ from things, raises 
us from destructive illusion, whether blind custom or superstition, to beneficence and 
so “from wild disordered egoism to the productive search for happiness which 
confers benefits on others as well.”88 From reason flows the “beneficent potentiality 
of self-love.”89 Locke builds on the rejection of the traditional hierarchy of values 
whereby reason was substantive (enabling us to see the order of the good), and puts 
forward a view of reason that allowed us to do good. “The rationality in question is 
now procedural: in practical affairs, instrumental; in theoretical, involving the 
careful, disengaged scrutiny of our ideas and their assembly according to the canons 
of mathematical deduction, and empirical probability. This is how we participate in 
God’s purposes. Not through blind instinct, like the animals, but through conscious 
calculation, we take our place in the whole.”90
87 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 242.
88 Ibid.
89 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 243.
90 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 243.
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The act of ‘taking our place’ thus begins to supplant a religious cosmogony in 
which a sense of helplessness naturally prevailed among the many with a greater 
likelihood of collective crisis. Greater rational control meant ‘right order’ through 
participation by all, or most, thus giving each a stake in greater stability and the 
furtherance of Gods plan. This vision of a “rationalized Christianity” furthered the 
aims of ordinary life. God’s goodness is shown in his designing the world for our 
preservation and in making sure the various parts of it are “conducive to reciprocal 
conservation.” 91 The parts that work together with common purpose sustain the 
whole -  each part has its place, and is benefited by, and benefits other parts. Locke 
thus helps shape the growing Deist picture of the world. However, with the emphasis 
on ‘instrumental, maximizing reason’ the traditional understanding of faith comes 
under attack. The good that God wills comes more and more to be centered on the 
natural good and therefore grace and revelation become unnecessary for directing 
individual action. Through disengaged, procedural reason we can know God’s design 
and therefore what ought to be done, and God only wills what can be done. By the 
end of the seventeenth century the fully rational Deist picture of the cosmos is all but 
complete.
5. Deism and the New Providential Order: Re-marking Difference
The view of a cosmic order reflected in nature comes under attack in the 
modem period, under the broad banner of ‘ordinary life’. A great chain of being, as 
our quotation from Girard at the outset of this chapter indicates, is discredited as a 
metaphysical illusion. However, within new more rationalized Christianity inspired 
by the development of Protestantism the notion of a great chain is given a new more
91 Taylor, Sources o f the Self p. 244.
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dynamic meaning, as we shall see below. The order that, since Plato, had belonged to 
a hierarchical vision of the universe is redefined in a more instrumental way with the 
advent of Deism.
According to Taylor, the form of Deism that Locke inspired, in which a 
‘punctual self places priority on disengagement, operates by objectifying the domain 
of experience in question. Arising from its close relationship with voluntarism (a 
freely willing unaccountable God), this new outlook inherits a command theory of 
law and morality.92 Reward and punishment as an underlying motivation for action 
ensures that “law” determines what is good. In a rationally ordered world it is 
ultimately God who wills our good and dispenses our just deserts. To avoid pain we 
must keep our passions in check or keep them in their proper place. Within this 
scheme of things an ethic can be constructed whereby each person maximizes his or 
her own good, and the ‘higher good’ becomes just the maximization of individual 
goods. The law as a function of the state can then be seen to regulate competing 
goods - in the extreme as an arm of a ‘Leviathan’.
The idea of love, or desire directing us internally to our proper end (which 
was central to traditional philosophies of motivation) plays no part in this rational 
scheme. However, before a rationalized Christianity was transposed into secular law, 
the absence of any positive role for our feelings in relation to the good was being 
rigorously questioned. Taylor comments on how a group of seventeenth century 
thinkers called the ‘Cambridge Platonists’ rejected a religion of external law “in the 
name of one which saw humans as intrinsically attuned to God.”94 The contrast is 
described as a religion of fear versus one of love, “a servile or forced devotion versus
92 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 249.
93 Ib id .
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a free one.”95 The imagery of the Cambridge Platonists in their attack on 
“mechanical Christians”, and their celebration of an “inner nature”, was prescient. 
With such language as “the organic versus the artificial” and “the living versus the 
mechanical” Taylor notes how some commentators were right to see these thinkers 
as significantly prefiguring later Romanticism: “The battle lines are already 
drawn.”96
From these ‘battle lines’ the key idea develops that morality is not just a 
matter of arbitrary extrinsic decree with no bidding from our natural inner sentiments 
to guide us towards the good. The new idea suggests that the highest good does not 
lie in an arbitrary will, as with voluntarism, but in the very nature of the cosmos, “our 
love for it isn’t commanded under threat of punishment, but comes spontaneously 
from our being.”97 According to Taylor, Shaftesbury, followed by Hutcheson, 
develops a rival to Lockean Deism that stressed ‘natural affection’ and saw 
disengaged reason as standing in the way of our love for the whole that the good 
person longs to grasp.98 The challenge to the older Deism is clear: the motive of 
benevolence must be the key to goodness. But Hutcheson went further by holding 
that we must also believe in and trust our own moral inclination. “In acknowledging 
the mainsprings of good in us, we rejoice in them, and this joy makes them flow 
stronger.”99 Once again, after Augustine, “we turn within to retrieve the true form of 
our natural affection; or our benevolent sentiments; and in doing that we give them
95 In this analysis o f external law there are echoes o f how Jacques Derrida describes the God of 
Abraham as the ‘one who sees in secret’. J, Derrida, The Gift o f  Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998). Indeed, when we consider Kierkegaard’s ‘fear and trembling’ in 
face o f ultimate commitment, we can grasp how thinking in relation to ethics was foreshadowed by 
this earlier debate. “Humans approach God in fear as an inscrutable law giver whose judgments are 
utterly beyond human comprehension, and may have already, indeed, condemned us, regardless o f our 
present aspiration to reform.” Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 249. Further to this, what preoccupies the 
Father of existentialism is a certain loss of qualitative distinctions (see main Introduction, note 15)
96 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 250.
97 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 253.
98 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self pp. 254-255.
99 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 262.
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their full force.”100 What the two forms of Deism - mechanistic and proto-Romantic, 
respectively -  seem to share, according to Taylor, is the notion of a great 
“interlocking universe” in which parts are designed to be conducive to their mutual 
preservation and flourishing.
In Deism the traditional cosmic order that took paradigmatic shape with Plato 
noticeably shifts towards a providential order whereby God is now concerned with 
maximizing human happiness.101 Taylor argues that the impact of this shift can be 
felt most forcibly in the widespread belief in the affirmation of ordinary life. It 
translates as a dramatic change from a hierarchical understanding of the good as a 
vision of rational cosmic order to a view that sees each person participating in the 
good through a providential interlocking order based on universal benevolence. The 
idea that Hutcheson added to the more disengaged, instrumental view of ordinary life 
was that the fullest human happiness is attained when we give full rein to our moral 
sentiments and feelings of benevolence.102 What makes God good is that he brings 
about our happiness, and our happiness thus brings about the general good; self- 
fulfillment can be seen as having a moral dimension. However, the Deist conception 
of happiness, Taylor points out, is defined purely in creaturely terms. Our soul still 
needs God to be integrally good. “But what our goodness seems to consist in is a 
‘determination... towards the universal happiness’; and what God’s goodness 
consists in seems to be his fostering this same end.” Happiness, as a non- 
theocentric notion of the good, plays a central role in this outlook. What ordinary life 
fosters is a view that focuses on the human, since it is now human happiness that
100 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 265.
101 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 267.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. Taylor is quoting here from, Francis Hutcheson, A System o f M oral Philosophy.
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really matters in the universe.104 Practical benevolence, the reduction of suffering, 
becomes paramount.
The crucial point about Deism that Taylor stresses is that it was not just a 
staging post for atheistic humanism. On the contrary, it was based on a deeply held 
religious worldview embedded in the Protestant affirmation of ordinary life. The fact 
that it was human-centered certainly marked a change from the ancient model and 
may indeed have inspired later atheistic theories. But despite this, what gave Deism 
its affinity with Christianity was the fact that “once more a cosmic order was at the 
centre of spiritual life.”105 To best illustrate this interlocking order in which ordinary 
life plays a central role Taylor draws heavily from Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man. 
In continuity with a long tradition, Pope describes the new order as a ‘great chain of 
being’.106 But what differs about Pope’s “Vast chain” is that it no longer functions 
within the neo-Platonic theory of emanations, but is rather “that interconnection of 
mutual service which the things of this world of harmonious functions render to each 
other.”107 The chain is here based on a providential order. Taylor notes that there was 
a traditional “organicism” in the older views of order whereby mutual dependence 
held everything in check: a theory of ‘correspondences’. If each thing did not hold its 
ordered place in the whole it was believed that things would revert to chaos, and here 
we find a striking resemblance to how Girard describes the sacrificial crisis in 
Violence and the Sacred.
In the context of my dissertation, it is striking that Taylor illustrates the 
delicate balance of the traditional ontic logos, where ‘each thing holds its ordered 
place’, with the same example of Ulysses’s speech in Troilus and Cressida that
104 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 268.
105 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 272.
106 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 274.
107 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 275.
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Girard cites: “Take but one degree away, untune that string, / And hark what discord 
follows”.108 However, Taylor does not focus, as Girard does, on the effectiveness of 
this older order -  so long as all degrees remain harmonious -  in holding crises in 
check. Rather he wants to stress what has changed with the arrival of a more 
mechanical view of the universe. In the new interlocking order, the mutual support 
takes “direct efficient-causal form” - things work together to form a whole.109 One 
couplet from Pope’s Essay will suffice to illustrate the transformation that Taylor 
wants to convey: “Nothing is foreign: Parts relate to whole; / One all-extending, all 
preserving Soul.”110 As long as the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane were kept apart, as they 
were in the older ontic order, the system remained delicately balanced. But with the 
advent of a providential order, order is now ‘preserved’ when each individual takes 
up his or her calling. Order, and hence benevolence, is something we all actively 
have a stake in. For Taylor the decisive change relates to how one order replaced 
another:
As the metaphysical basis of the earlier view erodes, in particular with the growing success 
of mechanistic science, the new vision can step into the vacuum. It is fully compatible with
the modem conception of the nature o f a thing as made up of forces which operate within it.
Each thing is seen to have its own purpose or bent.111
Here is a radically new conception that is ready to be transposed into a self­
regulating economic system.112 The goodness of the order consists in the fact that 
these purposes do not run counter to each other but rather mesh with and feed each
other. Finding one’s own purpose, the source of one’s happiness, has become part of
a Design.113
108 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 275-276.
109 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 276.
110 Ibid.
111 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 276 (my italics).
112 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 286.
113 Taylor describes the new order as follows: “Instrumental reason intervenes in two ways... First, it 
shows us that the best policy, for the maximization of our gains, is to fit into our proper place in the 
order. Everything is made so that the good of each serves the good of all; so our best interests must be
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Thus the ethic of ordinary life stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream of 
ancient thought. Certain activities are singled out not because they are hierarchically 
ordered in light of the human’s rational nature, but because they are part of God’s 
plan. The new activities (work in a calling and family life) “are marked as 
significant, because they define how God intends us to live, what he designed us for 
when he made us. It follows that to see what we ought to do we need an insight not 
into the hierarchical order of nature but into the purposes of God.”114 The ‘clearly 
marked differences’ of the older sacred order, that had to be clearly circumscribed so 
as to avoid crisis, are given a new understanding since now the purposes of God 
reveal the marked character of what activities we are called to. Acknowledging this 
becomes important because in doing so we are acknowledging God’s plan for us. 
This has to do with our own personal relationship to God, and the role each 
individual plays in discovering his or her calling rather than simply filling a pre­
existing slot in some natural ranking, which if not properly filled (or somehow 
breached) could see the whole operation revert to chaos. What makes the proper way 
of life good is now found in the new significance of each thing. The unity of the 
overall design - the concord -  is achieved through the interlocking purposes. The 
specific design of each thing, what marks it out as different, is also what brings it 
into sync with other things and the greater design. Now living by nature is living by 
an ethic, not of hierarchical reason, but of marked activities, fully continuous with 
the affirmation of ordinary life that gave rise to it.115
to act for the general good. But second, this whole itself is a magnificent creation of instrumental 
reason, now that of God, which has encompassed a universal maximization. Our powers of reason
which enable us to see this, can lift us to a grasp of the whole and in this way bring us to want more
than our particular interest.” Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 280.
114 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 278.
115 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 279.
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6. Conclusion: ‘Self-Love and Social’
Having considered ‘the affirmation of ordinary life’ and its influence on 
Deism, we can now respond to Girard’s anthropological concerns when he asks “who 
has ever seen a great chain of being collapse?” by saying that nobody has seen a 
chain collapse because ‘the chain’ as it was originally understood is transposed onto 
a new, more efficient interlocking system, fully in accordance with a ‘rational’ and 
‘benevolent’ form of Christianity; this form emerges as a reaction to the traditional 
Catholic view of the sacred and is itself a new order filling the vacuum generated by 
the decline of the older order . The point here is not to argue against the traditional 
‘ontic’ order, however its ‘metaphysical status’ is viewed, nor to attempt to discredit 
Girard’s anthropological principle of ‘Degree’. Rather, what Taylor highlights is how 
order is re-imagined in the modem period, as something that has its locus in a more 
human and less theocentric view of nature. Furthermore, the massive effort to 
formulate this new perspective is initially driven by a Christianity-inspired 
incamational mode of life. The advantages of the new Deist order are such that each 
person living out the differences marked as significant for him or her could now 
assume some responsibility for initiating and maintaining a new order to supercede 
the older view (with its emphasis on maintaining order as a meaningful whole 
through the contemplation of succeeding levels of hierarchy). The new providential 
order passes through the space of radical reflexivity. Gathering ourselves in from 
dispersion, we discover God’s design and our place in it. By giving ordinary life 
greater significance in cosmic affairs, this internalisation helped offset the likelihood 
of the “chaos” that threatened a traditional social order, and, of course, earlier more 
archaic forms of order. Each part is now indispensable to the whole and, furthermore,
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is our route to universal harmony and happiness. In Pope’s words: “SELF-LOVE and 
SOCIAL are the same”.116
We saw how Taylor gives a central role to Augustine’s notion of inwardness 
in helping to shape the early modem identity. Augustine’s ‘two-loves’ theory 
provides a developed notion of the will, and places a certain primacy on the self and 
its inner relationship with God that resists the formulation that Girard gives it. Within 
an Augustinian perspective, the ‘Saint and the Romantic’ are not separate subjects 
but constitutive tendencies of the same dynamic experience of interiority. Arising 
from this, the notion of inwardness paves the way for both the modem disengaged 
stance of rational control, and the more expressivist theories of nature that develop 
out of what I have called the proto-Romantic reaction to the mechanistic universe 
(met in the previous section) and that I shall explore in the next chapter. Instrumental 
reason allows us to play our part in the design of nature, but our way of contact with 
this design also lies within us in another way - namely in our natural sentiments of 
sympathy and benevolence. Exploring my own sentiments (including my desires and 
inclinations) takes on moral importance since what is right and good is what fits a 
design, of which my sentiments are an integral part, and to which they are inwardly 
attuned.117 As our feelings become normative, our access to the whole domain of 
good and evil, while still subject to correction by reason, depends more and more on 
our moral sense to help us uncover the right inner impulse.
I have been arguing, after Taylor, that Girard’s theory of ‘self-divinization’, 
which makes ‘generosity’ and ‘proof a double-sided attribute of pride, fails to 
acknowledge the internalization of moral sources that takes definite shape in the 
modem period. The emphasis on rational control is a development on Corneille’s
116 Ibid., p. 280.
117 T ay tor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 282.
118 Taylor, Sources o f the Self p. 284.
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notion of generosity, which, Taylor explains, still belongs to an older ethic of honor 
and glory. Having looked at Augustine in greater detail, we can now see how the 
cogito, as the locus of gathering and the basis of Descartes’ first-person stance, is in 
continuity with the Augustinian move inward. And, having once again considered the 
role of Degree, but this time in the context of the interlocking purposes that the Deist 
picture introduces, we can begin to imagine how the great chain is transformed from 
a delicately balanced ‘ontic order’ into one that takes ‘direct efficient causal form’. 
Clearly marked differences are still part of this order, though, these “differences” are 
no longer understood as belonging solely to an externally ordered hierarchical 
system, but instead become constitutive of our own disengaged stance to the world, a 
stance that also comes to include an important role for our sentiments.
According to Taylor, unity and identity are thus preserved and, pace Girard, 
not completely undermined in the modem period; the new Deist vision can ‘step into 
the vacuum’.119 In an interlocking order things work together to form a whole 
whereby individual ends feed each other. Within this benevolent design that places 
priority on ordinary life the individual must take up a calling for his or her own good 
and for the sake of the whole. By taking rational control of oneself and one’s place in 
this order, a lot less was left to chance, and so one’s dependence on worldly things 
was thought to decrease. It is here, perhaps, that the Protestant interpenetration of the 
sacred and the profane has its greatest anthropological significance, since it radically 
undercuts a world that could more easily be given over to superstition, and indeed 
crisis.
The affirmation of ordinary life thus transforms the notion of degree into one 
that the human now has a share in determining. The great chain of being is no longer
119 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 276.
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understood as reflecting an ontic order hierarchically ascending throughout nature 
and the cosmos, but is instead brought down to earth -  a transition that Arthur O.
♦ 190Lovejoy refers to as the ‘temporalization’ of the great chain of being. God’s 
benevolence means human happiness must prevail and so, in fulfilling his or her 
purpose, the individual assumes a certain responsibility for generating the order and 
harmony of the whole. How we access the new order will depend on the importance 
we give to the different kinds of moral sources.121 However, after Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, it is no longer simply a rational process as it was for Locke. Knowing 
good and evil now depends on our moral sense and feelings as much as on our 
reason; and these come to awareness within us. The horizontal axis of transcendence 
that Girard describes as ‘deviated’, resulting only in the pernicious illusions of 
metaphysical desire, and later referred to as the basis of a sacrificial crisis, can be 
fruitfully reconsidered in light of Taylor’s analysis of the modem period. ‘Ordinary 
life’ and the reduction of suffering are two powerful early modem ideas that give a 
peculiarly Christian significance to the ‘interpenetration of the sacred and the 
profane’. Whereas for Girard, this interpenetration is a source of crisis, in the 
perspective that I have been elaborating in this chapter it can become part of a 
worthy struggle to realize an incamational mode of life. In the next chapter we will 
consider, with the help of Taylor’s work on Hegel, how this struggle becomes the 
catalyst of modem subjectivity as it attempts to understand division and unity as the 
very basis of historical reality.
120 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f Being: A Study o f the History o f  an Idea (New York: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 246.
121 Taylor, Sources, p. 283.
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Chapter 5
Rethinking Division and Unity 
(Subjectivity, Religion, and the Current of Life)
The new place of sentiment completes the revolution which has yielded a modem 
view of nature as normative, so utterly different from the ancient view. For the 
ancients nature offers us an order which moves us to love and instantiate it, unless 
we are depraved. But the modem view, on the other hand, endorses nature as the 
source of right inner impulse. Nature as norm is an inner tendency; it is ready to 
become the voice within, which Rousseau will make it, and to be transposed by the 
Romantics into a richer and deeper inwardness.1
- Charles Taylor
In that the good to which nature conduces is now a purely natural, self-contained 
good, and in that the proximate moral source is a self-subsistent order of interlocking 
beings, to whose principles we have access within ourselves, the stage is set for 
another independent ethic, in which nature itself will become the prime moral source, 
without its Author.2
- Charles Taylor
1. Introduction
In the last chapter we traced, with the help of Taylor’s work in Sources o f the 
Self, what he describes as a massive shift in the notion of the constitutive good 
connected with nature. While we did not give any considerable space to the pre- 
Christian Greek context, which Taylor of course does, we nonetheless sketched the 
transition from a hierarchical notion of reason to a conception of providential design 
that marks certain activities as significant. The affirmation of ordinary life preceded 
and energised the new providential order that presented a picture of nature as a vast 
network of interlocking beings. The design in nature “works towards the 
conservation of each of its parts”, whereby the age-old principle of order, “is now 
understood as conducing to the life and happiness of the sentient creatures which it
1 Taylor, Sources o f the Self p. 284.
2 Taylor, Sources o f the Self p. 315.
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contains.”3 Taylor’s analysis of these developments gives us a way of further 
understanding, in the context of our discussion concerning crisis, how a more 
primitive order -  one based on ‘clearly marked differences’, externally organised and 
maintained through sacrifice -  might gradually come to be re-imagined in a manner 
that places the centrality on the individual’s rational control and basic moral 
sentiments, as the constitutive aspects of a new order.4 In this way, Taylor’s 
philosophical history can be seen as partially in agreement with Girard in so far they 
both acknowledge that an older order is radically challenged in the period that 
becomes known as modem. But for Taylor, the Augustinian notion of inwardness is 
one of the defining moves that pave the way for ordinary life and the emphasis on 
practical benevolence. If, by the time Descartes’ wrote his Meditations, the social 
world was still greatly threatened by sacred violence and the propensity for it to 
escalate into crisis, as Girard claims is characteristic of all cultures, then individuals 
themselves were soon to begin functioning to generate the order and control (once 
the preserve of the social), in the name of a new, religiously inspired motivation 
towards universal respect.
However, having argued that the modem period involves a kind of 
internalisation of moral sources and a re-marking of difference by the individual 
(rather than the whole society), as something that Girard perhaps dismisses too easily 
when he describes the ‘modem world as being synonymous with a sacrificial crisis’, 
we are still left with an important question. The question concerns whether the
3 Ibid.
4 Marcel Gauchet also explains the development of transcendence as a process of increased 
differentiation through internalisation, highlighting the specificity o f Christianity and the Reformation 
in this process. “[TJranscendent religion’s basic characteristic is to be found.. .in its innovative attempt 
to provide increasingly sophisticated versions of God’s difference and to display their consequences. 
The reality o f the process initiated by the advent o f the Christian concept o f the Deity should not be 
sought in something that appeals to an explicit continuity with tradition. We must rather look for it in 
what broke with institutional repression in the Church -  that is, the Reformation -  in response to the 
structural split contained in the notion of a unique creator god”. The Disenchantment o f  the World: A 
Political History o f  Religion, trans., Oscar Burge (New Jersey: Princeton: 1999), 61.
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individual has the capacity to sustain the moral dimension of this internalisation 
when this dimension becomes disconnected from a recognisable form of Christian 
theism 5 In other words, what happens to the “divisions” that, as we saw in chapter 
one, Girard argues are constitutive of the Romantic individual’s ‘pride’, when the 
more obviously transcendent order of Deism is replaced more and more by the 
individual’s subjective powers alone? Might Girard’s thesis concerning “self- 
divinization” still be relevant to an analysis of modem individualism once the initial 
inspiration of ordinary life, as a historical development, loses its momentum? In this 
chapter we will consider how the problem of division (the catalyst of ‘crises’), relates 
to the whole notion of ‘inwardness’ as it continued to make its influence felt. Once 
again, Taylor’s philosophical history will be rallied in a selective and focused way to 
respond to Girard’s damning critique of modem individualism. My argument here 
does not dispute the central Girardian insight that religion is essentially violent and 
that, arising from this fact, social and cultural order relies on a measure of violence to 
quell destructive mimesis and restore harmony. However, I want to offer a critique of 
Girard’s analysis of ‘originality’ as the source of ‘internal mediation’ and all the 
problems that beset the modem world -  what he understands as the default position 
of those who fail to see that their desires are not their own. Following Taylor, I want 
to argue that ‘originality’ has a moral basis. This argument will attempt to show that 
while ‘self-divinization’ is a possible but not inevitable tendency in modem forms of 
freedom (as cupiditas for Augustine is a possible but not inevitable tendency of the 
will).
By once again addressing Taylor’s philosophical history to the central 
problem of division in Girard’s work, as it is articulated in the context of literary
5 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 315.
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space and cultural space -  as Romantic pride and sacrifice respectively -  I will 
outline how Taylor understands the Romantic emphasis on ‘inner nature’ as a source 
of good and the precondition of originality. Girard explicitly argues that 
individualism is a form of separation and fragmentation.6 However, I hope to show in 
this chapter, with Taylor’s help that the philosophies of nature in the eighteenth 
century reveal that our being in touch with our inner nature keeps us connected to the 
benevolence postulated by moral sense theory -  so that connection and unity, rather 
than separation and fragmentation, characterise the individual in whom this inner 
nature flows.
In section two we will look at how Romantic expressivism, as a development 
of this strand of Deism, is from its inception preoccupied with a notion of ‘illusory 
substitution’, arising from the conception of a ‘divided will’ that can be traced back 
to Augustine’s ‘two-loves’ theory. The problem of being ‘deceived’, then, was 
explicitly thematised within Romanticism from the beginning and so cannot simply 
be construed, a la Girard, as an over-determined ‘inevitability’ of an unreflective 
individualism.7 In an attempt to respond to the charges of ‘self-divinization’ that 
Girard levels at modem individualism for its ‘mistaken’ preoccupation with 
‘originality’ I will outline, in section three, how originality comes to the fore in the 
modem period as, in part, a reaction to a more rationalist view that sought to 
objectify the self and the world, leaving human beings divided and hence cut off 
from an authentic unity. In section four, I will consider how what Girard and others
6 ‘The structure of crime and redeeming punishment redeems the solitary consciousness”, Girard, 
Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 314. and again, “I am alone and they are everyone -  this is the 
underground motto.” p. 260.
7 1 am referring here to the tendency within Girardian discourse to associate Romanticism exclusively 
with the ‘self-deceiving subject’ who mistakenly believes in his own originality, when in actuality his 
identity is mediated by an other. This also gives rise to anachronistic claims concerning what 
historical figures could be deemed ‘Romantic’. So for example, Chris Fleming and John O ’Carroll in 
their essay, “Romanticism”, claim, “Augustine was not a Romantic” in, Anthropoetics 11, no. 1 
(Spring/Summer 2005). The implication here o f course (which I am contesting) is that Augustine 
could ever have been a Romantic.
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see as a form of self-divinization can be understood as an attempt to meet the 
demands of authentic expression and heal the subjects ‘rift’ with nature. Section five 
will draw out the religious implications of this move for the subject who must now 
confront the challenges of division and unity as a new historical project, albeit one 
with significant antecedents in the long tradition of western thought. By drawing out 
further what Taylor sees as the religious context of subjectivity in section six we will 
highlight how Girard’s concerns are not dissimilar to Hegel’s; the latter’s attempts to 
overcome division, I shall suggest, can be fruitfully compared to the scapegoat 
theory. Finally, we will consider again some of Taylor’s analysis from Sources, in 
particular how he understands the expressivist movement as giving rise to the 
shadow side of modem humanism in the aftermath of the scientific developments of 
the seventeenth century. This shadow side comes about when the ‘current of life’ is 
reinterpreted (with peculiarly dire consequences) as ‘blind will’ -  connected now, 
ominously, to homo religiosus.
2. Sentiments and the Voice of Nature
The shift to Deism and to a providential design opened the way for a new and 
unprecedented role for sentiment.8 In this section we will examine how the historical 
developments paved the way for the Romantic understanding of nature that has been 
so influential in the modem period. With the advent of Deism, a new and 
paradigmatic route of access to the design in nature is now gained through our 
feelings. When sentiments become “normative” in this way we discover what is 
right, partly by coming to experience our normal sentiments. “This may involve our
8 Taylor believes that the revolution in the philosophical understanding of sentiment in the seventeenth 
century is reflected in a change o f  vocabulary: ‘‘the word ‘sentiment’ itself, partly replacing ‘passion’, 
bespeaks the rehabilitation the life of feeling has gone through”. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 283.
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overcoming the distortive effects of vice or false opinion -  Hutcheson constantly 
points out how the extrinsic theory makes us fail to appreciate our moral sentiments, 
and this dampens them.”9 Thus ‘sentiment’ becomes the touchstone of the morally 
good “ ...because undistorted, normal feeling is my way of access into the design of 
things, which is the real constitutive good, determining good and bad. This sentiment 
can be corrected by reason when it deviates, but the insight it yields cannot be 
substituted for by reason.”10 Unlike in the theories of rational order that preceded it, 
sentiment and its role in a providential order is here part measure of the good, a 
measure that reason must take account of.
By placing greater value on the private sphere, including conjugal marriage11 
and family bonds -  as well as the range of emotional experiences wrought through 
the new medium of the novel -  the emphasis on sentiment has a massive influence on 
the culture of modernity.12 This emphasis is also found in the growth of the feeling 
for nature in the eighteenth century and, more particularly, the sentiments that nature 
awakens in us.13 Taylor once again reminds us of what is new about this reverence 
for nature by highlighting how it differed from the earlier conception of 
“correspondences” (found, as we have seen, in Shakespeare) between natural 
phenomena and human affairs.14 He gives the example of the portends prior to
9 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 284.
10 Ibid.
11 Taylor explains the changes in the following way: “What changes is not that people begin loving 
their children or feeling affection for their spouses, but that these dispositions come to be seen as a 
crucial part o f what makes life worthy and significant”. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 292.
12 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self pp. 286-296.
13 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 298.
14 In chapter two we looked at Girard’s anthropological account of the great chain as a phenomenon to 
which he refuses to grant any metaphysical status, stressing instead the notion o f “Degree” as the 
underlying principle of all order and hierarchy. In the last chapter I spoke about the great chain and 
the “correspondences” by referring to difference between Girard’s and Taylor’s account of ‘the chain’, 
which Taylor’s analysis of Deism brings out. The chain itself does not cease to exist, nor does it stop 
acting as a useful metaphor; rather (for Taylor at least) the order it had maintained as part of an otitic 
order is transposed in the modern period onto an interlocking order with greater subjective control.
My point here is to draw out how these different interpretations of order are working in respect to 
Girard’s and Taylor’s thought.
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Duncan’s murder (in the play Macbeth) to illustrate these correspondences: “On the 
previous Tuesday a falcon had been killed by a mousing owl, and Duncan’s horse 
turned wild in the night”. These ‘signs’ refer to a disturbance of order in nature that 
was at the time well understood as a ‘public language of reference’.15
Nature is here in some way in tune with human affairs. But the relation is utterly different 
and in fact incompatible with the modem one we inherit from the eighteenth century. 
Shakespeare draws on some notion of ontic logos, more precisely on the correspondences of 
Renaissance thought. The same hierarchical order manifests itself in different domains, the 
human, the avian, the animal; and so these are attuned: the disorder in one is reflected in the 
disorder of the others. Duncan’s murder is the negation o f all hierarchy, as is the killing of a 
falcon by a mousing owl or the rebellion of animals against mankind.16
We have already seen how the principle of ‘Degree’ is central to Girard’s notion of 
cultural crisis, and how when this is disturbed ‘what discord follows’. While Girard 
underscores the anthropological aspects of Degree and hierarchy etc., we can 
nonetheless recognise the similarity here between what Girard describes as a cultural 
order and what Taylor describes as an ontic order -  in both cases chaos can occur.
However, we can also recognise a difference that can help explain why 
Girard sees this order as something that becomes defunct in the modem period, while 
Taylor sees it as something that is transposed onto a new interlocking order. This 
difference comes through in how each describes the pre-modem order itself: for 
Girard we might say this order is ‘tuned’ (hence his emphasis on Shakespeare’s 
musical metaphor), while for Taylor it is ‘attuned’ (hence his emphasis on the 
correspondences). Girard thus views the order as quite static to begin with, the 
harmony having to do with the various pre-existing slots, or ‘ranks’, being filled, and 
crucially maintained, while the disorder in the various spheres that we find for 
example in Lear or Macbeth represents a loss of difference between these slots (what
15 Taylor refers to R.M. Rilke’s Dunio Elergies, as an example of how, in the modem period, the poet 
no longer has the same gamut of references available to him or her as was once available in an ontic 
order. Hence, his or her poetry embodies the modem sense of alienation from nature and God. “Who 
if  I cried out will hear me among the order of angels?” Taylor, Ethics o f Authenticity, pp. 84-85.
16 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self pp. 298, 299.
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he calls a ‘crisis of degree’). While stressing the delicate balance of this order, Taylor 
also draws our attention to our connection to nature, a form of contact that was, 
already within an ontic order, a kind of participation, whereby individuals (by 
keeping their proper places) felt invested in the whole -  a whole that greatly 
transcended them in status and power. This difference between Girard and Taylor 
opens up two divergent construals of the transition to the modem world: as heralding 
either a sacrificial crisis or a new mode of being. Whichever of these construals we 
opt for will determine whether we see our relationship to nature and order being 
sundered in the modem period, or somehow being reconstituted.
The greater emphasis on sentiment in the eighteenth century and the 
importance of nature, and its power to awaken our moral sentiments, Taylor believes, 
belongs to an order that is being reconfigured. Beginning with the moral sense 
theories in the seventeenth century, the older cosmology is gradually replaced by a 
view that values inner experience and feeling in a way that is very different from the 
order in nature depicted by Shakespeare:
.. .the meaning that the natural phenomena bear is no longer defined by the order of nature in 
itself or by the Ideas which they embody. It is defined through the effect of the phenomena 
on us, in the reactions they awaken. The affinity between nature and ourselves is now 
mediated not by an objective rational order but by the way that nature resonates in us. Our 
attunement with nature no longer consists in recognition o f ontic hierarchy, but on being able 
to release the echo within ourselves.17
And this new way of thinking about nature as somehow having a resonance or “voice
within” becomes a key insight for a whole wave of expressivist theories of nature
and human life around this time.18 Being in touch with this inner “echo” or “voice”
becomes a crucial issue for the subsequent generation of Romantic thinkers from
Rousseau onwards, since it is precisely their concern with being cut off from nature
17 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 299.
18 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 355.
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and the current of life through an over emphasis on mechanical and instrumental 
control that causes them to react vehemently against dominant modes of rationalism.
According to Taylor, Rousseau more than any other thinker of this period, 
gives us a way of understanding the internalisation of moral sources as somehow in 
continuity with the earlier doctrine of nature articulated by Augustine19 - with one 
important difference: ‘grace’ no longer has to break through as it does for Augustine.
In the orthodox theory, the source of the higher love is grace; it is the God of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob. For Rousseau (without entirely ceasing to be God, at least of the 
philosophers), it has become the voice o f nature. The doctrine of original sin, in its orthodox 
understanding, has been abandoned. Nature is fundamentally good, and the estrangement 
which depraves us is one which separates us from it. An Augustinian picture of the will has 
been transposed into a doctrine which denies one of the central tenets of Augustine’s 
theology.20
‘Grace’ now comes to us quite naturally from being in touch with the ‘voice of 
nature’ within, and hence the importance of nature as a source of goodness and the 
corresponding dangers of corruption from without. What we find in Rousseau’s 
Emile, for example, is an affirmation of the original impulse of nature, our contact 
with which becomes lost due to a depraved culture. “We suffer this loss because we 
no longer depend on ourselves and this inner impulse, but rather on others, and on 
what they think of us, expect from us, admire or despise in us, reward or punish in 
us. We are separated from nature by the dense web of opinion which is woven
•y ■»
between us in society and can no longer recover contact with it.” By comparing 
ourselves negatively with others we are led away from our true nature and into 
illusion and rivalry, not because our “originality” is false, as Girard maintains, but
19 Much o f the reforming spirit of the Enlightenment had an over confidence in human nature that 
Rousseau did not share. Unlike the Encyclopaedists, for example, Taylor tells us, “Rousseau was 
drawn to a view in which there was a place for a real notion of depravity. Human evil was not the kind 
of thing that could be offset by an increase of knowledge or enlightenment. Indeed the belief that it 
could be was itself part of the distortion, and reliance on it could only aggravate things. What was 
needed was a transformation of the will. Rousseau brought back into the world of eighteenth century 
Deism the fundamentally Augustinian notion that humans are capable o f  two loves, o f two basic 
orientations of the will”. Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 356.
20 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 357.
21 Ibid.
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because we mistake an externally induced image of our desires for some original
*  22impulse -  an image that Taylor refers to elsewhere as an “illusory substitute”.
By placing such an important emphasis on our inner nature over and against 
the corrupting influences of the external social world, Rousseau, Taylor argues, takes 
the revolution in sentiment that was a central feature of Deism farther than had been 
previously conceived. “For a moral sense theorist like Hutcheson, our own moral 
feelings are an important source of understanding the good, but they only serve in
• * 23combination with our grasping our setting within a providential order.” Thus our 
instinctive approval of benevolence serves to bring about both our own good and the 
universal good. However, the definition of conscience that Rousseau articulates as an 
inner sentiment could be viewed as more potent than the earlier moral sense theory. 
“Not just that I have, thanks be to God, sentiments which accord with what I see 
through other means to be the universal good, but that the inner voice of my true 
sentiments define what is good: since the élan of nature in me is the good, it is this 
which has to be consulted to discover it.”24 Our inner nature is thus unmoored from a 
pre-existing order, while our first point of reference becomes our own inner nature: 
“Rousseau immensely enlarges the scope of the inner voice. We can now know from
25within us, from the impulses of our own being, what nature marks as significant.” It 
is this potential that is fully embraced by the expressivist theories of nature, and 
hence can be seen as the starting point of a further transformation in modem culture 
towards a deeper inwardness and a radical autonomy.
22 Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, in Philosophical Papers 2: Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p. 161.
23 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 362.
24 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 362.
^rbid.
26 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 363.
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This radicalizing of moral sense theory by Romantic expressivism highlights 
a related problem to the one discussed above as to whether and/or how order is 
transposed in the modem world. We saw that Girard does not attribute any value to 
inwardness as a peculiarly western development, and so when traditional hierarchy 
begins to wane it simply has nowhere to be transposed to. The move to individualism 
marks a decline in culture and order. And because questions of ‘the Good’ are at best 
secondary to the functional requirements of a cultural system ‘the Good’ as 
something valuable in itself, is reduced by Girard to a healthy measure of ‘Degree’. 
The notion of hierarchy, which was understood within a Greek and Christian context, 
up until the modem period, as something that existed fo r  the sake o f the Good, is 
within an anthropological setting, something that exists in order to protect and 
preserve. Here lies the problem of having a static view of order since it forecloses all 
questions of what moves us to love and instantiate the Good, or the will of God, 
above and beyond the immediate scene or context, filled as it often is with anxiety. 
What the principle of ‘degree’ fails to explain is what makes the order in nature 
good, or fulfilling or worthwhile... something worthy of our love and allegiance. 
And in relation to our discussion of ‘inner nature’, the problem concerns precisely 
Girard’s capacity to take seriously the Romantic understanding of nature as a source 
of good.
For example, we have seen how Girard’s characterisation of the Romantic 
individual depicts someone always divided within himself by his so-called 
“mechanical” reactions to the other that are designed to protect his ‘originality’.27 
Yet crucially for Girard, unlike Rousseau, the individual’s pride, although a form of 
negative imitation, is not ultimately something socially induced; rather it springs
27 Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, p. 298.
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from his own mistaken belief in originality.28 The social world, at least in his later 
work, is fundamentally a source of protection from the paroxysms of mimetic 
contagion. However, for Rousseau, the pride that makes us compare ourselves and 
imitate negatively belongs solely to the state of society. He calls this socially induced 
pride, amour-propre. His state of nature on the other hand, is characterised by a 
peaceful self-love, amour de soi, that does not lead to violence because it is a solitary 
self-love with no need for others and therefore supposedly “without mimesis”.29 For 
Girard, the Romantic belief in ‘spontaneous desire’, or a desire that is somehow 
immune from mimesis, is synonymous with separation, as a mark of one’s own 
‘originality’, which leads to further pride and the multiple divisions of the 
underground.30 The problem for understanding Girard’s refusal to grant inwardness 
any value comes back in the end to his characterisation of separation as a form of 
pride, when, as we have seen, for Rousseau, being in touch with our inner nature is in 
no way meant as a form of separation but rather authentic connection.
All the tensions that beset Girard’s theory I would argue stem from the fact 
that he deems inner nature to be devoid of goodness. Desire is the master that makes 
sentiment its underling. But, as we have seen, an important strand of western 
spirituality, beginning in the modem period with moral sense theory and culminating 
with the Romantic voice of nature within, considers this inner nature to be 
fundamentally good (and with some claim to be in continuity with the Judea-
28 In atypical comment that aligns Rousseau with the ‘deviated transcendence’ of the Romantic hero’s 
‘spiritual askesis’ Girard says: “Rousseau affirms that he will present himself armed with The 
Confessions before the supreme tribunal. The Book of Life is displaced by the book of his life.” 
Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, p. 96.
29 Wolfgang Palover, “Mimesis and Scapegoating in the Works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant”, in 
Contagion: Journal o f  Violence, Mimesis, and Culture. Vol., 10, Spring 2003, p. 143.
30 What Girard’s analysis o f literary space teaches us is that the falseness of the social world is based 
on what he sees as the mistaken belief that there is any original impulse that the individual can gain 
access to through his or her inner experience.
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Christian inheritance).31 By missing the commonality between Deism and Romantic 
expressivism, and by characterising Rousseau’s move toward the self as a form of 
‘separation’, hence divine self-sufficiency, pride etc., Girard fails to recognise a 
significant moral dimension in the transition from a pre-modem order. To try and 
explain how what counts as ‘separation’ for Girard can become the basis of actual 
‘connection’ for Rousseau, and Romantic expressivism more broadly, we will now 
turn to Taylor’s Hegel and the defining ideas of the eighteenth century, ideas that 
sought to respond to the problems posed by separation, or ‘division’, and the 
requirements of unity.32
3. Expression and Originality: Combining Two Views of Nature
The Augustinian turn inward, toward the self, makes explicit the two 
tendencies of the will and their manifestations in caritas and cupiditas. The doctrine 
of the ‘two loves’, as we saw, allows for the possibility that the human disposition 
may be radically perverse. The Christian development of the will thereby weaves 
together two ‘master ideas’ that struggle to co-exist: “the will as our power to confer 
or withhold all things considered assent, or choice; and the will as the basic 
disposition of our being.”33 We also saw how, broadly speaking, the power to confer 
or withhold consent more or less comes to the fore as a developed idea with the 
notion of a disengaged subject and the centrality given to ordinary life. Even when
31 Taylor makes the point: “There is a divine affirmation o f the creature, which is captured in the 
repeated phrase in Genesis I about each stage of the creation ‘and God saw that it was good’. Agape is 
inseparable from such a ‘seeing-good’.” Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 516.
32 Taylor attempts to explain the continuity in the philosophical tradition as follows: “The philosophy 
o f nature as a source was central to the great upheaval in thought and sensibility that we refer to as 
‘Romanticism’, so much so that it is tempting to identify them. But as the mention o f Goethe and 
Hegel shows, this would be too simple. My claim is rather that the picture of nature as a source was a 
crucial part o f the conceptual armoury in which Romanticism arose and conquered European culture 
and sensibility. The word has a bewildering number o f definitions, and some have even doubted that 
there is such a thing as a unified phenomenon, as against a conceptual muddle hidden in a single 
term”. Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 368.
33 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 138.
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the picture is filled out in relation to our sentiments, our choice for the good is but 
the fulfilment of a right inner impulse. And as we discussed above, Rousseau’s 
challenge to what we might call this one-sided view of natural benevolence as simply 
tending toward the good, ensures that the Augustinian notion of a ‘divided will’ gets 
taken up again and revivified in terms that place an even greater significance on our 
inner impulses than the theory of moral sentiments had emphasised. The source of 
our unhappiness and our sense of alienation -  in short our inner division -  can now 
be understood to arise from the external world which generates the most malign 
forms of vanity and illusion.34 Can the voice of nature become a reliable source of 
order, a way of putting shape on the world when the extent of our inner division 
becomes evident?
Whereas the disengaged stance to nature seemed to stress rational choice 
often at the expense of a robust notion of human depravity, Romantic expressivism 
took seriously the notion of human will as the basic disposition of our being. The 
new formulation of our inner nature still meant that there could be a potential conflict 
between vision and desire.35 We can be cut off from our inner source of good, a 
condition, moreover, which our new scientific knowledge, so far from ameliorating, 
may only exacerbate. And so, the expressivists followed Rousseau in propounding a 
“two-loves” view:
The inner voice is our mode of access, but we can lose contact with it; it can be stifled in us. 
And what can stifle it is precisely the disengaged stance of calculating reason, the view o f  
nature from the outside, as a merely observed order. The filiation with earlier theories of 
grace is evident. Nature stands as a reservoir o f good. In the stance of disengagement, we are 
out o f phase with it, cut off from it; we cannot recover contact with it.36
34 An important figure on Taylor’s own understanding o f the modem period was Isaiah Berlin. See C. 
Taylor, “The Importance of Herder”, in Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, eds. Enda and Avishai Margalit 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1991). Also, I. Berlin, The Roots o f  Romanticism, ed. Henry Hardy (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1999).
35 As we mentioned in the last chapter, the significance o f this conflict for us under the formulation of 
‘two loves’ is that “in the zone in which we live o f half understanding and contrary desires, the will is 
as much the independent variable, determining what we can know as it is the dependent one shaped by 
what we see”. Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 138.
36 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 370.
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The continuity with the older tradition is borne out in the way that different currents 
of eighteenth century thought come to characterise humans’ powers, their limitations 
and the source of those limitations. While not in agreement with the Augustinian 
conception of original sin, the Romantic tradition did share with the older Catholic 
theology the belief that nature was fundamentally good. And unlike Descartes’ self- 
transparent cogito, Rousseau insisted that human depravity posed a fundamental 
problem to true self-knowledge -  since it was beyond the scope of a disengaged 
stance, coming to us as it often did unnoticed through the mediations of the external 
world, He did not disconnect from meaningful engagement with the world like his 
Calvinist predecessors. His was not the stance of ‘objectification’ that we associated 
with the aims of ordinary life in the last chapter.37 Hence, from the age of 
Enlightenment there evolved an anthropology which combined two perspectives that 
were not entirely consistent: “the notion of self-defining subjectivity correlative to 
the new objectivity; and the view of man as part of nature, hence fully under the 
jurisdiction of this objectivity”.38
Johann Gottfried Herder is identified as one of the key figures in the 
development of a post-Enlightenment climate in Germany -  a climate that was 
critical of some aspects of the modem revolution, while at the same time striving to 
incorporate much of its spirit. According to Taylor, Herder reacts against the 
‘objectification’ of human nature and the division of “the human mind into different 
faculties, of man into body and soul, against a calculative notion of reason, divorced
37 Speaking about the Protestant influence on the modem period, Taylor writes: “It is probable that the 
unremitting struggle to desacralize the world in the name of an undivided devotion to God waged by 
Calvin and his followers helped to destroy the sense of creation as a locus of meanings in relation to 
which man had to define him self’. Charles Taylor, Hegel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 9. Having used the terms ‘disenchanted’ or ‘desacralized’ to describe these developments, 
Taylor introduces the term ‘objectified’ to cover the “denial o f the world of inherent meaning, that is, 
the denial that it is to be seen as embodied meaning”. Ibid.
38 Taylor, Hegel, p. 10.
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from feeling and will”.39 In addition to his reaction against what we can broadly call 
‘dualism,’ he is largely responsible for developing an alternative anthropology 
centred on ‘expression,’ a term that Taylor borrows from the domain of art.40 What 
Herder adds to the older Aristotelian concepts is a self-unfolding subject, a subject 
that can recognise his self-realisation as his own -  as having unfolded from within 
himself, and from his own particular contact with nature.
It was Herder and the expressivist anthropology developed from him which added the epoch- 
making demand that my realisation of the human essence be my own, and hence launched the 
idea that each individual (...and each people) has its own way of being human, which it 
cannot exchange with that o f any other except at the cost of distortion and self-mutilation.41
This notion of having one’s own singular and unique way of being becomes a hugely
influential moral source for contemporary forms of freedom. By tracing the
predominant moral impulses of contemporary western culture, Taylor argues that the
quest for authenticity has its most significant historical antecedents in the eighteenth
century and in Herder particularly.42 As we already discussed, Rousseau had paved
the way for this radical view by giving the voice of nature an unprecedented
43primacy.
39 Taylor, Hegel, p. 13.
40 In saying that the central notion here is of human action or life as expression, Taylor is not harking 
back to the pre-modem view of the ‘world as text’ in which ideas and corresponding terms express or 
embody the same ideal order. Rather what he attempts to explain is the force at work here. In the older 
view we are expressing what already exists, the meaning o f which our expression somehow captures. 
However, Taylor suggests there is another sense in which we speak of expression as giving vent to 
something we feel or desire. When someone expresses anger by cursing or striking the table “what is 
expressed is a subject, or some state of a subject, or at a minimum some life form which resembles a 
subject”. Taylor, Hegel, p. 14. Taylor’s use of the term ‘expression’ is closer to this latter sense, 
although he claims something of the first is incorporated as well.
41 Taylor, Hegel, p. 15.
42 See also: Charles Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991).
43 Thus expressivist views differed from other formulas that were still common at the time, such as: 
‘To thine own self be true... familiar to us from Shakespeare’s Hamlet. While we do find an 
emphasis on inwardness here, it is still very much in the old world orbit of ‘not being false to anyone.’ 
With Herder, and ‘expressivism,’ the very notion of a ‘false world,’ or a world where the question of 
falseness between people emerges, is undercut. Unlike an ontic order, an expressivist view held that 
an individual is not simply responsible for his honesty - being right with himself in order to be right 
with the world, whereby the delicate ontic balance might otherwise be upset. The individual’s 
‘honesty,’ his unfolding self-realisation is now a world-transforming act.
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Central to human development and the realisation of human form in an 
expressivist view is the manifestation of an inner power striving to realise and 
maintain its own shape against those the surrounding world might impose. Taylor 
describes it as follows: “...the ideal realisation is one which not only conforms to an 
idea (as with Aristotelian form), but is also internally generated; indeed these two 
requirements are inseparable in that the proper form of a man incorporates the notion 
of free subjectivity.”44 With the emergence of a self-unfolding subject the older 
teleological notion of the human changes to incorporate a fuller model of subjective 
expression whereby in realising an essence or form, our life does not just embody 
this form in reality but also defines in a determinate way what it is.45 Taylor stresses 
that the idea a person realises, the form of her life, is not something wholly 
determined beforehand; it becomes fully determinate only through its own unfolding. 
The affinity here with the older notion of an inner voice helping to “define” what is 
significant is clear: authenticity has a moral dimension.
Hence the Herderian idea that ray humanity is something unique, not equivalent to yours, and 
this unique quality can only be revealed in my life itself. ‘Each man has his own measure, as 
it were an accord peculiar to him of all his feelings to each other’. The idea is not just that 
men are different; this was hardly new; it was rather that the differences define the unique 
form that each of us is called to realise. The differences take on moral import, so that the 
question could arise for the first time whether a given form o f life was an authentic 
expression of certain individuals or people. This is the new dimension added by a theory of 
je/f-realisation46.
In this new formulation the human subject comes to know himself by expressing and 
thereby clarifying what he is and recognising himself in this expression. According 
to Taylor, this two-fold expression -  both realisation and clarification of purposes -  
is one of the key ideas underlying the revolution of the late eighteenth century and, 
more significantly for our study, it is one of the foundational ideas of the civilisation 
which has grown up since then and shaped our contemporary world. Behind
44 Taylor, Hegel, p. 15.
45 Taylor, Hegel, p. 16.
46 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 16-17.
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externally induced illusions lies a moral source if only individuals can discover and 
express it. Contra Girard, “originality” has a moral significance.
Under Herder’s influence the new expressivist view of the subject as self­
unfolding, through the realisation and clarification of purpose, has a profound effect 
on language and art toward the end of the eighteenth century. Language is no longer 
only referential sign, it is also expression, and in this aspect it is seen as continuous 
with art. Both are vehicles of expression that define and clarify human feelings, and 
transform them into something higher. In the case of art, in its highest form, the 
feeling must be recognised by the artist as her own; “subjectivity at its highest is self- 
awareness”.47 A certain quality of feeling is an essential component, a feeling of self 
that is also a vision of self, expressed in our highest activities, language and art. By 
achieving self-clarity, we express our full selves and hence are free. Essential to our 
fulfilment is the feeling and vision we have of ourselves at our fullest, “as natural 
and spiritual beings, as subject of natural desires and of the highest aspiration to self-
48clarity and freedom and expressive form, and all of these in harmonious umty”. 
This view of the subject and his relationship to the world can be found in the 
Romantic poetry of the age, in its reverence for nature and awe of the sublime. We 
can also recognise in this view how our natural inclinations should be affirmed as 
truer forms of expression while our negative feelings can be properly understood 
only in relation to a corrupt society.49
Taylor reminds us however that the expressivist anthropology was a response 
to the atomist, mechanist, and utilitarian picture of human life. What flowed from 
philosophy and poetry associated with this anthropology at the time was a rift within
47 Taylor, Hegel, p. 21.
48 Taylor, Hegel, p. 22.
49 Once again Rousseau, one of the first to articulate this insight, sums up this basic Romantic idea in 
the opening lines of Emile'. “God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become 
evil”. Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 357. See also: The Ethics o f  Authenticity, p. 29.
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nature: that is, between nature as plan or instrument and nature as the will that acted 
on this plan. The rift was intolerable for the originators of the expressivist theory 
(Rousseau, Herder, and other Romantics). They experienced the Enlightenment 
conception of nature as a tearing apart of the unity of life in which nature should be 
at once the inspiration and motive force of thought and will.50 This emphasis on unity 
and wholeness, which is accessed through a purer state of nature, is one of the central 
moral sources of contemporary freedom that Taylor identifies in Source o f the Self. It 
stresses that nature is more than just a template for the will; to overcome the 
dichotomy that accompanies objectification the voice of nature must speak through 
the will.51
We find emerging here two dominant views of nature. Whereas one sees the 
objectified world as proof of the subject’s self-possession, the other feels it as 
imposing exile or inner cleavage, amounting to a denial of life, communion with 
nature, and the possibility of self-expression.52 An integrative expressivist view 
included a passionate demand for unity and wholeness. Proponents of this view 
rejected the dichotomies of the Enlightenment conception of nature and the 
distortions of the human’s true nature as self-expressive being. Since the human is 
expressive in this way, such a distorted view is an obstacle to human fulfilment. As 
Taylor explains in a manner that echoes the objections of the Cambridge Platonists to 
strict Lockean Deism: “A man who sees his feelings as in another category from 
thought, as facts about him to be explained mechanistically, cannot rise higher to a 
transformed expression of them.”53 In such a world humans are thus alienated from a
50 Taylor, Hegel, p. 23.
51 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, pp. 357- 358.
52 Taylor, Hegel, p. 23.
53 Taylor, Hegel, p. 24.
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vital part of themselves, in a manner similar to how in Girardian theory the 
community becomes alienated from its own source.
Another kind of abstraction, owing to the Enlightenment conception of 
human being introduces a false world of representation that cuts people off from the 
real Living sources.54 The individual’s self expression is distorted because “his life 
does not express him, but rather an illusory substitute for his real feelings and 
aspirations”.55 So, while human’s are cut off from nature and denied full expression 
they are also fed a false picture of the world that stands in for their true aspirations 
and thereby fails to fulfil the promise (that these aspirations hold) of unity and 
wholeness. Taylor attributes the original articulation of this ‘illusory substitution’ to 
Augustine,56 but clearly it is a concern close to his own heart. Indeed Taylor takes 
Foucault to task for not being critical enough when denouncing liberation through 
expression as just another form of illusion. The point is a subtle one since Foucault 
also sees ‘self-expression’ as succumbing to ‘illusory substitution’ through the 
regimes of control associated with knowledge/power.57 Taylor’s defence of 
authenticity is based on his belief that there is always an impulse towards the good, 
or what is higher, at work in our struggles. In the case of Foucault this good might 
include an impulse towards greater equality, but, according to Taylor, it remains 
implicit, unexpressed, and therefore inaccessible. Thus we can never decide what 
values should remain off limits, or what should be given full expression. Taylor 
attributes this confusion to Foucault’s Nietzsche-derived stance of neutrality between
54 This concern with being ‘cut o f f  is a further development of what we discussed in the previous 
section in relation to Rousseau; namely, the way human beings can lose touch with their inner nature 
and come to identify with an internalised ‘illusory’ image of themselves from the external world.
55 Ibid.
56 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 356.
57 Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, pp. 152-184.
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the different historical systems of power, which ironically appears to neutralise the
58evaluations that arise out o f his own analysis.
Over and against the objectified view of the world as proof of the subject’s 
self-possession, expressivism offers us a strongly anti-dualist philosophy. In 
addition, it makes freedom a central value of human life. This freedom is seen as 
consisting of genuine self-expression rather than the standard Enlightenment view 
which stressed the independent self-defining subject.59 Reminding us of the 
persistence of ‘illusory substitutions’ Taylor says that freedom experienced as 
authentic self-expression is threatened not only by external invasion but also by all 
the distortions that expression itself is menaced by. It can fail by a mis-shaping that is 
ultimately external in origin, but may become anchored in the self.60 This is, of 
course, another reference to Rousseau and his theory of amour-propre. But we can 
also detect here the kinds of ‘distortions’ that are addressed in Girard’s own theory of 
triangular desire.
As already indicated, Girard shares with Rousseau certain insights into the 
forms of mimesis that generate so many of the distortions, alluded to above, that 
expression is menaced by. Pride, in all its various guises, helps to explain for both 
thinkers how the “gentlest of passions receives sacrifices of human blood.”61 Yet 
Girard’s view of human nature is closer to Hobbes’s rather than Rousseau’s 
assessment of humans in their natural state. For the source of pride for Girard, does
58 Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, p. 163.
59 Taylor, Hegel, p. 24.
60 Ibid.
61 Rousseau, it seems, also had an acute anthropological intuition, and was aware o f how ‘negative 
mimesis’ could lead to collective violence: “People become accustomed to judging different objects 
and to making comparisons; gradually they acquire ideas o f merit and beauty, which in turn produce 
feelings o f preference. As a result o f seeing each other, people cannot do without seeing more of each 
other. A tender and sweet sentiment insinuates itself into the soul, and at the least obstacle becomes an 
inflamed fury; jealousy awakens with love; discord triumphs, and the gentlest of passions receives 
sacrifices of human blood.” Jean Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, trans., Maurice 
Cranston (London: Penguin Press, 1984) p. 114.
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not, in the end, come from the social world. It is not then an externally produced 
image of desire that causes the Romantic hero so much trouble by becoming 
anchored in the self, pulling her outward away from the essential goodness of her 
natural impulses. Rather, all the distortions that the individual is beset by belong to 
and arise from a compulsive belief in a unique spontaneous identity. So while 
Girardian theory holds no possibility of a self-reflexive first-person perspective in the 
mode of an Augustinian subject, he does however maintain a view of nature that is 
closely aligned to Augustine’s concept of evil as inherent in our natural disposition. 
However, as I have already argued, this view of nature as evil is only part of the 
Augustinian picture. For Augustine, the human hearts’ capacity to quest God in the 
end permits us to think of human nature as redeemable. Is Girard too selective in his 
reading of Augustine?62
The Romantic objection to the more disengaged forms of freedom, Taylor 
claims, was based precisely on the fear that humans were being cut off from nature 
and hence from the possibility of unified integral expression. Freedom experienced 
as authentic expression cannot be realised in a world where the subject is separate. 
The ‘freedom’ of the rational subject of control only works to keep humans alienated 
from full expression - from ‘the realisation and clarification of his feelings and 
vision’. This static view of freedom also generates ‘illusory substitutes’ for the 
individual’s true aspirations that not only fail to fulfil, but make one unaware of 
one’s true nature.63 Taylor seems convinced, as Rousseau was before him, that these 
illusions are ‘ultimately external in origin’, though they can indeed become anchored
62 “Le trois quarts de ce que je dis sont dans saint Augustine” (“Three quarters of what I say can be 
found in Saint Augustine”). René Girard, Quand ces choses commenceront..., Entretiens avec Michel 
Treguer (Paris: Arléa, 1994), p. 224.
63 The Romantic hero of literary space, whose mechanical reactions send him rushing toward a 
model/obstacle or resentfully holding on to his divided nature for the sake o f desire, is in Taylor’s 
analysis misnamed. While Girard attributes the Romantic impulse to Descartes ‘deceptive’ ethic of 
generosity, we can perhaps now more clearly see that Descartes as the father o f modem rationalism, 
and a mechanistic view of the universe, was no Romantic.
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in the self.64 However, notwithstanding the expressivist critique of disengaged 
reason, the central motivating force of the whole Romantic tradition, as it took shape 
for Herder and others at this time, was not separation, or ‘self-divinisation’ as Girard 
maintains, but rather the wholeness of integral expression through greater contact 
with the ‘current of life’. Indeed, in so far as Girard is actually concerned with 
‘separation’ and the multiple divisions of ‘internal mediation’ that for him 
characterise the Romantic individual’s various ‘illusions’, he can be seen as sharing 
with this whole tradition an important insight into the overarching significance of 
unity.
4. ‘Self-divinisation’ or the Demands of Expression?
It should be acknowledged that Girard is not eccentric in reading much of 
modem thought as an attempted move toward and legitimation of ‘self-divinisation’. 
In this section I will look at a quite similar reading, focused especially on Kant and 
Hegel as thinkers confronting and attempting to reconcile deep tensions bequeathed 
by the stand-off between the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Here the 
internalisation that Taylor claims began as a religious development is thought to take 
a more radically humanistic turn as humans set out on their own to resolve their inner 
conflicts. Both Kant and Hegel are seen as attempting to resolve the problem of the 
divided nature of human being by first understanding it as a dichotomy between 
subject and object and then bringing the shortcomings within the self into 
relationship (through reason or spirit) with a more idealised self. For Kant then, 
‘moral dignity’ is achieved by overcoming the phenomenal self under the 
compulsion of the moral will to be perfect -  or to strive to realise its noumenal self.
64 Taylor, Hegel, p. 24.
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For Hegel, finite spirit and the limitations of the objective world are overcome 
through a dialectical movement toward Absolute Spirit. Speaking about Kant’s 
concept of freedom as a form of inner “bondage”, Robert Tucker claims:
He maintains that practical reason compels man to form a picture of himself as a being o f  
godlike perfection and to regard this idealized person as his ‘real s e l f . . .  This hubris is the 
pathology of human selfhood. Man falsifies his identity as finite man when he arrogates to 
himself absolute attributes and powers...in his attempt to realise the unrealisable, he 
necessarily becomes divided in himself. His soul becomes the arena of a war between homo 
noumenon and homo phenomenon,65
A little later Tucker describes the same tendency toward self-divinisation in Hegel as
follows:
...The Kantian dichotomy... reappears in Hegelianism writ large as a dichotomy between 
noumenal world-self and phenomenal world-self. The division of Kantian man against 
himself in the quest for moral perfection has turned into spirit’s division against itself, or 
self-alienation. And just as Kant pictures the divided man as being at war with himself in the 
effort to eliminate the two selves, so Hegel represents self-alienated spirit as locked in 
conflict with itself: ‘Thus spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome itself as its most 
formidable obstacle. That development, which in the sphere of nature is a peaceful growth, is 
in that o f spirit, a severe, a mighty conflict with itself. What spirit really strives for is the 
realization of its ideal being.... Its expansion, therefore, does not present the harmless 
tranquillity of mere growth, as does that of organic life, but a stem reluctant working against 
i t s e lf .66
When this project of self-divinisation becomes the philosophical solution to internal 
division, we can readily grasp why Marx, in a letter to his father while still a student 
of Hegel, wrote: “If previously the gods dwelt above the earth, now they were at the 
centre of it.”67
As Tucker makes clear, there is already an acknowledgement of modem 
philosophical humanism as a form of ‘self-divinization’, if not explicitly by Kant or 
Hegel, certainly by Marx. Tucker sees such ‘self-divinization’ as negative, as 
‘pathological’, and Girard’s own reaction against ‘originality’ -  his account of how 
‘men become gods’ -  sits comfortably within this reading. However, there is another 
way of thinking of this whole philosophical development, which Taylor gives us: one
65 Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. 2nd Ed. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), p. 38.
66 Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, p. 50, internal quotation taken from Hegel’s Lectures 
on the Philosophy o f  History.
67Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, p. 73.
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that does not see pride as the dominant motif, but rather emphasizes instead the 
genuine concern to respond to the pressing need to reformulate the subject’s 
relationship to the world in face of rapidly changing socio-historical forces. While 
Taylor’s analysis of the eighteenth century does not minimise the significance of the 
‘divided self for modem thought, it does however stress the religious dimension of 
this struggle for unity. Thus, his analysis highlights not so much the various modem 
solutions to the problem of inner division (Kantian, Hegelian, Marxist etc.). Rather, it 
underscores the significance of the impulse towards wholeness or unity itself, which 
is understood as being in continuity with the Judeo-Christian religion, and from 
which arises all philosophical problematizing about ‘division’, as separation or 
alienation.
As we have seen, expressivism contained an inspiration to unity with nature 
that the atomising theories of the Enlightenment were thought to undermine. 
Objecdfied nature was experienced as an exile and, what is more, the demands for a 
whole, fully expressed life could not be satisfied with overcoming the Cartesian 
‘mind/body’ dualism. This desire for union between body and soul, thought and 
sense, that was in no way fulfilled by the self-possessed rational subject, could not 
stop at the limits of the body:
If I am not satisfied with myself as a mind confronting internal and external nature, but must 
think o f myself as life in which nature speaks through thought and will, if  therefore I as a 
subject am one with my body, then I have to take account of the fact that my body is in 
interchange with the greater nature outside. Nature knows no fixed boundaries at the limits of 
the body, and hence I as a subject must be in interchange with this greater nature.68
The desires of the subject cannot be purely individualistic. The subject is here
connected in a complex and intimate way with nature. If I am to be authentic, if my
feeling/vision of myself is to adequately express my true nature, my real existence,
then my feeling/vision has to go beyond the limits of myself to encompass the ‘great
68 Taylor, Hegel, p. 25.
2 0 2
current’ of life that somehow runs through me. And if there is to be unity in the self 
(which of course is essential to the Romantic spirit of the eighteenth century) then it 
is this ‘greater current’, not just my own bodily life, which has to be united with 
higher aspiration to freedom and expression. “Thus one of the central aspirations of 
the expressivist view was that man be united in communion with nature, that his self­
feeling (Selbstgefühl) unite with a sympathy (Mitgefühl) for all life, and for nature as 
living.”69
We can readily see how being connected in this way allows all our bodily 
feelings and experiences to take on greater significance. The subject as the locus of 
all possible unity and wholeness becomes crucial to our experience of the body and 
the natural world; this experience is different from an ‘objectified world of 
mechanical relations’. For the expressivist view and the Romantic Movement in 
general this latter scientific world could only be experienced as dead; as a place of 
exile, devoid of that universal sympathy which obtains between people.70 Against 
this alien world, nature is now seen as a great stream of life of which we are a vital 
part. Therefore, our way of contact, Taylor explains, is by sympathetic insertion into 
this stream, whereby we seek interchange with a larger life in a quest for unity and 
wholeness.
Much of the expressivist emphasis on unity was inspired by nostalgia for the 
pre-modem period, and in particular by the avowed fascination with classical Greece. 
To the thinkers of this age, the ancient Greeks represented a mode of life in which 
the highest human aspiration was at one with human nature and with all of nature. 
This mode of life was the perfect exemplar of the expressivist desire for union and 
communion. The Greek era, Taylor tells us, was one “of unity and harmony within
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid .
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man, in which thought and feeling, morality and sensibility were one, in which the 
form which man stamped on his life, whether moral, political or spiritual flowed 
from his own natural being, and was not imposed on it by the force of raw will.”71 
Behind this picture of Greek ‘unity and harmony’ we can, with hindsight, detect a 
deep division between a rarefied space and what was not considered worthy of 
inclusion. Equipped with our ethic of ‘dignity’ and ‘equality’, we must see this pure 
classical space as quite small and exclusive.72 However, what the expressivists did 
recognise in their aspirations for freedom and fulfilment was that in early Greek 
culture the great current of life in nature was not alien to the human spirit. On the 
contrary, nature “was inhabited by gods of human shape”, with whom humans
* • 73 •sustained communion, and who drew from them their highest feats.” So, while 
perhaps naive about the violence that pertained to the generative forces of Greek 
religion, the Romantics nonetheless recognised a truth in the unifying power of this 
form of expression.
Yet there was something else uneasy about the expressivists’ longing, since 
their much-valued new subjectivity, and the freedom that it brought, was won largely 
at the expense o f the unity of the old cosmic order to which the ‘Greek way’ was so 
intimately connected. The nostalgia for this ‘Greek way’ was therefore deeply 
fraught. The yearning personified by Schiller, among others, sang of a past when 
‘Life’s fullness flowed through creation’. But it also sang of the irretrievable loss as
71 Taylor, Hegel, p. 27.
72Indeed, Girard’s mimetic theory, and its explication of the role of generative scapegoating, reminds 
us o f the huge price o f ‘unity and harmony’ in ancient societies. “Even in fifth century Greece”, he 
claims, “ -  the Athens of the great tragedians -  human sacrifice had not, it seems, completely 
disappeared.” (Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 1984, p. 9). And to see how this unity was achieved 
and how intuitively the ‘generating spark of religion’ (Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 1984, p. 87) 
was understood, (Girard gives us many examples). In Chapter Two we discussed the function of 
tragedy that draws on the religious impulse, and outlined Girard’s analysis o f Oedipus and Pentheus 
as scapegoat figures.
73 Taylor, Hegel, p. 26.
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humans now stand before a ‘Godless nature’, a nature devoid of its generative force 
(it was this sense of loss of course that fuelled Romantic nostalgia).
Another characteristic of the expressivist movement related to its sense of 
communion with nature is its aspiration to brotherhood or communion with other 
human beings. The Enlightenment vision of society made up of atomistic, morally 
self-sufficient subjects provokes a sense of outrage among those who held to an 
expressivist view. This vision promotes the idea of a subject who enters into external 
relations with other subjects seeking either advantage (a la Locke), or the defence of 
individual rights (a la Kant). For the expressivists the connection between people has 
to run deeper, not least because it has to channel the great current of life. “They seek 
for a deeper bond of felt unity which will unite sympathy between men with their 
highest self-feeling, in which men’s highest concerns are shared and woven into 
community life rather than remaining the preserve of individuals.”74 This desire to 
unite in sympathy and be united in a common concern has had a powerful influence 
on the modem imagination, as the story of nationalism in the twentieth century can 
attest. For the expressivists it was an ideal inspired, once again, by the ancient Greek 
polis where the gods of the city and the gods of nature were two sides of the same 
coin, bringing together the fullest freedom with the deepest community life. Overall, 
the four demands -  for inner unity, freedom, and communion with others and with 
nature — reflect the aspirations of expressivist consciousness; and incorporating such 
a strongly felt need for integral expression -  a need once again met in the pantheistic 
culture of ancient Greece -  they gave the modem subject an unavoidably sacred 
character. However, it could not be guaranteed that the subject alone could find the 
resources to generate the much sought after unity.
74 Taylor, Hegel, p. 28.
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To the expressivist mix of fusion and creation Kant added an emphasis on the 
moral freedom of the subject -  a freedom that reinforced the subject’s self- 
possession while at the same time distancing her from her natural inclination. For the 
expressivists, Kantian autonomy, while compelling in its account of human freedom, 
merely reflected a more profound inner cleavage. Kant developed the idea that the 
individual should “draw his moral precepts out of his own will and not from any 
external source, be this God himself.”75 Yet, however much Kantian freedom might 
inspire individuals to buck external demands and received authority, it could not 
deliver on the much hoped for integral expression. To the contrary, because of its 
emphasis on the independent self-choosing subject, this radical freedom seemed 
possible only at the cost of a disjunction with nature. This disjuncture, as Taylor 
points out is
...a  division within myself between reason and sensibility more radical that anything the 
materialist, utilitarian Enlightenment had dreamed, and hence a division with external nature 
from whose causal laws the free self must be radically independent, even while 
phenomenally his behaviour appeared to conform.76
Here lie the seeds of modem existentialism: a break with external nature and all that 
it might entail for the individual. “The radically free subject was thrown back on 
himself, and it seemed on his individual self, in opposition to nature... and on to a
*77 * •decision in which others could have no share.” An individual’s ‘unique measure’ is 
not being expressed here through a self unfolding subject, or in the Kantian sense, by 
“submitting nature to law”, but rather was being exercised in and through an infinite
7o
choice, a choice that ultimately pitted the subject against the world.
The way of dealing with the aporia of radical freedom and integral 
expression that Taylor explores is not the existentialist way, but rather the way of
75 Taylor, Hegel, p. 30.
76 Taylor, Hegel, p. 33.
77 Ibid.
78 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 450.
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history -  where the highest challenge to historical reflection is to reconcile what is 
greatest in ancient and modem cultures. The paradigm of expressive perfection that 
many eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers found in ancient Greece was based 
on a belief that this classical period had achieved the most perfect unity between
7Qnature and the highest human expressive form. However, the price of the 
development of reason to that higher stage of self-clarity, which is essential to our 
realisation as radically free beings, was that this beautiful unity, which came so 
naturally to the early Greeks, had to die. And this was so because humans had to be
on *
inwardly divided in order to grow. The growth of reason and hence radical freedom 
required a disjunction from the natural and sensible. The “sacrifice” of primal Greek 
unity was necessary if humans were to develop to their fullest self-consciousness and 
free self-determination.81 For while there was no hope of a return to the lost beauty 
of Greece, there was hope of a higher synthesis once humans had developed their 
faculty of reason. “If the early Greek synthesis had been unreflective, and had to be, 
for reflection starts by dividing man within himself, then the new unity would fully 
incorporate the reflective consciousness gained, would indeed be brought about by 
this reflective consciousness.”82 This at least was the hope of reconciling the division 
that modem subjectivity both inaugurated and contained, and the primary tasks of 
thought and sensibility were seen as the overcoming of profound oppositions -  
oppositions between the two ideals of radical freedom and integral expression. In 
the end, Kantian autonomy does not overcome these oppositions but deeply 
exacerbates them. The only way for cosmic spirit to reach unity and wholeness was 
to somehow include a place for reason -  reason that is essentially divisive. And this
could only happen, as Hegel most fully grasped, if humans are seen as the vehicle of
•  •  84this spirit while still retaining their autonomy.
5. Religion and the History of Division
The Enlightenment insistence that nothing should be believed but what
reason licences failed to dispel the belief that religion is a source of unity as the early
Greek synthesis had amply demonstrated.85 A ‘religion of the people’ appeared
indispensable to the kind of unity that could restore an individual’s relationship with
nature and reconcile the opposites that so divided him, or her. For Hegel, the public
religions of ancient Greece provided an important model of Volksreligion. These
public religions were “an integral part of social life, inseparable from the other
• • * 86aspects of the city’s common existence, and essential to its identity.” In short, 
Hegel sought a regeneration through religion whereby one could achieve radical 
freedom while at the same time a wholeness of integral expression -  undivided. 
Following Rousseau’s rejection of the traditional hierarchy of preferences that obtain 
between human beings in a social context, and acknowledging the need for 
recognition that arises from our other dependence, Hegel saw the Greek festival as a 
way of affirming subjectivity and the current of life as somehow other than and yet 
integral to each other.87 Caring about myself in this context is compatible with 
freedom and social unity.88
84 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 48-49.
85 In his work on Hegel, Taylor shows how the Enlightenment in Germany was interwoven with 
religion and could never be contained in one of two opposed camps, as in France. Taylor, Hegel, p. 12.
86 Taylor, Hegel, p. 54.
87 By breaking with the older hierarchical view of the universe Rousseau is at the origin of a new 
discourse about honour and dignity. ‘T o the traditional ways o f thinking about honor and pride he 
adds a third, which is quite different. There was a discourse denouncing pride... which called on us to 
remove ourselves from the whole dimension o f human life and be utterly unconcerned with esteem. 
And then there was an ethic of honor, frankly nonuniversalist and inegalitarian... Rousseau borrows 
the denunciation o f the first discourse but he doesn’t end up calling for a renunciation of all concern 
with esteem. On the contrary, in his portrait of the republican model, caring about esteem is central.
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According to Taylor, in order for religion to achieve Hegel’s aims it must be 
fully subjectivised “...that is, it must be more than an external allegiance to certain 
doctrines and practices, and become a living piety in order to unite man within 
himself: and it must be more than the religion of some individuals, it must be woven 
into the life of the people, and linked with reformed political institutions if it is to
O Q
unite men with each other.” Here the Enlightenment picture of the human is not 
rejected but integrated into a larger vision where reason and sensibility are not 
opposed. Hegel’s requirements for regeneration thus meet the requirements of a 
Volksreligion such as the Greeks enjoyed. However, Taylor tells us that Hegel is very 
much concerned with understanding and expressing this regeneration in Christian 
terms. To this end Hegel becomes preoccupied with the distinction between ‘pure’ or 
‘natural’ religion and ‘positive’ religion that the teaching of Jesus and its subsequent 
distortions make clear. Taylor tells us that in his essay, The Positivity o f the Christian 
Religion, Hegel sets out to explain what happened to the religion of Jesus so that it 
‘degenerated into present-day Christianity’ with the original emphasis on the integral 
movement of the heart replaced by rules and dry formulae. A ‘positive’ religion is 
grounded on authority rather than postulated by our own reason directed by our heart 
and supplemented by the forms our devotion takes.90
The sad truth of Christianity is that it was forced to become a positive 
religion. Jesus’ teachings could not reach a generation of people oriented so much to 
the law and command. So Jesus was forced to rely on the messiah myth and to give
What is wrong with pride or honor is its striving after preferences, hence division, hence real other- 
dependence, and therefore loss of the voice of nature, and consequently corruption... The remedy is 
not rejecting the importance o f esteem, but entering into a quite different system, characterised by 
equality, reciprocity and unity of purpose”. Charles Taylor, “The Politics o f Recognition”, in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994). p. 49.
88 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  
Recognition, p. 48.
89 Taylor, Hegel, p. 55.
90 Taylor, Hegel, p. 55.
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this myth a higher sense.91 The result was ultimately that the followers who were 
unable to live up to the standard of the heart, who were incapable of living the full 
unity of reason and will preached yet another positive religion founded on belief in
Q-J
Christ, rather than a recovery of God’s will in one’s own heart.
While preserving the original teaching of Jesus, this religion did not meet the 
requirements of a regenerated Volksreligion. For one thing, the unity between 
autonomy and wholeness is still unattainable by anyone but the man-god. Worse, not 
only does this ideal become external (a Christ to whom men pray, or an after-life 
beyond this world) but, as Taylor points out: “[t]he sense of separation and 
inadequacy is all the crueller in that the ideal is higher than its predecessors, not just 
compliance with the law of external observances, but a purity of intention, against 
which men must sense uncleanness of the heart, a vice of the will.” The perfect 
example of a natural religion that combines a radical freedom and integral expression 
must now somehow recover this ‘unclean heart’ and ‘corrupt will’ and in an act of 
transformation reach a higher standard of intention. All this appears too tall an order. 
Hegel’s reflections on the problem give rise in to the theme of the ‘unhappy 
consciousness’. Once we grasp the original teaching of Jesus, Christianity becomes a 
failed religion -  a realisation made all the more dramatic by the fact that Jesus had to 
die, so unprepared was the world to hear his message.94
As a result of this failure we find a sadness at the heart of the new religion 
that, Taylor claims, did not attend the earlier Volksreligion. “Already this [failure] 
marks the subsequent life of Christianity with a certain melancholy, that at the centre 
of its worship is the Crucified One, and this starkly contrasts with Greek religion in
91 Taylor, Hegel, p. 57.
92 Ibid.
which the divine is woven into the self-affirmation of the community”.95 What was a 
celebration for the older pagan religions becomes a source of profound sadness for 
the Judeo-Christian faith.96 Girard unlike Hegel describes this sadness as a failure to 
properly unite around the victim.97 However, Hegel does suggest that this 
melancholy could be further understood as arising from the deep division that 
Christianity was meant to heal, i.e. - between radical freedom and integral 
expression. In The Spirit o f Christianity and I t’s Fate, Hegel discusses his paradigm 
of the original ‘unhappy consciousness’ - the religion of the Jews as founded by 
Abraham. Taylor tells us that for Hegel ‘separation from’ and ‘domination o f  nature 
were defining features of this religion from the beginning. With the sacrifice of Isaac, 
Abraham tore himself loose from the original unity with nature and with his tribe. 
“Nature became for him so much neutral matter, which could not be united with
n o
spirit but rather had to be dominated by it.”
Taylor claims that Hegel interprets the spirit of Abraham as a spirit of 
‘objectification’ and ‘disenchantment’ that -  as already discussed in relation to 
Enlightenment reason - divides humans internally and externally. This divisive spirit 
of ‘separation’ and ‘domination’ ceased to see nature as “an embodiment of sacred or 
spiritual order in relation to which man must define himself, and came to be seen as 
raw material to be shaped by human will.”99 Here Taylor takes issue with Hegel 
regarding the source of this objectification. While Hegel sees it as belonging properly
95 Ibid.
96 Heget develops the idea of the ‘unhappy counsciousness’ as something also experienced by spirit 
when it encounters the objective world. “In its confrontation with an apparent object, spirit feels 
imprisoned in limitation. It experiences what Hegel calls the ‘sorrow of finitude’.” Tucker, Philosophy 
and Myth, p. 53, internal quotation taken from H egel’s Science o f  Logic.
97 For Girard, the melancholy of Christianity arises from the unavoidable innocence o f the victim, 
whereas the ‘self-affirmation’ of the Greek religion was bought at the expense o f the victim - the one 
deemed guilty. Hence, Girard too sees Christianity as a ‘failed religion’, but unlike Hegel’s account 
this is its triumph since it provides all cultures with a way out o f  violent mimesis and the human 
tendency to unite around a victim. Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 141-179.
98 Taylor, Hegel, p. 58.
99 Taylor, Hegel, p. 58.
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to Judaism, Taylor argues it is more accurately viewed from a historical perspective 
as characteristically Christian.100 According to Taylor, by seeing the essential 
connection in this objectification between separation from and domination of nature, 
Hegel is ‘projecting one of the central strands of modem consciousness back onto the 
father of the Jewish faith’.101 In effect, the division between ‘radical freedom’ and 
‘integral expression’ comes to have a religious character very different from the 
shining example of the Greeks. In the Greek model, religion -  when properly woven 
into the life of the city -  is responsible for creating only unity. The religion of the 
Jews on the other hand is seen as a source of division that comes to have an 
important resonance for the individual’s relationship to the world in the modem 
period.
While Taylor is careful to point out that Hegel’s analysis may not be 
historically accurate he does not disagree with Hegel’s essential argument, namely 
that the division is a religious one. He simply relocates the significant moment of 
‘religious division’ onto Christianity. Regarding Hegel’s projecting back ‘too far’ 
(and recalling his own analysis of the affirmation of ordinary life that we have 
already met) Taylor writes: “Historically this is hard to sustain; but if I am right in 
holding that Christianity and particularly its Calvinist form had an important role in 
the forming of the modem consciousness of objectification, Hegel’s thesis here may 
be insightful even if  misplaced". The difference between the two thinkers as to the 
source of the objectification and disenchantment becomes significant when we 
consider, as we already have, Taylor’s philosophical history in Sources o f the Self 
The radical reflexivity that comes to play a defining role in the early modem period,
100 Girard also claims that the spirit o f Christianity is ‘divisive’. He quotes Matthew’s gospel, “Don’t 
think I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace but a sword”. René Girard, I 
See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans. James G. Williams (Mary Knoll: Orbis Books, 2002), p. 159.
101 Taylor, Hegel, p. 58.
1CG Ibid, (my italics).
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as a new mode of inwardness that values ordinary life, is central to Taylor’s 
argument concerning modem freedom; for it suggests that the divisions within the 
self are driven, at least in part, by an incamational mode of life whose primary 
inspiration is the Christian gospels. Abraham’s sacrifice may be understood as the 
source of a break with nature and a clinging to God, but its occurrence is still very 
much within an externally ordered social world. In anthropological and historical 
terms, Abraham’s ‘break’, while radical, does not fundamentally challenge the law of 
sacrifice that permits the community to bond as a community (a people), and to re­
establish difference at the expense of a victim. Thus, modem objectification becomes 
sacrifice by another name, whereby even the innerworldly asceticism of the Puritan 
(the ‘putting under foot’) can be seen to reflect the older Abrahamic adherence to the 
law.
Taylor claims that Hegel more or less made the same point about Christianity 
overcoming the older forms of division with respect to human beings and nature, and 
thereby becoming an ‘agent of disenchantment’. He quotes Hegel: “Christianity has 
depopulated Valhalla, hewn down the sacred groves and rooted out the phantasy of 
the people as shameful superstition, as a diabolical poison.”103 Of course for Taylor 
this is not a secondary point - and cannot be if his intuitions about inwardness and 
ordinary life are to have currency. Hegel thus understands Christianity as having an 
anthropological and historical import by generating in individuals a greater sense of 
independence and self-possession in a life generated by the internal law of the heart 
rather than the external ‘positive’ law of command.104 Hegel’s comments above
103 Taylor, Hegel, p. 58. Here Taylor is quoting from: H. Nohl (Ed), Hegel’s, Theologische 
Jugendsch rif ten
104 Reading disenchantment as a form of division, and separation from the sacred, also helps explain 
why Taylor does not reduce Weber’s analysis o f  the modem world to a ‘knee-jerk’ atheism that 
equates the loss o f religion with the loss of metaphysics -  what Girard refers to as “the loss o f the 
suprasensible in the Platonic sense.” Girard, The Girard Reader, p. 259.
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suggest that he shares with Girard a similar insight into religion. With deference to 
Girard’s hermeneutical key, however, we might say that Jesus does not so much 
“root out the poison” as expose the whole process of ‘rooting out poison’ as no more 
than scapegoating -  an exposure achieved only by his own subjection to this process, 
by his own willing assumption of the scapegoat-victim role.105 Thus the failure of 
sacred violence to generate a cleansing unity, which Jesus’ life and death expose 
once and for all, can be understood to propel the whole notion of modem 
disenchantment. In this way the flattening of hierarchies for Girard becomes 
synonymous with a ‘sacrificial crisis’, while for Hegel it becomes synonymous with 
a form of expression and self-realisation that can meet the requirements of radical 
freedom and integral expression through the self-conscious regeneration of order.106
6. Division and the Unity of Life: ‘Unanimity Plus One’
Religious developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provide 
the impetus for a variety of ways of rethinking the order inherent in nature. Whereas 
previously the good was conceived in terms of a hierarchically ordered universe, by 
the eighteenth century it comes to us quite naturally if we can only somehow reach 
beyond the illusions of socially induced pride and make contact with its ‘inner
105 That the ‘phantasy of the people’ is ‘rooted out’ as a ‘diabolical poison’ reflects Girard’s comments 
on the pharmakon, which he articulates in terms o f sacred violence. With respect to this old Greek 
festival it is explained in Violence and the Sacred that the poison is part o f the cure in the same way 
that pure violence protects against impure violence in ritual sacrifice. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 
pp. 288, 296,297.
The hierarchy that Hegel introduces is not based on an ontic order, or a purely ‘anthropological’ 
notion o f degree. It is more horizontal than these formulae, which are both characterised by vertical 
succession. However, Taylor argues that Hegelian hierarchy is also historical and temporal: ‘The 
general structure of the universe... is thus determined by virtue of its being the embodiment and 
expression of Geist. It includes a hierarchy of beings from the lowest inanimate forms through various 
kinds of living species to man. And then o f course, for the realisation o f Geist, man has to develop... 
So that there is also a hierarchy of cultural forms and modes o f consciousness which succeed each 
other in time and make up human history.” Taylor, Hegel, p. 91. See also: Arthur O. Lovejoy, “The 
Temporalization of the Great Chain”, in The Great Chain o f  Being: A Study in the History o f an Idea 
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965).
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voice’. Rousseau is an important hinge figure in the transition to modernity because 
of the way he maintains a ‘two-loves’ view of nature, and hence a theory of how 
human nature can be deceived and even depraved. However, because of the essential 
goodness of nature the Romantic individual’s turn inward can be construed not as a 
separation in the manner of Girard’s literary hero, but rather as a form of genuine 
connection to the great current of life -  the basis of an identity that is both individual 
and social.107 Herder develops the notion that each individual or people has his or her 
own unique way of being that is to be discovered, clarified and made determinate, in 
the actual process of its own unfolding and so cannot be determined beforehand, for 
example by the requirements of a hierarchically ordered universe. The more those 
influenced by Herder confront the need for integral expression and the historical 
conditions of their separateness (the radical freedom so valued by Kantians) the more 
impossible seems the task of unification. It is precisely to this fundamental aporia 
that Hegel responds, and provides something of a solution.
Hegel’s turn to Judaeo-Christian religion was not meant simply as an 
allegorical device to help articulate his philosophical system, but actually provides
1 D Rthe anthropological basis for the working out of his theory of master and slave. By 
breaking with nature and his tribe, Abraham clung to God in servitude and, in return, 
God put nature at human being’s disposal. The ‘unhappy consciousness’ is the 
consciousness of this break in which unity and mutuality is replaced by domination 
and servitude -  “between man and nature, nature and spirit, and ultimately also 
between man and man.”109 As already mentioned, the religion of Jesus, which 
emphasised a movement of the heart, was replaced by another ‘positive’ religion
107 Taylor, “The Politics o f Recognition”, p. 49.
108 While Girard’s ‘original scene’, like Freud’s, is based on the violence of ‘all against one’, Hegel’s 
‘original scene’ is based on the violence of ‘one against one’. Hobbes, another main ‘scenic’ thinker, 
suggests the primary threat is ‘all against all’, which is perhaps the first phase in the Girardian scene.
109 Taylor, Hegel, p. 59.
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based on law and command. The result was that the primary movement of Jesus’ 
disciples became that of retreat, of turning inward.110 In this movement, we might 
argue, Augustine and Dostoyevsky (in their somewhat different ways) excel.
Taylor shows how Hegel comes to see the initial break with nature and 
attempted reconciliation through Jesus in the context of the Kantian ideal of moral 
autonomy and the aspiration to expressive unity. However, from early on, Hegel 
refuses to accept the separation of morality and inclination that was central to Kant’s 
position. With his more anthropological account of religion, he comes to see that this 
separation was inevitable, and in many ways culminates in Kantian autonomy with 
its division between duty and desire. Taylor describes this realisation by Hegel as 
follows: “Against the Kantian separation of duty and desire, Hegel sees Jesus’ vision 
of their union, in which the spirit of their reconciliation... replaces, goes beyond and 
hence fulfils the law with its particular measured prescriptions.”111 This presents a 
strong case against those like Tucker (and of course Girard) who, as we saw at the 
beginning of the last section, argue that Hegel’s development on the Kantian theme 
of ‘inner division’ is just a bolder form of self-divinisation. Taylor’s account allows 
us to see this development as one that attempts to fulfil the requirements of freedom 
-  as the very essence of Christianity.
By contrast with a religion based on love - as a union of opposites -  Kantian 
morality remains one of division, and what is perhaps worse, despite its claims to the 
contrary, it retains an “indistinguishable residue of positivity.”112 However, rather 
than being dominated by a master outside ourselves -  through rules and commands 
etc. -  we are now dominated by a master within: we become slaves to the rational 
moral law. Against this division created by Kantian autonomy, “Hegel holds
110 Ibid.
111 Taylor, Hegel, p. 60.
112 Ibid.
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fundamentally to the expressivist view of nature: the self is the inner single source 
which expresses itself in the unfolding of reason and inclination alike. Thus the 
imposition of an alien law on one of these sides of our being is a kind of (partial) 
slavery.”113 This analysis of Kantian morality, according to Taylor, fits with Hegel’s 
discussion of Abraham and how his separation from nature cannot but lead to 
relations of domination and servitude. With this morality we now become masters of 
inclination and servants of reason, whereas before we were masters of nature and 
servants of God. Thus, the Kantian moral individual is the successor of Abraham 
who (in Taylor’s words) “internalizes his jealous law-giving God and calls him 
reason.”
The unity of life, the precious goal of Romantic expressivism, is near 
impossible to achieve under the rule of law - external or internal. Positivity, 
separation, and objectification remain persistent yet apparently necessary obstacles in 
our search for the full unity of integral expression. This unity encompassing our 
actions and what befalls us in history is captures by Hegel’s notion of ‘fate’, 
understood as “the reaction unto us of our own trespass against life.”114 To sin 
against life is to separate and divide the living whole within and between humans, or 
between humans and nature. Like the Eastern notion of ‘karma’, or indeed the Greek 
notion of ‘nemesis’, it is to call down a certain fate upon the sinner. For Hegel, to see 
this, that is, to see fate as the other side of our act, is to see the possibility of 
reconciliation by ceasing to act in ways that divide. To act in this reconciling way, is 
to act out of love, as Jesus did.
However, according to Taylor, Jesus does not, in the end, provide the model 
of the perfect religion for Hegel - namely a teaching that can transcend the
113 Ibid.
114 Taylor, Hegel, p. 61.
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limitations of autonomy, and combine radical freedom with integral expression, 
because Jesus does not ultimately escape fate (this is the very reason for the 
melancholia, as already noted, which at least for Hegel is inextricable from 
Christianity). “Fate can catch even the innocent who is drawn into transgression 
against his will. Suppose I am attacked, and I have to fight for my life or let injustice 
be done. In either case I must transgress against the unity of life, by what I do or 
what I suffer.”115 In one sense then Hegel interprets Jesus’ fate as a transgression 
against the unity of life. In another sense Jesus dies willingly in order not to be 
divided from others, and hence from love.
Despite the ambiguity that Taylor highlights here in Hegel’s account of Jesus’ 
death, what is revealing, in terms of our conversation with Girardian theory, is the 
way fate is used to explain how an innocent person can die and how his death can be 
justified in relation to ‘the unity of life’. Fate was of course notorious for cutting 
down Greek heroes -  heroes who were never truly ‘innocent’, who always suffered 
from some ‘tragic’ flaw that would justify the ‘revenge of the gods’: their murder, or 
expulsion from the polis. If, as Girard claims, Jesus is a scapegoat, the victim of his 
people, like Job before him,116 then the community depends on his guilt, because it is 
the very guilt of the victim that allows the community to form as a community (the 
unity of the community is always divided -  it is always unanimity minus one). As we 
have seen, according to Girard, the only thing that can restore unity when a violent 
crisis escalates is the scapegoat mechanism -  a process that requires the ‘unanimous 
guilt’ of the victim. If Jesus does appear to transgress against ‘unity’, as Hegel 
suggests, then following Girard we can assert that he ‘transgresses’ rather against the 
unanimity that is always generated at the expense of the surrogate victim -  the one
115 Taylor, Hegel, p. 62 (my italics).
1,6 René Girard, Job: A Victim o f His People, trans. Yvonne Freccero (London: Athlone, 1987).
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who, relative to the collective ‘sin’, Girard tells us, is always innocent. Hence Jesus 
acts for the sake of authentic unity, even though fate ‘catches him’ the way fate has 
caught every victim ‘since the foundation of the world’ - through an act of collective 
violence.117
Perhaps, in the end, it is Hegel’s model of Jesus that is flawed. But we can 
nonetheless begin to see how a theory of sacred violence as a form of ‘unity’ (as 
unanimity) that is itself a ‘division’, can be understood within the context of the 
eighteenth century search for the wholeness of integral expression. Separation no 
longer needs to be simply managed with a binding inner law as in the Kantian ideal. 
For Hegel it is rather to be overcome through the self-positing nature of spirit, of 
spirit’s own desire to know itself. If we accept Taylor’s argument concerning a 
religiously inspired internalisation of moral sources, then it is a short step to 
acknowledging why the problem of division and unity might become paramount for 
the subject. It is after all a problem implicit in the socio-cultural world, which 
according to Hegel finds its early expression in Abraham’s break with nature. It does 
not take too much further speculation, helped by Girardian theory, to see this 
archetypal separation as having its anthropological bearing in sacrifice, or in 
collective murder and scapegoating, a point implicit in the Hegelian dialectic. The
117 Describing how the ‘tragic flaw’ functions in Greek drama, as a ‘shadowy similitude’ of religious 
experience, Girard says, the hero “must be neither wholly good nor wholly bad. A certain degree of 
goodness is required in a tragic hero in order to establish sympathy between him and the audience; yet 
a certain degree of weakness, a ‘tragic flaw’ is needed, to neutralise the goodness and permit the 
audience to tolerate the hero’s downfall and death”. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 291. Fate like 
‘chance’ in primitive ritual is a way o f unburdening the community from the consequences o f what 
happens next. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 312-314.
118 While Hegel does not posit a ‘founding event’ as Girard does, and arguably justifies violence by 
making conflict necessary -  as if human beings are God’s scapegoats (His means of becoming whole) 
-  we do find in Hegel a preoccupation with sacrifice as somehow efficacious. “Itself is its own object 
of attainment and the sole aim o f spirit. This result it is, at which the process o f the world’s history has 
been continually aiming; and to which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar 
of the earth, through the long lapses of ages, have been offered.” Quoted in Tucker, Philosophy and 
Myth in Karl Marx. p. 48. Reflecting a more nuanced view o f Hegel on sacrifice, Taylor writes:
“From the very beginning...Hegel does not take up the standpoint o f the more austere Enlightenment 
about religion, that nothing can be believed but what reason licences. He does indeed condemn
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Romantic divisions of Girard’s early work and the community’s separation from a 
part of itself through scapegoating in his later work bespeak a very ‘Hegelian’ 
problem.
The persistent yet mistaken belief in one’s own ‘uniqueness’, Girard claims, 
is responsible for self-divinisation and all the historical and human ‘developments’ 
that flow from this concealed desire to be God. However, as we saw above, 
following Herder, the subject as unique and original is the paradigm for the 
expressivists -  in this view it could never be the case that the subject’s identity was 
simply his own, since it was also an integral expression of the whole. Subjectivity 
may indeed divide us and separate us, but at a higher level it was thought to also 
generate a greater unity. If ‘uniqueness’ is the ‘mechanism’ of division (which is 
how it appears in Girard’s literary criticism), might it not rather be understood as the 
source of unity in line with Girard’s later work? In other words, in and through the 
community’s initial coming together and separation (unanimity minus one), is there 
not an implicit identity with the one set apart, the surrogate victim (the source of a 
unanimity plus one)?
7. Conclusion: A Post-Romantic Vision
Both Girard and Taylor place Christianity at the heart of modem division, 
‘disenchantment’ and ‘objectification’ and yet, as we have seen, they both hold quite 
different views on how this crisis should be understood. Girard believes that 
differences belong to the community through original violence; disenchantment 
erodes the externally mediated ‘degree’ of difference because it flattens hierarchies
superstition, where men act in order to bring about a response from the supernatural, say, sacrifice in 
order to placate an angry God. But he is far from holding that sacrifice has no place in a purified 
religion if  it is done... as an expression of dependence on God, rather than a means o f avoiding 
punishment (as Hegel rather unrealistically saw Greek sacrifice).” Taylor, Hegel, p. 54.
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and sends the individual into himself, where degree cannot be maintained simply 
because the individual lacks the cathartic resources to re-inscribe these differences in 
an efficacious manner. Hence, “‘Individualisation’ marks a later, decadent stage in 
[sacrifices’] evolution, a development contrary to its original impulse.”119 Taylor 
argues in a different vein entirely. His preoccupation is with the philosophical 
developments in western culture, covering a shorter time-span than Girard -  from 
early Greek to Christian, to modem, and then to contemporary periods -  and giving 
primacy to the depth of human experience. These developments he claims have 
brought about a massive shift in the notion of a constitutive good, an internalisation 
of moral sources based largely on the Protestant affirmation of ordinary life, and 
subsequently a new and important role for sentiment that gets taken up by the 
Romantics and articulated as the voice of nature within.
The tensions that I outlined above, arising from the ideals of freedom and 
expression, are the same tensions that Taylor articulates in Sources. The division at 
the heart of modem freedom -  a liberating form of independence at odds with an 
impulse towards unity and wholeness -  is the same division that leaves the modem 
subject in Sources ‘constitutionally in tension’.120 To follow the way of rational 
control, for which Kant provides the moral template, is to adopt a stance of 
disengagement from one’s own nature and feelings. This in turn impedes the exercise 
of the creative imagination - so essential for full expression. Kant, as the modem 
Abraham who “internalises his jealous law-giving god and calls him reason”, 
becomes emblematic of this conflict and division. When understood historically and 
culturally it seems that division is indissociable from any concept of identity or unity 
-  because once we begin to reflect (on our experience, our relationships etc.) we are
119 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 101.
120 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 390.
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already divided. Whether ultimately grounded in the self or the community, absolute 
unity is predicated on separation, as Hegel acknowledges. We can perhaps now see 
more clearly that ‘division and unity’ are written into the modem subject from its 
inception. The individual, as separate, is both apart from  and a part o f the whole. 
This insight finds peculiar anthropological expression in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, and gains a positive shape in the modem period with the affirmation of 
ordinary life. However, as religious horizons begin to fade, the subject’s unifying 
power is increasingly revealed, and not without problems.
The critical aspect of the revolution that took shape in the European 
imagination was a new mode of inwardness that wanted to include the demands of 
disengaged rational control and integral powers of expression. Arising out of the 
early modem disputes that rejected the hierarchical view of nature is a view of inner 
nature, made potent by the expressivist idea of articulation: the inner domain of the 
self can now be construed as having depth, that is, reaching further than we can ever 
articulate.121 Comparing this new domain to what was previously available, Taylor 
writes:
That examining the soul should involve the exploration of a vast domain is not, of course, a 
new idea. The Platonic tradition would concur. But this domain is not an inner one. To 
understand the soul, we are led to contemplate the order in which it is set, the public order of 
things. What is new in the post-expressivist era is that the domain is within, that is, it is only 
open to a mode of exploration which involves the first-person stance. That is what it means 
to define the voice or impulse as ‘inner’.122
Up until the eighteenth century the subject that had emerged from the religious
developments of the sixteenth century in opposition to the traditional view of cosmic
order, was largely defined by disengaged rational control. From the eighteenth
century on, according to Taylor, the modem subject is no longer defined by just these
powers of instrumental reasoning, but by the new power of self-articulation as well -
121 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 389.
122 Ibid.
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the power which has been ascribed since the Romantic period to the creative 
imagination.
Rousseau reminds us that being in touch with ourselves, our ‘inner nature’, 
can involve illusion -  it can involve a misshaping by the pride and false images that 
come from the social world but eventually became anchored in the self. His attempt 
to break with the older hierarchical system of ‘preferences’ makes him an important 
hinge figure for Taylor, between the traditional ‘honour’ system and the modem 
system of ‘dignity’.123 The key point here for Taylor is that, while having a socially 
derived identity is no longer an option, the need for recognition by others of one’s 
identity still persists. The difference today is that the fulfilment of this need is no 
longer guaranteed by social categories that everyone takes for granted, categories 
whose meaning is still inscribed within a larger cosmic order.124 Selfhood has a 
moral significance for Taylor precisely because of what is at stake in having an 
identity today. While ‘the means’ of expressing it may be subjective, ‘the matter’ -  
what it is about -  is tied to the very process of generating meaningful categories that 
can help replace the significances that were once embedded in a public order of 
reference.125
Exploring the depths of our being need no longer lead us to God, as it did 
with Augustine. By the mid nineteenth century a preoccupation with the current of 
life in the modem period brings a new danger. To the extent that we are taken 
beyond ourselves in this exploration it is to the larger nature from which we 
emerged. This nature, while contactable through ‘the voice within’, cannot offer us a
123 Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, p. 49.
124 “...inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn’t enjoy this recognition a priori. It has to win 
it through exchange, and the attempt can fail. What has come about with the modem age is not the 
need for recognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognised can fail” Taylor, “The 
Polities of Recognition”, p. 34.
125 Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity, pp. 81- 82.
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higher view of ourselves.126 With the advances in modem science (evolutionary 
theory, micro biology, astronomy) that make any special place for humans in the 
universe ever more questionable, the voice of nature becomes correspondingly 
uncertain. Our inner sentiments, which thinkers from the moral sense theorists to the 
Romantic expressivists believed could provide us with a moral compass to help us 
navigate in an essentially corrupt social world, cease to be trustworthy.
Beginning with Schopenhauerian ‘Will’, the Romantic ‘voice of nature’, and 
the notion of ‘inner depths’, becomes emptied of its ‘idealized content’.127 By the late 
nineteenth century our inner depths are seen as amoral and impossible to measure. 
They amount to no more than a ‘blind will’ that is indifferent to our basic concerns 
for happiness and the preservation of life. A master image of this new sense of the 
human condition is found in Joseph Conrad’s, Heart o f Darkness, when Marlow sees 
the natives for the first time:
The earth seemed unearthly. We are accustomed to look upon the shackled form of a 
conquered monster, but there you could look at a thing monstrous and free. It was unearthly, 
and the men were - No, they were not inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it, - 
this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would come slowly on one. They howled and 
leaped and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the thought o f their 
humanity - like yours - the thought o f  your remote kinship with this wild and passionate 
uproar. Ugly. Yes it was ugly enough; but if  you were man enough you would admit to 
yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace o f a response to that terrible noise, a dim 
suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you- you so remote from the night of first ages 
- could comprehend. And why not?... What was there after all? Joy, fear, sorrow, valour, 
rage - who can tell? - but truth -  truth stripped of its cloak of time.128
This passage, which Taylor quotes, illustrates the shadow side of the modem story.
In a pre-modem world, religion provides a reliable means of transcendence, whereby
certain actions can be deemed good, noble, virtuous etc. The instruments of the
Church, informed by religious doctrines, can protect and renew the congregation of
faith. However, within the new modem landscape brought about by ‘science and
126 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 390.
127 Eagleon, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, p. 160.
128 Joseph Conrad, Heart o f  Darkness and the Secret Sharer (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), p. 51.
129 Taylor, Sources o f the Self p. 417.
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progress’, the very act of transcendence, that was an unquestioned good in Christian 
Europe, is opened to the same scrutiny as archaic religion, a scrutiny prompted by 
our “remote kinship” with more primordial forms of transcendence.
What Conrad confronts us with, according to Taylor, is a radically post- 
Romantic vision, one that no longer sees nature as a source of goodness, but rather as 
the source of ‘a wild and passionate uproar’ that finds its purest expression in homo 
religiosus. It has one overriding consequence for our ‘all too human’ nature that is 
powerfully formulated by Nietzsche in his concept of the will to power: we cannot 
escape it’s meaning for us, however dark and unimaginable. What began as a 
religious affirmation of ordinary life in the sixteenth century -  one that maintained a 
central place for the good -  had by the early twentieth century followed 
internalization to its ultimate conclusions. Thus, this ‘affirmation’ unmoors itself 
from any concept of the good beyond the subject, only to find its human powers 
struggling on the edge of an abyss. How does the self proceed in a post-Romantic 
age when the inner depth of the creative imagination -  our contact with nature as a 
reliable source -  is so thoroughly cast in doubt? This question is equally relevant to 
Taylor’s own work and how he attempts to recover a historical self. How he goes 
about answering this question perhaps is the defining move that allows him to 
respond positively to Girard’s anti-subjectivism. The problem posed here for Taylor 
has to do with the way the self in the modem period can avoid the stance of pure 
objectivity and rational control, while remaining sufficiently connected or attuned to 
others and to the world so as to have a meaningful identity-maintaining life. 
Expression remains for him an indispensable condition of selfhood, even though our 
modem sources are not wholly reliable after the ‘Schopenhauerian turn'. However, 
despite if not because of the transformations in modem culture, Taylor is a
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philosopher of the good. The modem subject, in being radically resituated in relation 
to her moral sources, may be left in uncertain waters with no possibility of returning 
to the warm gulf stream, or to the peculiar comfort of a dry and ordered 
topographical landscape. But there is nonetheless a potential to shape the horizon 
within which one finds oneself and hence to see beyond the danger. The quest is still 
open. While we may no longer have completely reliable maps to navigate, and while 
the future may be as much an act of will as a fact of circumstance, Taylor thinks 
there is still hope for the self. It is to his reasons for this hope that I now turn in the 
next, final chapter.
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Chapter 6
Crisis and Unity in Moral Space 
(Selfhood, Sacrifice, and the Good)
From the very beginning of the human story religion, our link with the highest, has 
been recurrently associated with sacrifice, even mutilation, as though something of 
us has to be tom away or immolated if we are to please the gods.1
- Charles Taylor
In many cultures, [the] sense of the special importance of the human being is 
encapsulated in religious and cosmological outlooks, and connected views of social 
life, which turn it in directions antithetical to modem rights doctrine. Part of what is 
special about humans is that they are proper food for the gods; or that they embody 
cosmic principles differently between men and women... The rights doctrine 
presents human importance in a radical form, one that is hard to gainsay. This 
affirmation can be taken on several levels. Just empirically there seems to be 
something to it, although establishing this is not just a matter of counting heads, but 
of making a plausible interpretation of human history.2
- Charles Taylor
1. Introduction
At the end of Sources o f the Self having mapped the conflicts at the heart of 
modem freedom, Taylor confronts a fundamental problem at the heart of the human 
story. Traditionally, humans managed to survive only within a religious world view, 
and this worldview revealed very early the price of such survival -  some significant 
element of human sacrifice -  a price that perhaps we have no good grounds to 
suppose will cease to be exacted even when we have made the transition to a post­
religious worldview.3 Taylor’s insight in the first quotation, into the price of human
1 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 519
2 Taylor, ‘Explanation and Practical Reason’, in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), p. 56.
3 Derrida confronts the problem of sacrifice from a philosophical perspective in his book The Gift o f  
Death. Also in his essay “Faith and Knowledge” he refers to the crisis o f  thought and decision in the 
context of sacrifice, as involving a ‘price that is priceless’. J Derrida, in Religion, eds., J. Derrida and 
Gianni Vattimo, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), p. 51. While Derrida highlights the impossibility of  
deciding in situations that include the trace of religious violence, and hence making transitions 
(between self and other, or even historically from past to present to future), Taylor highlights the
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culture and community, reveals his concern with the forces of religious violence. 
Something in the very constitution of the human condition suggests that we are 
separated from ourselves, for better and for worse. Arising from this, both thinkers 
also share a belief that modem culture rightly reacts against more traditional forms of 
transcendence that do violence to marginal individuals and or groups. And, 
somewhat surprisingly, they both agree that this reaction relies on a universalist 
assumption about the source of our concern for others, albeit an assumption that is 
often left unarticulated. For, as they both see it, secular culture opposes traditional 
forms of transcendence, while at the same time drawing inspiration from the older 
moral and spiritual sources.4 However, as I argued in chapter four, Taylor, unlike 
Girard, believes that there is a real moral basis to modem culture, although 
articulating its significance is increasingly difficult. His philosophical history 
highlights how an internalisation of the good first becomes radical around the 
sixteenth century, and helps to bring about a transformation in values from a
hierarchically ordered world, where the supreme good was very much beyond this
life, to an order that centred on the individual, thereby giving him or her greater 
scope to define what the good actually consists in.
But Taylor’s story is not by any means an entirely positive one for the
individual. What comes about with the loss of the older ‘well-ordered’ world is a 
form of ‘atomism’,5 not because the individual chooses to live solipsisticly, without
albeit fraught possibility, o f making such decisions/transitions -  non-violently -  through interpretation 
and narrative.
4 Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p. 104. From Girard’s point o f view modem atheism and talk of 
the ‘death of God’ are simultaneously correct and naïve. ‘What is in fact dying’ Girard tells us, ‘is the 
sacrificial concept of divinity preserved by medieval and modem theology.’ Girard, Things Hidden, 
135. Atheism, he believes, is correct in opposing, for the most part, the God of transcendent violence, 
but naïve in thinking that this is the God of Christian faith. Webb, Self Between, p, 186. The failure to
recognise this on behalf of modem atheism means: “Modem anti-Christianity is merely the reversal of 
sacrificial Christianity and as a result helps to perpetuate it.” Girard, Things Hidden, p. 226. 
s Charles Taylor, ‘Atomism’, in Philosophical Papers 2: Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 187.
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social bonds, but rather because the new scientific paradigm dominates to such an 
extent that one’s deepest and highest aspirations toward fulfilment become difficult 
to express, or to make meaningful. The scientific revolution in its relentless tendency 
toward reductive materialism does not just cramp human fulfilment, it distrusts all 
appeals to transcendence. This curtailment on human potential and happiness, 
according to Taylor, is itself a kind of ‘mutilation’ that still tends to run very deep in 
our culture; and, as a result, that individuals experience the profound absence of the 
earlier deeper and higher form of significance without any obvious way of 
connecting to it and making it their own. This is the source of a general malaise and a 
profound crisis for the self.6 Toward the end of chapter five we saw a deepening of 
the problem of sacrifice as a form of inner division whereby the self for all its good 
intentions to generate unity is left in dark and uncertain territory.
Hence, both Taylor and Girard share the view that the modem world is a 
source of crisis, but for Taylor the need for a concept of the good is stronger that 
ever. As Guy Vanheeswijck points out, “Girard focuses on what has been lost in the 
constitution of the modem subject; Taylor does not undervalue such a loss, but is 
precisely in search of an articulation of moral sources which have constituted the 
modem subject in order to compensate fo r  this loss.” For Taylor the crisis in modem 
culture is a ‘crisis of identity’ centred on the self, developing in history -  a self as the 
locus not only of the crisis but also of any attempted resolution of it. For Girard, 
modem culture is a crisis of difference -  a sacrificial crisis -  that has its origins in a 
world whose restorative resources are in decline. For him the modem ‘divisions 
within the self are non-recuperable because the individual lacks the necessary
6 As Taylor is aware this crisis has been recognized by a number o f important thinkers indifferent 
ways: for example, classic thinkers o f modernity such as, Weber, Tocqueville, and Nietzsche, and 
more recent cultural critics such as Christopher Lash and Allan Bloom.
7 Guy Vanheeswijck, ‘The Place of René Girard in Contemporary Philosophy”. Contagion: Journal o f  
Violence, Mimesis and Culture.. Vol. 10, 2003, p. 107.
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cathartic mechanism that properly belongs only to the community. Within a 
functioning sacred order this mechanism helps maintain what Girard calls the 
anthropological principle of Degree as salutary preserver of differences, thereby 
channelling violence creatively to protect against crisis. In its search for self- 
fulfilment modem individualism fails to realize that its freedom is ultimately stifling. 
But as we saw Girard’s own theoretical attempt to merge his later work with his early 
work only compounds the difficulty of forging a conception of the self that, in the 
absence of the earlier ‘anthropological principle’, can withstand the loss of hierarchy; 
and this difficulty is further reinforced by the anti-subjectivist import of what I have 
called his “reifying of desire” -  thereby creating even greater problems for any 
ethical attempt to confront religious violence.
In outlining Taylor’s philosophical history in chapters four and five I argued 
that Taylor can respond positively to a number of problematic motifs in Girard’s 
theory, which (if left as they are) prevent us from understanding Girard’s 
anthropology in a context of human development. These motifs, addressed in chapter 
four, are: 1) the loss of positive interiority as an aberration of Augustine’s concept of 
the will, 2) a conflation of two distinct concepts of generosity that misses what is 
radical about modem reflexivity, and 3) an account of order that focuses only on 
what is lost -  to the exclusion of early modem religious developments. Taylor’s 
account of early modem developments, and in particular the ethic of ordinary life, 
allows us to re-imagine the transition to the modem period as containing an 
inspiration to greater individual participation in the ordering process -  in the name of 
benevolence and the reduction of suffering. Many of those thinkers preoccupied with 
a providential order in nature were also concerned with our inner sentiments and our 
connection to nature as a source of good. The Romantic Movement took this
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development a stage further through its tendency to an identifiable form of theism 
with a conception of inner depths. These depths prompt us to be in touch with the 
‘current of life’, and to put shape on our own life, thereby avoiding socially induced 
illusion. However, this deepening of the initial transposition of order brought new 
dangers. At the end of the last chapter, I broached the problem that arises for modem 
theories of subjectivity when they become unmoored from a reliable concept of the 
good and then carried into the treacherous waters of blind will. Taylor’s own solution 
to this problem is articulated in his philosophical anthropology, which attempts to 
take seriously the historical concerns that pertain to the internalisation of the good, 
and, following from this, the emergence of the individual’s creative powers. Thus his 
philosophical history and his philosophical anthropology are interrelated -  
interpretation at one level informs interpretation at the other and vice versa. As we 
shall explore in this chapter, the transcendental conditions of subjectivity, that form 
the basis of his philosophical anthropology, open out onto a broad narrative and a 
deeply historical self.8
Even when we can show that Taylor successfully meets the challenges posed 
by Girard -  by demonstrating that order is transposed rather than eroded in the early 
modem period -  we are still left with the even greater challenge of showing how 
Taylor’s conception of selfhood can respond positively to the problems posed for this 
self by the ‘Schopenhauerian turn’. These problems concern a kind of 
‘impenetrability’ (Conrad), a radical alienation from ourselves and, therefore, the 
impossibility of knowing and doing the good. If we are to convince Girardians that 
their anti-subjectivism is in danger of adding to these Schopenhauerian forces that 
leave individuals at the mercy of a primal agency that can erupt in violence, we need
8 Describing Taylor’s project, Smith writes: ‘Transcendental analysis must be refracted through 
historical understanding.” Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 7.
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also to convince them of an alternative to reifying desire: we need to show that 
Taylor’s philosophical anthropology is also equipped to tackle Girard’s concerns 
about ‘ontology.’9 In other words, we need to make the case that Taylor’s 
philosophical anthropology can deal with crisis (both individual and cultural) more 
thoroughly and, perhaps, more convincingly than Girard does. For Girard, as I have 
argued, presents a flawed conception of subjectivity (one that conceals an unfounded 
dichotomy), a subjectivity which he then alleges is unable to cope with the ‘modem 
sacrificial crisis’. This internal problem in Girard’s theory, as I have argued in 
chapter three, stems from the ‘unity of novelistic conclusions’ at the end of Deceit, 
Desire, and the Novel, and the exclusion of the Romantic hero and hence any 
genuine condition of subjectivity. As I have shown, Girard’s early and later works 
are not continuous. And his own scapegoating of the subject precludes any 
alternative -  more positive -  account of the self. How might Taylor’s conception of 
selfhood avoid the initial problem that pertains to Girard’s conception of subjectivity, 
and then proceed to tackle, in a serious -  because now self-conscious -  manner the 
‘burning concerns’ that the latter has about modem individualism and its inability to 
cope with undifferentiation and crisis?
In the context of our overall discussion thus far of crisis and unity, we might 
identify Girard’s key concerns as, A) the vicissitudes of desire, B) the inability of the 
individual to ‘re-mark’ difference, C) the modem loss of difference, and D) the need 
for unity as a still enduring, though deeply fraught, need today. In light of Girard’s 
later theory of religious violence, and the centrality of the scapegoat mechanism in 
the generation of human culture and order, the self simply does not have the 
resources to meet these concerns in a satisfactory manner. The greater part of this
9 These concerns, discussed in chapter one, relate to Girard’s analysis o f modem subjectivity as the 
form of an ‘ontological illness’, ‘self-divinization’, etc.
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chapter will be given over to analysing some of the key concepts of Taylor’s 
philosophical anthropology and to arguing that they can meet these Girardian 
concerns. My aim is to argue that Taylor is also a thinker of crisis, which, for him, as 
we have seen in the previous two chapters, has deep historical roots. I hope to show 
that his analysis of the self as a human agent, and its capacity to cope with crisis in a 
more subjective space of reflexivity, is all the time informed by the broader 
background of contemporary culture. Thus the two spaces of crisis that, as we saw in 
part one, pertain to Girard’s account of the self/other relation, and the communal 
space of ritual and Degree, for Taylor can never be separated out.
Section two of this chapter, then, will tackle the first two of Girard’s key 
concerns, namely “the vicissitudes of desire”, and “the inability of the individual to 
‘re-mark’ difference”, by considering Taylor’s conception of ‘strong evaluation’ as a 
way of breaking out of the circularity of imitative desire, and ‘moral space’ as a 
space of reflection and orientation through which we can make the kinds of 
distinctions that provide meaning, thereby compensating for the loss of the earlier 
now more contested categories of difference. In this section the issue of identity also 
arises in a way that will enable me to show that it is crucial to the whole aporia of 
difference that we meet in Girard’s theory. Section three, then, will tackle Girard’s 
third key concern, namely, “the modem loss of difference”, by considering the 
importance that Taylor places on modem ‘disenchantment’ and the centrality he 
gives to understanding the loss of meaning that can attend the subjectivising of order, 
while still maintaining the viability of moral space for the formation of individual 
identity. Section four will tackle Girard’s fourth key concern, namely, “the need for 
unity as a still enduring, though deeply fraught, need today”, and will do so by 
considering Taylor’s conception of a human life driven by a craving or quest that -
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while allowing for certain kinds of death and rebirth -  can be gathered (more or less) 
into a narrative unity over the whole life-course.
2. Moral Space: Strong Value, Identity, and Gaining Orientation
The factors that generate crisis for the self in the modem period, discussed in 
chapters one and two in the context of literary and cultural space, have to do with the 
strictly imitative and reactive nature of the subject’s desires albeit that they appear all 
the time to be seeking to establish the Romantic hero’s identity as separate.10 The 
illusions of literary space are only confirmed for Girard by his later analysis of 
cultural space when imitative desire -  in extremis -  is explained as the catalyst of 
cultural crisis; the individual’s belief in originality, her ‘metaphysical desire’, is now 
seen as the effect of her broader culture, and the deterioration of this culture’s 
organising power -  the scapegoat mechanism. However, as I argued in chapter five, 
Girard’s analysis of the Romantic concern with originality as somehow preoccupied 
with separation is in fact mistaken. The Romantic Movement itself, as it developed 
from its initial impetus in ‘moral sense theory’ to its central doctrine of ‘nature as 
source’, was preoccupied with connection rather than separation -  a connection to 
self, to others, to nature and to the cosmos -  and through this connection, with the 
possibility of integral expression. Girard’s account of the imitative and reactive 
nature of the modem individual’s desires -  and his or her quest for original identity -  
appears grossly overdrawn. Is Girard’s conception of desire really credible or helpful 
for thinking about human agents and their experience of crisis today?
l0In Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, Girard understands the Romantic view as “mechanistic” and 
“divisive”, while for Taylor, as we have seen in chapter five, it is precisely the reaction against these 
characteristics that distinguishes Romanticism and, in particular, expressivism from other forms of 
modem freedom that embrace mechanism, atomism and technical control. See Girard, Deceit Desire 
and the Novel, pp. 188-298. See also Charles Taylor, The Ethics o f  Authenticity. (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), chap. 1.
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By describing desire as ‘mimetic’, Girard makes a distinction between human 
and animal (or non-human) needs and desires.11 Fleming explains this as follows: 
.. although animal needs for hydration, shelter, rest, and nutrition persist at the 
human level, they do not in themselves constitute ‘desire’ per se. Any of these needs 
may serve as pretexts for the formation for desire, but by themselves, are not 
sufficient for it.”12 Unlike human ‘needs’, which, being biological and arising from 
particular situations, can at least be met, “desire”, from a Girardian point of view, 
“can emerge in the absence of any genuine appetite at all.”13 Thus, unlike human or 
animal needs, it is “indeterminate”, and so prone to “fascinations with objects and 
figures that possess not only use values, but symbolic values as well.”14 The key 
difference is perhaps that we can imagine an individual satisfying his or her needs 
regardless of belonging to a group, but we cannot in the Girardian scheme imagine 
desire even arising for the same individual without the presence of others.
Such an apparent disjuncture in Girard’s theory between ‘needs’ and ‘desires’ 
is not part of Taylor’s understanding of human agency. Human beings desire, and 
have a capacity for reason and hence agency, by virtue of reflection. Desires are not 
‘grafted on to the needs and appetites of animal life’15 as if the apparent symbiosis 
here is actually determined by the collective. To be a human agent (whatever about a 
hominoid) is, as an individual, to reflect on and evaluate one’s desires. This 
reflection, and what Taylor calls the ‘strong evaluation’ accompanying it, underpins
11 Webb draws our attention to this distinction between what he refers to as “appetites and needs” and 
“desires”, which is discussed by Girard and Oughlourlian in Things Hidden, p. 283, and To Double 
Business Bound, p. 90. Webb's own contention is that this distinction “is o f more fundamental 
importance than the authors realize, and has not yet been fully developed”. The Self Between, p. 8 
(also see footnote, p. 8)
12 Fleming, René Girard: Violence and Mimesis, p. 11.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ib id .
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a distinction between ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ desires that Taylor borrows 
from the moral philosopher Harry Frankfurt.16
First order desires are desires that human beings share with other animals. Animals desire 
food, a mate, to avert danger and so forth and their behaviour can be explained in terms of 
whatever is required to satisfy their desires. Human beings have similar ‘first order’ desires 
or appetites, but their behaviour is also motivated by positive or negative feelings about the 
desires themselves. Human beings have the capacity to evaluate their desires accordingly, 
and they are often motivated to act on the basis of such evaluations. ‘Second-order’ desires, 
then, are desires about desires, desires which enable us to arbitrate between motives and so to 
act in a way that is distinctive of human agency.17
Admittedly, the distinction between first and second order desires depicted here
appears to align with the distinction we have just seen between what Girard terms
‘needs’ and ‘desires’. However, Taylor believes, if we fail to ask the important
question concerning what we do when we evaluate different desires we will miss the
more significant feature of human agency that reflection on desire brings out. Smith
explains the distinction through which Taylor gets at this significance.
On the one hand, we can weigh up which of the desires will, as a matter of fact, provide the 
most satisfaction. Faced with the choice, say, between desirable flavours of ice cream, I can 
compare the strength of the desires I happen to have and I can choose on the basis of my 
stronger desire. The decisive issue in my evaluation is just what I happen to feel like. Taylor 
calls this ‘weak evaluation’. But a quite different issue is at stake, Taylor remarks when we 
find ourselves evaluating desires in terms o f their worth. So, for instance, petty feelings of 
spite might incline me one way, but I am also aware that I can be moved by a more generous 
spirit. What counts now is the way I locate or interpret the feelings, that is, how I characterise 
them as something base and petty, or as something higher and more admirable.18
For the human agent, as strong evaluator, the world is charged with significance. By
discerning the worth of her desires she can help make them part of a worthwhile
life.19 With this distinction between weak and strong evaluation we are better able to
grasp Taylor’s concept of the self and how we come to possess an identity, and,
16 See Charles Taylor, “What is Human Agency?”, in Human Agency and Language. Philosophical 
Papers, 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
17 Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity, p. 89.
18 Ibid.
19 According the Smith, ‘Taylor is not just claiming that the strong evaluator is more articulate about 
his options.. .For he is also claiming there can only be said to be a range o f options on account of their 
‘desirability-characterizations’. The range of possibilities facing the strong evaluator does not pre­
exist the articulation of his desires or purposes, as if the weak evaluator had simply overlooked them. 
The nuance and depth with which the strong evaluator reflects upon his desires and purposes finds its 
way into the desires and purposes themselves”. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and 
Modernity, p. 90.
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importantly, we can begin to see the role of our desires and motivations in this 
process
For Taylor, reflection on desire always takes place within a moral framework. 
An individual’s identity, then, as strongly valued, can be understood as being defined 
by the fundamental commitments and identifications that go into providing the 
‘frame’ within which he or she can try to determine in each case what is good or 
valuable, or what should be done.20 One’s framework then is the horizon within 
which one is capable of taking a stand.21 On this understanding of identity, a 
Catholic, anarchist, an atheist or a Jew, is not just strongly attached to a particular 
spiritual view or background; rather this view or background provides the frame 
within which they can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, 
worthwhile or of value. Conversely, if they were to lose this commitment or 
identification they would be lost with regard to a range of important questions in 
determining the significance things have for them. We call this condition, which is 
tied to a loss of meaning, an ‘identity crisis’. In not knowing who they are, people 
who experience this condition lack a frame or horizon within which things can take 
on a relatively stable significance and have value.22 According to Taylor this painful 
and terrifying experience brings to light the essential link between identity and a kind 
of orientation.23 “To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in 
which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what is
20 For further discussion of ‘strong evaluation’ see Charles Taylor, “Explanation and Practical 
Reason”, in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995). In this 
important essay, Taylor already anticipates much of the core o f his argument in Sources o f  the Self.
21 Taylor, Sources, p. 27.
22 The frameworks, within which these values reside, whether, for example, British, Catholic, 
anarchist or combinations of all three, are not simply dispensible interpretations, a point that often 
appears muted in Girard‘s discourse. In fact, Taylor argues that doing without the frameworks that 
constitute our qualitative distinctions is utterly impossible. The horizons within which we live our 
lives and make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative distinctions: living within these 
strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency. Taylor, Sources, p. 27.
23 Taylor, Sources, p. 28.
237
not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary.”24 
Our framework then is our limit, our horizon, within which we take a stand and gain 
orientation. The question of identity ( ‘who am I?’) and its relationship to orientation, 
are part of a particularly modem discourse. The frameworks that were embedded in 
nature -  and taken for granted by human beings -  no longer provide a viable set of 
co-ordinates for personal meaning. Today, our identities, as defined by whatever 
gives us our fundamental orientation, have been ‘disembedded’ from such older ontic 
orders and have become complex and many-tiered.
The ‘who’ question, presupposes a subject who can answer this question for 
him or herself, an interlocutor among others, someone with his or her own standpoint 
or position.
But to be able to answer for oneself is to know where one stands, what one wants to answer. 
And that is why we naturally tend to talk of our fundamental orientation in terms of who we 
are. To lose this orientation, or not to have found it, is not to know who one is. And this 
orientation, once attained, defines where you answer from, hence your identity.26
Speaking for oneself has a moral accent. One’s identity, which allows one to find 
one’s bearings and plot a course through strong evaluation, is largely constituted in 
moral space. This space, for Taylor, is “ontologically basic.” The question for his 
enquiry into selfhood thus becomes: through what framework-definition can I best 
find my bearings in this moral space. To live in a space of questions to which strong 
value and framework definitions provide answers is to have a number of co­
ordinates. The qualitative distinctions that we make in order to arrive at these co­
ordinates provide a quasi ‘map of moral space’; they permit us to find the precise 
horizon within which we know where we stand, and what meanings things have for
24 Ibid.
25 Taylor, Sources, p. 29.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. Smith makes the point that Taylor’s hermeneutics (especially his explication of moral space) 
owes adept to Heidegger. See Nicholas H. Smith, ‘Taylor and the Hermeneutical Tradition”, in R. 
Abbey, ed., Charles Taylor: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 34.
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us.28 Hence our identity, as an active process of discernment and deliberation, is 
inextricable from orienting ourselves in a space of concern, and of meaning. In other 
words, by incorporating the qualitative distinctions that need to be clarified within 
this space, our identity is both defined by strongly valued preferences and also 
defines the space of qualitative distinctions within which we live and choose. 
Making qualitative distinctions, discovering meaning, and ‘marking difference’ for 
oneself, has (pace Girard) a subjective dimension. Moral space provides the 
conditions for working out the personally nuanced solutions to a range of problems 
whose solutions were once presented impersonally as ‘readymade’ by a religious 
worldview.
Within the picture just outlined we cannot choose to be lost or have an 
identity crisis, because being lost or in crisis results from a failure to make qualitative 
distinctions and to find meaning. To be able to choose in this context means to be 
able to make just such qualitative distinctions. The issue of having an identity is thus 
closely tied to the issue of not being in crisis, since working on your identity is the 
very process of getting clear on the things that are of significance to you. Moral 
space, for Taylor, thus provides the conditions for helping to resolve a fundamental 
problem concerning selfhood in the modem period. Our frameworks arise from 
attempts to answer questions that inescapably exist for us today in the absence of a 
traditional religious worldview. The person who chooses poorly is still operating 
within a framework unlike the person who is experiencing what we commonly call 
an ‘identity crisis.’ “To be without any sense of strong value, as Taylor depicts it, is 
to suffer a painful and frightening emptiness.”30 It is because frameworks can fail,
28 Ibid.
29 Taylor, Sources, p. 30.
30 Smith, Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 93.
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while at the same time they are of such defining importance for us, that Taylor 
believes we ought to define them as best we can:
One orients oneself in a space which exists independently o f  one’s success or failure in 
finding one’s bearings, which makes the task of finding these bearings inescapable. Within 
this picture, the notion of inventing a qualitative distinction out o f whole cloth makes no 
sense for one can only adopt such distinctions as make sense to one within one’s basic 
orientation.31
Once we begin to reflect on our desires we are already in a space of concern that 
presupposes some sense of ‘higher or lower’, in other words a space that gives 
meaning to our choices. Without some implicit sense of a standard, we cannot, on 
Taylor’s account, be said to be operating within the terms of an ‘identity’. Hence 
even a desiring subject disoriented by false imitation, to the extent that he is making 
distinctions at all, is still orientating himself within the parameters of a personally 
derived identity. The limits that we draw (if and when we do draw limits) are drawn 
from our knowledge of what we actually do.
It follows from Taylor’s account of frameworks as ‘necessary’, that the many 
different religious accounts of ‘the shape of the divine’ are not simply answers to 
questions that might one day disappear from human concern. Modem identity does 
not presuppose or imply the loss of religious frameworks. And just as traditional 
religious claims should not be written off as ‘ontologically queer’, orientation should 
not be thought of as the answer to an artificial, dispensible question concerning ‘who 
I am’. Rather it is impossible to conceive of a form in which this question is not 
‘always already’ there, demanding an answer: as a moral subject, I can no more do 
without some orientation in moral space than as a moving body I can do without 
some orientation -  some sense of front and behind, left and right, above and below -  
in physical space.32 For Taylor, any epistemological position that fails to take
31 Taylor, Sources, pp. 30-31.
32 Smith, ‘Taylor and the Hermeneutical Tradition”, p. 39.
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account of this question (an actual failure bearing on a widespread identity crisis in 
Western culture today) ignores or suppresses what we actually do when we try to 
make sense of our lives on a whole range of questions concerning our identity and its 
relationship to the good. The subject within Girardian theory, caught up as she is 
within an entirely imitative and reactive space, cannot locate herself within a space 
of questions concerning the good and hence cannot even begin to evaluate in a strong 
way with respect to the significance of her life. In the space that Girard articulates, it 
is unclear how the ‘framework definitions’ can provide the basis of an identity that 
might help the subject in the throes of crisis to gain orientation. Moral space, as 
ontologically basic (or existentially inescapable), permits subjects to gain such 
orientation to the good, by evaluating their desires and purposes in a strong way 
(thereby working through illusions to the greater clarity afforded by qualitative 
distinctions).
3. Disenchantment: Modem Crisis, and Being Lost in Moral Space
For Girard, human beings, as individuals, lack a cathartic mechanism, and 
thus the loss of degree in the modem period ushers in a sacrificial crisis. Taylor’s 
philosophical history allows us to see that the breakdown of traditional forms of 
order and clearly marked differences is partly brought about by the establishing a 
new providential order. But Taylor also tells of a crisis that is brought about by the 
loss of what he calls traditional religious frameworks. The sense of meaning that 
such hierarchical and otherworldly views once imparted appears impossible to 
replace. Yet the very thing that makes human life valuable is tied up for Taylor with 
the possibility of finding or making such meaning. The moral world of modems is 
made significantly different from previous civilisations by our sense today that
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human beings command our respect. This can readily be seen in the importance we 
place on avoiding suffering.33 The notion that we ought to reduce suffering to a 
minimum is an integral part of what respect means to us today. Girard refers to this 
new value as arising from what he describes as the modem concern for victims.34 For 
Taylor, the importance of reducing suffering can be explained by the decline of 
belief in a cosmic order that required us to ritually undo a terrible crime often with an 
equally terrible punishment. In the past ‘suffering’ was often institutionalised in a set 
of practices that were concerned with balancing the books. To punish someone was 
in some ways to pay a debt to nature. “In the language of the time the criminal must 
make amende honorable,”35 In his essay on Foucault, Taylor draws our attention to 
the “radical discontinuity” between such organised violence and the sense that 
modem democratic societies normally have of themselves. Such ‘punishment’, 
described by Foucault in the context of its own time as a kind of ‘liturgy’, seems to 
modems a form of sadism.37 “Human beings are set in a cosmic order, or constituted 
by a hierarchy of beings which is also a hierarchy of goods. They stand... in a
»?38political order, which is related and in some sense endorsed by the cosmic order.”
If this was once the case, our notions of respect now are emphatically opposed to 
orders of this kind that require human beings to suffer, and in a sense to be 
sacrificed.
33 Taylor, Sources, p. 12.
34 René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning.
35 “Certain kinds of crime -  parricide is a good example -  are offences against this order... They do 
not just represent damage done to the interests o f certain other individuals... They represent a 
violation of the order, tearing things out of their place, as it were. And so punishment is not just a 
matter o f making reparations for damage inflicted... The order must be set right”. Charles Taylor, 
“Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, in Philosophical Papers 2, p. 154.
36 rbid.
37 Ibid. The bigger the crime the more that time was ‘put out o f joint’ (to paraphrase Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet), and therefore the greater the punishment required to set things right. Taylor discusses the 
meaning o f organized violence in a pre-modem context -  the significance it had for a public order. 
See also, Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason”, p. 55.
38 Ibid.
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But regardless of how brutal these older orders could be, and however much 
they restricted and excluded and trammelled other than dominant groups, the 
meaning that they provided was a stabilising force. Both Taylor and Girard agree that 
the loss of this older ‘transcendent’ order, as the basis of a meaningful whole, is the 
main challenge of the modem age. For Taylor, providential Deism provided 
something of a solution (as we saw in the context of the initial breach with an ontic 
view). However, he believes that the problem is exacerbated today because of 
strongly naturalist tendencies deeply entrenched in the human sciences as well as the 
natural sciences themselves that deny tout court any validity to transcendent 
frameworks.39 When this denial then gains a further foothold in a great deal of 
influential philosophical discourse some of our most important moral distinctions are 
left inarticulate and unexpressed. It is these distinctions that might otherwise step 
into the vacuum created by the eclipse of the earlier ‘meaningful’ order(s) and open 
the way to other possibilities of meaning.
Largely for this reason Taylor, in Sources, explores the sense we make of 
moral intuitions that have for millennia provided meaning and standards for action. 
In doing so, he attempts to retrieve the moral ideal behind the self’s motivated 
search.40 Since, as long as the true motivation of our actions and beliefs remains 
implicit, unexplored and even hidden - as tends to happen within a narrow range of 
scientific, instrumental and procedural criteria - questions about substantive meaning 
and ‘the good’ likewise remain inaccessible. Even modem rights doctrines eschew
39 Taylor’s quarrel here is not just with naturalism but also with a great deal of contemporary political 
philosophy which, under the banner o f a procedural or neutral liberalism (Dworkin, Scanlan, Rawls), 
seeks to exclude substantive moral issues (other that those concerning distributive justice) from the 
domain o f ‘public reason’.
40 Broadly, Taylor’s claim here is that what begins as a mode of ‘access’ to the world, once objectified 
through language, becomes a discernible set of ontological claims that can be rationally argued. It is 
this argument or conversation that he attempts to cultivate in Sources, with such diverse historical 
thinkers as Plato, Augustine, Rousseau, Descartes, Locke, Shaftsbury, Hutcheson, and a range of 
modem literary figures, some of whom we encountered in chapter four.
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our motivational connection to the good.41 Hence, the background picture that might 
provide a plausible interpretation of our journey so far -  and what drives out highest 
aspirations and our deepest concerns -  remains fraught and unclear.
In other words, there is a lot of “suppression” today of what it means to be a 
self.42 Taylor’s concern about this suppression, and the silence that it breeds, is 
focused on the lack of fit between what people officially and consciously believe and 
what they need to make sense of their actual moral reactions43 We draw on 
frameworks when we have to make sense of our responses and when we have to 
defend these responses as the right ones. In the past, when moral frameworks 
enjoyed unquestioned allegiance, the process was more straightforward. Within the 
contemporary liberal philosophical climate that cramps our impulses toward more 
substantive ends, people often remain unaware of the constituents of their beliefs and 
unclear about their true motivations. “Many of our contemporaries deny ontology 
altogether.”44 This denial, and not the denial of ‘Romantic originality’, is, for Taylor, 
the cause of crisis today because -  operative in the ‘soft-relativism’ prevalent 
through much of contemporary thought -  it refuses to even engage in deliberations 
about what makes for a worthy, fulfilled, or meaningful life.
The undermining of our sense of the cosmos as a meaningful order, what 
Weber calls the ‘disenchantment of the world,’ has destroyed the ‘taken-for-granted’
41 On the ‘priority of the right over the good’ in contemporary moral philosophy see Charles Taylor 
“Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy”, in William Schweiker, ed. Iris Murdoch and the Search fo r  
Human Goodness (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996). The kind of problem that arises here 
can perhaps be seen in the following example: I believe in capital punishment, as both punitive and 
preventative, but also feel, at a deeper unexpressed level, that the taking of human life is a violation of 
a person’s inherent dignity. The suppression of moral frameworks adds to the confusion here, and 
ignores the substantive issue (what constitutes a person’s inherent dignity). The silence the more 
proceduralist views promote runs counter to an ethics that would reclaim its moral sources and come 
clean about its moral frameworks.
42 Taylor, Sources, p. 10.
43 Taylor, Sources, p. 9.
44 Taylor, Sources, p. 10.
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horizons in which people previously lived their moral and spiritual lives.45 The 
question of meaning, or of thinking about the point of one’s life, never arose for 
people prior to the modem age. Today, by contrast, ‘dignity’ (the basic condition of a 
self-derived identity) is on everyone’s lips but achieving it is more and more 
difficult. As Taylor observes, the older horizons that satisfied this human longing -  
in the case of, for example, Corneille -  have disappeared, a fact well captured by 
Nietzsche’s madman.46 This loss of traditional frameworks generates a sense of 
disorientation, one that appears very close to what Girard describes as ‘the 
breakdown of difference’ -  although it is never total or absolute for modem culture 
as it perhaps was in local contexts for earlier societies. Describing the crisis that 
threatens the modem seeker, compared to his pre-modem precursor, Taylor writes 
“the world loses altogether its spiritual contour, nothing is worth doing, the fear is of 
a terrifying emptiness, a kind of vertigo, or even fracturing of our world and body 
space.”47 People’s sense of emptiness, futility and lack of purpose today is well 
documented by psychoanalysts and is arguably related to the dissolution of their 
horizons of meaning.48 While some individuals may suffer the consequences of this
45 Taylor, Sources, pp. 16-17.
46 By evoking Nietzsche here Taylor, unlike Girard, links disenchantment to ‘the death of God’ in a 
way that is less directly tied to sacrifice and more tied to a definite loss o f meaning in the modem 
period. Girard sees this as the quintessential move by modern atheism, the loss of the ‘suprasensible in 
the Platonic sense’, and argues that when compared to the full-blooded collective murder that it 
actually masks, it should be seen as a “harmless cliché.” René Girard, “Nietzsche versus the 
Crucified”, p. 257. Such a criticism would be wrong-headed in the context o f Taylor’s analysis o f the 
modem period, since he is clearly not interpreting disenchantment as a form of atheism.
47 Taylor, Sources, p. 18.
48 Taylor, Sources, p. 19. It has become a commonplace in psychotherapeutic writing to highlight the 
culturally mediated shift in the dominant mode o f psychological ailment from the kind of hysteria 
classically diagnosed by Freud to contemporary forms of narcissism as a kind of meaning deprivation. 
See, for example, J. Schumaker, The Age o f  Insanity: Modernity and Mental Health. (Connecticut: 
Praeger, 2001) and C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: Norton, 1991). As relevant as 
psychopathology is in describing our moral malaise, Taylor is mainly concerned here to point out the 
conspiracy o f silence around moral frameworks, which as well as undermining the psychological 
resources to help us on our quest, also leaves our basic moral intuitions hidden, thereby allowing the 
more instrumental and procedural activities to triumph over the more substantive ones without 
contest.
245
crisis more than others, Taylor argues that we still “[need] frameworks to know 
where we stand on issues.”49
For many people an ultimately believable framework is the object of an 
uncertain ‘quest’ that can fail, and to fail in this respect is to fail to find meaning, to 
fail to make sense.50 The quest then, is always a quest for sense.51 This sense is found 
or made through articulating it, and because, for us modems, so much here depends 
on our powers of expression, what we find, by way of a framework, is interwoven 
with what we invent. More and more today, we attain meaning by making sense 
through our expressive powers. To put it bluntly, the point of our lives is bound up 
with our attempts to find just such a point.52 As older horizons fade frameworks take 
on moral significance by incorporating a crucial set of qualitative distinctions which 
allows us to function with the sense that some action, feeling, way of being is 
incomparably higher than the others. Once again moral space, in Taylor’s 
philosophical anthropology, becomes the most basic condition for determining the 
significance of these distinctions for identity in an age of cultural crisis.
Taylor sees himself as arguing against various forms of ‘atomism’ when he 
makes the point that “a self can never be described without reference to those who 
surround it.”53 And Girard, of course, would also rightly acknowledge that other
49 Smith, Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 92.
50 Taylor, Sources, p. 17.
51 Taylor, Sources, p. 18.
52 This ‘sense o f things’ is central for Taylor. It is inherently expressive; its purpose is to somehow 
become articulate. He does not see every individual as being capable o f mustering the expressive 
powers necessary to reclaim their moral sources. Rather he suggests that it may be left to historians, 
philosophers, and anthropologists to try to formulate explicitly what goods, qualities, or ends are at 
stake here. Taylor, Sources, p. 21. Our individual lives become reflections o f  a much broader 
historical background picture. We are carried by tradition, or what the hermeneutical philosopher 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, calls ‘effective history’. Speaking of this concept of history in Gadamer’s work 
David E. Ling writes: ‘The words and concepts of a particular language reveal an initiative of being: 
the language o f a time is not so much chosen by the persons who use it as it is their historical fate -  
the way being has revealed itself to and concealed itself from them as their starting point”. Hans- 
Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans., and ed., David E. Ling (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1976), p. lv.
53 Taylor, Sources, p. 35.
246
people are intrinsic to my sense of self. But unlike rationalist and materialist 
accounts of the self, and unlike Girard who gives no play to human agency, Taylor 
sees language as having a definitive role in helping to shape the conditions of 
selfhood.54 I am who I am only in conversation with others where objects take on 
meaning in a strong sense - not just for ‘me’ but for ‘us’.55 A self exists only within 
what Taylor calls ‘webs of interlocution’ where I define who I am (in so far as I can) 
through shared meanings arising in a community that is always original, or primary, 
in the sense of being always already there, before my arriving in it.
It is this original situation which gives its sense to our concept o f ‘identity’ offering an 
answer to the question of who I am through a definition of where I am speaking from and to 
whom. The full definition of someone’s identity usually involves not only his stand on moral 
and spiritual matters, but also some reference to a defining community.56
The two dimensions of identity-definition (the ‘where from’ and the ‘to whom’)
reflect the original situation out of which the whole issue of identity arises. However,
according to Taylor, modem culture has tended to occlude the second dimension
(interlocution), as if it were of significance only early on in one’s development and
should play no part in one’s more mature life as an adult. And so, while a break with
our early community is indeed part of discovering our own path in life, independent
positions still remain embedded in ‘webs of interlocution.’ It is through language that
“we remain related to partners of discourse, either in real live exchanges, or in
indirect exchanges.”57 In some instances -  for example the Puritan experience in
North America -  the very act of leaving home to search for one’s own way in life can
only be understood in the context of a tradition whereby, ironically, the command to
be self-sufficient arises out of the community itself. This provides a nice example,
54 Taylor follows Bruner and Wittgenstein on this issue. Elsewhere he discusses the significance o f a 
language community in terms of Herder’s contribution to language theory. See ‘The Importance of 
Herder”, in Philosophical Arguments (Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 98.
55 Taylor, Sources, p. 35.
56 Taylor, Sources, p. 36.
57 Taylor, Sources, p. 38.
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for Taylor, of the “transcendental embedding of independence in interlocution” 
discussed above.58 Furthermore, it shows the weakness of the ‘interdividual’ position 
that gives priority to ‘webs of desire’59 over ‘webs of interlocution’.60
Our mode of being and sharing a language with other agents ties in with the 
connections Taylor outlines between our sense of self and our sense of the good -  
value relations once again provide the context or background picture to who I am. He 
extends this picture , in showing that the same issues are involved when it comes to 
discerning our sense of our life as a whole and the direction it is taking as we lead 
it.61 Narrative unity plays an important role in shaping this direction, as we shall see 
below. To set the context for this discussion Taylor retraces some of his footsteps 
here. He reminds us that by looking at qualitative distinctions as a way of gaining 
orientation in an existing space of ‘inescapable’ questions about the good, we see 
that having a moral outlook, like having an interlocutor, is not an optional extra. 
Arising from this complex of relations that we must all the time get clarity on, the 
spatial metaphor takes on a new significance. There are now two ways we can have 
or fail to have orientation. “I can be ignorant of the lie of the land around me - not 
know the important locations which make it up or how they relate to each other. This 
ignorance can be cured by a good map. But then I can be lost in another way if I
58 Taylor, Sources, p. 39.
59 Webb, The Self Between, p. 91.
60 On the more dialogical nature of ‘in-between-ness’, which interdividual psychology eschews in 
favour of what it understands as the more determining ‘webs o f desire’, Joseph Dunne writes (with 
reference to Hannah Arendt): “This... ‘in-between’ -  called the ‘web o f relationships’ by Arendt -  
which is constituted by deeds and words but which ‘is not tangible, since there are no tangible objects 
into which it could solidify’ makes up the very substance o f human affairs ( ‘the realm o f human 
affairs, strictly speaking, consists o f the web of human relationships which exist whenever men live 
together’). And yet it is the very reality which is most consistently ignored or underestimated in all 
reductionist accounts of these affairs: ‘the very basic error o f all materialism in politics ... is to 
overlook the inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique 
persons, even when they are wholly concentrated upon reaching an altogether worldly object”. Joseph 
Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure o f  Technique (Notre Dame and 
London: University o f Notre Dame, 1997), p. 91. (Internal quotations taken from Arendt’s The 
Human Condition).
61 Taylor, Sources, p. 41.
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don’t know how to place myself on this map.” To know where a place is in a 
meaningful way I must know where it is in relation to other places in the known 
world. I can have a good description of where I am but I can lack a map for 
orientating myself. But then, I can also have a map yet lack knowledge of where I am 
on it. Also, in keeping with Taylor’s analysis of language, identifying where I am is 
akin to identifying who my interlocutor is, and how I might agree or differ from his 
or her perspective. Gaining orientation in moral space requires being able to identify 
and, in addition, locate oneself in relation to significant features of our lives.
Taylor’s two-fold account of how we can be lost in terrestrial space also has 
its analogy in how we orient ourselves in relation to the good. Getting clarity on the 
good requires “not only some framework(s) which defines the shape of the 
qualitatively higher but also a sense of where we stand in relation to this.” This 
cannot be a neutral question for us; we care and cannot stop caring where we stand in 
relation to what is highest and best. For the need to be connected to, or in contact 
with, what we see as being of utmost importance and value is one of our most basic 
aspirations. The structuralist influence on Girard’s work prevents any such 
intentional ‘taking up’, ‘being there’, or orienting ourselves in this way. The contrast 
between literary space, where the subject is left at the mercy of a desire that seems 
always beyond its powers of reflection (causing it to react to others in a dialectic of 
escalating crisis), and moral space, as Taylor depicts it, is stark. In drawing out the 
contrast, as I have done by comparing Girard’s early work with Taylor’s 
philosophical anthropology, we can now readily see that moral space is surely a 
better account of how we live our lives. In my view, it can be said to trump ‘literary 
space’ and even ‘cultural space’ as depicted by Girard, showing these spaces as
62 Ibid.
63 Taylor, Sources, p. 42.
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offering inadequate accounts of human agency. And, significantly, moral space can 
now be seen as allowing us to understand the problems of ‘crisis’ and ‘difference’, in 
the context of having an identity, as negotiable outside a rigidly defined order. But, it 
may still be asked, does Taylor’s account hold up when confronted with the loss of 
religious horizons?
This brings us back once again to the issue of ‘strong evaluation’, which 
involves questions about what kind of life is worth living, How we answer these 
questions -  and answer them through our actions -  will determine the extent to 
which we will be connected or in contact with what we see as good. Furthermore, 
regardless of how it might change from person to person, and culture to culture, 
Taylor insists that our being concerned with some or other ‘strong’ issue, is not 
optional, and for the same reason that our orientation as ‘identity defining’ is not 
optional. If we cannot but stand somewhere in relation to things that give our life 
meaning, then caring about an ultimate question must also matter: “not being able to 
function without orientation in the space of the ultimately important means not being 
able to stop caring where we [stand] in it”.64 We can see how (in this space of 
‘inability to stop caring’) the goods that define our spiritual orientation are the ones 
that define the worth of our lives. It is because these issues are so inextricably linked 
that Taylor believes it necessary to explore ‘the weight or substance of one’s life’ as 
a question of how one is ‘placed’ or ‘situated’ in relation to, or ‘in contact with,’ the 
good.65 In gaining clarity on the things that matter to me, in making choices and 
exercising my human agency, I give my life comportment. The ultimate questions, 
those that Taylor sees governing the other questions that appear less important, arise 
for many people today in terms of the ‘meaningfulness’ and the ‘worth’ of their lives,
of whether or not they are (or have been) rich, amounting to something, or going 
somewhere. Getting clarity on these ultimate questions and the range of more 
proximate questions framed by them is the work of forging an identity and hence 
overcoming the prospect of crisis -  as a loss of externally generated difference.
4. ‘Conclusions’ in Moral Space: Craving, and the Unity of a Self
We saw in chapter one how ‘metaphysical desire’ precipitates the crisis in 
literary space, leading to the hallucination of the ‘the double’ and the Dostoyevskian 
apocalypse: “The truth of metaphysical desire is death.”66 We also saw in chapter 
three how Girard carries over this term into his cultural anthropology to help explain 
how an ‘infinity of desire’ gives rise to the modem sacrificial crisis. This analysis of 
desire -  in extremis -  that sees Romantic originality as a form of ‘separation’, I have 
argued, is overdrawn. Reflection on desire (i.e. strong evaluation) and not ‘blind 
mimesis’ is the proper mode of human agency. If ‘novelistic conclusions’ in literary 
space are unequivocal in their rejection of Romantic desire, conclusions in moral 
space must remain open to more piecemeal negotiations. Even if desire can of course 
go wrong for the self in moral space, how might unity be generated here without 
repeating the error of Girard’s scapegoating of the self, or worse perhaps, 
scapegoating some other?
As we have seen, in Sources Taylor describes how the weight or substance of 
one’s life is bound up with working out what matters to one, and thereby gaining 
orientation in moral space. However, having a framework, like having a good map, 
requires knowing where we stand in relation to the qualitatively higher. Who we are 
is closely tied to where we are heading and who we are becoming. As Taylor writes,
66 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 282.
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moral space concerns “our most fundamental motivation, or our basic allegiance, or 
the outer limits of relevant possibilities for us, and hence the direction our lives are 
moving in or could move in.” I care about where I stand because I care about who 
I am and what I desire to be. There are many ways this can be defined and so there 
are many ways we can be in contact with the good. Taylor wants us to look on these
diverse aspirations for meaning or fuller ‘Being’ as forms of a craving that is
£ 0
“ineradicable from human life.”
This craving can take many different forms. Much depends here on our 
favoured description. Catholics, anarchists, revolutionaries, artists, even 
householders, whose aspirations give meaning or fuller being to their lives, all have 
to be rightly placed in relation to the good. To try to draw out what all of these have 
in common, Taylor outlines two divergent examples of how the same ineradicable 
craving is at work in apparently different manifestations: a fulfilled householder and 
an estranged ‘underground man’. 69 The same ‘aspiration to connection’, is at work in 
each life and is basic to why either individual cares about being ‘rightly placed’. In 
one case our aspirations may appear integrated and unobtrusive, we may even be 
unaware of them if things go well and if by and large we are satisfied with where we 
are. In the other case, our lives may be tom apart and disordered by the craving; its 
potential to manifest itself as intractable resentment or disdain can motivate some of
67 Taylor, Sources, p. 46.
68 Taylor, Sources, p. 44.
69 About the former Taylor writes: “The householder’s sense of the value o f what I have been calling 
ordinary life is woven through the emotions and concerns of his everyday existence. It is what gives 
them their richness and depth.” Sources, p. 44. About the latter he writes: “...they are people whose 
lives are tom apart by this craving. They see themselves, over and against the master of themselves, as 
in the grip of lower drives, their lives disordered and soiled by their base attachments.” Ibid. Taylor 
could well be alluding to Dostoevsky’s ‘underground man’ when he describes the feelings associated 
with this form o f craving as: “I can’t really throw myself into this great cause/ movement/ religious 
life. I feel on the outside. I know it’s great in a way but I can’t feel moved by it. I feel unworthy o f it 
somehow.” Taylor, Sources, p. 45.
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the bitterest conflicts in human life.70 But unlike the destructive desire we meet in 
literary space, our cravings in moral space, however potentially debilitating, can still 
be brought within the ambit of reflection. The individual who assumes a first-person 
perspective, and begins to orient him or her self in terms of a set of qualitative 
distinctions does so as a mode of craving, and hence is always ‘more or less’ in 
relation to the good.71
This dynamic quality highlights another basic feature of human existence: 
“What we are” right now can never fully sum up our condition, because we are 
always changing and becoming. The spatial dimension of the self is bound up with 
the temporal. Even as we develop through our ‘life cycle’ and make sense of certain 
things, our place, where we are located, is constantly challenged and potentially 
revised by the new events of our lives as we experience more and mature. As such, it 
is never just a question of where we are, but also where we are going. Although the 
first may be a matter of more or less the latter is a question of toward or away from - 
an issue of yes or no.72 It is for this reason that an absolute question always frames 
our relative ones. “Since we cannot do without an orientation to the good, and since 
we cannot be indifferent to our place relative to the good, and since this place must 
always change and become, the issue of the direction of our lives must arise for 
us.”73 Because our lives are constantly moving within a space of questions, where we 
are makes sense only in terms of where we are going and whether or not we are on 
course to get there. Moral space presupposes an ultimate destination.
70 Ibid.
71 Taylor’s debt to Augustine is obvious here, and it connects up with what we discussed in chapter 
four as the continuum of desire which becomes caritas or cupiditas -  that is, not two separate desires, 
which effectively correspond to two separate subjects, but rather one love -  albeit divided by two 
tendencies of the will.
72 Taylor, Sources, p. 45.
73 Taylor, Sources, p. 47.
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The question of destination or direction brings to the fore the other issue 
highlighted at the beginning of this section, namely ‘the unity of a se lf. Taylor has 
been arguing that in order to make minimal sense of our lives and have an identity 
we need an orientation to the good, which means some sense of ‘strong value’, or the 
qualitative discrimination of the “incomparably higher”. However, Smith argues that 
for Taylor there is another ‘inescapable moral dimension’ to subjectivity. “There is 
also something about the unity of a self that necessarily lends it moral meaning.”74 
The metaphor of moral space is expanded here to help us understand how a life keeps 
moving to keep apace with changing circumstances. Our reference points to who we 
are, that help us to gain orientation in moral space turn out not to be fixed in this 
space once and for all. “Our lives and concerns change. No one is frozen in time, and 
it follows from the sheer temporality of life, Taylor thinks, that ‘the issue of the
76 •direction of our lives must arise for us’.” From the above discussion of the 
movement and direction of our lives we can see that the sense of one’s good has to 
be woven into one’s life as an unfolding story. “On account of the fact that self- 
understanding inescapably occurs in time, it requires some synthesis of the present,
76past and future. Narrative plays the part of this synthesis.”
The intelligibility of our lives is apprehended in narrative -  a narrative that
77plays a bigger role than simply structuring our present. The narrative unity of a self 
involves the stories we tell of how we got to where we are, and where we are going, 
or what we project to become. For example, as we evaluate the moral space that 
constitutes our lives we have to move backward and forward to make a real 
assessment. Taylor describes this process as follows:
74 Smith, Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 97.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Taylor, Sources, p. 47.
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To the extent that we move back, we determine what we are by what we have become, by the 
story of how we got there. Orientation in moral space turns out to be similar to orientation in 
physical space. We know where we are through a mixture of recognition of landmarks before 
us, and a sense o f how we have travelled to get here.78
We know ‘who we are’, or where we are, through what we have become or how we 
have arrived. “In order to be able to answer... the question ‘who am I?’ one must
7 q
have recourse not only to strong evaluation but also to narrative.” To make sense of 
my present action, if it is more that merely trivial, requires a narrative understanding 
of my life, a sense of what I have become which can only be given in story. This 
reading of the role and function of narrative can also help us understand how our life
ort . k
has direction, as discussed in the previous section. As I project my life forward to 
what I am not yet, as a continuation or as something more innovative, I project a 
future, indeed a ‘bent’ for my whole life to come.81
It is thus that the idea of the ‘who’ question as extending over a ‘whole life’ 
gives rise to the important issue for Taylor about the ‘unity’ of a life. Taylor wants 
to reject any conception of a self as able to detach itself in single moments erasing all
75 Ibid.
79 Smith, Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 98.
80 Smith elaborates what he sees as an important point here: “It only makes sense to ascribe direction 
to a life i f  we can distinguish between more or less significant moments, events or experiences, but in 
doing this we are articulating a changing relation to the good.” Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 
98.
81 Taylor, Sources, p. 47. Cf. “The fact that the story I am living projects me into a future, to a self that 
I am not yet but which must be of concern, gives my life, indeed all human life, the character o f a 
quest”. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity, p. 98.
Of course, Taylor is highly critical of the discourse that suggests the self is the same from one time 
and place to another - that it has some ‘substantive unity’ that could be considered a criterion of 
personal identity. However, he does not make the corresponding error of arguing that the self can be 
completely new, or different from one time and place to another. Here Taylor’s position seems very 
close to Paul Ricoeur’s attempt to conceive of the self in terms of ipse rather than idem and as 
embodying a continual interplay of ‘sedimentation and innovation’. See especially, Paul Ricoeur, 
Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See Taylor’s comments on 
Ricoeur’s "History and Hermeneutics," in Philosophy o f History and Action, Yirmiahu Yovel, ed. 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 21-5. Drawing out Ricoeur’s distinction between ipse and idem in the 
context o f Girard’s work, Gavin Rood argues that it is precisely the lack o f such a distinction by 
Girard, that leads the latter away from selfhood considered as narrative mediation (ipse). Drawing out 
this crucial difference between the two thinkers in the context o f their approaches to myth, Rood  
argues, “Girard reads myth through the lens of mimetic desire. Mimesis in Girard therefore function 
as a drive that patterns human behavior... but while this is extremely important, Girard emphasizes 
the drive o f mimetic desire in narrative at the cost of subjectivity.” Flood, “Mimesis, Narrativity and 
Subjectivity in the Work of Girard and Ricouer”, p. 210.
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traces of the history of it previous engagements -  a self he refers to, after Locke, as 
‘punctual.’83 Once again we see that human persons exist only in a certain space of 
questions and what is in question is, generally and characteristically, the shape of my 
life as a whole. Yes, my life moves and develops, and there is a time for everything, 
but that time is inwardly derived. My readiness, my becoming, is only possible
R4through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. 
And that is why Taylor claims one’s “self-understanding necessarily has temporal 
depth and incorporates narrative.”85 It includes the hope that in the fullness of our life 
the future will “redeem” the past and make it part of a life-story that has overall 
coherence, sense and purpose. This striving for meaning or substance takes place 
through narrative because we cannot but determine our place in relation to the good, 
which is the very process of gaining an orientation to it.
At first glance this narrative structure of subjectivity in moral space appears 
similar to literary space and the way the author overcomes the negative image of his 
desires, not least when Taylor refers to Proust’s A la recherché du temps perdu. 
However, there are some important differences that stand out when we compare 
these two spaces. The narrative unity of a self presupposes a first-person perspective 
on the part of the storyteller -  the subject must not be excluded a priori from telling 
her own story. This feature is absent from Girard’s criticism and subsequent 
anthropology on the grounds that the subject suffers from an ‘ontological illness’ and 
therefore needs the therapeutics of the critic in order for her ‘true’ story to be told, 
the ending of which the literary community then shares in. It is only in the context of 
Girard’s later analysis of death and rebirth (that is, in the context of collective 
violence against victims), that the early ‘unity of novelistic conclusions’ can be
83 Taylor, Sources, p. 49.
84 Taylor, Sources, p. 50.
85 Ibid.
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understood as a form of scapegoating by Girard and the literary community -  thus 
revealing a dichotomy between the old Romantic subject and the ‘new’ self. 
Precisely because of this ‘division’, the ‘unity’ that is achieved at the end of Deceit, 
Desire, and the Novel can admit of no continuity between the author who dies and 
the one who is reborn (i.e. before and after). Were it to do so, some degree of 
originality would be granted a determinative role in the author’s rebirth, which 
Girard does not allow. The ‘rebirth’ that occurs in literary space involves an absolute 
transformation: an entirely new self from the ashes of the Romantic hero. For the 
author, as subject, to rule out unity in advance, which appears to be what Girard 
proposes, and then to find herself released into ‘unity’ at the end of the novel, must, 
at the level of moral space, be seen as a discontinuity between one self and an other 
self -  at no point in the self’s own narrative was unity a genuine desire. While the 
‘narrative unity of a life’ that, Taylor describes, also involves a process of ‘death and 
rebirth’ (in and through the series of maturations and regressions that go into making 
up a subjects life as a whole), the transformation in moral space is not into something 
totally new as it is in Girard’s criticism. In view of the aspiration to unity that, Taylor 
believes, can be expressed in many ways, Smith comments, “any restriction of the 
temporal sequence of a life in either the past or the future must appear as a 
mutilation.”86 It is in considering the temporal sequence of a whole life in relation to 
other non-western narratives that may not share this sequence that Taylor hits on 
something that highlights for us an important contrast between him and Girard on the 
issue of ‘death and rebirth’, an issue that has at bottom to do with the temporal 
structure of the self. Smith explains:
Taylor concedes that other cultures may experience time differently. Decisive ruptures in the
flow of a life, understood as death and rebirth or completely different selves, are conceivable.
But they can be so conceived only by stepping outside the horizon of western modernity.
86 Smith, Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 99.
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Within this culture at least, ‘the supposition that I could be two temporally succeeding selves 
is either an overdramatized image, or quite false. It runs against the structural features o f a 
self as a being who exists in a space of concerns’ .87
The analysis here runs directly against the kind of radical rupture between a sort of
Romantic pre-self and a later, new and utterly transfigured self, depicted by Girard in
literary space. If, as I propose, we adopt this Taylorian analysis it enables us to see
that the author as subject is not perhaps so blind after all. Her ‘originality’ can thus
be placed in the context of moral space and seen as part of the narrative conditions of
life lived as a whole', a form of unity that individuals -  in their own expressive
fashion -  can make their own.
5. Sacrifice, and the Best Account Possible
So far in this chapter I have been considering Taylor’s conception of the 
strong evaluation that takes place in a space of questions about the good or what is 
highest and best in human life. This space, it transpires, presupposes a first-person 
perspective and a subject who is all the time gaining orientation in relation to the 
concerns of her life; for Taylor, it is a space governed by the qualitative distinctions 
that we make within a horizon of some concern. I highlighted how the quest for 
selfhood and identity is a quest that gets played out over a whole life, a life that 
makes room for our maturations and regressions, our overcomings and defeats. 
Taylor believes that the plotting and re-plotting of our lives can be achieved through 
narrative, so that over time greater unity is achieved -  a unity that may indeed 
involve some kind of death and rebirth but not in a way that would break the 
continuity between what is new and what came before. All of this points to a subject 
that is not divided in the way the Girardian subject is when scapegoated (as I have
87 Ibid.
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suggested) at the end of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel. But might Girard say that 
Taylor meets the requirements of a newly conceived subjective space, but still does 
not meet the requirements of cultural space where, he claims, the demands of 
sacrifice prevail? In other words, might Girard argue quite convincingly that the 
challenge of religious violence is too great for a subject who has no appreciation of 
the persistent need for sacrifice?88 I will try to show how this question, posed from 
the side of Girard’s work can be answered from Taylor’s perspective. This will 
involve bringing together his largely separate accounts that I discussed in this part of 
the dissertation: namely his philosophical history and his philosophical anthropology.
In this chapter we have considered one of Taylor’s hypotheses concerning the 
need for frameworks today to help compensate for the loss of horizons associated 
with modem disenchantment. Such a loss of horizons generates a crisis, what he 
refers to elsewhere as the ‘malaise of modernity’, within socio-historical and moral 
space. While sharing some of Girard’s insights into the nature of modem crisis, 
Taylor sees the more immediate threat coming from an inarticulacy about our most
OQ .
cherished goods that stifles the work of making qualitative distinctions. This 
inarticulacy is deeply embedded in the historical disputes that I discussed in chapters 
four and five in the context of the modem break with the older transcendent order, 
and a new emphasis on ordinary life and human flourishing. This latter view, while 
originally part of a religious development (one still wedded to a form of theism), was 
gradually superseded by the continued emphasis on ‘this world’ so that the dominant
881 refer to heightened ‘mimetic’ violence and how it can escalate into mob hysteria -  a phenomenon 
that Girard believes is part of our human ‘make-up’.
89 Charles Taylor, “The Inarticulate Debate”, Chp. 2., The Ethics o f  Authenticity (Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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view finally became one of complete disavowal of transcendence, although the desire 
for going beyond life remained.90
The inarticulacy that stifles our spiritual source today, making human life and 
action difficult to sustain, has its roots for Taylor in the widespread scientific temper 
(what he calls ‘naturalism’) that denies any legitimacy to transcendent frameworks. 
This movement gathered considerable momentum during the scientific revolution of 
the seventeenth century and later with classical utilitarianism which placed the 
emphasis on ‘this world’ as the site of action, reward and punishment, as opposed to 
the older ‘other worldly’ view that saw the ‘this worldly’ view as but a stepping 
stone to an eternal order of checks and balances. With the Protestant Reformation 
and its scorn for the so-called higher spiritualities, the new sciences presented a 
polemical stance towards traditional perspectives and their implied elitism. But 
Taylor argues that, within this polemic that raised ordinary life to a new standard, the 
essential point became obscured. This point, for the reforming and revolutionary 
temper, was that “the higher was not to be found outside of but as a manner of living 
ordinary life.”91 However, what became blurred and even lost in this process was 
some of our most important moral distinctions, such as, what constitutes a good life 
and what makes some choices more important than others. In chapters four and five I 
discussed what Taylor sees as two of the most important developments arising out of 
the modem break with an ontic order: ‘radical freedom’ and ‘integral expression’, 
which, he argues, are still central to the “great intramural debate” of our culture.
As a result of the historical disputes revolving around ‘ordinary life’ and the 
new modes of rational control and self-expression, modem secularist culture contains 
(‘mingled together’) both authentic developments of the Gospel, of an incamational
90 Charles Taylor, “Spirituality of Life and its Shadow”, in Compass, Vol. 14, no. 2.
91 Taylor, Sources, p. 23.
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mode of life, and also a closing off to God, which negates the Gospel. Taylor defends 
the notion that modem culture, in breaking with the structures and beliefs of 
Christendom, also carried certain facets of Christian life further than they ever were 
taken, or could have been taken within Christendom.92 Nonetheless the full-blown 
rejection of frameworks contributes to a moral and spiritual crisis in our culture by, 
on one hand, appearing progressive and without fundamental contradiction, while on 
the other hand straining to make sense of itself, keep itself motivated, and provide 
legitimacy for its high moral standards. The question he appears concerned to answer 
is whether such high standards can be sustained without gaining clarity on our deeper 
aspirations; do we have the moral resources to continually respond to such exacting 
demands?
I indicated in the introduction to this chapter, that while the need to go 
beyond life may not be stated, or deliberately expressed today, it is still, Taylor 
believes, a “driving” force in people’s lives.93 He claims that human beings have an 
undeniable yearning to respond to something beyond life, which, if denied, cramps 
and stifles. He does not believe that the issue of religion as an organising force is 
irrelevant for secular culture, for two reasons: the aspiration to something beyond life 
is a basic human need that does not cease to seek expression (despite being cramped) 
once religious horizons fade; and, such aspiration, if not met in a process of moral 
deliberation, can be expressed in a way that denies human flourishing, and hence 
may entail violence. In other words, by denying legitimacy to transcendent 
frameworks which modem secular culture (spurred on by naturalism), appears to do, 
one does not avoid the problem of transcendence by violence, which, as we saw in
92 See A Catholic Modernity? Charles Taylor's Marianist Award Lecture, with responses by William 
M. Shea, Rosemary Luling Haughton, George Marsden, and Jean Bethke Elshtain, James L. Heft, ed. 
(Oxford University Press, 1999).
93 Charles Taylor, “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy”, in William Schweiker, ed. Iris Murdoch and 
the Search fo r  Human Goodness (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), p. 25.
261
the case of amende honorable, was still part of an older cosmic order that embodied 
a fascination with death and suffering. While the view that broke with this order (by 
emphasising ordinary human flourishing) gradually became a purely humanistic 
affirmation, Taylor believes that the original inspiration for the reduction of suffering 
derived from Christianity -  albeit in a form that had decisively rejected important 
elements of the earlier religious dispensation.94
In chapter five we discussed developments in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries that brought an altogether different view to bear on the 
affirmation of ordinary life, its formulation in Deism, and its subsequent expression 
in the Romantic ‘voice of nature’. This radical perspective, what Taylor describes as 
the ‘Schopenhauerian turn’, takes us into the dark and apparently intractable 
territories of blind will, illustrated vividly by Conrad’s master image of “truth 
stripped of its cloak of time.” The benign ‘current of life’ is here transformed into 
something monstrous and alien, residing in what Eagleton calls ‘the pit of our own 
being’. The affirmation of life that was so much a part of the reforming spirit of the 
seventeenth century takes on sinister proportions in an attempt to overcome the now 
abiding horror of our own impenetrable darkness. These developments provide the 
catalyst for what Taylor calls the revolt from within humanism -  from ‘within 
unbelief itself -  and those views that want to cut all ties with transcendent 
frameworks. Beginning with Nietzsche, this revolt does not simply reject 
transcendent frameworks, but seems to acknowledge and even celebrate, the fact that 
blind will can push us toward modes of dominance -  even modes of ‘moral’
94 White admitting that there is a “risk of some distortions”, Taylor describes the early modem 
developments this way: “If it were spelled out in propositions, it would read something like this: (1) 
that for us life, flourishing, driving back the frontiers o f death and suffering are of supreme value, (2) 
that this was not always so; it was not so for our ancestors and for people in other civilizations; (3) 
that one o f the things that stopped it being so in the past was precisely a sense, inculcated by religion , 
that there were “higher” goals; (4) that we have arrived at (1) by a critique and overcoming of (this 
kind of) religion.” Taylor, “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy”, p. 23.
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dominance - that must simply be accepted as an aspect of ‘life’. What makes the 
Nietzschean revolt so significant for secular humanism and its universal values of 
equal respect, is that this revolt is ‘against the primacy of life itself.’95 Taylor 
describes its main thrust as follows:
There is nothing higher than the movement of life itself (the Will to Power). But it chafes at 
the benevolence, the universalism, the harmony, the order. It wants to rehabilitate destruction 
and chaos, the infliction of suffering and exploitation as part of the life to be affirmed. Life 
properly understood also affirms death and destruction. To pretend otherwise is to try to 
restrict it, to tame it, hem it in, deprive it of its highest manifestations, what makes it 
something you can say “yes” to. A religion that proscribes death-dealing, the infliction of 
suffering, is confining and demeaning.. .[And hence modem] life-affirming humanism breeds 
pusillanimity.96
While rejecting moral curbs that insist on respect for others and egalitarian and 
democratic concerns, the proponents of the revolt from within humanism insist on 
the importance of higher human achievement, which can be realised only through 
unbridled ‘will to power’. Because of this insistence, Taylor argues that the 
Nietzschean understanding of “enhanced life” is similar in one way to traditional 
forms of transcendence that yearn for something beyond life, the very thing that 
modem humanism attempts to limit. But as Taylor ruefully observes, this new form 
of transcendence “takes us beyond by incorporating a fascination with the negation 
of life, with death and suffering”,97 and therefore does not acknowledge any 
‘supreme good’ beyond the all too human power to ‘affirm’.
Girard makes a similar point with respect to Nietzsche’s affirmation of
QO
human sacrifice as a kind of extreme ‘social Darwinism’. However, the thesis that 
Taylor presents is that despite the initial religious inspiration of the ‘affirmation of
95 Ibid.
96 Taylor, “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy”, p. 26.
97 Ibid.
98 While sharing Nietzsche’s insight into the inherent violence o f  human culture, Girard parts 
company with Nietzsche with regard to the role of Christianity in providing a genuine alternative to 
such violence. Quoting Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’ he highlights an important passage: ‘Through 
Christianity, the individual was made so important, so absolute, that he could no longer be sacrificed: 
but the species endures only through sacrifice.... Genuine charity demands sacrifice for the good of 
the species -  it is hard, it is full of self-overcoming, because it needs human sacrifice. And this 
pseudo-humaneness called Christianity wants it established that no one should be sacrificed” (Girard’s 
italics). Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, p. 174.
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ordinary life’, Western modernity since the Enlightenment is very inhospitable to 
religion, thereby denying the inherent force of this yearning for transcendence 
altogether. The refusal to grant any legitimacy to ‘moral frameworks’ is largely due 
to the gains made by secular humanism on behalf of individual freedoms, and the 
fear of backsliding into a climate that appears antithetical to such freedoms." In 
Taylor’s view, secular humanism and genuinely religious perspectives (especially 
Christian and Buddhist) agree in affirming humanitarian and egalitarian concerns. 
Practically, there is a great deal of convergence in their ethical commitments; Taylor 
only doubts whether exclusive humanism can muster the motivational resources to 
meet these commitments.
But for Taylor, the more severe challenge today arises from a somewhat 
different quarter: the revolt within atheistic humanism against the primacy o f life 
itself a move that Taylor associates with the danger of the homo religiosus. This 
negation o f life from the (originally) humanistic side of the modem story, inspired by 
Nietzsche and his followers, refuses to omit the shadow side of human life - 
wherever it might be prone to push us - and remains dauntingly within the modem 
affirmation of life. Thus, atheistic humanism while rejecting traditional forms of 
Christian transcendence is pushed beyond all moral standards in ‘realizing’ the 
fullness of life, and the human cost of that ‘fullness’ becomes inevitable.100
Frameworks, in the context of moral space, Taylor believes, can help us 
deliberate strongly valued goods in a practical way without denying our 
‘ineradicable bent’ toward something beyond life. By denying them altogether, or,
99 Taylor, Sources, p. 104.
100 It is at this point o f his discussion of transcendence by violence that Taylor mentions the work of 
Girard. The religious affinities of the cult of violence in its various forms are indeed palpable. What 
it might mean, however, is that the only way fully to escape the draw towards violence is . .. through a 
full-hearted love of some good beyond life. A thesis o f this kind has been put forward by René Girard, 
for whose work I have a great deal of sympathy, although I do not agree on the centrality he gives to 
the scapegoat phenomenon”. Taylor, ‘¿ is  Murdoch and Moral Philosophy’, p. 27. See also Taylor’s 
reference in a similar context, in A Catholic Modernity? p. 27.
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indeed, the subject that holds them (as Girard does), we do not adequately confront 
transcendence by violence, a project whose survival into our contemporary age neo- 
Nietzscheans do not flinch from proclaiming. Hence, it is precisely in the context of 
our strongly valued goods, our human desires (pace Girard), that the more immediate 
threat arising from Enlightenment rationalism and post-Romantic irrationalism, 
makes itself felt, as a peculiar kind of “inarticulacy” that either cannot or will not get 
clear on issues of fundamental concern -  the very things that can also propel us to 
violence.101
Where these modem debates about human flourishing, the rejection of 
transcendence, the primacy of life, and the rejection of this primacy, all come to the 
fore today, for Taylor, is in the problem of contested goods -  when the universalising
109 .force of benevolence meets a horizon of ‘difference’ that appears intransigent. The 
question becomes how, or if, we can make a transition to a more improved position. 
The problem of meeting the challenge here can be seen as a test not only to our own 
high standards, but also our ability to grant equal respect to standards other than our 
own. Much of Taylor’s political philosophy addresses the difficulty of making 
transitions in matters of substantive concern, and the understandable wish to avoid 
making an argument just from our ‘way of life’. But nonetheless, rather than appeal 
to an abstract universal standard, that can seem disconnected from any desire to love 
and respect others, Taylor believes that our own ‘best account available’ is all we 
genuinely have to go on. Thus, the BA principle (as he calls it) becomes operative in
101 Girard maintains that the loss al all significance is the catalyst of collective violence.
102 Girard, of course would claim that it is not confronting difference that is a problem but confronting 
sameness. It is precisely the loss of religious frameworks that makes generating ‘real’ differences -  
ones that can contain violence -  a problem. However, whichever way we see the problem (as one of 
sameness or difference), we can still acknowledge that ‘difference’ is important; if  there is 
contestation here it is concerning the source of crisis.
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a context where competing definitions of a higher good call into question the good of 
one or other party to a moral dispute.
For Taylor, the BA principle, as an ‘error reducing move’, is the best way 
to ensure that we take seriously our moral intuitions and what we actually do when 
we try to make sense of our lives on a whole range of issues concerning our identity 
and the good. The place of qualitative distinctions in our ethical life is crucial here 
because they articulate the moral point of our actions rather than just giving reasons 
for doing what we ‘ought’ to do as in the case of neo-Kantian procedualism that 
prioritises the right over the good at the expense of our motivating aspirations.104 
According to Taylor, it is this kind of indexing of our moral intuitions that can help 
convince people to aspire to a moral vision by moving them to make it their own, or 
by helping them to articulate their own sense of this good. He refers to this indexing 
of our moral intuitions as a form of “subtler language”105 that can open us out to why 
the good in question might be worth making our own. Hence articulacy helps explain 
in a fuller and richer way the meaning of moral action for us, just what its goodness 
or badness, being obligatory or forbidden, consists in.106
It is the goods that lay the greatest claim on us that hold the greatest potential 
for conflict. These goods, what Taylor refers to as “hypergoods”, appear the highest, 
and as such are almost beyond question. Yet, he believes, these hypergoods, as 
potentially divisive as they are, must not be kept merely implicit in moral debate if 
we are to be honest about the things that hold our allegiance and motivate us. It is 
precisely a hypergood’s ability to move us that makes it so valuable. “We experience 
our love of it as well founded. Nothing that couldn’t move me in this way would
103 Charles Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason”, in Philosophical Arguments, p. 52.
104 Smith, Meanings, Morals, and Modernity, pp. 110-111.
105 Taylor, The Ethics o f Authenticity, p.81
106 Taylor, Sources, p. 80.
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count as a hypergood.”107 The problem is that such deeply held beliefs may be 
wrong, but there is no way of knowing unless I meet the challenge, when the 
occasion arises, and try to give my best account of why I hold this view and should 
continue to do so. Perhaps I would have to concede that my deeply held belief is 
wrong. But so long as I put my ‘best account’ forward as ‘provisionally’ my best 
then I avoid the charge of trading on a mistaken belief, since “[there] is nothing 
better that I could conceivably go on. Or my critics for that matter.”108
When we consider that certain deeply held values might actually be 
incommensurable, the problematic nature of deciding between ‘hypergoods’ can feed 
into the more pessimistic view (outlined above), that conflict and violence are an 
inevitable part of life and may even appear necessary in order to contain even greater 
violence.109 If we rule out competing views in advance, we may be left with nothing 
but our own ‘indefensible’ desire to ‘go beyond’, hence forcing us into greater 
unjustifiable extremes, fuelling crisis, both internal and external. Hypergoods present 
serious difficulties for every account that recognises its own first-person perspective, 
not only because different cultures believe that their views are correct, but also 
because when we look out from our own culture we can readily see beliefs and 
practices elsewhere that we find unacceptable and even abhorrent. Trying to mediate 
between hypergoods can provoke an epistemological malaise. The temptation is to 
take a relativist stance as the more sophisticated forms of naturalism contend is the 
only option. This stance holds that there is simply no way of adjudicating between 
two deeply divergent ideological viewpoints. But since so many of our most 
cherished values in the west (for example, dignity, equal respect), are based on
107 Taylor, Sources, p. 74.
108 Ibid.
109 While nowhere claiming that violence is necessary, Girard does maintain that blood sacrifice 
enacted through ritual once functioned in an efficacious way to contain an even greater primordial 
threat. See Violence and the Sacred.
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claims to universality values that most of us take as axiomatic, the silence that 
relativism promotes can potentially lead to a more invidious form of conflict. 
Universal goods will always want to stretch beyond the local, and if they are denied 
expansion they run the risk of losing their meaning as goods.110
Taylor accepts incommensurability as a possibility, but he strenuously rejects 
it as a ‘fatality’ or ‘in-principle limit’.111 His main concern is that if the ‘objectivity 
of values’ is based only of the mere fact of their being embedded in our way of life, 
then there is no way of telling whether they are wrong or inadequate. The moral 
frameworks within which most ‘westerners’ stand espouse hypergoods that lay claim 
to a standard by which to judge ‘lesser’ beliefs and practices (e.g. the standard of 
universal respect). Noteworthy for our discussion, Taylor uses the example of 
sacrifice in a manner that is close to what Girard normally means112 by his more 
culturally specific use:
When we stand within the moral outlook of universal and equal respect, we don’t consider its 
condemnation of slavery, widow-burning, human sacrifice and female circumcision only as 
expressions of our way of being, inviting an equally valid condemnation o f our free labour, 
widow-remaniage, bloodless sacrifice and sex equality from the societies where these 
strange practices flourish.113
He returns here to his basic premise that moral frameworks are not optional; they are,
rather, expressions of our deepest moral intuitions that have emerged over time as a
way of orienting us toward the good and a greater understanding of ourselves.
Through the process of ‘maturation and regression’, told as a story of who I am and
who we are, frameworks, that take account of the meanings things have for us, help
110 Taylor, Sources.
111 Taylor, Sources, p. 67.
112 Girard’s own understanding of self-sacrifice has changed since he wrote Things Hidden in 1978, 
where he disavows the idea (Things Hidden, pp. 235-236). For his more recent understanding o f  ‘self- 
sacrifice’ see Girard, “Apocalyptic Thinking After 9/11”, especially his comments: “One has to make 
a distinction between the sacrifice o f others and self-sacrifice. Christ says to the father: ‘you want 
neither holocaust nor sacrifice; then I say: ‘Here I am’.’ In other words: I prefer to sacrifice myself 
than to sacrifice the other. But this still has to be called sacrifice. When we say ‘sacrifice in our 
modern languages it has only the Christian sense.” Ibid, p. 30.
113 Ibid, (my italics). For further discussion of the sacrificial practices o f the Aztecs see Sources, p. 43, 
also “Comparison, History, Truth” (Philosophical Arguments), p. 152.
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describe and evaluate the world of human affairs. Because of this we cannot simply 
set them aside when we are confronted with a different culture, and in particular, we 
might add, in the case of more archaic practices. Rather, we are compelled to make 
the case for our way of life.
Providing the best available account and attempting to make transitions in 
moral space, and, between competing goods, means making comparisons in a 
historical context. This in turn involves deciding what is good, and doing so in light 
of the transitions to the modem period. “Precisely the aim of the comparative 
exercise is to enable us to understand others undistortively, and hence to be able to 
see the good in their lives, even while we also see that their good conflicts with 
ours.”114 To make decisions based on such comparisons is not always to be 
presumptuous (although Taylor grants that there are generally good reasons for not 
interfering in another culture’s life).
When we have a conflict in life, we feel justified and called on to make a choice, to sacrifice 
or trade off one good for another... [have] we any doubt that the Jews and the Moriscos 
ought not to have been expelled from Spain, even though it increased the homogeneity o f the 
society, which in that day was considered an unquestioned good? Wouldn’t we welcome the 
discontinuance of suttee or human sacrifice?115
The last question here reminds us of what is new about the language that Taylor
employs, and that ‘internalisation’ in the context of universal respect demands a very
different form of sacrificial practice than what was acceptable in earlier cultures. The
perspective we find here is an historical one.
According to Taylor, it is made possible by the modem ethics of ordinary life
and the emphasis on reducing suffering, which sees the supposed higher ends that
previously ‘trumped’ life being progressively discredited.116 However, it is the very
process of change, of repudiating earlier goods, and moving forward, for example, to
114 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, p. 153 (my italics).
115 Ibid.
116 Taylor, Philosophical Papers, 2, p. 156.
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a stronger democratic culture, a more embodied self, or ‘stronger relationality’, 
that makes the promotion of hypergoods so problematic. There are many 
perspectives within the human sciences that choose to say nothing of these goods 
either for strategic reasons or out of well-meaning concern, or both. And there are 
others who recoil at the thoughts of submitting to such ‘other-worldly’ 
impositions.118
Gaining clarity on the strong values that we cannot but live by helps us to 
decide, as best we can, and hence orient ourselves in moral space. The difficulty of 
moving beyond some goods, as a ‘trade o ff, or as an actual acknowledgement that 
some good has a stronger claim, connects up with the whole problem of sacrifice that 
Girard’s work is preoccupied with, but it does so in a way appropriate for moral 
discourse rather than a discourse strictly concerned with an archaic ritual. Smith 
points out how sacrifice is thematised in Taylor’s work in the context of practical 
reasoning.
But hypergoods themselves, as Taylor stresses, are sources of conflict. On the one hand one 
might recognise several higher order goods, that is, different standpoints, from which to 
evaluate or rank first order goods. On the other hand the single-minded pursuit o f a 
hypergood has its own costs. Those who aim at the higher good must sacrifice other goods. 
There are occasions when those who do have such an aim find themselves asking, whether 
the sacrifice required by a hypergood is really worth it, and such moments precipitate 
practical reason.119
We can immediately recognise that the issue here concerns our valuing of goods, and 
especially those that are competing or conflicting. For example, I can decide about a 
‘clean environment’ from my perspective as a householder, and from my perspective 
as a businessman, but weighing up the good in question will be different in each
117
117 Here, I borrow a term from Frank C. Richardson and Kathryn M. Frost’s paper, “Girard and 
Psychology: Furthering the Conversation” (Unpublished, Ottawa, 2006) p. 5.
118 He believes all of these views, including Kant’s notion o f rational agency, have something in 
common. They all overtly adhere to an ‘ethics o f inarticulacy’, which not only leaves any discussion 
of moral intuitions or substantive goods off limits, but also leaves their own qualitative distinctions 
deeply confused. Taylor argues instead that while many of our cherished hypergoods may turn out to 
be illusory, it is wrong, and potentially more harmful, to think that we have stumbled upon an apriori 
argument showing this to be so. Taylor, Sources, p. 71.
119 Smith, Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, 104.
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case. Then again, the sacrifice I feel required to make may not afford me different 
perspectives; indeed it may throw the whole notion of ‘sacrifice’ into question. For 
example, I may realise that I would make a very bad husband and family man, 
although my community sees this role, traditionally, as occupying a position of 
honour and even reverence for God. Should I marry and sacrifice my personally 
derived sense of well-being for the ‘higher good’? Indeed, from the perspective of 
the revolt within humanism discussed earlier I may ask, what cause, in the cold light 
of day, is worth giving up my freedom for?120 The practical deliberations inherent in 
bringing forward the best available account, may involve not only some form of 
trade-off of lower goods but also a sacrifice for the sake of what is a higher good.
Taylor believes, then, that the debate about hypergoods is a source of deep 
conflict. Without acknowledging the importance of hypergoods, he argues, it is 
impossible to get clear on what might need to be sacrificed in the name of what is 
‘highest and best’. The problem of confronting these ultimate goods and coming 
clean about our own ‘strong values’ is part of the longer running debate about 
frameworks. Describing the scene of contestation in contemporary western culture, 
Taylor writes:
We could think of our culture as the scene of a three cornered... battle. There are secular 
humanists, there are neo-Neitzscheans, and there are those who acknowledge some good 
beyond life. Any pair can gang up against the third on some important issue. Neo- 
Neitzscheans and secular humanists together condemn religion and reject any good beyond 
life. But neo-Neitzscheans and [those who acknowledge some good beyond life] are together 
in their absence of surprise at the continued disappointments of secular humanism, together 
also in the sense that its vision lacks a dimension. In a third line-up, secular humanists and 
believers come together in defending an idea o f the human good, against the anti-humanism 
of Nietzsche’s heirs.121
120 Eagleton argues that sacrifice remains a problem for modem and postmodern discourses. “On the 
w hole... modernity has regarded the self as too precious to be abandoned. If sacrifice blurs the bounds 
between life and death, conditions which most pre-modem cultures know to be on the most intimate 
of terms with each other, the modem will enforces an absolute distinction between them. Modernity 
regards self-dispossession as the enemy of self-realization, not as its vital precondition, and so tends to 
buy its self-realization on the cheap. Postmodemity is equally skeptical o f sacrifice, largely because it 
is uncertain that there is enough of a self to be relinquished in the first place”. Holy Terror, p. 129.
121 Taylor, ‘Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy’, p. 27.
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This ‘three-cornered battle’ sketches the main lines of the debate that Taylor 
understands as having emerged historically from the affirmation of ordinary life. As 
already intimated, however, the really problematic issue for him involves the conflict 
between humanism (that can have a religious or anti-religious variant) and the anti­
humanism whose only higher good is its own freedom, including the freedom to 
indulge in violence -  even in its most archaic forms.
These two views, however, may not be compatible; our commitment to the 
hypergoods of self-determining freedom and universal and equal respect is put under 
increasing pressure to contain a revolt from within “which sees the kind of sacrifice
199of the ‘lower’ goods” which this commitment entails “as utterly unacceptable.” 
For the latter view, the equalising forces of modem respect only breed 
‘pusillanimity’. It is precisely the view that says we owe anything to others that the 
neo-Nietzscheans wholeheartedly refute.123 Indeed they are unapologetic in their 
refusal to ‘sacrifice’, in the sense of letting go of ‘freedoms’; freedoms that might 
open a space for extending respect, or the values of ordinary life. In other words, 
they refuse to sacrifice themselves, even when it entails that other human beings are 
sacrificed. While Girard, like Taylor, also sees the potential danger here of unleashed 
conflict and violence, and even appears to take the measure of it (more fully perhaps 
than Taylor), his disavowal of the subject and any prospect of making gains 
historically feeds into this conspiracy of silence around frameworks and further
122 Taylor reiterates the above point in the subsequent paragraph o f Sources, by saying that he is 
referring to the conflict of in modern culture “.. .between a view which gives unchallenged primacy to 
the hypergood an the one hand, and a view which see the kind of sacrifice of the other ‘lower’ goods 
which this entails as utterly unacceptable, on the other. This latter outlook arises from the modem 
affirmation of ordinary life and has developed into a host of forms, from the Romantic-inspired 
defense of harmony with ‘nature’ within and without, to Nietzschean attacks on the self-destructive 
character of morality.” Taylor, Sources, p. 101.
123 It should be stressed that ‘letting go’ of what is dear to oneself in Taylor’s account can be 
understood as a form o f ‘self-sacrifice’ that only makes sense within the horizon o f a hypergood. “A 
hypergood has its own demands and these may indeed require self-sacrifice. There are life goods that 
the hypergood overrides”. Smith, Meaning, Morals, and Modernity, p. 112.
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stifles the role that the good actually plays in contemporary life. In the long run his 
undermining of human agency in the context of his analysis of collective violence 
arguably gives succour to Neitzsche-inspired forms of transcendence.
If this dissertation has managed to show that Girard’s ‘anti-subjectivism’ is 
wrong-headed, and that Taylor can respond convincingly to Girard’s central concerns 
about division and unity, then the obvious question that arises at this point in our 
discussion is this: given that they both are Christian thinkers, why not place Girard 
and Taylor in the same camp with regard to the conflicts of modernity? Each is 
inspired by similar sources and together they offer a way of taking the full measure 
of the modem revolt from within humanism and the danger of homo religiosus.x'A In 
other words, when working together, with their penetrating insights into crisis and 
unity, they present a broad front against the excesses of postmodernism that would 
deny all moral frameworks and even embrace violence and destruction. What more 
urgent project can there be?
6. Conclusions: Being on Both Sides of the Debate
This dissertation has initiated a conversation between two important
contemporary thinkers. In so doing, it has attempted to bring together their
apparently divergent ideas concerning selfhood and sacrifice. I made the case that
Girard’s literary criticism, when read from the perspective of his later cultural
anthropology, can be understood as a form of scapegoating. As such, it is a
mythologizing of violence and a tacit re-inscription of division within the self, and
124 Taylor is also influence by Dostoyevsky’s analysis of human evil and the possibility o f a theistic 
perspective. See Fergus Kerr’s comments in ‘Taylor’s Moral Ontology”, in Charles Taylor: 
Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, ed. Ruth Abbey (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 98. Also, for a relevant discussion of Taylor’s analysis o f Dostoyevsky’s work concerning a 
view of good human mediation (or positive imitation) that does not involve a loss o f  subjectivity 
(pace Girard), see C. Taylor, “Dostoyevsky and the Modem World”, in Lonergan Review. No. 4 1996. 
pp 130-156.
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hence a form of unity at the expense of the self. As the theory develops, this tension 
becomes evident with the hypostatising of desire and the complete ‘immolation of 
the subject’. The problems in Girard’s overall theory, I suggested, stem from this 
reification of desire and the way it ends up having so much in common with 
Schopenhauerian ‘Will’. For all his insight into transcendence by violence, Girard 
leaves the self excluded from the conditions of positive transcendence and moral 
identity. Both Taylor’s philosophical history and philosophical anthropology provide 
a way of understanding Girard’s single greatest concern regarding crisis: how, when 
differences break down, order can be restored. And crucially they do this without 
forfeiting a concept of selfhood. On the contrary, the affirmation of ordinary life 
shows how a religious doctrine of inwardness inspired a revolution in thought 
concerning the locus of the good, and a rationalized version of this development gave 
rise to a new Deist conception of order as the design in interlocking purposes. The 
Romantic reaction to the overly instrumental parsing-up of nature that this ‘design’ 
involved provided a new found confidence in our ‘inner depths’ and the moral ‘voice 
of nature’. However, without some ‘good’ to be found firmly beyond ourselves, 
developments in modem science and geographical exploration cast a dark shadow 
over the Romantic vision, with religion and the current of life becoming juxtaposed 
with terrifying consequences. Do we get around ‘the terror’ by denying moral 
agency?
I have been trying to outline in this chapter a number of points of contact 
between Girard and Taylor. The latter gives an account of the loss of horizons in the 
West, what he describes after Weber as the ‘disenchantment of the world’, which 
involves the fading of religious frameworks and the discrediting of the cosmos as a 
meaningful whole. Like Girard, he understands this loss as a source of profound
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crisis for the individual. However, by arguing that framework definitions are a basic 
condition of human agency, the loss of given horizons is superseded by the more 
complex and uncertain role of self-defined horizons, something that is missing in 
Girard’s work. Taylor’s philosophical anthropology provides a better account of 
human agency than either ‘literary space’ or ‘cultural space’, because within the 
conception of moral space that he depicts, ‘strong value’, as a reflective means of 
arbitrating between conflicting desires and purposes, can help us gain orientation 
with respect to the important questions that arise for us.
The moral spaces of our lives, plotted through narrative, can help us move in 
relation to our concerns, so that our stories, and the strong values that constitute our 
identities, need not run aground in sterile debate or blank incommensurability. 
Providing the best account available -  as an error-reducing move -  is an exercise of 
practical reason, helping me to decide between competing goods, so that my 
“strongest aspiration toward hypergoods [does] not exact a price of self- 
mutilation.”125 As fraught as the conflicts in our culture are, articulating our 
frameworks has a moral significance. Hence, Taylor wants us to say what our 
underlying sense of the good consists in: make it articulate in descriptive language 
and find formulations for it that figure in moral thinking. By doing so, he is in part 
following a Socratic line that believes ‘we aren’t fully human beings until we can say 
what moves us, what our lives are built around’. What concerns him most is the 
importance of articulacy for our sense of the good, in particular the way articulacy 
can bring us closer to the good as a moral source and give it power to move us. We 
are reminded here that the good can be some action, or motive, or style of life which
125 Taylor, Sources, p. 107.
126 Taylor, Sources, p. 92.
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is seen as qualitatively superior.127 While outlining these general characteristics of 
the good, Taylor stresses that there is something in all these distinctions that deserves 
these attributions of ‘Good’ in a fuller sense. Using the example of Plato’s cosmic 
order and the ‘Idea of the Good’ as key to this order, Taylor shows how this ‘Good’ 
in a fuller sense -  the ‘constitutive good’ -  helps define one’s actions and motives. 
The crucial point for Taylor however, is that it is also a ‘moral source.’ ‘It is a 
something the love of which empowers us to do and be good’. As such, the 
constitutive good does more than spell out what we ought to do; love of it also 
empowers us to do and be good -  indeed, loving it is part of what it is to be a good 
human being. This view, which sees articulation as a way of putting shape on the 
good, also emerges in the way that empowering images and stories function in our 
time.129 Even though we may not be able to substitute for the theological or 
metaphysical beliefs that underpinned many of the most powerful stories that once 
laid claim to our imaginations, the images they evoke still inspire us. Indeed these 
stories “go on pointing to something which remains a moral source, something the 
contemplation, respect, or love of which enables us to get closer to the good.” The 
image of the Good as the sun in light of which we see things clearly and are moved 
to act morally is borrowed by Taylor to illustrate how the sources of the self - 
sources that find expression in many ways and in many different traditions -  can 
once again resonate with our deepest longing.
To draw on such powerful images and stories is to be moved to love and 
respect them and, through this love and respect, to be better able to live up to them. 
Articulacy as a dominant feature of moral space opens us to the reservoir of moral
127 Ibid..
128 Taylor, Sources, p. 93.
129 Taylor, Sources, p. 95.
130 Taylor, Sources, pp. 95-96.
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sources that are still active in our world. Of course, articulation is not a given, and a 
living language must renew its sources. This potential is ensured, Taylor reminds us, 
because words can have great depth and resonance. They can bring us in touch with 
sources hitherto unknown or restore older familiar sources. They can help us 
understand our life anew and allow us to see our own stories through the prism of a 
much ‘greater’ narrative. He readily admits that our narrative projects both grand and 
small often involve distortions.131 As well as the worry of the ‘dead formulations’ 
and the ‘trite imitations’, he claims that ‘the whole thing may be counterfeit.’ That is 
“the act by which their pronouncing releases force can be rhetorically imitated, either 
to feed our self-conceit or for even more sinister purposes, such as the defence of a 
discreditable status quo”.132 There are good reasons to keep silent, but he does not 
believe they can be valid across the board, for without any articulation we would lose 
contact with our moral sources altogether. The issue for him rather is to discern, 
however tentatively, what ought to be articulated. If the qualitative distinctions that 
modem moral philosophy tends to suppress are to be reclaimed from their current 
limbo this must be done in some kind of descriptive and evocative prose. To 
recognize the importance of frameworks as somehow inescapable expressions of our 
deepest moral impulses, and to find ourselves inescapably located with respect to 
these horizons of significance, is to take up the problem of sacrifice that was once 
‘ready-made’ in the context of a more traditional religious world view. While the 
problem of homo religiosus remains, perhaps the only way to get beyond the dangers 
here “lies in the turn to transcendence, through a full-hearted love of some good 
beyond life.”133
131 Taylor, Sources, p. 97.
132 ibid.
133 Taylor, Spirituality o f Life and its Shadow, 5.
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According to Taylor, as we come in contact with our deepest moral 
allegiances we will see our moral predicament as both more complex and more 
potentially conflictual than we do at present. In particular, we shall find that we are 
and cannot but be on both sides of the great intramural moral disputes between the 
espousal of hypergoods and the defence of those goods that are to be sacrificed in 
their name.134 Whether or not certain moral allegiances can be fully repudiated once 
the connections are drawn remains to be seen, but that our identity has temporal 
depth underscores just how much the moral conflicts of modem culture rage within 
each of us -  as beings who exist historically.135 Taylor argues that articulacy can 
bring greater lucidity to these moral conflicts and help us to see our way, where this 
is at all possible, to a reconciliation between conflicting goods. Expressing our 
deepest concerns and giving our best account can help ensure that our strongest 
aspirations towards ‘hypergoods’ do not exact a price of ‘self-mutilation’, by 
allowing us to recognise and acknowledge the full range of goods that we live by and 
to which we cannot but give allegiance. Hence, articulacy can bring us out of the 
cramped postures of suppression that shrink our spiritual horizons or fuel the darker 
forces of the modem story. It can open us to our moral sources and release their force 
in our lives. This is Taylor’s hope. In this chapter I have attempted to show why this 
hope may be considered reasonable -  and in particular why it might be reasonably 
embraced by readers of Girard convinced (as I am) both of his powerful sense of our 
contemporary predicaments and of his failure to offer any truly convincing way of 
responding to them.
m  Taylor, Sources, p. 105.
135 Taylor, Sources, p. 106.
136 Taylor, Sources, p. 107,
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